

Special Topic: The British Empire, Australia and the Americas

Introduction	YOICHI KIBATA
Out from Down Under: Post-modern Australian Culture(s)	PHILIP BELL
Thomas Jefferson's Pacific: The Science of Distant Empire, 1768-1811	ALAN TAYLOR
Region Is Thicker Than Blood?: The British Empire in Australia's Foreign Relations	TERUHIKO FUKUSHIMA
The Empire Dies Back: Britishness in Contemporary Australian Culture	DAVID CARTER
Comments	JUN FURUYA
	KENRYU HASHIKAWA

Special Contributions

Colonial Modernity and Print Culture Studies: Books and Readers in Australian Society	DAVID CARTER
On Listening to the Un-Said: Julia Cho's <i>Durango</i> and Asian Americanist Critique	KAREN SHIMAKAWA

Articles

To the Bottom of the Lake: Trauma and Narrative in Tim O'Brien's <i>In the Lake of the Woods</i>	MINEO TAKAMURA
Preparing for the "Next War": Civil Defense during the Truman Administration	MASAKO HATTORI
The Portraits of Betty Crocker and the Transformation of American Society	AI HISANO
Place, Community, and Identity: The Preservation Movement of San Francisco's Japantown	YOKO TSUKUDA
The Green Light and the Golden Glitter: Money and the American Dream in <i>The Great Gatsby</i>	AYA MIYAMOTO

Book Reviews

Shunya Yoshimi, <i>Pro-American/Anti-American: Political Unconsciousness of Postwar Japan</i> (2007)	YASUO ENDO
Toshio Watanabe, <i>Lectures on American Literature for Japanese Scholars and Students</i> (2007)	AKIRA ITO
Nagayo Honma, <i>Challenges of the U. S. Presidents: Light and Shadow of the "Empire of Liberty"</i> (2008)	TOSHIHIRO NAKAYAMA
Tetsuya Amino, <i>Inca and Spain: The Interplay of the Empires</i> (2008)	HIDEFUJI SOMEDA
Yoichi Kibata, <i>The British Empire and Imperialism: Essays from Comparative and International Perspectives</i> (2008)	JUN FURUYA
Daizaburo Yui, <i>A Hawkish Republic: Researching the War Memories in American History</i> (2008)	KENRYU HASHIKAWA
Activities of the Center for Pacific and American Studies	AYA MIYAMOTO

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目 次

特集：「アメリカ太平洋とイギリス帝国」

特集にあたって	木 畑 洋 一	5
Out from Down Under: Post-modern Australian Culture(s)	Philip Bell	6
Thomas Jefferson's Pacific: The Science of Distant Empire, 1768-1811	Alan Taylor	20
Region Is Thicker Than Blood?: The British Empire in Australia's Foreign Relations	Teruhiko Fukushima	30
The Empire Dies Back: Britishness in Contemporary Australian Culture	David Carter	41
コメント	古 矢 旬	55
コメント	橋 川 健 竜	60

寄稿論文

Colonial Modernity and Print Culture Studies:

Books and Readers in Australian Society	David Carter	63
On Listening to the Un-Said: Julia Cho's <i>Durango</i> and Asian Americanist Critique	Karen Shimakawa	83

論文

To the Bottom of the Lake:

Trauma and Narrative in Tim O'Brien's <i>In the Lake of the Woods</i>	Mineo Takamura	95
Preparing for the "Next War": Civil Defense during the Truman Administration	Masako Hattori	112
ベティ・クロッカーの表象とアメリカ社会の変遷	久 野 愛	128
Place, Community, and Identity:		
The Preservation Movement of San Francisco's Japantown	Yoko Tsukuda	142
緑の灯火と黄金の輝き— <i>The Great Gatsby</i> における貨幣とアメリカの夢—	宮 本 文	160

書評

戦後日本の「審級」としての「アメリカ」:

- 吉見俊哉著『親米と反米—戦後日本の政治的無意識』(岩波書店、2007年)
.....遠藤泰生..... 175
- 渡辺利雄著『講義アメリカ文学史—東京大学文学部英文科講義録』(全3巻)
(研究社、2007年).....伊藤章..... 186
- 本間長世著『アメリカ大統領の挑戦—「自由の帝国」光と影』(NTT出版、2008年)
.....中山俊宏..... 194
- 網野徹哉著『インカとスペイン—帝国の交錯』(講談社、2008年)
.....染田秀藤..... 198
- 木畑洋一著『イギリス帝国と帝国主義—比較と関係の視座』(有志舎、2008年)
.....古矢旬..... 204
- 油井大三郎著『好戦の共和国アメリカ—戦争の記憶をたどる』(岩波書店、2008年)
.....橋川健竜..... 210
- アメリカ太平洋地域研究センターの研究活動報告(2008年度)
.....宮本文..... 217

特集 アメリカ太平洋とイギリス帝国

特集にあたって

木 畑 洋 一

東京大学アメリカ太平洋地域研究センターでは、2008年9月13日（土）に、「アメリカ太平洋とイギリス帝国」というテーマのもとで、シンポジウムを開催した。本号の特集は、このシンポジウムにおける報告とコメントから成っている。

このシンポジウムは、その英語名が ”The British Empire, Australia and the Americas” であったことに示されるように、オーストラリアに一つの力点が置かれていた。東京大学駒場キャンパスでは、1970年代後半以降これまで約30年にわたって、オーストラリアから第一線の研究者を招いて、オーストラリア関係の教育にあたっていた。2000年にアメリカ太平洋地域研究センターが発足してからは、オーストラリアからの客員教授は本センターに所属して、教育と研究に従事している。これまで、センターでの通常の研究会ではそうした客員教授の方々に報告をお願いしてきたが、オーストラリアの問題を中心にすえた企画が行われたことはなかった。従って、このシンポジウムはそのような企画としては最初のものとなる。

シンポジウムのテーマとしては、アメリカ合衆国とオーストラリアに共通する歴史的背景としてのイギリス帝国との関係に焦点をあてることにした。幸い、2008年度は豪日交流基金を通してオーストラリア政府から寄付金をいただいたため、メディア分析を軸としてオーストラリア社会について活発な研究が行われているフィリップ・ベル教授（ニューサウスウェールズ大学）をお招きすることができ、アメリカ太平洋地域研究センターの客員教授デイヴィッド・カーター教授（クィーンズランド大学）、および日本におけるオーストラリア政治・外交研究の第一人者福嶋輝彦教授（桜美林大学）との三人の報告者によって、オーストラリアに関する多角的な報告を組むことができた。

また、アメリカ近代史の権威であるアラン・テイラー教授（カリフォルニア大学デイヴィス校）にも報告者に加わっていただき、アメリカ合衆国建国期を対象とする鋭い切り口の報告を行っていただいた。

本特集は、これらの報告と、本センターの古矢旬教授、橋川健竜准教授によるコメントから成る。

なお、このシンポジウム開催に際して、アメリカ研究振興会からいつも変わらぬご支援をいただいたこと、さらにオーストラリア大使館、豪日交流基金からのご後援をいただいたことに対し、心からお礼を申し上げたい。

Out from Down Under: Post-modern Australian Culture(s)

Philip Bell

You just walk out of the world and into Australia (D. H. Lawrence, *Kangaroo*, 1923)

The cultural transition is almost complete....If Americans can put a man on the moon they can fit Australia into their flag (Phillip Adams, *All the Way with the USA*, 2002)

O wad some Pow'r, the gifty gi'e us: to see ourselves as others see us (Robbie Burns, *To a Louse*, 1785)

Because fears of American 'cultural imperialism' persist into the 21st Century I've chosen to address the issue of the American 'empire' in terms of cultural influence—the 'soft power' of America—from the perspective of Australia in the twenty-first century.

In Australia, the conservative Howard government's decade in office (1996–2007) provoked charges of sycophancy and cowardice in our national diplomatic attachment to American foreign policy, including its anti-terrorism adventures following '9/11.' In migration, refugee policy, 'border protection,' but especially in defence where Australia committed small numbers of troops to the 'coalition of the willing' in Afghanistan and in Iraq, the ex-British colony fell into line with the USA.

However, in parallel with these continuing international dependencies, Australian cultural conversations, and hence its so-called 'identity,' moved in other directions, increasingly independently of the USA. I will argue that the meanings and values that are the feared currency of America's version of cultural modernity are increasingly irrelevant to what it means to identify as 'Australian' in the 21st Century.

Domination and resistance

It cannot be denied that United States culture—from the 'political' to the 'popular'—is deeply and variously implicated in Australia's post-WWII history. Often represented as rampant 'Americanisation,' the forces putatively transforming modern Australia were carried by consumer capitalism and embedded in the triumph of the 'American Century.' Australian cultural and political change were widely assumed to depend on and imitate those of the USA as post-war Australia became closely identified with American interests during the Cold War, Vietnam, and the so-called 'war against terrorism.' Commentators left and right lamented these influences, reacting to the assumed 'soft power' of the USA.

In the first decade of the new century, the complaint continues: Australia is still 'the fifty-first (United) State,' still enjoying a 'special' political and perhaps cultural relationship with the USA. As the Bush administration stumbles into history, as the *real politic* of oil and climate change re-write global relationships, Australian pundits, cartoonists, even the Deputy

Prime Minister, lament our imitation and consumption of American commercial culture.

In the new world (dis)order following the ‘first’ Gulf War, Australia has been called on to again demonstrate its allegiance to the United States, especially in concert against terrorism, while continuing as a good international citizen working sympathetically with the UN and international legal and humanitarian tribunals. At the same time during the past decade Australia has actively promoted to the world its own increasingly distinct social and cultural identity through sport, television, cinema and the performing arts. It speaks with strident voice and unique accent, and increasingly looks to Asia and Europe for inspiration and response in cultural conversation and, to some extent, in political allegiance.

I argue in this paper that the political and cultural dependencies of Australia on the United States have been radically transformed since the end of the Cold War as ‘what Australia means’ has been re-written in an increasingly post-modern, global vocabulary. Despite populist local fears of ‘Americanisation,’ I will argue that recently accelerating developments in the diversifying cultural life of the smaller nation are not directly or causally linked to politico-strategic decisions that identify it closely with US power and ambition. The political and cultural spheres have become increasingly independent of each other, I suggest, and Australia’s military/political subservience to the Washington offers little insight into the complex cultural relationships between the two nations.

Two important reasons for this assertion are that Australia is increasingly ethnically diverse and politically pragmatic. Its commercial cultures are less and less identifiably ‘American,’ if they ever were. Australia is no clone of US culture, and its contradictory, multi-faceted sense of itself is changing as rapidly as its demographic mix. To understand these developments from the perspective of Australia one needs to examine the smaller Pacific nation’s explicit attempts to define itself in ways that can be advertised to the world at large. So I will illustrate some of the ways by which Australia proclaimed its self-identity during the past decade, most distinctly for the Sydney Olympic rituals (2000), but also in idealising ‘racial’ diversity, and in the most culturally important domain of everyday life, broadcast television.

Negotiation and change

Like much of Western Europe and Canada, Australia has a long ‘love-hate’ relationship with US exports, whether these be material or cultural. These continue to be both *welcomed* as the glittering promise of modernity, capitalism and democracy, and *resisted* as a hegemonic threat to national differences and diversity in an increasingly globalised/Americanised world. This contradictory understanding and reception of America abroad implicitly suggests flaws in the claim that unequal societies are simply vulnerable to the Great Power’s influences, unable to resist the homogenising consequences of its ‘soft power.’

In the unique case of post-colonial Australia, cultural resistance, negotiation, adaptation, modification, and outright rejection of US commercial culture have been the norm. While some examples of accommodation, even acceptance, can be seen, these never end in simple

servile imitation (think of car culture, Drive-in cinemas, 'fast food,' the 'republic debate'). From *within* an allegedly imitative culture, like Australia, particular local responses are generated by distinct histories, unique social forces and institutions, and by local cultural practices. For example, in the field of television—a putative spearhead of Americanisation—local programs and productions have flourished *despite* the popularity of some US sitcoms, big budget movies and transplanted news formats. Over almost fifty years of viewing, the vernacular Australian voice, local accents and Australian stories have not been swamped, nor indeed, diminished by television products made for the US market (a claim argued in detail later in this paper).

In our 1993 book, *Implicated*, Roger Bell and I adopted a linguistic metaphor to express the fluidity and dynamism of cultural influence:

If one thinks of Australian culture and society as structured like a language, ... then one might think of 'Americanisation' as like linguistic infiltration. It does not so much replace or displace the local lexicon as supplement it and change its elements ... change is effected throughout the whole structure even though no obliteration of a previous lexicon may occur ...¹⁾

I would add that international political relationships are not reducible to cultural 'influences,' and that the latter are never simple. Local cultures may become increasingly vernacular and more confidently proclaim their distinctiveness to a globalised or American-dominated international community while, at the same time, the smaller nation-state (even an Anglophone, treaty-bound nation-state like Australia) aligns itself more intimately with American initiatives internationally. Moreover, as a model of all that was 'modern,' Twentieth Century America has been understood in Australia as embodying opposed extremes: it displayed both a gleaming utopia, but also a tawdry dystopia.

Obviously the US remains a powerful social model and cultural example that other nations find difficult to ignore. However, in a variety of studies of Americanisation published from the early 1990s, interpretations built on ideas of unilateral domination or cultural imperialism have been rejected. Rob Kroes, a leading European scholar in this field, summarises these arguments: 'America's culture has become an unavoidable presence' globally, but its 'reception knows many voices: there is a resilience in other cultures that refuses to be washed away.'²⁾

¹⁾ P. Bell and R. Bell, *Implicated: The United States in Australia* (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1993), 202–6.

²⁾ R. Kroes, "Americanization: What Are We Talking About?" in *Cultural Transmissions and Receptions: American Mass Culture in Europe*, ed. R. Kroes, R. Rydell and D. Bosscher, 302–20 (Amsterdam: Vu University Press, 1993).

Recent analysts agree that so-called Americanisation cannot be separated from broader processes or modernisation, consumerism and globalisation—processes of which America is a part, but for which it is not separately responsible. Focusing on France, Richard Kuisel argues that ‘Americanisation’ has ‘become increasingly disconnected from America,’ is confused with global changes affecting much of the post-war world, and might best be identified as ‘the coming of consumer society.’³⁾

Roger Bell and I have suggested that broadly parallel developments in different modern societies—from suburbanisation to fashion or ‘economic rationalism’—should not be interpreted as *caused* by the US imposing its own image on other willing, or unwilling, imitative cultures. It is more appropriate to view Australia as following the US along a broadly similar if somewhat retarded road towards post-industrial status, passing through stages of modernization that characterise most capitalist or mixed economies. So, on this interpretation, suburbs, freeways and mass culture were not symptoms of the Americanisation of Australia but of the modernisation and hyper-modernisation of *both* the US and Australia.⁴⁾

The complications of *post-modernity*

During the 1990s, and again in the shadow of the US Iraq invasion, a chorus of complaint about American domination has been raised in the pages of Australian newspapers and magazines. Columnist Phillip Adams satirically observed ‘... if the Americans can put a man on the moon, they can fit Australia into their Flag.’⁵⁾ This rather backward-looking rhetoric echoes essayist Don Watson’s lament:

These days we are in no doubt about it: we are America’s deputy and trusty as they come. Ask not whether this is an honourable destiny and a fitting conclusion to a century of nationhood; it is a fait accompli, both sides of politics broadly agree on it.

Watson believes that the Anglo-Australian identity, built on pioneering hardship and war-time bravery, has been swamped by migration and modernisation:

The existing panoply of symbols and mantras excludes too many people and too much of what has happened since the War (WWII)—the migrants, Vietnam, the increase in the educated population, the beneficiaries and victims of the new economy, the new roles for women and new awareness of their roles in the past, a new awareness of the land.

³⁾ R. Kuisel, *Seducing the French: The Dilemma of Americanization* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 1–4. For a broader interpretation of American influences on postwar Europe, see R. Pells, *Not Like Us: How Europeans Have Loved, Hated and Transformed American Culture Since World War II* (New York: Basic Books, 1997); and Kroes et al., eds., *Cultural Transmissions*.

⁴⁾ See generally, P. Bell and R. Bell, eds., *Americanization and Australia* (Sydney: UNSW Press, 1998).

⁵⁾ P. Adams, “All the Way With the USA,” *The Weekend Australian*, July 6–7, 2002, R32.

Australia now contains multitudes that the legend cannot accommodate. So long as our leaders ply the legend as if it can accommodate them, the further we drift from the truth about ourselves.

Of course, Watson is correct: Australia needs to imagine new versions of its many communities. The old stories do exclude too many 'new' Australians (both local and overseas born) and their cultures. But it does not follow that no stories make sense to 'us,' nor that the dialogues we call 'culture' have been silenced.

Western-style, post-war societies are all caught up in dynamic global and bi-lateral political and cultural currents that might better be characterized as 'post'-modern. Watson does allow that the newly-globalised Australia is 'pluralist and post-modern,' although he seems to believe that Australian cultural diversity is as incoherent as it is inauthentic. It is inauthentic because it is modeled on the USA and defies definition in traditionally local terms:

If the country has a problem, so has [Prime Minister] John Howard. He has been trying to stuff a pluralist, post-modern bird into a pre-modern cage. The bird won't go. It's not that it won't fit, but rather that it's not a bird. It's no one thing. It's our multitudes.⁶⁾

Obviously, if one demands that cultures be univocal, homogenous and consensual, they are more easily imprisoned than if they are plural and dynamic, a possibility that Watson seemed to lament, along with the then Australian Prime Minister, Howard. He therefore linked global economic forces to cultural and social changes that he feared were disintegrating. He saw the newly minted de-regulation of wages and the economy as a counterfeit currency, undermining consensus and coherence, and so equated globalisation with Americanisation. Watson's version of post-modernity perpetuates the rhetoric of Western cultural decline that follows in the wake of American-style consumer capitalism. This is ironic because, as I will illustrate later in this paper, during the current decade Australian post-modernising imagery has become playfully optimistic.

The innocence of Australian *post-modernity*

The 2000 Olympic Ceremony

The notion of a post-modern condition implies diverse cultural identities and new kinds of 'subjectivities' (to use the jargon). Politically, it advertises a brand of ultra-liberalism. It celebrates 'difference,' seeing traditional knowledge/authority as antithetical to the interests of the diverse modes of liberal 'citizenship'—what one author calls '*do it yourself*'

⁶⁾ D. Watson, "Rabbit Syndrome: Australia and America," *Quarterly Essay* 4 (2001): 5, 57, 48.

citizenship,' defined in terms of culture, not of the State.⁷⁾ Post-modern culture highlights experience rather than meaning, pastiche instead of narrative, the present not the past. Critical post-modern commentators lament the disintegration of 'high' cultural traditions, and predict that cultures that fail to honour their historical traditions will produce 'subjects' with only a 'shallow' sense of person-hood.

Such deep changes cannot be conclusively demonstrated. However, insofar as it is relevant to the question of putative Americanisation of cultural identity, there are compelling signs that Australian public and commercial culture is re-defining many of its traditional ways of thinking about being Australian. These changes are most notable this century, but they build on, rather than invent anew, self-consciously 'Australian' versions of identity rooted in the country's colonial past. A revealing encapsulation of these changes was the 2000 Sydney Olympic Ceremony.

The Opening Ceremony began as a vacant arena of red earth (*terra nullius*?) that was soon occupied by a flag-carrying cavalry of 'men from Snowy River.' As the horse-riders retreated to the perimeter of the oval, the Australian national anthem, *Advance Australia Fair*, became the focus of the world's televisual attention. Surprisingly two versions of the anthem were presented: one, sung by a male quartet (*Human Nature*) harmonising in a popular international/American ('Mid-Atlantic') style that rendered the anthem almost unrecognizable to Australian ears; the second, a formal solo version, sung by Julie Anthony, on top of a giant stairway, filmed from below. Her accent was formal Australian, her dress conservative blue.

By contrast, in 1956, the Melbourne Olympics were declared 'open' by Prince Philip of Edinburgh. A military band presented the Australian anthem, 'God Save the Queen.' (The Queen of England and therefore of Australia was, in fact, the wife of Prince Philip!) Eleven Olympics later, and these risible colonial connotations had given way to internationalist, entertainment performances of the Australia's national song. The two recent versions could be read as metonymically referring to the traditional, formal nation state (Julie Anthony), but also to the idea that Australia is an entertainment space, a global commodity itself: the *Human Nature* version was a popular song like any other. Perhaps one rendition of *Advance Australia Fair* curtsied to the Queen; certainly, the other saluted Uncle Sam.

A list of the principal 'movements' of the television rendition of the Sydney ceremony reminds us that the post-colonial nation re-wrote its colonial and racist past as it celebrated its multi-ethnic future:

1. Aerial approach to Sydney
2. Mounted Stockmen ('Men from Snowy River' dress)
3. Deep Sea Dreaming (Nikki Webster as girl in pink)
4. Corroboree: *Awakening* (Djakapurra Munyarryn and 900 indigenous dancers)

⁷⁾ J. Hartley, *Uses of Television* (London: Routledge, 1999).

5. Floral Australia
6. *The Tin Symphony*: Colonial tableaux (Captain Cook, Ned Kelly ...)
7. *Arrivals* (migrations)
8. World diversity celebration
9. Athletes and coaches assembly
10. The Torch Ceremony ('Aboriginal' athlete, Cathy Freeman lights Games torch).

The 'tin symphony' used American/Irish fiddle arrangements of popular Australian songs to celebrate colonial life: Australia's past was no longer 'the bush' against which British pioneers struggled, no longer a brutally contested frontier, certainly not the arena for colonial and racial power.

The Olympics use of Cathy Freeman and the explicitly reconciliatory dances and exchanges of the ceremony had sought to cleanse Australian popular imagery of the blood of the frontier as well. The Sydney ceremony itself enacted a show-business version of a reconciliation ceremony as it confabulated a massive 'dream-scape' of pre-historical (natural) and historical (cultural) 'fun'—innocent fun, dreamt up by a cute girl on the metonymic Australian beach. The voice-over that guided the international viewers through the spectacle anchored its meanings to non-historical abstractions. So it was that the ancient and the modern were linked as inevitable and as natural, as natural as the turning of the earth. As Captain Cook brought Europe to Australia, the commentary explained (perhaps significantly, in the present tense):

But Australian's ancient revelry is disturbed by an irresistible force with the arrival of a new culture, a new people—it's an age of discovery, the beginning of modernisation, the dawning of a new era in a land as old as time.

Most commentators discussing the dramaturgical and ritual character of grand public spectacles emphasise the significance of audience experiences of 'liminality' (marginality and transition across thresholds) as well as 'communitas' (open inter-subjective, encounters that celebrate a common humanity without ethnic or political divisions). Symbolically, opening ceremonies also enact a kind of gift-giving from the host country to the rest of the world. Global media events promote societal integration, nationalistic loyalty and consensus around notions of 'Humanity' ('We are the world,' etc). They proclaim themselves 'historic,' are minutely pre-planned, and primarily designed for the world's media.⁸⁾ As the Beijing example also shows, they offer a golden opportunity for nationalistic self-promotion, for turning old stereotypes of a country around, a process in which Australia has been deeply involved especially through its tourism and education industries, during the past two-to-three decades.

⁸⁾ Cited in J. Larson and H.S. Park, *Global Television and the Politics of the Seoul Olympics* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993).

Cultural and social debates are displacing the more formally ‘political’ discourses of those times when the nation ‘rode on the sheep’s back,’ before the Australian dollar was ‘floated.’ Locally accented ‘lifestyle’ consumerism, sports and nostalgic nationalism are increasingly seen as culturally salient overseas, as is the smiling face of state-sanctioned multiculturalism. Of course, the ongoing debates around Aboriginal land rights (‘Mabo’) the ‘stolen generations’ and reconciliation, refugees and human rights, do not intrude into the publicity brochures for our distant and exotic example of somewhere to visit. Identity is always represented as an idealisation. But the ideal is changing.

One commentator noted before the Sydney Games that:

The advertising of Australia has started to incorporate characteristics associated with ‘the postmodern,’ such as irony, parody and self-reflexivity. An example (was) the dotted kangaroos on bicycles in the eight-minute Australian advertisement at the closing ceremony in Atlanta. In line with Australia’s status as post-national, postcolonial or a post-modern archetype, the country has come to be advertised as a model for a globalised society with a fluid multicultural identity and a flourishing indigenous culture.⁹⁾

Others have noted also that Australia’s tourist and Olympic marketing had become increasingly engaged in selling images of an exotic trans-historical place, a place of tradition, but also of post-colonial innovation and fun. As Australia is only one among many settler societies coming to terms with its own history, the unique brand of exoticism and spectacle it offers needed to be highlighted. Peter Conrad observed that in the global, tourist-inviting, media panorama, new but ancient Australian people and place could be imagined.

In England, the advertising agencies have transformed Australian holidays into existential quests, adventures in self-transformation. One television campaign tells a series of short, therapeutic stories ... (of) life-changing expeditions (in the outback).

Conrad claimed that Australia has been ‘re-branded.’¹⁰⁾ I would add that it is now again brand-new: ‘Discover the other side of yourself’—Australia is ‘... the envy of a world that once ignored its existence. Dreams now travel in a different direction, gravitating back from a deracinated northern hemisphere to the earthy enchanted south.’ (*The National Geographic Magazine* also focused on Sydney, the ‘Olympic City’ in its August 2000 edition. Bill Bryson’s piece was studded with sunlit beaches and glittering water. He too pointed to the vibrancy of the city both ‘old and young’ at the same time.)

⁹⁾ E. Herman, “Sale of the Millennium: The 2000 Olympics and Australia’s Corporate Identity,” *Media International Australia* 94 (2000): 176.

¹⁰⁾ P. Conrad, “The New World,” *Granta: The Magazine of New Writing* 70 (2000): 25.

So at the turn of the millennium, ‘Australia’ seemed to become the label for a kind of European-originated innocence that connoted youth, fun, irony (of an unserious kind) and domestic hospitality. The ancient country looked like the youngest nation. The fresh face of a child on the beach symbolised the newest version of ‘no-longer-colonial.’ Perhaps Australia was presenting itself as a ‘new-age,’ transcendent version of post-modernity. It certainly saw itself optimistically, and adopted a peculiarly local iconic and verbal vernacular as it smiled at the huge international television audience. It is true that the symbolic reconciliation between Aboriginal and European Australians enacted during the ceremony could be read as an ideologically driven attempt to excuse colonial oppression, and that the exploitation of Cathy Freeman (‘an Aboriginal’ athlete) to light the cauldron smacked of protesting too much. But even these gestures would have been impossible in, say, the corresponding ceremony of 1956, a time when Australia was importing unprecedented numbers of British and Continental European immigrants, and was more obviously following the ‘American social model’ of modernisation (*pace* Watson, above).

Integration and multi-ethnicity

Waves of Asian and Pacific immigration since the Vietnam War have had a marked effect on Australian culture and fractured the monolith of European-Australian ethnicity. A revealing sign of a new-found sense of assimilated diversity and of the virtues of hybridity is found in the faces that increasingly and unexceptionally populate Australian television screens and sports carnivals. A memorable example of these new versions of assimilation centered on putatively ‘Asian’ facial features, was a 2005 front-page item in the *Sydney Morning Herald*. A colour photograph of a young female fashion model of ‘mixed’ Asian/European background was headlined ‘Beauty and the East.’ Below it was shown a series of computer-generated faces embodying increasing ‘degrees’ of ‘Asian’ features, and correspondingly fewer ‘European’ features as one read from the left hand image to the right. The models at each facially opposite end of the hypothetical continuum were young women. It was reported that a scientific sample of Australians judged the fictional face that was mid-way between ‘Asian’ and ‘European’—that is, literally in the middle of the putative racially melded series—to be the ‘most beautiful.’

The SMH example might be seen as reifying racial hybridity epitomised in youthful beauty. In the newspaper its digitised facticity became a metonym for a newly idealised, notion of what it meant to be judged beautiful as an Australian. The photos appeared to show racial blending and to demonstrate happy acceptance of the hypothetical result. Hybridity was an ideal, not just a tolerable option (at least where young women’s faces were concerned). It is possible to see in this example a new kind of assimilationism, one modeled on diversity and lacking an essential racial ideal (certainly a British ideal).

Sydney: still the post-modern party-place

Recently (in July, 2008) the **Catholic World Youth Day** (actually a week-long festival)

was held in Sydney. As it did for the Olympics, the Pacific city dressed up as the sunlit place where youthfulness beckoned pilgrims from around the world. Again, European friendliness and innocence nodded acceptance to ancient Aboriginal presence, just as had occurred during the Olympics. A year earlier the **Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation** had been hosted with much security and fanfare. For that event, however, Australians criticised and satirised the security and pomp of the international gathering. Flattered, angered and bemused in equal measure, Australia saw the demonstrations of international (especially American) power as excessive. The fleeting visit of President Bush rendered the event of little more than comical interest to a media intent on celebrating the difference between ironic Australian informality and imperial American excess.

Through these events watched by the world, the Antipodean outpost of England happily hosted the West's most powerful political leader and most celebrated religious figure. But local presentations and reflections on these events stressed that Australia was beholden neither to the Catholic Church nor to the USA. Australia (a nation set in the distant East from Europe) continued to tell the world that its example was unique. It reassured itself and the northern Hemisphere that the wide brown land was no more than an ironic monarchy, and an embarrassed republic. It didn't want to appear to be trying too hard to show off its international status. So the media invoked the vocabulary that had been honed during the Olympics—'*friendly*', '*hospitable*', '*youthful*', '*innocent*', '*fun*'—to flatter its local readers and viewers.

'Hyper-vernacular' television

Entertainment has always been the arena where Australian commentators have confronted what they see as 'Americanisation.' So my final example is television, a medium that I see as mundane and local, yet culturally most important because of its ubiquity and cultural subtlety. Far from representing the most egregious and aggressive form of US 'soft power,' I will argue, television provides the strongest *counter*-example to the thesis that Americanisation undermines or displaces local meaning and values.

Bell and Bell (1993) commented on the first two decades of Australian television:

That more Australians watched *Roots* than any other television broadcast prior to 1980 suggest that the idioms and cultural content of American history and American television were familiar and pleasurable in Australia. More generally, however, it is clear from the empirical evidence of the 'ratings' at least, that Australians watched American genre series in huge numbers from the first years of television. Until the Mavis Brampton Show (1965) and *Homicide* (1967), locally produced entertainment programs other than the news, sport, or games shows, were too rare to be genuinely competitive with American imports (if one allows that ratings data demonstrate cultural 'preferences'). Three years after the introduction of television, in 1959, all of the 'top-ten' programs in Australia originated from the United States: 77 *Sunset Strip*, *Wagon Train*, *Sea Hunt*,

Rescue 8, Maverick, Perry Mason, Leave it to Beaver, Father Knows Best, Rifleman, and Sunday night movies.¹¹⁾

During the past one and a half decades, however, things have changed. Magazine-style, 'infotainment,' comedy, 'reality,' and consumer-advocacy genres have led local audience preferences. It is possible that this change began roughly during the years of the Hawke-Keating governments, when financial institutions were deregulated and there was strong growth in tourism and other service industry employment, the introduction of competition in telecommunications and the multiplication of 'information industries' jobs. Ironically, greater internationalisation of the economic and cultural worlds seemed irrelevant to the cultural content of popular television. Indeed, led by sport and 'light' entertainment programming, it became more confidently 'local,' less beholden to international influence.

The last decade has seen this localisation continue apace. This is clear in a summary of recent trends in television content and popularity:

Typical mainland capitals ratings figures during 2008 show that

- During the past decade, Reality TV (usually local) and Sport, Lifestyle (home improvement, *The Block*) have proven increasingly popular.
- US imported prime-time high cost drama and comedy, but local sport (e.g. 'State-of-origin' Rugby League), reality/lifestyle and 'current affairs' are now the staple of 'network' broadcast television.
- Younger viewers (16–39) prefer US shows, including *The Simpsons*, *Grey's Anatomy*, but local lifestyle and reality shows are also popular with this demographic, even on the ABC (*Rove*, *Good News Week*, *Spiks and Specks*).
- However, older viewers watch more TV and more local content (especially on ABC) and UK imports.
- About 20% of viewers habitually use ABC (Australian/British) and SBS (international programs, local and imported soccer).
- Most watched programs during a typical week in mid-2008, were:
Ch 7 News (Sunday) (Aust)
Australia's got talent (Aust)
NCIS (US)
Domestic Blitz (Aust).
Better Homes and Gardens (Aust).
- Subscription TV's most watched programs were Australian Rules and Rugby football, 'Australia's Next Top Model' and 'Selling Houses Australia.'

It should be noted that these patterns are very stable: the routine fare of vernacular, local,

¹¹⁾ Bell and Bell, *Implicated*, 173.

immediate, ephemeral programs with low production values mean that *Broadcast* television is less and less ‘American’ and more and more self-consciously Australian (or Anglo-Australian) compared to the patterns of the 1980–90s (c.f. *Implicated*, 1993, quoted above).

Second, the most popular American productions are generically narrow comedies and dramas. They are enjoyed as diverting, seen as ‘entertainment’ with high production values, rather than being understood as ‘about us’ in any ethno-cultural sense. They are often labeled as ‘American’ when discussed by viewers (e.g. *Seinfeld*, *The Simpsons*, *The X-Files* are of interest because they are ‘different’). It might be argued that they are often understood *by contrast* with Australian programs, not as part of the same local cultural domain. Because they not reassuringly Australian they are not used to ‘rehearse identity,’ as recent commentators might say.

Despite globalisation and digitisation, Australian television is increasingly locally focused and vernacular, even parodically so. ‘American,’ it is not. Sometimes it does address Americanisation, but only to laugh at the excesses of US culture or behaviour: In early 2008, the Commonwealth Bank introduced a series of TV Commercials that satirised the stereotypical American ignorance of Australian culture and laughed at US imported experts’ ability to complicate even the most simple tasks. This was contrasted with direct, Australian know-how—what Australians might call a lack of ‘bullshit’ (echoes of *Crocodile Dundee* and the legendary pragmatism of the bushman can perhaps be seen in these examples).

Advertising is the ‘key link’ in the relationships amongst television industries, audiences and program genres and schedules. Increasingly, many of the most watched programs conflate advertising with their infotainment content. The new Rudd Labor government has presented itself as an administratively efficient, economically conservative, though environmentally and socially progressive regime. But, rather like television’s versions of the world, it has encouraged a de-politicisation of politics, a very (if I may say so) ‘post-modern’ thing to do: new politics is not about class, just as television is unconcerned with social division. Instead, the domestic, the consumerist and the mundane prevail. Politically and culturally older Australia seems preoccupied with health, housing, consumerism and ‘lifestyle,’ and just occasionally with the environment. The popularity of these programs, could be argued to reinforce retrospective complacency: It closes the gate on possible intrusions by the political or the public into recreational television.

What America means

Recent cultural analyses have moved away from assuming ‘essentialist,’ fixed national types of identity towards more contested, even contradictory and shifting or provisional postulations of ‘identities’ (always in quotation marks, usually plural). Such a discursive approach emphasises that what we label national ‘identities’ are not aggregations of psychological types; instead they can be thought of as particular modes and fields of representation itself: Australian cultural identity, then, does not refer to a list of ideal cultural ‘values’ that have no precise material basis or context. Ironically, identity is not one, not

unified; rather, it is a fabric of textual strands with no fixed boundaries.

The blanket term ‘Americanisation’ is frequently no more than an assumption concerning the origins of a cultural example (language, dress, food) that may or may not be accurate. It has been applied indiscriminately within Australian media discourse to label an array of factors seen as threatening to national(istic) identity, way of life, or ‘consensus values.’ This pejorative use of ‘Americanisation’ lamented social practices and cultural values that putatively originated in the United States (or in Hollywood, Los Angeles, or some metonymic reference to that nation). It assumed that the offending items were not meaningful within the Australian context merely because they made cultural sense to some local groups but that they carried with them their alien ‘American’ origins. It follows that popular discourse on this issue is frequently nationalistic, assuming both an essential Australian cultural and political identity, and a general consensus to which US-originated commercial culture is seen as a threat.

Australian complaints about putative Americanisation shifted from the economic to the cultural sphere with the rise of global capital in the 1980s. Cultural concern seems to have displaced the Yankee dollar as the preferred culprit in the popular discussions of US influence on other nations. Culture (language, dress and sport in particular) has attracted the most vocal reactions—if the correspondents and professional commentators in the local media are taken as the yard-stick. Yet cultural reception and transformation (what Bell and Bell called ‘negotiation’ in *Implicated*) involve complex processes, much more than ‘imitation’ or ‘domination’ suggest.

As I have illustrated by discussing prominent cultural examples, the past decade especially has seen ‘America’ recede from Australian cultural conversations. The ‘Great Power’ resonates only faintly in how Australia describes itself and its place in various global communities. The USA is a big ship to turn around when the storms of oil shortages and global warming demand flexible navigation. More agile, smaller nations like Australia may be better equipped to participate the post-modern commodity-based cultures that are emerging in the new century. Australian postmodern nationalism, or pseudo-nationalism, is culturally so pervasive that America is becoming increasingly distant from local consciousness.

Many other examples suggest themselves: I could have discussed sport, linguistic conventions, dress, ‘celebrity culture,’ gastronomy, or even what might be called the post-national university. Of the last, Readings¹²⁾ notes that, in the contemporary (what he terms the ‘post-historical’) university, means are increasingly seen as ends and universities have largely relinquished their role of educating citizens in their own national culture. Readings sees this as evidence that cultural globalisation is becoming the dominant version of what was once feared as Americanisation. However, the effect of this conflation is paradoxical:

¹²⁾ B. Readings, *The University in Ruins* (London: Harvard University Press, 1997).

“Global ‘Americanization’ today (unlike during the period of the Cold War...) does not mean American national predominance but a global realization of the contentlessness of the American national idea, which shares the emptiness of the cash nexus and excellence. Despite the enormous energy expended in attempts to isolate and define an ‘Americanness’ in American studies programs, one might read these efforts as nothing more than an attempt to mask the fundamental anxiety that it in some sense means nothing to be an American, that American culture is becoming increasingly a structural oxymoron.”¹³⁾

The grand narrative of the liberal state progressing through industrialised modernity is now a story without a final chapter. This is because national cultures are no longer ‘national’ in the sense once thought possible and desirable. Therefore, nationalistically defined ‘Australian’ culture is also increasingly anachronistic as the content of a local curriculum (except in the sense spectacularly proclaimed in the Olympics or mumbled in the parodic vernacular of television). So I have argued that a resurgent although novel kind of pseudo-nationalism is emerging from under assumed American cultural hegemony.

Moreover, I have assumed that international political relationships are seldom directly tied to cultural ‘influences.’ Local cultures may become increasingly vernacular and confidently proclaim their distinctiveness to a globalised or America-dominated international community while, at the same time, they are firmly bound to the larger power by treaty and commerce. I would also emphasise that *post*-modern cultures and global markets are not even uniformly accented let alone hegemonic. So my principal point in this paper is that no national culture can usefully be understood as dominated by another and hence not as ‘Americanised.’ Whatever ‘America’ means to a Pacific, post-colonial nation like Australia, even the paragon of modernity is herself caught up in the same global yet decentred and decentring circuits of meaning and identity as the smaller Pacific country. So from the ‘down under’ perspective, culturally at least, ‘America’ means less and less than it used to.

¹³⁾ Ibid., 35.

THOMAS JEFFERSON'S PACIFIC: THE SCIENCE OF DISTANT EMPIRE, 1768–1811

Alan Taylor

As traditionally told, the Meriwether Lewis and William Clark expedition across the American West to the Pacific was an adventure into the great unknown and a story of national fulfillment. That version, I will argue, slights the global context and the international significance of their exploration. We need to recover the expedition's context within a prior and expanding series of European probes, both geographic and commercial, into the North Pacific. Far from heading out blind, Lewis and Clark sought a new American route to a Pacific world recently delineated by Spanish, Russian, British, and French maritime explorers. Their discoveries inspired commercial mariners, who developed a profitable and globe-spanning trade in European metal goods, Northwest American sea otter pelts, and Chinese luxury goods during the late 1780s. The profits also attracted a British-Canadian, Alexander Mackenzie, who led an overland party across Canada to the Pacific in 1793—anticipating Lewis and Clark by a decade.¹⁾

The various probes combined science and commerce and inspired a heated competition between rival empires for information about, and access to, the Pacific world. That competition brought the diverse peoples all around the Pacific rim into new relationships over very long distances through the medium of European ships. And the growing integration of the Pacific into a European-managed market economy obliged the native peoples of the Pacific Rim to adapt to unprecedented and traumatic changes in their world.

The Pacific exploration by Europeans troubled the leaders of the new United States. Although their western boundary then lay at the Mississippi, American leaders assumed that their people enjoyed a natural and providential right ultimately to settle and dominate North America to the Pacific. At the end of the eighteenth century, however, as the Pacific became defined on global maps, in published journals, and in the diplomatic discourse of Europeans, Americans could not take for granted their eventual possession of their continent's west coast.²⁾

¹⁾ For work that does acknowledge the international background, see James P. Ronda, *Astoria & Empire* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1990), 4–36; James P. Ronda, "Dreams and Discoveries: Exploring the American West, 1760–1815," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd. Ser., 46 (Jan. 1989): 145–62. In the latter, Ronda notes, "The persistent notion that exploration was an adventure into the unknown cannot be farther from what explorers were really about" (p. 147).

²⁾ See, for example, Thomas Jefferson to Archibald Stuart, Jan. 25, 1786 in Donald Jackson, ed., *Thomas Jefferson & the Stony Mountains: Exploring the West from Monticello* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993), 61.

No American saw the Pacific implications more clearly than Thomas Jefferson, who combined a special interest in science with a diplomatic expertise in Europe. As early as 1783 he was casting about for an American to conduct an overland exploration in search of the Pacific—and he explicitly couched that search in dread of a British alternative. Jefferson gave scant thought to the Russians, considered the French as friends, and regarded the Spanish as weak: as easy marks for an inevitable American expansion. But Jefferson obsessively feared the British empire as a formidable, relentless, and insidious foe to the American republic. He worried that the emerging web of Pacific exploration and commerce would enable the British to renew their empire in a new and especially promising quarter, one that would curtail American expansion westward.

Science

Until the mid-eighteenth century, the Pacific Ocean remained the most mysterious part of the temperate earth to Europeans and their American colonists. On the far side of the planet from Europe, the Pacific was especially difficult for Europeans to reach. From the west, the only maritime access came via the distant, stormy, and rocky Strait of Magellan at the southern tip of South America. Although long hoped for, and persistently sought, the fabled Northwest Passage through northern North America remained elusive. The Pacific was also so huge—covering a third of the planet—that European mariners readily got lost for want of accurate techniques for determining longitude. Once they found a secure track across the Pacific, mariners clung to it, which discouraged new discoveries.

During the early sixteenth century, the Spanish mariner Ferdinand Magellan entered and crossed the Pacific via the straight that now bears his name. Following up on Magellan's discoveries, the Spanish founded a colony at Manila in the Philippines and, during the 1560s, initiated a trade across the Pacific to Mexico. Along the trade route, the Spanish discovered a few inhabited islands, principally Guam in the Marianas, where they established a small settlement to resupply their ships with water and provisions. Following the same narrow trade passage in one vessel once a year from the Philippines to Mexico, the Spanish preserved their ignorance of most of the Pacific. During the sixteenth century, the Spanish did probe the California coast north of Mexico, but they decided against colonization. And the northwestern coast of North America to Alaska and the Aleutians remained unknown to the Spanish—or any other Europeans—until the eighteenth century. Nonetheless, the Spanish insisted that they owned the Pacific and threatened to destroy the intruding ships of other European empires.³⁾

During the eighteenth century, the Russian, British, and French governments began systematically and competitively to explore the Pacific Ocean in search of imperial advantage. The decline of Spanish naval power enabled rival vessels more securely to

³⁾ Warren L. Cook, *Flood Tide of Empire: Spain and the Pacific Northwest, 1543–1819* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), 1–20.

venture into the Pacific. New and more precise instruments—especially the chronometer—permitted mariners to ascertain their longitude in distant oceans. Better instruments also led to the development of far more accurate maps and charts, which were critical to navigating the vast reaches of the open Pacific to find and return to far-flung islands.⁴⁾

Spain's rivals invoked service to science as their right to explore the Pacific, in defiance of Spanish protests. With the zeal of converts, the rivals treated Spanish secrecy and protectiveness as intellectual crimes against human progress. Of course, the European rivals celebrated science as a universal ideal in order to pursue their special geopolitical interests to investigate distant places and to trade with exotic peoples. Consequently, the Spanish ambassador was skeptical when a British official defended Pacific exploration on the grounds "that the English Nation is actuated merely by desiring to know as much as possible with regard to the planet which we inhabit."⁵⁾

As never before, the eighteenth-century imperial explorers self-consciously wrote and acted in the name of science. Although commanded by naval officers, and worked by common sailors, the voyages also included cartographers, astronomers, naturalists, and artists to study and depict the waters, skies, soils, plants, animals, weather, and peoples of distant coasts. In 1771, when Captain James Cook returned to England from the South Pacific, his team of naturalists unloaded more than 500 bird skins, another 500 specimens of fish, more than 1,000 new species of plants, 1,300 sketches and paintings—as well as an array of Polynesian clothes, tools, weapons, musical instruments, and vocabularies.⁶⁾

In eighteenth-century Europe, wealth and prowess increasingly accrued to nations that took the lead in discovering and analyzing new information about distant places and peoples. And, because scientific publications circulated throughout the learned circles of the European elite, systematic exploration became a medium for the competitive pursuit of national prestige. Indeed, the collection and publication of geographic information became critical to diplomatic claims to new lands. For example, Captain Cook urged that his Pacific findings be quickly "published by Authority to fix the prior right of discovery beyond dispute." By promptly and officially printing Cook's maps and journals, the British government reaped

⁴⁾ Derek Howse, ed., *Background to Discovery: Pacific Exploration from Dampier to Cook* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); Glyndwr Williams, "The Pacific: Exploration and Exploitation," in *The Oxford History of the British Empire, Volume II: The Eighteenth Century*, ed. P. J. Marshall, 552–75 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998); David Mackay, *In the Wake of Cook: Exploration, Science, and Empire, 1780–1801* (London: Croom Helm, 1985), 16–17.

⁵⁾ Barry M. Gough, *Distant Dominion: Britain and the Northwest Coast of North America* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1980), 51–52, 93.

⁶⁾ Mackay, *In the Wake of Cook*, 5–6; Lucile H. Brockway, *Science and Colonial Expansion: the Role of the British Royal Botanic Gardens* (New York: Academic Press, 1979), 61–76; John Gascoigne, *Science in the Service of Empire: Joseph Banks, the British State, and the Uses of Science in the Age of Revolution* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 16–33; Richard Drayton, *Nature's Government: Science, Imperial Britain, and the 'Improvement' of the World* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 41–49, 66–67.

credit for “discovering” much of the Pacific Northwest in 1778, when, in fact, secretive Spanish expeditions had already visited that coast in 1774 and 1775.⁷⁾

During the 1760s, the British began systematically to explore the Pacific. In 1768 the British Admiralty and the Royal Society entrusted Pacific exploration to Captain James Cook, an especially disciplined navigator and geographer. Cook brought along a few scientists, principally the botanist Joseph Banks. In two long and celebrated voyages, in 1768–1771 and again in 1772–1775, Cook systematically criss-crossed the South Pacific and mapped the coasts of Australia and New Zealand—previously known only vaguely from hasty Dutch encounters a century before. The two voyages established Cook’s reputation as the preeminent explorer of the eighteenth century. More methodical and thorough than any previous explorer, Cook developed maps, charts, and journals of unprecedented precision, thereafter defining the Pacific in print for distant Europeans. He also set the scientific protocols emulated by subsequent explorers seeking equal credit for their empires.⁸⁾

In 1776–1779, for his third and final voyage, Cook probed the North Pacific in search of the fabled Northwest Passage around or through North America. Sailing northeast from Tahiti in January 1778, Cook was pleasantly surprised to stumble upon the Hawaiian islands, a mid-oceanic and subtropical range of volcanic peaks inhabited by Polynesians who had arrived about 900 years before. After two weeks of mostly harmonious exchanges—both diplomatic and commercial—Cook sailed northward in renewed search of North America’s northwest coast, arriving there in the spring of 1778.⁹⁾

In the spring of 1778 Cook spent a month at Nootka, an inlet on the west coast of Vancouver Island, to repair and refit his ships and to obtain fresh water and provisions. The local natives called the place Yuquot and themselves the Moachat, but Cook’s misnomer, “Nootka,” has stuck ever since on both place and people. They had some past experience with European mariners and ships because of brief Spanish visits in 1774 and 1775. Eager to procure metal goods, the Moachat paddled out in many canoes to meet Cook’s two ships and initiate trading.¹⁰⁾

During that spring and summer, the mariners purchased 1,500 sea otter pelts for about six pence apiece in English goods. A year later, en route homeward, they stopped in China, where each pelt sold for goods worth about \$100. Launched as science, Cook’s voyage evolved smoothly into commerce—which demonstrated the close relationship of capitalism and

⁷⁾ Cook, *Flood Tide of Empire*, 79–84, 100; David J. Weber, *The Spanish Frontier in North America* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 285–86.

⁸⁾ Gough, *Distant Dominion*, 21–24; Mackay, *In the Wake of Cook*, 7–8; Lynne Withey, *Voyages of Discovery: Captain Cook and the Exploration of the Pacific* (New York: William Morrow and Co., 1987), 126–322.

⁹⁾ Gough, *Distant Dominion*, 24–29; Withey, *Voyages of Discovery*, 323–64.

¹⁰⁾ J. C. H. King, “The Nootka of Vancouver Island,” in *Cook’s Voyages and Peoples of the Pacific*, ed. Hugh Cobbe, 89–93, 100–103 (London: British Museum, 1979); Cook, *Flood Tide of Empire*, 87; Gough, *Distant Dominion*, 33–39, 42–43.

science in British thought and practice.¹¹⁾

Upon departing Nootka, Cook and his men spent the summer and fall of 1778 following and charting the coast northeastward to Alaska and the Bering Strait. In November of 1778, the mariners sailed back to Hawaii, for a warm-weather base to rest and resupply through the winter. In February of 1779, however, Cook died in a violent melee provoked by a bungled attempt to arrest some Hawaiians for the theft of some iron tools and a small boat. Cook's successor, Lieutenant Charles Clerke, sailed away in March to complete their coastal survey of Alaska, before proceeding to China with a cargo of sea otter pelts.¹²⁾

Upon returning to London, some of the crewmen published accounts of their voyage in 1781 and 1782, and Cook's official journals appeared in print in 1784. Those publications, especially their reports of the profitable sea otter trade, aroused intense interest by European governments.¹³⁾

Between 1785 and 1790, British merchants dispatched some twenty-six ships laden with trade goods to Nootka and other raincoast harbors. Proceeding on to China with sea otter pelts, the traders purchased Chinese porcelain, tea, spices, and silks for conveyance and sale in Europe. Once the rare experience of government-sponsored explorers, circumnavigation became a commercial commonplace during the late 1780s. By the end of the decade seven American ships had visited that coast to trade for sea otters. Many more followed during the 1790s as American shippers eclipsed the British, who were hampered by the monopoly to the China trade awarded to the East Indian Company by the British empire.¹⁴⁾

Mackenzie

Cook's third voyage had roughly closed the cartographic gap between Spanish California and Russian Alaska. Cook's thorough exploration virtually killed the myth of an accessible salt-water Northwest Passage through North America. But, at the same time, he suggested a new fantasy: that a capacious inlet—now known as Cook's Inlet—on the coast of Alaska received a large river that flowed westward from the interior.¹⁵⁾

Such a river promised relatively easy access to the Pacific from the center of North America, which especially intrigued British fur traders based in Montreal. After the British

¹¹⁾ King, "The Nootka," 107–8; Cook, *Flood Tide of Empire*, 87–88; Mackay, *In the Wake of Cook*, 59.

¹²⁾ Cobbe, ed.; Robin Fisher and Hugh Johnston, eds., *Captain James Cook and His Times* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1979); Alan Frost and Jane Samson, *Pacific Empires: Essays in Honour of Glyndwr Williams* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1999); Williams, "The Pacific: Exploration and Exploitation," 552–75; Withey, *Voyages of Discovery*, 370–400.

¹³⁾ Weber, *Spanish Frontier*, 285–89; Cook, *Flood Tide of Empire*, 100–104, 111–19.

¹⁴⁾ Jackson, ed., *Thomas Jefferson & the Stony Mountains*, 48; Cook, *Flood Tide of Empire*, 100–107, 111–14; Gough, *Distant Dominion*, 51–71, 100.

¹⁵⁾ Harold Innis, "Peter Pond and the Influence of Capt. James Cook on Exploration in the Interior of North America," Royal Society of Canada, *Transactions*, 21 (1928), Section II, 139–40; Ronda, *Astoria & Empire*, 5–6.

conquest of French Canada in 1760, British firms took control of the fur trade that extended westward via the Great Lakes into the Manitoba country around Lake Winnipeg. The British traders also assumed the former French beliefs that the Rocky Mountains were low and narrow—scant obstacle to western exploration and commerce—and that Lake Winnipeg lay near a navigable river called “Oregon,” which flowed westward to the Pacific. “Oregon” seemed ever closer as the British traders probed westward in search of new Indian hunters able to supply large quantities of beaver pelts. In 1767–1768 some traders reached and wintered on the Saskatchewan River, which served, a decade later, as the base for Peter Pond to open the fur trade along the beaver-rich Athabaska River and Lake to the north. From Indian informants, Pond learned of the Great Slave Lake, which emptied into an immense river, known to the Indians as the Deh-Cho, that evidently flowed westward toward the Pacific. During a 1785 visit to Montreal, Pond read accounts of Cook’s third voyage and latched onto the explorer’s suggestion that Cook’s Inlet received an immense river: “Cook’s River.” Equating the Deh-Cho with Cook’s River and the fabled “Oregon,” Pond planned to find and descend the river to the Pacific. To systematize his discoveries and speculations and to publicize his future services as trader and explorer, Pond prepared a large and detailed map, linking Canada’s interior with the Pacific coast as delineated by Cook.¹⁶⁾

Facing prosecution for murdering a rival trader, in 1788 Pond fled across the border into the United States, where he languished in poverty and obscurity. Pond’s departure empowered his former protege, a young trader named Alexander Mackenzie who had arrived in the Athabaska Country in 1787. Inheriting Pond’s plan, Mackenzie led a small party of Indians and French Canadians in birch-bark canoes down the Deh-Cho during the summer of 1789. To Mackenzie’s chagrin, the river turned northward, reaching the Arctic Ocean rather than the Pacific. Subsequently known as the Mackenzie River, the waterway did prove commercially valuable as a new source of furs for the Montreal cartel, and the 1,120 mile journey established Mackenzie’s abilities to lead a small party deep into unknown territory possessed by jealous natives.¹⁷⁾

In 1792 Mackenzie returned to the Athabaska country to prepare his second expedition, this time involving about nine men, once again a mix of Indians and French Canadians. In the spring and summer of 1793, they ascended the rocky and rapid Peace River, heading westward into the Rocky Mountains, which proved far higher, wider, and more complex than anticipated. Through trial and error and ultimately with the advise of local Indians, Mackenzie found a way through the mountains to the Bella Coola River, which flowed

¹⁶⁾ Innis, “Peter Pond,” 139–40; Ronda, *Astoria & Empire*, 6–13; W. J. Eccles, *Essays on New France* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1987), 96–109; Barry Gough, *First Across the Continent: Sir Alexander Mackenzie* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1997), 62.

¹⁷⁾ Barry Gough, “Peter Pond,” *Dictionary of Canadian Biography*, V (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983):681–83; Gough, *First Across the Continent*, 67–98, 101; W. Kaye Lamp, “Sir Alexander Mackenzie,” *Dictionary of Canadian Biography* V:538.

through dark forests of immense trees toward the Pacific.¹⁸⁾

Mackenzie just missed connecting with a British maritime expedition led by Captain George Vancouver, a protege of Cook, who had come via Hawaii to survey the Northwest coast in June. While trading with the raincoast natives, one of Vancouver's men, Thomas Manby, astutely observed,

As neither Land [n]or Water, stops the car[r]rier of commerce, I dare say, many of our articles have by this time, nearly approached, the opposite side of the Continent, as a continual chain of barter, exists between Tribe and Tribe, through this amazing track of Country, which in time, will no doubt, find their way, to our factories in Canada, or the back settlements of Hudson's bay.

Indians had long traversed the mountains that were so mysterious, complicated, and daunting to Mackenzie. And just as Manby had predicted, Mackenzie began to find European metal goods among the Sekani people of the mountains, which confirmed that they knew the trade route to the Pacific. Mackenzie explained that he then set out to "pursue that chain of connexion by which these people obtain their ironwork." Once Mackenzie reached the Nuxalk people on the Bella Coola River, those trade goods proliferated, confirming his proximity to the ocean. The emerging Pacific world of trade that was Mackenzie's goal also generated the tangible clues that drew his party to its destination. The eastward and overland passage of those clues revealed a long-standing web of intertribal connections otherwise opaque to the explorer.¹⁹⁾

Mackenzie enacted the ceremonies of possession expected by Enlightenment exploration. First, he recorded ethnographic, botanical, faunal, and geologic information that matched what he had read in Cook's journals—to document that his party had reached the same coast. Second, Mackenzie employed his bulky navigational instruments (hauled hundreds of miles over rugged terrain for this special moment) to calculate and record latitude and longitude. Without such measurements for publication at home, Mackenzie's travel and trouble would be for nought. Third, with a paint made of vermillion and grease he inscribed a large rock: "Alexander Mackenzie, from Canada, by land, the twenty-second of July, one thousand seven hundred and ninety-three."²⁰⁾

Finally, in trade with the Bella Coola people, Mackenzie collected sea otter pelts: the consummate trophy that he had reached the Northwest Coast. Both coming and going, the

¹⁸⁾ Gough, *First Across the Continent*, 105–23.

¹⁹⁾ Thomas Manby quoted in Elizabeth A. Fenn, *Pox Americana: The Great Smallpox Epidemic of 1775–82* (New York: Hill & Wang, 2001), 251; Mackenzie quoted in Gough, *First Across the Continent*, 128.

²⁰⁾ Gough, *First Across the Continent*, 143–56, Mackenzie quoted on p. 156. For the European imperial tradition of ceremonies of possession, see Patricia Seed, *Ceremonies of Possession in Europe's Conquest of the New World, 1492–1640* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

goods of the Pacific trade proved essential to Mackenzie's success. Where European trade goods had led Mackenzie over an Indian trail, an Indian trade good became critical to proving his Pacific arrival to a European audience. Indeed, the sea otter pelt had become the symbol as well as the substance of the profitable trade that drew Europeans (and Americans) into the North Pacific world with its emerging ties to the Chinese market.²¹⁾

Ultimately, none of these ceremonies would matter unless Mackenzie safely returned to Montreal and London with his precious journal and sea otter pelts to demonstrate his accomplishment. On August 24, 1793 Mackenzie reached his Peace River base east of the Rockies, completing a circuit of 108 days (75 out and 33 back) and 2,400 miles (about 1,200 each way). Not until the summer of 1794 could he attain Montreal, where he shrewdly plied British officials with tales of adventure, reports of science, and gifts of sea otter pelts. In return, Mackenzie reaped their enthusiastic letters to the home government, endorsing his accomplishment and praising his vision of a global trade through Canada.²²⁾

In late 1801 in London, Mackenzie achieved his first goal by publishing his journals with a prestigious firm and with the assistance of a consummate editor. Mackenzie benefitted from the patronage of especially Sir Joseph Banks, an accomplished naturalist; a veteran of Cook's first voyage; the king's preeminent scientific advisor; and the prime conduit for scientific information and patronage in the empire. Banks and Prince Edward arranged for the publication of Mackenzie's journals and for his knighthood by the king in early 1802. That winter Sir Alexander Mackenzie basked in the praise and attention of London's high society.²³⁾

Mackenzie tried to convert his new intellectual and social cachet into imperial authorization and funds for his commercial scheme. By establishing fortified trading posts, he argued, the British could command the native peoples and sea otters of the Pacific Northwest. According to Mackenzie, the stakes were global:

By opening this intercourse between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans and forming regular establishments through the interior, at both extremes, as well as along the costs and islands, the entire command of the fur trade of North America might be obtained. . . . To this might be added the fishing in both seas and the markets of the four quarters of the globe.

In particular, Mackenzie urged the construction of armed posts at Nootka Sound and at the mouth of the Columbia River, the largest and only navigable river in the Pacific Northwest. Otherwise, he warned, the Americans would occupy both.²⁴⁾

Unfortunately for Mackenzie, imperial officials were polite but noncommittal. The

²¹⁾ Gough, *First Across the Continent*, 152.

²²⁾ *Ibid.*, 160–81.

²³⁾ *Ibid.*, 170–80

²⁴⁾ *Ibid.*, 180–86, Mackenzie quoted on p. 205.

British government was exhausted of funds by a long war with France. And Britain's rulers were loath to cross the powerful interests—the Hudson's Bay Company and the East India Company—which felt threatened by Mackenzie's proposed end-run around their profitable monopoly rights.²⁵⁾

The president

In 1802 Mackenzie's most avid—but horrified—American reader was the new president, Thomas Jefferson. Ever fearful of British intentions, the president naturally concluded that British officials would, of course, embrace Mackenzie's scheme to occupy the raincoast just to spite the United States. In fact, British officials paid far less attention to the United States than Jefferson believed. Preoccupied with more pressing matters in Europe and India, British ministers wasted relatively little time or energy on the pesky but irrelevant Americans. Moreover, the clashing economic interests within the empire deprived its policies of the coherence, determination, and malignancy that Jefferson imagined.²⁶⁾

Jefferson eagerly procured Mackenzie's book, which worked on both Jefferson's British fears and his transcontinental hopes. On the one hand, Jefferson felt alarmed by Mackenzie's call for the British occupation in armed force of the Pacific Northwest. On the other hand, Jefferson saw opportunity in Mackenzie's conjecture that the passage through the Rocky Mountains would be lower and easier further south, in the American latitudes. The President hoped that an American overland expedition could reach the Pacific via the Columbia River, which had eluded Mackenzie and which was the most promising conduit for American influence and trade over land.²⁷⁾

In addition to helping to catalyze the Lewis and Clark expedition, Mackenzie's book served that venture as an essential source of geographic information and exploration know-how. Jefferson gave a copy to Meriwether Lewis, who carried it across the continent. Because Mackenzie had learned and applied the scientific forms of exploration, his journal was an invaluable guide to Lewis and Clark.²⁸⁾

The expedition also carried a composite map made in Philadelphia but based on the British maps of 1802 (Aaron Arrowsmith) and 1803 (Nicholas King), which recorded the information garnered by Cook, Vancouver, Pond, and Mackenzie. Thanks to the maps and

²⁵⁾ Gough, *First Across the Continent*, 4–5, 170–85.

²⁶⁾ Peter S. Onuf, *Jefferson's Empire: The Language of American Nationhood* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 2000), 100; Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson, *Empire of Liberty: The Statecraft of Thomas Jefferson* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 42–43, 62.

²⁷⁾ Gary E. Moulton, ed., *The Journals of the Lewis & Clark Expedition* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1986), II, 1–3; Jackson, ed., *Thomas Jefferson & the Stony Mountains*, 92–95, 197; Ronda, "Exploring the American West," 149–50.

²⁸⁾ David McKeehan to Meriwether Lewis, April 7, 1807, in Donald Jackson, ed., *Letters of the Lewis and Clark Expedition, with Related Documents, 1783–1854*, 2 vols. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2nd ed., 1978), II:401–2.

the journals, Lewis and Clark had a surprisingly clear picture of their Pacific destination. Their challenge was to get there, which would fill in the geographic gap in Euro-American knowledge, south of Mackenzie's crossing and between the Mandan Indian villages of the upper Missouri (which had been frequented by French and British traders since the late 1730s) on the east and the Pacific coast to the west.²⁹⁾

The procedures followed, and the discoveries made, by prior Pacific explorations shaped the famous instructions that Jefferson bestowed upon Captain Meriwether Lewis in June of 1803. To meet scientific standards, the American explorers were to make frequent and precise celestial measurements "to fix the latitude and longitude of the places" they reached. In a journal kept in multiple copies they were to record detailed observations of the flora, fauna, soil, and climate. And Jefferson ordered them to collect detailed ethnographic data that would later assist American officials, traders, and missionaries in the assimilation and subordination of native peoples. Bent on immediately wresting the sea otter trade away from British mariners, Jefferson directed Lewis to investigate whether it could be "conducted through the Missouri & U. S. more beneficially than by the circumnavigation now practised." And Jefferson recognized that mercantile shipping to the Pacific Northwest had become so routine that his explorers could anticipate returning by sea—if the overland return seemed too dangerous. The President instructed Lewis to seek out "the sea-vessels of any nation" to take a passage "by sea, by the way either of cape Horn, or the cape of good Hope." In sum, British books and maps had generated a familiarity with the Pacific world that inspired and informed Jefferson's plans for the Lewis and Clark expedition.³⁰⁾

The scientific forms followed, and scientific information sought, by Lewis and Clark have long seemed to represent the unique initiative and scientific genius of Thomas Jefferson. By instead recovering the expedition's predecessors, we can see their development of the protocols and goals of exploration that Jefferson mastered and taught to Lewis. Putting the Lewis and Clark expedition in a more global and historical context, however, shifts rather than diminishes its importance. If less than an unprecedented push into the unknown, the expedition was also obliged to overcome the liabilities of a late start in the geopolitics of science. If endowed with the insights of predecessors, Lewis and Clark also faced the challenges of claiming an American place in a highly contested corner of the globe. By making the most of what had already been learned, the Lewis and Clark expedition helped to secure a Pacific footing against formidable competitors endowed with precedence.

²⁹⁾ Jackson, ed., *Thomas Jefferson & the Stony Mountains*, 129–34; Eccles, *Essays on New France*, 98–109.

³⁰⁾ Jefferson to Lewis, June 20, 1803, in Jackson, ed., *Letters of the Lewis and Clark Expedition*, I, 61–66 (quotations, p. 65). For the scientific preparations for the expedition, see also, William H. Goetzmann, *Exploration and Empire: The Explorer and the Scientist in the Winning of the American West* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966), 3–7.

Region Is Thicker Than Blood?: The British Empire in Australia's Foreign Relations

Teruhiko Fukushima

Introduction: Beyond the debates over 'All the way with LBJ' or 'Engagement with Asia'

In the debates over the postwar Australian foreign policy, there have been two different directions. One is the tradition of close strategic cooperation with the 'great and powerful friends,' namely, Great Britain in the prewar era, and the United States since the early 1950s. One of the most well-known statements illustrating such an approach is the remark made by the Australian Prime Minister Harold Holt during the height of the Vietnam War. He promised the US President that Australia would go 'all the way with LBJ.' Another direction is the attempts to consolidate friendly networks with Asia by establishing multilateral regional frameworks. This approach is represented by former Prime Minister Paul Keating's famous slogan of 'Engagement with Asia.' The Japanese audience may be familiar with media jargon *datsu-o nyu-a* (getting away from Europe, going into Asia), using the analogy of *datsu-a nyu-o* (getting away from Asia, going into Europe) advocated during the early Meiji period.¹⁾

There is no denying that Australia's foreign relations have steadily drifted towards the Asia-Pacific direction away from the Anglo-centric one in the past 60 years. But not a small part of the region includes the Commonwealth countries which share with Australia common British influence in political, economic and cultural aspects. It is no wonder if the Australian government leaders who had long been accustomed to the British centred external relations tried to face its neighbouring region based on closer links with these countries tied by kinship. So this presentation tries to discuss the questions of how have Britain and its Empire, especially the Commonwealth countries in the Asia-Pacific region been placed in Australia's postwar diplomatic networks and what are the present meanings of the Commonwealth links for Australia's foreign relations.

Commanding question of how to fill the postwar partner vacuum

Let me start from pointing out the basic facts, by making simple comparison with New Zealand which may look very similar, even identical to Australia for the most of the audience. But definitely, Australia has been far more extroverted than New Zealand. Australia has participated in every war fought by the American soldiers throughout the 20th and 21st centuries. New Zealand not only declined to send troops to Iraq, but also has refused entry of American ships which cannot deny carrying of nuclear weapons since the 1980s. This

¹⁾ For example, see Ken Suzuki, "'Datsu-o nyu-a' soten ni Kyowasei iko mo uranau Go sosankyō," *Asahi Shimbun*, January 29, 1996.

contrast derives from the strong sense of threat or insecurity traditionally held by the Australians. Sparsely populated on the vast continent, the Australians who had enjoyed high standard of living were anxious about being swallowed by neighbouring, densely populated, but culturally quite different Asia. The history of Australia's white tribes started with the transportation, sending of convicts. This means that the early white Australians were intentionally taken away by the government authorities from Britain and dumped on the unknown arid island continent thousands miles away from home. It is no wonder that they held strong senses of isolation and anxiety and the resultant sense of reliance on the mother country. Luckily enough, the Australians could establish the rich society sustained by high and relatively uniform standard of living towards the second half of the nineteenth century. However, the chronically small population and the long distance from Britain had always aroused the strong sense of insecurity.²⁾

Such geopolitical factors drove prewar Australia into two basic policies in terms of overseas relations. Firstly, it demonstrated the strong allegiance to Britain in order to make it sure that the world's strongest Navy would lend a hand in emergency. In return, Australia sent a large number of troops to the other parts of the world and let them fight and bleed for Britain. Out of 330,000 young Australians sent to Europe and Middle East during World War I, 60,000 could not come back alive home. Secondly, it established White Australia to prevent lower wage labour and social unrest by maintaining Anglo-Irish cultural homogeneity. This notorious policy to prohibit the entry of alien Asia-Pacific immigrants have something in common with Australia's attempts to keep German and French presence away from its neighbouring sphere such as New Guinea and New Hebrides in the late nineteenth century, in that the Australians tried to alienate these relatively smaller threats on their own capacity. However, the Japanese military offensives after the Pearl Harbour undermined the credibility of these traditional security policies. For the first time, the sense of insecurity turned out to be reality. The Australian governments after the Pacific War were thus faced with the imminent task of reorganising its defence strategy.

The Labor governments of the 1940s tried to reorientate Australia's foreign relations. The 1942 New Year's article by the Prime Minister declared that Australia would 'look to America free of any pangs' arising from its kinship with Britain. Although the Australian soldiers did fight hard side by side with their American friends, diplomatically Canberra's voice was not heard so seriously by Washington. So the Labor government tried to pursue its new security strategy by enhancing regional cooperation through the Commonwealth links. In 1944, Australia concluded the so-called ANZAC Pact with New Zealand and declared that the South Pacific was their region of utmost interest. Its foreign minister looked to India as one of the promising counterparts in regional cooperation. In the advent of the Cold War, however, Australia was too small to turn such new initiative feasible.

²⁾ Stuart Ward, "Security: Defending Australia's Empire," in *Australia's Empire*, ed. Deryck M. Schreuder and Stuart Ward (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 232-46.

The conservative Coalition governments (1949–72), which maintained its reign for more than two decades, took more realistic approach and it established the alliance with a new ‘great and powerful friend’ with the conclusion of the ANZUS Treaty in 1951. For some royalists such as Prime Minister Robert Menzies (1949–66) who uncritically supported Britain in the 1956 Suez Crisis, it sounded heartbreaking to endorse alliance documents without British signature, but the anti-communism logic was enough for the conservative politicians to fully accept the strategic realities. They fell into the similar pattern of thinking to their predecessors, by vigorously sending troops to the Korean and Vietnam Wars.

Despite those differences, there were some commonalities between the Labor and the Coalition approaches in the early postwar period. Firstly, the Australian politicians of this time, more or less, shared the sentiment called ‘British race patriotism.’ According to Stuart Ward, ‘British race patriotism’ is the ‘idea that all British peoples, despite their particular regional problems and perspectives, ultimately comprised a single indissoluble community through the ties of blood, language, history and culture.’³⁾ In Australia, ‘British’ was embraced by many people as the term to describe themselves as a nation comprised of the English, Scottish, Welsh and Irish people in a harmonious manner on the *terra Austrailis*.⁴⁾ British race patriotism led the Australian leaders towards feeling comfortable to foreign relations centred on Britain or the Commonwealth.

When the Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement was concluded in 1957, the Coalition government duly accepted to station Australian troops on the Malay Peninsula along with the British and New Zealand counterparts. Australia was also receptive to gradually taking over the British strategic roles in the South-East Asian region. While such moves by the Menzies government was argued in the context of anti-communist forward defence strategy, I would like to emphasise their significance as the emergence of Australia’s commitment to regional stability, as Australia’s strategic presence on the Malay Peninsula culminated in the Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA) in 1970 which has been still active today as one of the important regional forums for security dialogue.

Despite their British race patriotism, the postwar government leaders had to realise that they had to seriously consider Australia’s foreign relations beyond the familiar framework of the Commonwealth. The experience of the Pacific War compelled them to recognise the strategic significance of the Dutch East Indies for Australia’s security. The 1940s Labor government, though at first felt comfortable to take sides with the Dutch, supported Sukarno’s independence movement.⁵⁾ Although the Coalition politicians were critical against such an

³⁾ Stuart Ward, *Australia and the British Embrace: The Demise of the Imperial Ideal* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2001), 2.

⁴⁾ Neville Meaney, “Britishness and Australia: Some Reflections,” *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 31, no. 2 (May 2003): 126.

⁵⁾ Neville Meaney, “The End of ‘White Australia’ and Australia’s Changing Perceptions of Asia, 1945–1990,” *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 49, no. 2 (November 1995): 176–77.

anti-colonial move while in opposition, they had to accept the reality and the need to get along with newly independent Indonesia, when they came into office from late 1949. The Coalition government was enthusiastic in setting up the Commonwealth-based aid program, namely the Colombo Plan in 1950. While driven by the Cold War logic of preventing communist infiltration, one of its main objectives was accommodation of Australia's largest neighbour on the north into the multilateral aid forum, as shown by the fact that Australia was quite eager to increase the membership of non-Commonwealth countries such as Indonesia. Australia adopted such careful an approach towards the unpredictable nationalist Sukarno government that it did not prejudice the Colombo Plan aid even when the Australian troops stood face to face against the Indonesian counterparts in the jungles of the Borneo Island during Indonesia's Confrontation against Malaysia, 1963–65.⁶⁾

Shock and luck: Japan's role in reorientation of Australia's foreign relations

Australia tried hard to accommodate another very important non-Commonwealth country in the region into the Commonwealth framework, when Japan gained entry into the Colombo Plan in 1954. But the Japanese question had far more significant strategic, political and economic implications for Australia than the Indonesian one during the 1940s and 1950s. The strong antipathy against Japan due to the ill-treatment of Australian prisoners of war was so widespread that there was a mood not to admit any Japanese presence in Australia. The entry of Japanese fishery vessels even into the northern non-Australian territorial waters was blocked, and normalisation of trade was also out of the question for manufacturers and trade unions which might be exposed to tough competition from cheaper Japanese goods. Driven by the sense of urgency against losing Australia's fair share of trade in Japan due to the American bilateral approach in the advent of the surplus disposal, however, the Coalition government dared to negotiate out the 1957 Commerce Agreement, overcoming the strong wartime antipathy and fear of influx of cheap Japanese goods, in order to cultivate the promising Japanese agricultural market.

This was the victory of Australia's pragmatism to look to Japan free of any pangs arising from its traditional commercial networks with Britain in the name of imperial preference. Due to the careful management of the trade flows by both Japanese and Australian officials and businesses, Japanese exports did not disrupt Australian markets as much as expected, and the reinstalled bilateral economic relations proved mutually beneficial. Incrementally, the sense of mutual confidence as economic partners was built up among those people. However, this economic initiative of Australia sparked a sudden move from the mother country. In 1961, Britain made an application for entry into the European Economic Community. Together with South Africa's breakaway from the Commonwealth, the shock was such that even Menzies had to admit the need for Australia to shake away British race patriotism and seriously to commit itself to Australia's neighbouring region beyond the framework of the

⁶⁾ Daniel Oakman, *Facing Asia: A History of the Colombo Plan* (Canberra: Pandanus Books, 2004), 94–96, 243.

traditional Commonwealth links.⁷⁾

Luckily enough, the 1957 'economic rapprochement' with Japan paid off, as Japan took over Britain as the largest customer in 1967, after Australia began to export its newly discovered mineral resources to Japan which achieved high economic growth towards the mid 1960s, to symbolise the start of the 'honeymoon period.' It is noteworthy that Australia showed its willingness to extend its regional commitment through the Japanese channel. While the both government officials agreed to have annual review after the Commerce Agreement, in 1963 business leaders agreed to hold the first annual joint meeting of the Australia-Japan Business Cooperation Committee and the Japan-Australia Business Cooperation Committee. The bilateral economic dialogue in this forum brought forward the establishment of a regional business leaders' forum, the Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC) in 1967. It is Australia's pattern to develop bilateral links with Japan into the Asia-Pacific multilateral networks. Such effort for regional cooperation may be described as 'party diplomacy,' in that it has been done in an incremental manner, by meeting a number of times, accumulating dialogues over drink and dinners and thus building mutual confidence. In other words, this incrementalism was Australia's response to the need for adaptation to the new diplomatic realities. Such an approach may have been fit for the pragmatic Australians, as they repeated the similar pattern in the slow demise of White Australia. The Labor government introduced the large scale immigration intake program under the slogan of *Populate or Perish*, for the sake of strengthening national defence and building up the prosperous economy. As a result, Australia came to accept a number of refugees and immigrants from various non-English speaking European countries, nominally maintaining the White Australia policy. But this was the start of the end of White Australia, because the intake of culturally different ethnic groups, no matter how white they were, meant compromising Anglo-Irish cultural homogeneity of Australia. Towards the mid 1960s, the discriminatory immigration regulations for racial reasons were quietly dismantled.

Whitlam reorientated, Fraser followed and Hawke cemented

While such evolution of Australia's foreign relations away from the Anglo-Commonwealth centred into the Asia-Pacific oriented emerged in a quiet incremental manner, it was the Labor government under Gough Whitlam (1972-75) that introduced symbolic reorientation of Australia's foreign relations. He advocated 'more independent' foreign policy, independent of 'great and powerful friends.' Such an approach was suspected by Washington as anti-American still under the Cold War, and the Australian electorate felt anxiety about alienating the US ally. The hazardous approach to Washington affected the credibility of the Whitlam government so much in domestic terms that the post-Whitlam Labor Party became so cautious as not to be mistrusted as anti-American. By the 1980s, there developed the bipartisan support over the maintenance of friendly relations with the US ally

⁷⁾ Ward, *Australia and the British Embrace*, 179.

between Coalition and Labor. On the other hand, Whitlam behaved carefully in an attempt to achieve symbolic independence from Britain, as *Advance Australia Fair* replaced *God Save the Queen* as national anthem without fuss in 1975.

However, another attempt of the Whitlam government for symbolic independence affected relations with Japan. Resource nationalism diplomacy stirred up the national sentiment for ‘buying back our farm’ to discourage Japanese mining investment. One of the reasons for the trade frictions over cutbacks of coal, iron ore, beef and sugar purchases by the Japanese was Australia’s excessive persistence in contract terms and inflexibility to negotiate the economic predicaments out. In other words, this time the Australians adopted too legalistic, un-Asian approaches. In the field of non-economic, cultural and human exchanges, however, Whitlam’s symbolic approach proved correct in that the government made attempts to promote institutionalisation of Australia-Japan relations by proposing negotiation for a Nippon Australia Relations Agreement (NARA) and establishment of an Australia Japan Foundation. The deliberate attempts to broaden relations with Japan, the country which was not much familiar to the ordinary Australians, had an effect to demonstrate government’s determination to promote exchanges with Asia to the domestic arena. The same logic can be applied to the introduction of multiculturalism by the Whitlam government, in that it conveyed government’s message delivered to international as well as domestic audience that Australian could no longer afford to accept racial discrimination. Thus Whitlam’s symbolism had the effect of establishing founding stones to give clearer reorientation to the Australians who had felt a bit lost, realising that British race patriotism no longer worked.

The Coalition government led by Malcolm Fraser (1975–83) played a role to settle the changes brought by Whitlam among the Australian public. The Fraser government immediately passed the bill to establish AJF and concluded the Basic Treaty for Friendship and Cooperation with Japan in 1976. The Asia-Pacific multilateral diplomacy since the 1960s was also buoyed when Fraser agreed with his Japanese counterpart Masayoshi Ohira to activate regional cooperation in 1980. Subsequently the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) was established. Although Fraser tried to set up a new direction of Australia’s regional cooperation by holding the Commonwealth Head-of-Government Regional Meeting, it was a product of Fraser’s sheer idea and did lack the realities. For Fraser, the Commonwealth proved only effective as a forum to raise strong criticism against the apartheid.⁸⁾ An extremely important achievement by the Fraser government is the massive intake of Indochinese refugees. Since the Coalition government supported multiculturalism in a quiet manner without fanfare, the Australians could stay calm and could understand the humanitarian needs and the strategic importance of admitting the largest mass of culturally very different ethnic groups, amounting to more than 200,000 within a decade, and they duly accepted further multiculturalisation of their society.

⁸⁾ Alan Renouf, *Malcolm Fraser and Australian Foreign Policy* (Sydney: Australian Professional Publications, 1986), chap. 8.

The Labor government led by Bob Hawke (1983–91) further cemented Australia's 'enmeshment with Asia,' in Hawke's words. Its symbol is the successful establishment of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) by hosting its inaugural meeting in Canberra in 1989. But this symbol was sustained by Australia's persistent diplomatic efforts of Asian style through dialogue and persuasion, in collaboration with Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry. By this time, it had become apparent for the Australian public that the Australian economy had no alternative but to develop closer relations with Asia, and otherwise it would not be able to overcome the economic crisis since the early 1980s. In fact, the maintenance of friendly relations with Japan bore fruits, as the 1980s saw the remarkable rise of Japanese tourists and students visiting Australia as handy foreign currency earners. Providing so much employment opportunities with local communities, Japanese resort investments no longer sparked such strong anti-Japanese sentiments as in the 1970s.⁹⁾ Although the resources export to Japan started to show the sign of dwindling, this setback was well made up for by the rise of the Asian newly industrialised economies. Since closer links with Asia proved extremely beneficial, the Australians had become receptive to the Hawke government's further pursuit for multiculturalism. Indeed, multiculturalism seemed to attract more tourists and other business opportunities, and it did sound real that racist outlook would affect its Asian business links severely and that Australia desperately needed to shrug off the notorious image of White Australia. Since Hawke's period coincided with Australia's worst economic crisis in the postwar period, such an argument should have sounded more credible.

Overall, during the Whitlam, Fraser and Hawke periods, Australia adopted a careful, non-intermeddling approach towards the Asia-Pacific region. Ironically enough, this approach is specifically illustrated by the fact that all of these governments adopted non-intervention policy towards Indonesia's forceful annexation of East Timor since 1975. Such an approach seems to be in line with Australia's postwar traditional policy of keeping a certain distance with and not antagonising Indonesia.

Keating's symbolism and Howard's symbolic reactions

With the successful launch of APEC, by the early 1990s it looked apparent that the direction of Australia's new foreign relations was firmly oriented towards economically buoyant Asia, irrespective of the Commonwealth links. It was Prime Minister Paul Keating (1991–96) who tried to introduce a new framework of political thinking, founded on Hawke's achievements of the Asia-Pacific diplomacy and multiculturalism. For this purpose, delivering a message of 'Engagement with Asia,' Keating officially proposed a move to a Republic of Australia and introduced the Native Title Act in 1993. He aimed at the political effect to impress both the domestic public and Asia's neighbours that Australia had

⁹⁾ For this topic, see Chris Pocarier, "The Controversy over Japanese Investment in Australia, 1987–1991: Context and Lessons," *Japanese Studies* 24, no. 2 (September 2004).

transformed into a new country which proudly embraced cultural diversity and generosity. Keating extended Hawke's commitment to Asia into security fields, in order to impress the regional leaders with Australia's sincere willingness to be engaged with their people. Australian troops played a central role in the peacekeeping in Cambodia, where they cooperated well with Japan's Self Defence Force (SDF). However, Keating's emphasis on symbolic change was received by the average Australian people as a symbol of political correctness and negativism of Australian traditions, imposed by cultural elites.

Capitalising on such public sentiment, the Coalition government led by John Howard (1996–2007) tried to counter Keating's symbolism with traditional values. Although Howard was compelled to convene the Constitutional Convention in 1998 and it was decided that a referendum for constitutional amendment should be carried out next year, the republicanism movement had lost momentum by the time of the voting, as Howard successfully depicted the republicanism as an elite-led trendy issue which was irrelevant to the daily lives of the ordinary Australians. Moreover, the republican side was divided over the question of how to choose a president of an Australian republic. Not a few of those who advocated popular election voted against the proposed republic model to select a new head of the nation by two-thirds majority of the federal parliament.¹⁰⁾ As a result, to the eyes of the monarchists such as Howard, the republicanism debates were comfortably turned down.

In diplomatic terms, Howard's strong attachment to the US ally was more than apparent, as he described Australia as 'deputy to US sheriff' in the region, in the wake of the East Timorese crisis in 1999, only to offend Asia's leaders. But the advent of the war against terror after 9/11 consolidated Howard's political stance, as he joined the 'coalition of the willing' in fighting side by side with the American soldiers in Afghan and Iraq. The conservative side could enjoy strong domestic support, as the sense of imminent threat and insecurity reemerged within the society, especially against the Muslims. Backed by this strong political position, Howard could remain unequivocal in his refusal of 'symbolic reconciliation' with the Aborigines including apology and his deep scepticism about multiculturalism. Instead, he emphasised Australia's traditional values such as 'mateship' and tried to depict Australia as a country of Western culture. These developments were Howard's symbolic counteraction against Keating's symbolism of newly reborn Australia.

In the fields of pragmatic management of regional affairs, however, the Coalition government recognised the fact that the engagement with Asia was no longer reversible. During the Asian Currency Crises in 1997, Australia alongside with Japan, kept on giving financial assistance to the damaged Asian economies. 9/11 and the 10/12 Bali bombing terror in 2002 made it inevitable for Canberra and Jakarta to develop close regional cooperative networks for counter-terrorism. Furthermore, despite the apparent differences in their

¹⁰⁾ John Warhurst and Malcolm Mackerras, "Constitutional Politics: The 1990s and Beyond," in *Constitutional Politics: The Republic Referendum and the Future*, ed. John Warhurst and Malcolm Mackerras (Brisbane: University of Queensland Press, 2002), 22–23.

approaches to relations with Asia, Keating and Howard have one thing in common in that both former Prime Ministers achieved institutionalisation of security cooperation ties with Indonesia. In 1995, Keating signed the Australia-Indonesia Agreement on Security Cooperation with President Suharto. Significantly, it reinforced Australia's web of regional security networks founded on FPDA.¹¹⁾ Although Keating's security agreement with Indonesia was discarded due to the turmoil over mishandling of East Timor's independence, the Howard government reestablished the so-called Lombok Treaty for security cooperation with his counterpart under President Yudhoyono in 2006. From the viewpoint of strategic reality, it was most pragmatic for both Prime Ministers to maintain engagement with the most populated Islamic country in the world neighbouring on the north.

It is also noteworthy that security dialogues and exchanges with Japan started from Keating's period, in response to the end of the Cold War. These emerging security ties with Japan, though not so visible, steadily accumulated solid achievements, and under Howard were institutionalised in the shape of the Australia, Japan and US Tripartite Security Dialogue in 2006 and the Australia-Japan Joint Declaration of Security Cooperation (JDSC) in 2007. It should have been beyond imagination for the Australians of the early postwar period that its Defence Force troops would guard the Japanese engineers of SDF in southern Iraq 60 years on. With Indonesia and Japan firmly integrated into its regional strategic frameworks, now the direction of Australia's contemporary foreign relations seems to have been firmly locked with the Asia-Pacific region.

Conclusion: The meaning of the Commonwealth for Australia's regional diplomacy

The Commonwealth framework did not fully fit well with Australia's postwar Australia regional diplomacy. For it was imperative for Australia to overcome the problems with the two major non-Commonwealth countries, that is, of maintaining security over Indonesia and of forging relations with Japan from wartime antipathy into lucrative trade. Hence, it was most appropriate for Australia to develop regional links that would encompass the familiar Commonwealth countries in the Asia-Pacific and include Indonesia and Japan. Sharing common commercial interests, Australia could expand prosperous economic relations with Japan as early as the mid 1960s, and they became the core of Australia's regional diplomacy, bringing about multilateral economic cooperation leading to APEC. In its quest for such diplomatic direction, Australia adopted careful, incrementalist approach, which proved quite appropriate to the Asian style. Two nations' relatively isolated positions in the Asia-Pacific region may have driven them much closer with each other, as both Japan and Australia shared the "historical debts" in the Pacific War and White Australia. On the other hand, the modest approaches of the Japanese in both diplomatic and commercial arenas, should have helped their Australian counterparts to develop a sense of mutual confidence. Australia's pragmatist

¹¹⁾ Nancy Viviani, "Australia and Southeast Asia," in *Seeking Asian Engagement: Australia in World Affairs, 1991-95*, ed. James Cotton and John Ravenhill (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1997), 155-56.

tradition was a powerful weapon in mixing with the Asians, making full use of their favourite 'party diplomacy.'

For the postwar Australians, the cultural ties binding the Commonwealth together should have been not only welcome but also indispensable. It is hard to imagine Australian lives without cricket and rugby test matches. It is no wonder that Australia tried to utilise this vestige of imperial framework in their initial trial for regional diplomacy, as was the case in the making of the Colombo Plan. The Australian politicians and officials were pragmatic enough to leave this new forum for regional cooperation as flexible as possible, making the most of 'party diplomacy' at the post-conference dinners and drinks and extending its membership outside the Commonwealth.¹²⁾ So it was quite natural development for Australia to pursue regional economic cooperation with Japan when Britain started to show the move to withdraw from the Asia-Pacific region. Then Australia tried to expand and diversify the bilateral relations with Japan, starting from economic relations as benchmarked by the 1957 Commerce Agreement, through cultural and human exchanges as driven by the 1976 NARA Treaty, and into political and security cooperation as symbolised by the 2007 JDSC. In the process of these step-by-step developments, any differentiation of the Commonwealth from the other Asian partners no longer makes sense in Australia's foreign relations nowadays, because they are fully amalgamated in the name of the Asia-Pacific region.

Then finally can I pose a question? Why did Australia need to institutionalise Japanese relations at these turning points as above? In the event, Australia also concluded the security cooperation agreements with Indonesia. My temporary argument is that since Japan and Indonesia are very important for Australia, but not a Commonwealth member. Australia would not need a security 'agreement' with Commonwealth countries. FPDA is not an 'agreement' but just an 'arrangement.' It would be much easier to communicate, without written documents, with Commonwealth members sharing similar cultural backgrounds. But Australia had to confirm the goodwill of Japan and Indonesia to sustain stable cooperative relations by concluding various kinds of agreements, because Australia needed to develop mutual confidence with these countries and these agreements worked well in inspiring confidence. With security agreements concluded, now the links with these two countries seem to have entered the new stages of stability and maturity.

In this respect, it is interesting to point out a new medium for communication between the Australians and the other members of the Asia-Pacific region. From 2006 on, Australia completely entered Asia in the soccer world. Now we see the good rivalry between Japan and Australia for qualification to FIFA 2010. An Australian commentator said, "we look at the Socceroos against Japan in the same context as the Bledisloe Cup, or the Ashes series."¹³⁾ Though sounding a bit exaggerated, we should understand that such a remark was not only the outcomes of Australia's successful soccer campaign, including its first World Cup victory

¹²⁾ Oakman, *Facing Asia*, 238.

¹³⁾ Michael Cockerill, "Big in Japan," *Sydney Morning Herald*, July 21, 2007.

in 2006 but also the sense of intimacy founded on the modest but stable evolution of the postwar Japan-Australia relations. Then another commanding question will emerge: how should Australia accommodate China into its regional diplomatic framework. With fluent mandarin speaking Labor Prime Minister Kevin Rudd (2007–) at the helm, again, pragmatic incrementalism will do.

The Empire Dies Back: Britishness in Contemporary Australian Culture

David Carter

I

Empires, as we know, do not collapse overnight. They linger within institutions, cultures and *mentalités* long after the formal end of imperial administration, whether as trauma, nostalgia or aspiration. In the Australian case, this lingering imperial aftermath can be seen in the priority accorded to the British connection even after the Second World War by Australian governments, with the overwhelming support of the Australian population. Despite the lessons that might have been drawn from Britain's failure in the Pacific war, its resistance to Australia's war-time demands, and the military-industrial successes of the United States, reactivating the imperial connection was a primary aim of both major parties. More broadly, British sentiment appears to have suffered little damage during the war; if anything, it was strengthened. The continuing—or renewed—significance of Britain and Britishness to Australia at this time can be seen even in the launch of Australia's mass immigration program in 1946–47. This policy would eventually change Australia into a multi-ethnic society, but that was not the aim; quite the reverse. The purpose of encouraging immigration was to preserve and build a stronger white British Australia, a goal based in turn on the assumption of an Empire-wide family of British peoples (more precisely it was *narrower* than the Empire, extending initially not much further than the white settler societies). Immigration Minister Arthur Calwell assured Australians that all migrants would be “Caucasian” and nine out of every ten would be British.¹⁾

The norms of White Australia—and assimilation into a “British” society for the increasing numbers of non-British migrants—would remain largely intact for the next thirty years. Australians in 1960 could still with fair accuracy be described, in the phrase historian W. K. Hancock had used in 1930, as “independent Australian Britons” (the phrase itself goes back to the turn of the century).²⁾ In one sense this is not surprising as the concept of an Empire-wide British community was not so much ancient history as a relatively recent product of late-Victorian imperial ideology. The “new imperialism” of the late-nineteenth century was at its peak during the very decades in which Australian federation was being debated and the future nation's constitutional status decided.³⁾ And it remained strong,

¹⁾ A. W. Martin, “The People,” in *Australians from 1939*, in *Australians: A Historical Library*, ed. Ann Curthoys, A. W. Martin and Tim Rowse (Sydney: Fairfax, Syme & Weldon, 1987), 62.

²⁾ W. K. Hancock, *Australia* (Brisbane: Jacaranda, 1966), 50. First published London 1930.

³⁾ See Stuart Ward, “Transcending the Nation: A Global Imperial History?” in *After the Imperial Turn: Thinking with and Through the Nation*, ed. Antoinette Burton (Durham & London: Duke University Press, 2003), 45.

certainly still in the 1950s. During the Royal Tour of Australia by Queen Elizabeth II in 1954, the *Sydney Morning Herald* commented that “Australia is still and always will be a British nation whose greatest strength lies in the tradition she has inherited from England.”⁴⁾ This was not an argument likely to arouse controversy except among minorities on the radical or liberal left. In 1959, historian J. A. LaNauze described Australia as “at least until recently, a notably derivative and dependent society in its culture and institutions. Until the present generation, nearly everything came from Britain.”⁵⁾ There’s just a hint in La Nauze’s qualifying terms—“at least until recently,” “until the present generation”—that Britain was beginning to lose its symbolic power as an originary and all-embracing source of culture.

It is not surprising, then, that historians, postcolonial theorists and cultural studies scholars continue to trace what Tara Brabazon has called the “phantoms of Englishness,” or the “British phantoms,” still haunting Australian culture (Australians are typically careless about distinguishing between Britain and England).⁶⁾ In Chris Healy’s phrase, Australia continues to live in the “ruins of colonialism” or, Brabazon once more, “in a patchworked moment of British debris.”⁷⁾ The field of postcolonialism is concerned precisely with such after-effects, with both summoning and exorcising colonialism’s phantoms.

Nonetheless, without pretending that Australia has left the ghosts of imperialism behind I nonetheless want to push the argument in another direction and claim—somewhat polemically—that what is most remarkable is how suddenly and completely Britain (or England) became *irrelevant* to contemporary Australian culture; even more so, Britishness or Englishness as a distinctive site of symbolic value. Of course these concepts still circulate as possible sites of meaning and identification—and most importantly, now, as commodities—but in a globalised “mediascape” so do Frenchness, Chineseness, Japaneseness and Americanness (if I can be permitted to invent some necessary words). At the same time, the Britishness of any contemporary English cultural influences, if I can put it that way, is of little significance to Australian producers or consumers, either at the high or popular end of the scale. Indeed, to put it at its most polemical, Britain is about the *last* place that matters in many areas of contemporary Australian culture.

If explicit references to Britain and Britishness are now rare in Australia, certainly the ghosts of *whiteness* live on; with the difference perhaps that they are now our own ghosts, not ghosts imported from elsewhere. The ghosts stayed on, but we took away their British passports. The situation is an interesting one, shared no doubt, in different ways, by the other

⁴⁾ Quoted in Stuart Ward, *Australia and the British Embrace: The Demise of the Imperial Ideal* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2001), 24.

⁵⁾ Quoted in Ann Curthoys, “We’ve Just Started Making National Histories, and You Want Us to Stop Already?” in *After the Imperial Turn*, 74.

⁶⁾ Tara Brabazon, *Tracking the Jack: A Retracing of the Antipodes* (Sydney: UNSW Press, 2000).

⁷⁾ Chris Healy, *From the Ruins of Colonialism: History as Social Memory* (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

white settler societies, but it has not to my knowledge been remarked upon: Australia remains fundamentally a “post-colony” but the symbolic power of Britain and Britishness, I want to argue, has almost entirely evaporated. The aftermath of colonialism remains powerful but without any significant reference to the original, founding imperial power.

The point is not triumphalist. While there were indeed significant political and cultural developments in Australia in the late-1960s and throughout the 1970s, if my argument can be sustained it has as much to do with Britain’s withdrawal from its former imperial zone of influence as with any new self-awareness or sudden assertion of independence in Australia. I find persuasive Stuart Ward’s argument that what finally led to the collapse of the paradigm of the “British peoples” in Australia was not any internal political development, nor Australia’s turn to the USA during the Pacific War or the Cold War, nor its new trade focus on Asia, but rather Britain’s decision to join the European Economic Community in 1961.⁸⁾ While there had certainly been a “steadily widening gap between British and Australian priorities” since the war, up to that point “no single issue was of sufficient magnitude to call into question the basic belief in a wider British community of nations.”⁹⁾

This helps explain the *sudden* disappearance of British race patriotism from Australia’s political culture in the 1960s. Indeed as far as imperial collapses go, in the long historical perspective, this one was as near to “overnight” as possible. As Ward argues:

The remarkably sudden realisation that Britain was determined to pursue a new relationship with Western Europe, which could no longer be reconciled with the idea of a worldwide community of British peoples, served to render the imperial imagination obsolete in Australian political discourse, and ushered in new ways of thinking about an exclusively national Australian future.¹⁰⁾

Rather than struggling to free itself from the imperial embrace, Australia was cast aside with only the Commonwealth as comfort. The point for my argument is that with Britain’s reorientation towards Europe, the *symbolic* power of Britishness was also rendered obsolete, not merely economic or strategic rationales.

II

The situation of Australia’s culture can best be understood through the simple but telling definition that Tom O’Regan used in his studies of Australian cinema and television. Here we should understand the term “Australian culture” to mean a complex of institutional, industry and commercial relationships rather than as an embodiment of national character. O’Regan

⁸⁾ Britain applied to join the EEC in August 1961 (having previously held discussions with members of the Commonwealth including Australia). Its membership was blocked by French President de Gaulle in 1963 and again in 1967 before being accepted in 1973. Original documents can be viewed at <http://www.ena.lu/>

⁹⁾ Ward, *Australia and the British Embrace*, 20, 29.

¹⁰⁾ *Ibid.*, 4.

defines Australia in straightforward terms as a “middle-sized English-language culture.”¹¹⁾ Both adjectives are crucial.

As a *middle-sized* culture, Australia’s domestic market is large enough to support its own cultural industries in publishing, music, television, cinema, new media and so on; but it is not large enough for these to be self-sufficient as is the case for the USA, Japan or even Britain. Nor are these industries large enough to supply the needs of Australia’s own domestic consumers, hence we import. Indeed the market is large enough to be an attractive export destination for the larger English-language cultural producers (and here’s where the second adjective, *English-language*, becomes important).

It is not a failure of Australian culture so much as its defining reality that it is in a structurally subordinate relationship to contemporary US and, in certain areas, British cultures; that is, in relation to the two largest producers and exporters of English-language cultural products. Nor does this structural subordination necessarily translate into *cultural* subordination. The question of cultural influence, of course, is an extremely complex one, whether the case is the lingering effects of the British connection or “increasing Americanisation” (it always seems to be “increasing,” at least to its critics). The fact that Australia shares the English language with these two major culture producing nations means that Australians have relatively direct access and a kind of “insidership” to these cultures that will not be possible for those in other-language cultures. That’s to put the point positively. To put it negatively, Australia will not be protected by a language barrier. It will always be *vulnerable* (in negative terms) or *open* (in positive terms) to their products and influence, although we know that influence cannot be read directly off consumption patterns. O’Regan argues that there are good reasons—historical, economic and cultural—why Australian culture will share certain “family resemblances” with American and British cultures but that this does not mean Australia lacks a distinctive culture. We might, though, need to adjust our sense of exactly what having a “distinctive culture” means: in a globalised world, a world at once post-modern and full of lingering imperial phantoms, distinctiveness will always be a relative rather than an absolute difference. It is in this framework that I want to consider the place of Britishness in contemporary Australian culture.

For the remainder of this paper I want to examine a range of cultural fields in their contemporary Australian manifestations, looking for the presence or absence of Britishness as a cultural influence, a source of meaning, or a desired value. Behind this task is an argument for the disaggregation of the category of culture, and for what I call a principle of “*under-generalisation*” in cultural analysis. Almost certainly, Britishness will be unevenly distributed across different cultural domains and for different audiences. There is no “British culture” as a single, whole thing to be contrasted to “Australian culture,” although this is often the form that arguments have taken.

¹¹⁾ Tom O’Regan, *Australian Television Culture* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1993) and *Australian National Cinema* (London and New York: Routledge, 1996).

III

Let me begin with the elite or minority arts, specifically the visual and the performing arts (dance, opera, theatre), and then, moving further into marketplace, contemporary literature. In the visual arts, at least, I think the *strong* case can be argued: that Britain is about the last place that matters as a source of cultural significance, as a “centre” from which meaning emanates, or as an intellectual or stylistic reference point. Obviously, individual influences remain and the occasional scandal makes the British art scene newsworthy. Otherwise Britain scarcely figures on the horizon of influence, inspiration or even irritation for contemporary Australian artists. If it figures at all, it is as a multi-ethnic, diasporic and European Britain (often a black or Asian Britain), not the traditional Britain that cemented earlier cultural bonds. Even so, on the evidence of contemporary exhibitions, publications and criticism, it rates a long way behind East Asia, Latin America, USA, France, Italy or, for that matter, Ireland.

The internationalisation of the art scene—with its post-modern dynamic of simultaneity and decentralisation—is one reason for the decline of Britishness as either an overt or unconscious cultural reference point. The visual arts have been the most cosmopolitan and trans-national of the arts in terms of the diversity of influences and cultural flows that now constitute their field. Metaphors of cultural influence or importation are scarcely adequate to describe the way in which the art of East Asia and the Pacific, some American and European art, and, not least, Aboriginal art circulate today *within* the field of contemporary Australian art. Of course such changes in the field of art have not happened to Australia alone; they are symptomatic of a general internationalisation and hybridisation of art networks, concepts and markets. But they have happened in Australia in a peculiarly intense form for two reasons: first, the relatively sudden “discovery” of Asia and, belatedly, the Pacific as sources of contemporary art (as David Walker has written, Australia has a history of discovering to its own surprise Asia’s proximity to its own shores); and second, crucially, the unprecedented emergence of Australian Indigenous art (again, as *contemporary* art), as those who saw the Emily Kngwarreye exhibition in Tokyo or Osaka will readily understand.

English art is at best one node in an international network, but one relatively remote from what seems most exciting here and now. From an Australian perspective, in the midst of trans-cultural, trans-Pacific flows, England can seem, strangely, a bit like a colonial outpost, more remote than Sydney or Brisbane from where the really exciting stuff is happening. Here as elsewhere we see a reversal of cultural force. Symptomatic is the regional significance of Brisbane’s most important artistic event, the Asia-Pacific Triennial.

In the performing arts, London theatre, ballet and opera still carry prestige, and careers can still be made there (although this is no longer a common pattern). Australia’s established theatre companies still perform English classics and contemporary works, as we might expect given the shared language and the portability of international issues such as the Iraq war (the subject of one contemporary English play performed in Sydney this year). But Australian

theatre and dance takes its bearings from its *local* context first of all. This might seem obvious but in fact it is a relatively recent phenomenon in Australia, for this kind of local orientation or feedback loop requires a number of quite specific conditions: an identifiable local theatrical tradition, continuity in institutions and personnel, professionalisation, and the ongoing sense of an autonomous local audience. These conditions did exist in the late-nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, before cinema, but were then lost until the 1970s or 1980s; even then state patronage was necessary for their re-establishment.

Secondly, Australian theatre is markedly *international* in orientation. A quick survey of the current seasons of three of Australia's mainstream capital city theatre companies reveals that of thirty-four plays, eighteen, more than half, are Australian; seven are American; six English; and there's one each from Scotland, Ireland and Germany. I have to confess I'm cheating slightly, as the Sydney Theatre Company is using the occasion of Cate Blanchett's presence to stage Shakespeare's History Cycle, which, as a one-off, I've not counted. But to compensate I might note that one of the plays I have counted as English is in fact an adaptation of John Gay's *The Beggar's Opera*, relocated to convict New South Wales; and it will show *first* in Sydney before moving to London. There's more than one kind of reversal of cultural interest happening here. Even the presence in Sydney of global super-star Cate Blanchett and her residency with the Sydney Theatre Company suggest a global pattern of cultural flows rather than the older pattern of expatriatism.

Indeed the sudden disappearance of the phenomenon of cultural expatriatism sometime in the 1970s was symptomatic of the changed relationship to Britain (and to Australia itself) that I'm suggesting. The point is not that people stopped travelling to bigger cultural centres outside Australia, but they stopped travelling *as* expatriates, that is, as exiles or escapees from Australian culture, from colonial outpost to metropolitan centre. A similar pattern pertains in the field of literature. A generation that included figures such as Germaine Greer, Clive James, Robert Hughes and Peter Porter left Australia not just to further their careers but in more or less conscious acts of expatriatism. None has ever returned to live in Australia, but interestingly, over the last decade or so, all have returned to Australia in their work—Greer most spectacularly in a recent controversial contribution to the debate about domestic violence in Aboriginal communities.

Literature is one of the most interesting areas because it is where the British inheritance has been felt most powerfully: first because its very medium is language; second because of the central role that literature played in definitions of national character. Literature was seen, above all the other arts, as where the spirit of the race or nation would be expressed—hence the nineteenth century invention of Shakespeare as the embodiment of folksy Englishness.¹²⁾ Literature was the field where cultural nationalism in Australia found its most articulate

¹²⁾ David Carter, "Critics, Writers, Intellectuals: Australian Literature and its Criticism," in *The Cambridge Companion to Australian Literature*, ed. Elizabeth Webby (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 261.

spokespersons, at least until the 1970s when some of that power shifted to cinema. Australian publishing, too, was defined almost wholly by its subordinate relationship to London, a situation that mostly suited Australian booksellers and consumers but not (most) writers or critics. Of course, both the embrace of the British connection and nationalist resistance to it testified to Britain's continuing economic and symbolic power, and the relationship of the local national culture to the British inheritance remained the central issue for writers and critics until the last quarter of the twentieth century. Then it disappeared, once again quite suddenly, as the question simply stopped being interesting to contemporary writers and readers.

For the new generation of writers emerging in the 1970s, Britain shrivelled as either a positive or negative model. As suggested earlier, the collapse of British power and its realignment in Europe was a key factor. It meant that the post-war baby boomers who were then reaching adulthood were the first in Australia to have grown up wholly in a post-imperial world of declining British influence. This helps explain the strong *generational* attachment to the 1970s among this post-war demographic. At the same time, there were significant changes within Australia itself at the level of cultural institutions and audiences with the establishment of a national body to support the arts and another supporting cinema, growth in the commercial production industries, and, especially among younger people, an increase in levels of affluence and amounts of leisure time, and expanded higher education (meaning there were not only more young people but they were better educated and with more disposable income). In publishing, for example, both local and locally-based British publishers developed substantial new lists of Australian books. (The 1970s acts as a similar tipping point for local cultures in Canada, New Zealand and South Africa, a subject needing further exploration).

Historians have sometimes spoken of the 1970s as a period of "new nationalism" in Australia. While this is one way of describing the phenomenon it falls short of an explanation. Rather than reaching for vague generalisations about an emerging national identity, what we can point to in this period is the quite rapid emergence, over the space of a decade or so, of sustainable cultural industries in publishing, film, television, music, and the visual and performing arts. These had gained a certain density and predictability by the mid-1980s, characterised in each field by an established production industry, a diverse local market, a regime of regulation and intervention, and a professional infrastructure of agents, outlets, critics and administrators. These all remained, and still remain, within the framework of "structural subordination" I outlined earlier, and so they remain at best "middle-sized" and often vulnerable to larger players. None translates automatically into wealth, fame or long-term careers; indeed in many areas long-term survival has been the exception. Nonetheless, by the end of the 1980s we could say that a substantial "ecology" and institutional depth had been established for these different domains of culture, resulting in a system that takes its bearings primarily from its own market and traditions, even in a globalised world.

In the literary field, to return to my example, Australia now has a diverse book culture at

the high, middle and mass ends of the market. The point is not that local writers and critics are no longer interested in the international, quite the reverse. Rather, Australian literature—and culture in all these fields—is more integrated than ever before within international cultures and markets (integrated into rather than dominated by). Australia is no longer a dominion or “client” state within a closed literary and publishing market but a medium-sized player, both importer and exporter, within a globalised industry and transnational literary market (for fiction at least).

Australian literature, then, for both writers and critics, can take its bearings primarily from its own “here and now,” its own local occasions, without any sense of lack or belatedness. The international cultural traffic is such that contemporary British literature no longer feels like “our” literature, as it once did to many Australians. Some writers, of course, travel well and become internationally recognised—Ian McEwan for example—but they come to us as part of the global English-language fiction market in the same way as writers from many other cultures (even those in translation). Otherwise Britain is only a small speck on the Australian literary radar for contemporary writers and readers. Even in publishing, while Britain is still significant, it is no longer dominant. Most British houses, like most Australian houses, are now owned by one of the big five or six media conglomerates, German, French, Dutch, Canadian and American in origin (with Pearson the dominant British firm).¹³⁾

IV

Probably the most influential development since the 1970s, and the best known internationally, is the revival of Australian cinema. Without revisiting that fascinating story, we can note some relevant aspects for the present argument. In the early years of the revival, in the seventies and early eighties, there was in fact a great deal of energy put into the task of defining a distinctive Australian identity against a particular version of the British character and/or the colonial past (Britishness was shown as one or other combination of artificial, effete, officious, snobbish, and definitely “old world”). This return to Britishness was a curious, if telling anachronism given the state of the British film industry and the dominance of Hollywood at the time. Whether they were more or less contemporary in setting, like the Barry McKenzie comedies about an Australian in London, or historical dramas set in colonial times such as *The Man from Snowy River* (1982), the central point seemed to be to tell Australians that they *had* an identity and that they had emerged from their colonial past into full nationhood.

My point for the present, though, is to note again the disappearance of this theme from Australian cinema. Even in a film like *The Adventures of Barry McKenzie* (1972), which took the Australian–British relationship as its premise, much of the comedy depended upon

¹³⁾ See *Making Books: Contemporary Australian Publishing*, ed. David Carter and Anne Galligan (Brisbane: University of Queensland Press, 2007).

the sheer anachronism of the British connection (in *Snowy River*, in fact, the bad guy is American, not British). The theme of identity in relation to a colonial past or a British present had played itself out completely by the mid-1980s. What emerged instead, in the eighties and nineties, were the contemporary, urban and youth-centred romantic comedies and the “quirky” films like *Strictly Ballroom* (1992), *Muriel’s Wedding* (1994) and *The Adventures of Priscilla, Queen of the Desert* (1994). These were very local films that nevertheless broke Australia into the international festival circuit and often had significant international box office success. In their own way, they were “post-colonial” films in the specific context of cinema history. The first *Mad Max* (1979) was another decisive moment, prefiguring the present-day integration of Australian cinema into international cinema. It led to the internationally successful *Mad Max* sequels and opened a space for other international Australian films such as *Babe* (1995) and *Moulin Rouge* (2001).

Today British and Australian cinema are in a similar relationship to Hollywood; that is, as small (or medium-sized) “national cinemas” in relation to Hollywood’s global cinema. They can achieve occasional mainstream box office success, but otherwise they inhabit the fringe circuit of art house and festival cinema. It’s interesting that apart from a few big hits like *Bridget Jones’s Diary*, British films in Australia follow the same circuits as foreign-language films. I thought that was a smart point for my argument until I realised that the very same thing applies to the bulk of Australian cinema (which suggests once more that *cultural* explanations for nationally-organised differences are seldom sufficient). Australian films represent less than five per cent of the national box office most years, sometimes more like one per cent.

V

If the cultural fields mentioned so far do indicate that British culture is largely irrelevant to contemporary Australian culture, popular music and television would seem to be two areas where the evidence points in the other direction.

Although popular music originating in Britain is still an important part of the contemporary popular music scene in Australia—from boys’ bands to stadium rock—its “Britishness” is of relatively little significance to its Australian consumers. It is, for example, of much less significance than was the Britishness of sixties pop; then again, even “swinging sixties” London was partly about nostalgia for a disappearing Little England (Penny Lane and Strawberry Fields) and partly the manifestation of an emerging international youth culture (Lucy in the Sky perhaps). Today, the Britishness of British music is less defined and less significant than say the Americanness of American music or the Irishness of Irish music. If it is present, it tends to be sub-divided into genre and place of origin as with American music, as in “the Manchester sound.” UK Pop constitutes a market segment. But for fans and consumers in the music world, the cultural flows seem to work *horizontally* in terms of musical and sub-cultural styles rather than *vertically* in terms of national provenance. Individuals and subcultures develop “portfolios” according to genre, which might include

Australian, American, British, French or Japanese examples. This is especially so outside the dominance of American music at the mainstream end of the market.

This situation also means that Australian music can take its place in a transnational musical field. Although the balance of cultural power is still massively uneven, there is probably more opportunity in music than in most other domains to reverse the pattern of cultural flows, as groups such as Savage Garden and individuals like Kylie Minogue have shown. On another level, alternative bands such as the avant-pop group Regurgitator can build an international network of fans while remaining based in Brisbane: the circuits no longer pass necessarily through London or New York. Of course, Regurgitator has an official fan website in Japanese.

Finally, let me turn to television, the most difficult example of all for my argument. First some brief contextualisation. Australia has a mixed commercial/public television structure, with three free-to-air commercial networks and two public channels, the Australian Broadcasting Corporation or ABC, and SBS, the Special Broadcasting Service, established as a multilingual channel. Australian television is different from that in some other major systems in that it is still dominated by free-to-air services. Although pay-TV delivered by satellite and cable is growing slowly, it is struggling to get beyond the 30–35% mark in terms of market penetration. So for the majority of Australians, watching TV still means watching free-to-air TV.

That's where it gets interesting, because about half of Australian free-to-air TV is *imported*, the vast majority from the USA and a smaller percentage from Britain (plus other countries on SBS). British programs have traditionally been the preserve of the ABC, while American TV looms large on the commercial channels, although this has shifted around a little in recent years. Imported television dominates in certain specific genres, typically the high budget, prime time genres of drama series and situation comedies. Locally-produced television, by contrast, rather like in Japan in this one respect, dominates in the cheaper forms of television, for example those like game or talk shows shot live in the studio, live sport, or "lifestyle" programs, such as home improvement, real estate or health and well-being programs, that depend on being local and up to date (for example, advertising products that are available in one's local shopping centre). Nonetheless, Australia does have a television production industry making TV drama series, and Australian dramas regularly feature in the top ten most-watched programs. There aren't all that many, but there will almost always be three or four showing during the week in prime time, and they tend to rate highly with viewers—and so with advertisers. As with Australian films, we find what appears to be a paradox: the field is dominated by imported products, but Australians strongly support Australian material when it's available. The enjoyment of American or, for that matter, British programs is clearly not the opposite of identifying with or participating in Australian programs.

Television, then, presents a complex picture because of its different economics and audiences. But the British presence on Australian TV is certainly significant, between ten

and fifteen per cent of programs overall, with a higher percentage on the ABC. Further, despite the long history of British low comedy—a tradition extending back to the popular stage—the concept “British” *does* carry a specific cultural meaning in the television system: that of “quality” as opposed to American trash. What exactly the significance of this is for contemporary Australian culture is less clear.

Britain, after all, is the second largest producer of English-language TV after the USA, so it would be strange if Australian networks didn’t buy large amounts of it. The British production industry has been very successful in remaking itself as a TV exporter. But American and Australian programs consistently out-rate British programs. The reasons for the British presence, in fact, is partly economic: the ABC buys British to meet the tastes of its specific audience band, but also because it can’t match the commercials in the higher-priced US market where the latter have package deals with the American studios.

Television, unlike the cinema, can address itself intimately to a range of different publics, from a national audience to different niche audiences. For many, I suspect, British programs are just one part of the international programming available on Australian TV. For others, the British presence still carries the full burden of quality and acts as a way of making caste distinctions. This is one of the few places where Britishness still matters. More generally, through television we *consume* “Britishness” in quite specific ways. Many Australians, like many British themselves (and many Americans, French and Japanese perhaps), are suckers for the image of old Britain, the pre-1970s tourist Britain of fields and hedges, villages and eccentric old codgers, or the small houses in small suburbs, the pubs and the likeable coppers—the small, the slow, the un-cool. This version of little England is endlessly recycled by British TV (being set in the present doesn’t change the point; one trick is a remote setting where distance imitates time). This kind of programming has a faithful market in Australia, as do the high quality historical documentaries and adaptations of English novels, although that stream seems to be running dry. But there are many, especially younger Australians I suspect, who find it immensely tedious or simply fail to notice its existence; or who give cult status to a program like *Little Britain* which, as its name suggests, turns this image of Britain upside down with a mix of wit and vulgarity.

The other Britishness we consume through television is the inverse of “little England” and imagines a different relation to Hollywood. These are programs set in the modern city, a dark and decadent cityscape characterised by bizarre murders, incest, female forensic scientists and yuppie go-getters. This is a mini genre of its own, with its own niche audience and a time-slot to match (late Friday or Sunday evenings on the ABC); a new British influence but again one that has nothing much to do with the ghosts of colonialism and everything to do with international mediascapes. The same goes for the parallel fashion in fiction—for contemporary forensic crime novels—where certain kinds of Britishness have been restyled and carry significant brand power in the international literary marketplace.

As indicated by a recent major survey of Australian patterns of cultural consumption, ABC viewing is unevenly correlated with education but strongly linked to *age* and *class*

(it rises steadily with age, and is strongest amongst professionals, weakest among manual workers).¹⁴ But despite this apparent indication that British culture remains strongest among older, wealthier and professional cohorts, a connection between the “ruling class” and Anglophilia holds true, if at all, only in quite specific domains: in television, as we’ve seen, and to a slight extent in the cinema. More broadly, I would argue that the most stubbornly persistent—or, better, most actively engaged—attachment to British culture is found elsewhere: it is distinctly working class and lower-middle class. Even here, of course, it lives quite happily alongside popular Aussie nationalism and high consumption of American popular culture. But this demographic is less likely to be “cosmopolitan” in tastes or habits, and more likely to be attached to “whiteness” although this will remain largely unspoken.

To argue this more fully would require another paper, analysing a whole range of institutions from our Rugby League or Returned Servicemen’s Clubs to popular commercial theatre. But I do think this is where the influence of British culture lives on most strongly in Australia: not among artistic or intellectual elites, not (even) among the old ruling class or the new professionals, but in working-class and lower middle-class Australia. This is precisely the voting demographic that John Howard was able to move from the Labor Party to the conservative side of politics. In support of this argument we might note that one place where the British relationship lives on is in sport, at least in the media spectacle sports such cricket, rugby, and most recently at the Beijing Olympics, where a “side” competition arose between Australia and Great Britain. The respective Ministers for Sport had a bet as to which of the two countries would win the most medals; and the head of the Australian Olympic Committee made an unfortunate comment about Britain’s success in swimming (pretty good, he thought, “for a country that has very few swimming pools and not much soap”).¹⁵ At the end of the Games, Britain’s *Sun* newspaper made a big feature of the fact that Britain had in fact finished ahead of Australia in the medal count; apparently, the competition now matters as much to Britain as to Australia, not something one would have found in earlier periods. Much of this operates only at the level of deliberately provocative joking: one of the Australian stereotypes of the British is that they’re no good at sport, just as we find it hard to believe there are any good restaurants in England (and we *know* it’s impossible to get a decent cup of coffee). But perhaps this is precisely the kind of provocation and niggling you might find among siblings, suggesting that the family relationship is still pertinent in this area. Here at least, Australia’s achievements are sometimes measured against Britain’s; but significantly Britain now also seems to measuring its performance against Australia’s.

¹⁴ Tony Bennett, Michael Emmison and John Frow, *Accounting for Tastes: Australian Everyday Cultures* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 78–79. See also Chap. 8 on US culture in Australia.

¹⁵ “Poms in Lather over Hygiene Crack,” *Age* August 2008, www.theage.com.au/news.

VI

Obviously the shared language and relative cultural familiarity (for *some* Australians, certainly not all) still make a difference. In a number of fields, in dance, theatre, music and publishing, there are still good professional reasons to look towards Britain during a career — although today it might equally be New York, Paris, Tokyo or Beijing. But the most striking thing remains the *thoroughness* of Britain's disappearance as a significant cultural influence or reference point over what is a remarkably short period historically: one decade, two at most. Further, the dramatic decline of British cultural influence has not been caused simply by a dramatic increase in American cultural influence, although the American influence on youth cultures since the sixties has been decisive in reorienting cultural flows and breaking the mould of earlier cultural habits.

The idea that the importance of Britain to Australia began to decline some time in the 1960s or 1970s is widely accepted but less frequently examined. Taken as self-evident or as merely inevitable, it is prone to both over-statement and under-statement: over-statement in the idea that Australia's cultural maturity finally or suddenly arrived; under-statement in terms of the idea that cultural maturity or independence has *still not* really arrived. I think both these common views are mistaken. Indeed, to understand the changes in terms of Australia *versus* Britain is unhelpful. The fact that from the early 1970s the relationship to Britain was no longer an issue around which cultural politics would be fought out was the result of a series of demographic, technological and geo-political shifts which affected Australia and Britain alike: patterns of immigration to both countries; shifts in global political and economic power towards Asia (which have produced a shift in cultural power as well); the relative and, in many instances, actual simultaneity of modern global forms of communication; the “mass” influence of television and pop; the globalisation of high as well as popular cultures; and the fact that all these coincided with the careers of the post-war baby boom generation—and now their children. The effect of such changes has been to relativise, and in some cases invert, the cultural relations between the two countries. London can no longer stand in for the world. As the internationally successful Australian writer David Malouf wrote, in the course of arguing *for* the significance of the British heritage in Australia, in many ways the cultural relationship has been reversed: to many Britons, he remarked, Australia now looks like a version of what they might have become, “another and less disappointing history.”¹⁶⁾

It might be objected that the Australian sense of England implied in all of this is itself a decade or more out of date. I'm sure this is true. If so, I think it only helps establish the point that there has been little active, contemporary cultural exchange between Britain and Australia since, say, the 1980s. Again there are exceptions, in fine music, theatre, and in

¹⁶⁾ David Malouf, *Made in England: Australia's British Inheritance* (Quarterly Essay no. 12, 2003 Melbourne: Black Inc., 2003).

academic work in a different way, but these are local, professional, structural links, quite different from the power that the structures of imperialism once embodied.

As a footnote it's also clear by now that the 1999 vote against constitutional change to an Australian republic had virtually nothing to do with continuing cultural ties to Britain. (See my article in the latest edition of the *CPAS Newsletter*).¹⁷⁾ The “no” vote was a vote against an unpopular model of a republic. What made it possible was in fact the Queen's and Britain's *irrelevance* to contemporary Australia, because people felt there was little at stake in the change from a constitutional monarchy to a republic. There was enough truth in the claim that a republic would make no real difference (because Australia was already independent) for many to feel comfortable about voting “no” even if they felt little affection for the present system. Britain and the monarchy played no part in the debate, which was conducted instead in terms of the best constitutional arrangements for Australia. Similarly, even those who passionately defend the current Australian flag against those who'd like to change it—in particular, to get rid of the Union Jack in the corner—do so in thoroughly *nationalist* terms, and usually with only pale reference to any notion of a British heritage as a living thing in Australia.

Australia has developed a relatively distinctive set of cultural institutions, products, styles and occasions. But this Australian originality is by no means incompatible with the fact that these have shown and will continue to show some strong family resemblances to US and British cultures. Australian cultures and tastes will continue to be “both the same and different,”¹⁸⁾ in Tom O'Regan's neat phrase, in relation to those from the USA and the UK: distinctive, but only relatively so; similar in many dimensions but unique in the way that the ensemble of original, adapted, borrowed and refashioned elements work together in the Australian context. It is increasingly difficult to predict where the local authenticity of Australian culture is to be found, but my guess is that Britishness won't be much more than a novelty item—perhaps even a taste of the exotic—for most local consumers.

¹⁷⁾ David Carter, “Revisiting the Republic,” *CPAS Newsletter* 9, no. 1 (2008): 1–5.

¹⁸⁾ O'Regan, *Australian Television Culture*.

コ メ ン ト

古 矢 旬

今日はたくさんの方にこの暑いしかも土曜日にお集まりくださりましてありがとうございました。私はこの企画を立てた者のひとりとして企画の趣旨と若干のコメントを申し述べます。今日のご報告いただいた四つのペーパーそれぞれ独立に読んでも大変面白い内容を含んでいると思いますけれども、全体と合わせると、いったい何を狙っているのかということが少しわかりにくいかもしれないので、その点から補っていきたいと思います。

この壇上にいる人々のうち四人が CPAS の所属です。木畑さんと、それからカーターさんと橋川さんと私、ということです。この企画の出発点は、これら CPAS のメンバーに関わりの深い、二つの帝国、つまり「イギリス帝国」と、これはまあ歴史学的にあまり確立した用語ではありませんけれども「アメリカ帝国」の二つについて比較検討はできないかという関心がありました。木畑さんはイギリス帝国の専門家、私はどちらかというところ現代、20 世紀のアメリカ帝国（こちらは括弧付きですけれども）を専門としておりまして、橋川さんは、これからお話しいただくように初期アメリカ、アメリカ史です。それにカーターさんがオーストラリアの文化史というわけで、ざっくばらんな話として、この四人の一見バラバラの専門を、単純に組み合わせてみると今日のタイトルになります。この足し算の結果が、The British Empire, Australia and the Americas という今日の企画です。しかしむろんただそれだけではなく、それぞれの専門の背後に非常に大きな共通の話がひそんでいます。それは一回のシンポジウムではとうてい語り尽くせないものですが、実は今日の四つのペーパーはそれぞれにこの大きな問題に、別々の角度から実証的に接近する試みになっていると思います。

それで、今日の企画の全体的背景として、私どもが思い描いているテーマを歴史にそって列挙的に描いてみますと、第一番目のテーマがイギリス帝国です。もちろんこれは今日のテーマの中で一番古い部分にあたります。このイギリス帝国自体が、第一次イギリス帝国、第二次イギリス帝国と二分されるのが普通です。ウォルター・ローリーやエリザベスの時代からだいたいアメリカ独立革命くらいまでを第一のイギリス帝国とみる見方は、最近一般的になりつつありますけれども、その第一のイギリス帝国に次いで、第二次イギリス帝国とされるのが、だいたいわれわれがふつうイメージするヴィクトリア女王の下のイギリス帝国ということになります。このふたつの帝国の連続性や継続性という大きな歴史学的テーマが一つです。

それから二つ目のテーマは、これも時代を少し下りますが、いわゆる「帝国主義」の時代です。つまり列強によるアフリカ、中東、アジア、オセアニア各地域の植民地化が非常に急速に進んだ時代の世界史的特徴という問題です。

それから三つ目の問題が、(第二次)イギリス帝国から「アメリカ帝国」への転換の時期と意味に関わります。言い方を変えれば、パックス・ブリタニカからパックス・アメリカナへの転換と言ってもいいと思います。経済・軍事・安全保障、それから文化的な中心、これがすべてアメリカへ移って行く時代です。

で、四つ目のテーマが、「アメリカ帝国」の時代、「アメリカの世紀」に生まれた世界性の範囲、限界と特質と申し上げてもいいかもしれません。時代としては冷戦の開始から現在までにあたります。ただ、この「アメリカ帝国」の時代も、二つに大きく分かれています。だいたい1970年代のはじめ頃を境にして、冷戦と福祉国家の時代と、それからそのあとの、保守化とグローバリゼーションの時代という二つが見てとれます。最近ロバート・ライシュが、現代の金融資本主義をスーパーキャピタリズム（これは本のタイトルであり、邦訳タイトルは『暴走する資本主義』です）と規定していますが、その起源（もしくは「暴走」への助走が始まったの）は、おそらく1970年代はじめだろうというふうに書いています。入江昭さんも、最近、グローバル化の時代について語っており、やはりその時代はだいたい1970年にはじまったということをおっしゃっています。

というわけで、「アメリカ帝国」の時代、パクス・アメリカナの時代もほぼ1970年くらいで二分されるとみて良さそうです。その後ずっとグローバル化が進んでいって冷戦が終わります。このように5つくらいの時代、それにサブディヴィジョンを入れるとだいたい7つ8つの時代区分の全体に関わる問題を、たった4つのペーパーで論じ尽くせるとは思えません。これは企画を立てた人間として言い訳になりますけれども、今日のシンポジウムがかなり不完全な印象を与えるとすればそういうことに起因しているのだろうと思います。

そのような前置き、ないしは言い訳をした上で、以下個別のペーパーがどのようにこの問題にアプローチしているかをかいつまんで整理したいと思います。まず、テイラー先生の論文ですが、これは非常に新しい分野を開かれたペーパーです。ある意味では、今日ここでこのペーパーをお聞きになった方達は、新しい歴史の開始に立ち会っているといってもいいと思います。実は1990年代のはじめくらいから、アメリカ合衆国の歴史が非常に一国主義的であるという批判がなされるようになってきました。これを最初に指摘した一人がオーストラリアのイアン・ティレルという歴史家です。彼は1992年にアメリカ歴史学会誌に *transnational history* の呼びかけともいえるべき論文を発表していますが、つまり一国史を超えて、国境を越えたアメリカ史を考えようという提言を行っています。その後15年ほど経っていますが、ここ数年、アメリカ史をより国際的な視点から見直し、世界史に開く、あるいはグローバルな文脈の中でアメリカ史をもう一回考えようとする研究が続々と出てきています。ティレル自身やニューヨーク大学のトマス・ベンダーなどの歴史家が進めてきたそうした史学史的な傾向が、今日のテイラー先生のお話の中に非常に色濃く反映しているということをまず指摘しておきたいと思います。

この論文は、アメリカ合衆国の側から見て、太平洋岸北西部を舞台にしています。従来この地域の歴史は、アメリカの西漸運動の結果、最後に開拓された地域という意味で、アメリカの大陸膨張の勝利言説の掉尾として語られることが多かった、つまりアメリカがヨーロッパ列強を尻目に、太平洋岸まで行き着き、北米大陸開拓をやり遂げた地域として語られてきたといっていいいでしょう。ところが今日のテイラー先生のお話は、このパシフィック・ノースウエスト（ノースウエストということはこの地域をアメリカの東海岸から見た呼称ですね）の歴史を、逆に太平洋の側から見る、つまり太平洋の北東部（ノースイースト）として見直す試みであるといえます。アメリカ史、カナダ史からみたノースウエストを、太平洋あるいはオーストラリアの方から見るとノースイーストになる、同じ地域を

論じるにもそのように視点を変えることによって別の歴史が浮上してくる可能性がある。こうした視点や論点の転換はまだ十分になされていないかもしれませんが、いずれにしるこの辺境地帯の歴史を国際政治の舞台、それから国際経済の舞台、またヨーロッパ帝国の太平洋への展開過程の中に見ていく新しいアプローチがこのご報告によって提唱されているといえましょう。

この報告は、啓蒙の時代の後にきた、科学 (science) と通商 (commerce) という新たな人間活動を鍵とする新しい自由の帝国論です。それは、従来からいわれてきたジェファソンの「自由の帝国」論の背後に、イギリス帝国の質的転換——つまり東インド会社の独占に頼った重商主義的な帝国から、自由貿易を基調とするヴィクトリア朝の帝国への転換——という世界史的变化を見えています。アメリカ大陸の北西太平洋岸において新興国家アメリカ合衆国と先住インディアンとヨーロッパ列強とを巻き込んで展開された毛皮交易の実体を、このような世界史的文脈のうちに位置づけることによって、アメリカ史とイギリス帝国史との新しい結節点を見いだした点に、今日のテイラー先生のお話の斬新さがうかがえます。

カーター先生、ベル先生、福嶋先生のお話しは、テイラー先生の報告された時代を大きく下って、だいたい 20 世紀の後半という同じ時期のオーストラリアの文化や外交をテーマとされています。お三方のご報告も、そうしたテーマを一国主義的に語るのではなく、太平洋地域におけるイギリスからアメリカへの覇権の交替、その世界史的転換と関連させてオーストラリアの政治、経済、文化の自立化の意義を論じています。

カーター先生は、この地域においてイギリスの時代がどのように終わっていったのかを文化史的に明確にされている。それからベル先生はさらに時代を下らせて、さきほど言った 1970 年代以降のグローバル化の下でのオーストラリア文化の変容に焦点を当てられます。そこでの変化は、これまでは通常オーストラリア文化の「アメリカ化」と見られてきましたが、ベル先生は実際にはそうではなくむしろ「ポストモダン」への移行と見るべきだと問題提起されています。

ほぼ同じ時期を扱った福嶋先生の報告は、オーストラリアの国家意識の変容に関し大変興味深い論点を提示しておられます。つまり第二次世界大戦後、オーストラリアは、冷戦と反共主義に突き動かされて、従来の対英同胞意識（福嶋先生の言葉では British race patriotism）を脱して対米接近をはかっていくのですが、変容はそこにとどまらずに対米友好を維持しつつ、オーストラリアはアジア太平洋国家という独自のアイデンティティを確立していったとされています。その文脈からは、ベル先生のお話にもありました、2000 年のシドニー・オリンピックが重要な画期として浮上してきます。というのは 1956 年のメルボルン・オリンピックがイギリス中心な「白豪主義」のオーストラリアを印象づけたのに対し、シドニー・オリンピックでは先住民出身の女性ランナーに脚光が当てられたことに象徴されるように、多文化的オーストラリアがテーマとされたからです。ですからこの二つのオリンピックの間に、オーストラリア社会そのものが対外的にも国内的にも非常に大きく変わったこと、そしてそれによって太平洋地域の国際関係の構図も変化したことが今日の三つのペーパーで非常にクリアに描かれたのだという風に思っています。

そこで、今日の四つのお話をブリッジしなければならないのですが、それは非常に難し

い課題だと思います。とくにですね、アラン・テイラー先生のお話と、あとの三人の方の話をどうやってブリッジするのかというのは、非常に長い橋が必要で、それを支えるいわば橋桁を学問的に供給することがはたして可能かという問題もあります。いってみれば、最初に申し上げたように、フランス革命以後の、あるいはアメリカ革命以後の太平洋世界の変容の解明が、今日のシンポジウムの全体的課題だったのですが、4つのご報告はその変容の最初の段階と最近の段階をとりあげたといえましょう。

そこで、私は各先生にもいくつか質問があるのですが、今日はほとんど触れえなかった二つの時代の間の段階にも関わり、2世紀全体を見通すためにもあるいは必要かもしれないポイントを指摘して、コメンテーターとしての責めをふさぎたいと思います。あとでもしそれについて四人の先生方がお話しになるチャンスがあればですね、お考えを聞かせていただきたいと思います。

私が今日のお話を聞いていて興味を覚えた、ひとつの問題、ないしは観点は、人の移動という要因です。つまり「帝国」という統治の方式は結局のところ、人の移動あるいは移民、という要素を抜きには成り立ちえないものだとということです。非常に包括的な時空間として帝国が成立するためには人が動かなきゃならない。で、太平洋世界の近代以降の変容については、産業革命以後の交通革命の影響がきわめて大きい。つまり、非常に急速に人が動くようになった。だから、帝国の発展も衰退も、非常なスピードで進行することになった。ローマ帝国が何世紀も続いたのに、イギリス帝国は絶頂期からわずか半世紀くらいで衰退に向かったとか、あるいはイギリス帝国は四世紀か五世紀にわたって続いたのにアメリカ帝国（あるいはその覇権）は成立から一世紀もたたずに崩れて行く、といえなくもありません。人の移動とによって帝国ができ、衰退するのだとすれば、その成立と隆盛と崩壊のサイクルのスピードが、人類の移動手段の急激な発達とともに幾何級数的に増しているということは、やはり意識すべきだろうと思うのです。移動速度、つまり人やモノや情報の移動速度が現代までに飛躍的に向上してきた、そのような時代の出発点が産業革命期であり、それを生かして太平洋地域の交易の可能性を探究した先駆者たちが、マッケンジーでありクックであったといえます。ですから今日のテイラー先生の話は、国際関係のいわばインフラストラクチャーともいうべき移動手段の革新という新しい時代の夜明けを物語っていると言っていると思います。これがひとつの論点です。つまり、移動、移民、交通運輸革命 traffic revolution です。

それから二つ目の問題が「帝国」です。世界史上実にさまざまな「帝国」が生まれては滅びていった。今日のテイラー先生のお話の中では、ラッコ（sea otter）の毛皮帝国というモノで媒介された「帝国」の広がりが見え隠れしています。このように具体的なモノを取引することで成立している「帝国」の事例としては、綿花の例があります。綿の帝国（cotton empire）ですね。綿を通してイギリス帝国とアメリカ帝国との連関を描いた著作もあります。むろんこうしたモノの帝国と並んで、資本の帝国や文化の帝国、さらには軍事の帝国を思い描くことも可能でしょう。今日の4つの報告は、「帝国」と呼ぶか呼ばないかはあくとして、それぞれにモノやカネや文化や力などを媒介として成立する国際的な人間社会間の連関に関心を寄せています。太平洋地域に成立したそれぞれの段階の「帝国」あるいは支配の構造が、どのようなモメントに力点を置いたものだったのかということとを、あらためて考えさせてくれる四つの報告だったと私は思っています。

最後に、もうひとつカーター先生もベル先生も、オーストラリアの文化的な状況は脱イギリス化を経て、さらに脱アメリカ化に進んでいるとおっしゃったように思います。その先を、ベル先生はポストモダンの段階とされるのですが、こうした「脱」や「ポスト」で文化変容を語る場合、問題になるのは、元々の local な文化、vernacular な文化が何かという点です。オーストラリア文化の vernacular だとか local というのは一体何を指すのか、そもそもそのようなものがあるのかという問題です。先住民という存在を除いた場合に、果たして vernacular だとか local というのは、オーストラリア文化にありえるのでしょうか。これはアメリカについても起こる問題です。アメリカも先住インディアンを除いた場合、なにが vernacular でなにが local か、という問題は残るのだらうと思います。で、考えてみるとオーストラリアもアメリカも、アルゼンチンもカナダもみんな、これは入植者 (settlers) が作った社会を核として発展した国家です。元々あった先住民の社会を殲滅した後に、ヨーロッパからやって来た人がつくったのがこれらの社会の共通性です。そうすると、空虚なのは単にアメリカだけじゃなくてですね、オーストラリアも空虚なんじゃないか、という疑問を私は禁じ得ません。だから、ベル先生、カーター先生のお二人にお伺いしたいのは、vernacular、地方性だとかですね、方言性だとか、ローカリズムだとかっていうのは、オーストラリアでは何についていえるのかということです。個別の質問をいろいろ用意して来たんですけども時間がきましたので、ここで止めておきます。具体的な質問は、橋川さんの方からお願いします。

コメント

橋 川 健 竜

私はご報告いただいた四つのペーパーを題材に、三つの話をさせていただきます。第一は太平洋におけるグローバリゼーション、第二に帝国、第三にオーストラリアのアイデンティティです。その中で、ご報告の先生方に質問を差し上げたく思います。

第一に、太平洋におけるグローバリゼーションを特徴付けします。私は歴史屋ですので、グローバリゼーションは何度も、波のように来たと考えたいと思います。最初の波は18世紀の後半から19世紀の前半です。まとめるなら、探検と異文化間交易の時代であり、そしてその異文化間交易が、市場経済に取って代わられる時代といえます。探検についてはおそらく語る必要はないでしょう。ラッコの毛皮の取引は、先住民がラッコを捕えて、イギリス人やアメリカ人と取引するのであり、文化の異なる集団が手探りで交易している点で、すでに異文化間交易です。さらに、本日あまり出てきていない中国を加えると、ますます異文化間交易になります。当時の中国における対外交易は、今日では朝貢システムと呼ばれています。これは経済的な取引ではなく、中国こそが中心にあり、それ以外はすべて外縁にあるということ、モノの取引を通じて確認する、外交的な儀礼なのです。イギリスも当初はこれに合わせて取引することを余儀なくされましたが、中国から茶を大量に輸入していたこともあって、それに対応する輸出をしようと、1840年に有名なアヘン戦争を起こし、朝貢システムの解体に踏み出していくことになります。ここでオーストラリアについて補足しますと、オーストラリアも1800年から1820年ごろにかけて、アザラシの毛皮の取引を中国と行っていました。ただしこれは、アザラシの数が減ってしまったため、20年ほどしか続きませんでした。以上が一つ目の時代です。

二つ目は19世紀の真ん中から、20世紀の真ん中あたりまでの時代です。この時代の特徴は、人の移動と、それに対する反応です。この時期の初めに、カリフォルニアとオーストラリアで、数年の差でゴールドラッシュが起こります。1851年にオーストラリアで金が出るというニュースを広めたのはエドワード・ハーグレイヴズという人物ですが、彼はカリフォルニアで金を掘っていたことがありました。その後オーストラリアに戻り、地形的に似た場所について勘を働かせたのです。彼は太平洋をまたぐ人物だったわけです。さらに、ニュースを聞いて金を掘りに来た数多くの人々の中には、中国出身者も含まれていました。カリフォルニアには1860年代末に約6万3,000人が、オーストラリアには1880年にかけて4万人ほどの中国出身者が来ており、顕著な人の移動が起きていたのです。これに対して、アメリカでもオーストラリアでも反発が起きます。アメリカでは1882年に排華移民法を制定して、中国人の入国を禁じました。オーストラリアは1901年に連邦を結成した際、いわゆる白豪主義政策を完成させます。ですから太平洋的に同じことが起こっており、しかも敷衍するなら、オーストラリアはアジアの国々を恐れて、イギリス海軍に守ってもらうことを望んだと考えることができるでしょう。

三つ目は20世紀の後半から今日にかけてです。情報が瞬時に伝わり、文化が商品として世界中で共有される時代です。この時代については、ベル先生とカーター先生が詳しく

お話をしましたので、私が話を重ねる必要はないでしょう。オーストラリアにとって、アメリカはもはや脅威ではありません。イギリスはもはや権威ではありません。どちらも、圧倒的な帝国的存在ではないのです。グローバリゼーションの波について、以上のようにまとめたいと思います。

このように考えると、二つ目のトピックである帝国は、大雑把な物言いですが、恐れというものと結びついていることに思い至ります。オーストラリアがアジアの国々を恐れていたということは、先ほど申し上げました。アメリカがルイスとクラークを派遣した理由は、イギリスを恐れていたからです。アメリカ自身も誰かを恐れて帝国的という行動をとらねばならなかった、と考えてもよいでしょう。ここでテイラー先生に、ジェファソンに関する質問を差し上げます。ジェファソンは、彼をどう理解するか次第でアメリカ史全体の評価が変わってしまう人物です。特にジェファソンと商業、陸、海などの関係の扱い方が、大きな解釈の違いにつながります。テイラー先生のお話では、ジェファソンは海や商業と強く結びついていたことになりそうです。他方我々は多くの場合、ジェファソンを陸の人、農業を好んだ人とする通説に従ってアメリカ史を学んできました。この見解の違いについて、整理をしていただけると幸いです。

三つ目のトピック、オーストラリアのアイデンティティに話を移します。2000年シドニー・オリンピックの開会式では、オーストラリアのアイデンティティがひとつの商品として提示されていました。そこでは解放的で誰も排除されない感じがします。誰でも楽しく消費できる商品であり、恐れという感覚を引き起こさない、そんな風に見受けました。これはおそらく、オーストラリアが自分に対する自信を強めてきたことの現われなのだろうと思います。特に、外部からの影響力に対して、それに自分たちが対応でき、消化できるという自信を持つ、いうなれば柔軟で、かつ安定したアイデンティティを持つにいたったということでしょう。多文化社会を注意深く作り上げてきたオーストラリアの近年の歴史の、なすところなのかもしれません。ここでベル先生とカーター先生に質問を差し上げます。消費志向の柔軟かつ安定したアイデンティティは、とても魅力的なものです。しかし消費志向という点を考えると、それは、あくまで気が向いたら手に取ってみるものである、といった印象を私は禁じ得ません。もう少し強い思い入れやこだわりの場所はないのでしょうか。たとえば、粘り強く自分の国を改革していこうという意味は、消費志向のアイデンティティから起こってくるのでしょうか。キーティング首相のことが思い浮かびます。1990年代にキーティング首相はアジア地域とのつながりを積極的に求め、国内では多文化主義を推進しました。しかしそれはポピュリスト的な反発を呼び起こし、彼は選挙で敗北します。取って代わったのは保守的なジョン・ハワード政権であり、加えてワン・ネーション党という、さらに保守色の濃厚な政党が出現して注目を集める、ということすら起きました。ポストモダンで消費志向の自己理解をする社会では、改革を推し進めることは難しいのだとも考えるのですが、先生方はこの点をいかがお考えでしょうか。

最後に福島先生にひとつ質問を差し上げます。incrementalism, すなわち漸進的に成果を追求する、という言葉が先生に使われました。これを、ベル先生とカーター先生が示唆される消費志向のオーストラリアのアイデンティティと関係させて説明することは可能でしょうか。難しい質問で恐縮ですが、ご意見を伺えれば幸いです。私からは以上です。ありがとうございました。

寄稿

Colonial Modernity and Print Culture Studies: Books and Readers in Australian Society

David Carter

Introduction

In Australian literary studies over the last decade as in other parts of the Anglophone world there has been something of a shift away from the practices of “textual politics” and towards forms of cultural history. If textual politics has continued as a dominant practice, underwritten by one or other version of post-structuralist or post-colonial theory, alongside such criticism there has emerged a growing interest in the history of the institutional structures that organise reading and writing: publishing networks, reading practices, distribution and bookselling, newspapers and periodicals, and “book cultures” or “print cultures” more generally. The history of the book, print culture studies and studies of reading have all become significant growth areas, bringing together “new” and “old” scholarship in bibliography, intellectual history, and media studies. In the midst of various “after theory” narratives, some gleeful, some nostalgic, this new interest in the cultural history of books, print and reading emerges both *positively* out of engagement with cultural studies and critical theory and *negatively* out of a certain weariness with the routines of contemporary criticism.

Despite its negative charge, I always insist that the shift to cultural history is less anti-theory than *post*-theory; that is, it takes off precisely from the way critical theory points us beyond the autonomous literary work, but it takes this imperative away from deconstructive critique to a new constructive or constitutive sense of the sociology of texts and “the public life of literature.”¹⁾ If I wished to be polemical I might say that these days I am more interested in books than in literature, and more interested in what ordinary readers rather than critics do with them; or at least that I am interested in how literature and literariness circulate as material forms and as values in a broader and more heterogenous world of books, print and other media.

Book history is a vast, varied interdisciplinary field, but its basic logic is to argue that the meaning of books and other printed matter is not inherent in the text but dependent on the circumstances of their production, their physical form, and the contexts of reception. Thus book history is interested in the material book and in materialist questions such as the nature of publishing technologies and shifts in the publishing industry, the interdependent histories of print and copyright, the intersections between different media (newspaper, periodicals,

¹⁾ David Carter and Kay Ferres, “The Public Life of Literature,” in *Culture in Australia: Policies, Publics and Programs*, ed. Tony Bennett and David Carter (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 140–60.

books), and shifts in reading habits and the nature of the reading public. Its ultimate horizons are those of social, cultural and intellectual history. One well-known example is Elizabeth Eisenstein's classic 1979 study *The Printing Press as an Agent of Change*, now much challenged but still a foundational work.²⁾ To put it simply, print culture studies is interested in how books come to readers and how readers come to books (or other print materials) and the social means and consequences of these processes; or as a recent anthology put it: how "books make history" and how "history makes books."³⁾

Two other strands of emerging work in Australian literary studies and cultural history can be mentioned as a context for the present argument: studies in modernity and studies of trans-national, not merely national, contexts for Australian culture.

In common with other settler colonies, the relationship between nationality and modernity in Australia has been deeply ambiguous, both historically in fact and continuously in critical commentary. Australia was always viewed and felt to be both *too modern* and *not modern enough*: lacking its own history and traditions, on the one hand, but lagging behind the modernity of the great metropolitan centres, on the other. Australia had been born modern but had never quite achieved modernity. Orthodox studies charting the up-take of artistic modernism in art and literature have often suggested a "time-lag" whereby the Australian uptake of modernism was ten or twenty or thirty years behind the times (Australia's physical distance from Europe can be rendered—and experienced—as distance in *time* as well as space).

Such analyses have a point, but in this respect Australian modernism was not peculiarly antipodean or exceptional. Rather it was contemporaneous with a whole range of regional, provincial or "vernacular" modernisms across the globe, including in Britain and America themselves outside one or two major cities. More recent studies, working with the notion of modernity rather than modern-*ism*, have begun to rewrite the Australian story and to reveal a multi-layered history of Australian modernity—in design, town-planning, architecture, psychology, fashion, popular entertainment, and in books and reading.⁴⁾ Australia, in short, was part of the international "dispersal" of modernity, a trans-national phenomenon manifested simultaneously in different parts of the globe rather than something emanating solely from the metropolitan centres. Modernity had its own dynamic in Australia because of its distinctive relation to English and American culture, say, or its combination of high levels of urbanisation and low levels of industrialisation, but the point is to relocate Australian

²⁾ See *The Book History Reader*, 2nd ed., ed. David Finkelstein and Alistair McCleery (London: Routledge, 2006).

³⁾ Introduction, *A Companion to the History of the Book*, ed. Simon Eliot and Jonathan Rose (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), 1.

⁴⁾ For example; Liz Conor, *The Spectacular Modern Woman: Feminine Visibility in the 1920s* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004); Jill Julius Matthews, *Dance Hall and Picture Palace: Sydney's Romance with Modernity* (Sydney: Currency Press, 2005); Gail Reekie, *Temptations: Sex, Selling and the Department Store* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1993); Richard Waterhouse, *Private Pleasures, Public Leisure: A History of Australian Popular Culture Since 1788* (Melbourne: Longman, 1995).

culture *within* modernity rather than as left behind.

This emphasis is closely linked to a shift of focus from the national to the trans-national (for some the trans-national is the new post-colonial). One way of registering the change in my own work is as a shift of focus from “Australian literature” to “literature in Australia.” We have plenty of histories of Australian literature—a new Cambridge History is in preparation—but we have scarcely begun to think about the history of literature in Australia (or the history of books and reading). Work on colonial culture has delivered more in this respect than that focused on more recent times, because the absence of canonical nineteenth-century texts has forced critics to become historians and sociologists and to work across imperial and trans-national cultural networks. The gaps for twentieth-century studies, however, are remarkable in a settler, immigrant and post-colonial society in which the vast bulk of reading has *always* meant the reading of books written and published elsewhere. To link the two themes just outlined, in my own research imperial connections are revealed to be not merely oppressive forces for conservatism but also vectors of modernity in their own right, as Australian consumers sought the best new books from overseas.

Middlebrow book culture

Let me focus these concerns on a specific topic, the history of middlebrow book culture in Australia. By “book culture” I mean the institutions through which books and reading circulate in Australia, and the kinds of meaning and value attached to them; literature was a central part of this, of course, but the term “book culture” is meant to indicate a much broader field of publishing, reading and “book talk.”

More problematic is the term “middlebrow.” The word itself emerged in the 1920s in both the USA and Britain in a three-part hierarchy—highbrow, lowbrow and middlebrow—used to describe certain kinds of taste, certain kinds of culture and, of course, certain kinds of people. The word “brow” harks back to nineteenth-century phrenology, to the idea that lower types, such as criminal types, had lower and more prominent brows than the more civilised. Interestingly all three terms were almost always terms of abuse; that is, they were what you accused other people of being. If the positions *were* affirmed, it was usually defensively, claiming an identity in the face of an accusation: “Yes I am highbrow/middlebrow/lowbrow and proud of it!” Further, as terms of abuse, all three were also repeatedly feminised: there was the pansy highbrow, the domestic middlebrow, and the sentimental or sensational lowbrow. Thus while many claimed to be “*neither highbrow nor lowbrow*”—this was a thoroughly overworked cliché of the period—few claimed to be middlebrow.

The division between high and low cultures is a very familiar one, with a vast literature criticising and historicising the opposition; but the significance of a middle term, with its own history, has largely been forgotten in more recent work on popular culture. In order to grasp the dynamics of early-twentieth century modernity, however, it is important to restore the middlebrow’s distinctive presence to cultural history. While the mass culture critiques of F. R. and Q. D. Leavis, among many others, are well-known, it has largely been forgotten

that their anxieties were driven not just by the growth of lowbrow popular fiction but as much, if not more, by the rise of the middlebrow because of its insidious claims on quality culture.⁵⁾ Virginia Woolf, for one, saw the middlebrow as the natural enemy of highbrow and lowbrow alike: middlebrow culture, for Woolf, was “a mixture of geniality and sentiment stuck together with a sticky slime of calf’s-foot jelly ... in pursuit of no single object, neither Art itself nor life itself, but both mixed indistinguishably, and rather nastily, with money, fame, power, or prestige.”⁶⁾ In the USA, Dwight Macdonald, in a famous essay, indicted John Steinbeck and other well-known authors for professing what he called Midcult values. But he exempted Zane Grey, the prolific writer of popular Westerns, as “it seems never to have occurred to him that his books had anything to do with literature.” Midcult was the problem, for “it pretends to respect the standards of High culture while in fact it waters them down and vulgarizes them.”⁷⁾

The term “middlebrow,” of course, has no more historical or theoretical credibility than the high culture/low culture split—but also no *less*. It emerged in the early twentieth century to name what was new about divisions in the cultural field and marketplace, and indeed, as Woolf’s remarks suggest, to stake out positions in a kind of culture war. The middlebrow might thus be defined as a set of *attitudes towards* culture, and we can write their history. But these attitudes also gave rise to a set of institutions which had concrete effects in organising the field of culture. From the 1920s, books, markets, life projects, even national projects, were conceived within a field newly structured by its division into high, middle and low, even as individual texts, writers, and readers slipped around between the categories. This fact, plus the historical use of the term itself, means that the middlebrow is a useful analytical concept for understanding a range of phenomena in mid-twentieth century culture despite its conceptual vagueness.

The terms “highbrow” and “lowbrow” were in common use several decades before “middlebrow.” The idea of a cultural hierarchy scaled from high to low was common by the 1880s, but the idea of a distinct middle came later, in the twentieth century, for it depended on the simultaneous presence of high modernism on one side and urban mass culture on the other. As one American critic puts it:

Since the 1920s, the term *middlebrow* has designated the vast field of cultural production and consumption located between the most disparaged of mass entertainments and the elite ranks of avant-garde and high culture, at the intersection of consumers’ efforts to

⁵⁾ F. R. Leavis, *Mass Civilisation and Minority Culture* (Cambridge: Minority Press, 1930); Q. D. Leavis, *Fiction and the Reading Public* (London: Pimlico, 2000).

⁶⁾ Virginia Woolf, “Middlebrow,” *The Death of the Moth and Other Essays* (London: Hogarth Press, 1942), 182.

⁷⁾ Dwight Macdonald, “Masscult and Midcult,” *Partisan Review* (Spring 1960): 203–33 and (Fall 1960): 589–631.

access culture and the efforts of critics, educators, and entrepreneurs to make such culture more widely accessible.⁸⁾

What is important in this description is less the middle-ness of the middlebrow than the way it is located at the intersection of a new consumer imperative towards culture and a new organisation of cultural institutions and intermediaries committed to meeting that imperative and multiplying the desires it created. This dual commitment to culture and accessibility, whether through education or marketing, was critical in shaping the middlebrow; and the odd mix of agents indicated in the quotation—“critics, educators and entrepreneurs”—is exactly right in suggesting the dynamics and contradictions that drove it forward.

A very wide range of attitudes and institutions has been linked to the middlebrow, some higher up the scale, some lower, some commercial, some pedagogical, some focused on the classics, others on the contemporary and best-selling. What links them is the notion that culture —“good books” in our case—could be made more accessible, in two senses of the term: culture should not be the sole preserve of specialists or “highbrows” (it did not need to be forbiddingly difficult or intellectual, nor did one need a sophisticated critical vocabulary to appreciate it); and it should be readily available, through the media and the marketplace, for easy consumption. Hence the vogue for book selections, such as the recommended “Book of the Month” or the many “world’s greatest books” series. By democratising the appeal of culture, such institutions could assure consumers not only that “good books” could be entertaining but also that entertaining books could be worthwhile: those that were neither too highbrow nor too lowbrow.

The first recorded use of “middlebrow” in the OED in fact refers to musical broadcasts on the radio rather than to literature. The BBC, according to *Punch* in 1925, had “discovered a new type, the middlebrow ... people who are hoping that some day they will get used to the stuff they ought to like.”⁹⁾ The quote is a nice one for suggesting that the idea of the middlebrow felt new in 1925; and also for indicating the mix of aspiration and imperative, desire and discipline, often associated with it. Further, radio and new books were the two key media for the middlebrow because they offered to make prestige culture dramatically more accessible, more affordable, and more “repeatable” (or reproducible). Spreading and democratising culture according to some; cheapening and standardising according to others.

In 1949, American *Life* magazine published a feature article on the differences between highbrow, middlebrow and lowbrow covering everything from artistic taste, including reading matter, to tastes in food and drink, to clothing and home furnishings.¹⁰⁾ Indeed they

⁸⁾ Jennifer Parchesky, “‘You Make Us Articulate’: Reading, Education, and Community in Dorothy Canfield’s Middlebrow America,” in *Reading Acts: US Readers’ Interactions with Literature, 1800-1950*, ed. Barbara Ryan and Amy M. Thomas (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 2002), 229.

⁹⁾ As recorded in *The Oxford English Dictionary*.

¹⁰⁾ “Everyday Tastes from High-Brow to Low-Brow,” *Life* 26, no. 11 (April 1949): 100–101, reprinted in *Perspectives on American Book History: Artifacts and Commentary*, ed. Scott E. Casper, Joanne Chaison and Jeffrey D. Groves (Amherst and Boston: University of Massachusetts Press, 2002), 348–49.

distinguished between “upper” and “lower” middlebrow, and offered a handy chart to aid each reader’s identification of their own tastes—or perhaps their neighbour’s! (Interestingly, a Japanese version was published in 1958).¹¹⁾

EVERYDAY TASTES FROM HIGH-BROW TO LOW-BROW ARE CLASSIFIED ON CHART										
	CLOTHES	FURNITURE	USEFUL OBJECTS	ENTERTAINMENT	SAVINGS	DRINKS	READING	SCULPTURE	RECORDS	CAUSES
HIGH-BROW	 TOWN COUNTRY Rural Rural Rural Rural Rural	 Eames Eames Eames Eames Eames	 Decorative and artistic supply company	 Ballet	 Grown, slow and steady growth on the ground, not artificial	 A glass of "Chateau Lafite" red wine	 "Little magazines," criticism of artists, poets, etc.	 Cubist	 Rock and roll, ten and other	 Go
UPPER MIDDLE-BROW	 TOWN COUNTRY Rural Rural Rural Rural Rural	 Eames Eames Eames Eames Eames	 Decorative and artistic supply company	 Ballet	 Grown, slow and steady growth on the ground, not artificial	 A glass of "Chateau Lafite" red wine	 "Little magazines," criticism of artists, poets, etc.	 Cubist	 Rock and roll, ten and other	 Go
LOWER MIDDLE-BROW	 TOWN COUNTRY Rural Rural Rural Rural Rural	 Eames Eames Eames Eames Eames	 Decorative and artistic supply company	 Ballet	 Grown, slow and steady growth on the ground, not artificial	 A glass of "Chateau Lafite" red wine	 "Little magazines," criticism of artists, poets, etc.	 Cubist	 Rock and roll, ten and other	 Go
LOW-BROW	 TOWN COUNTRY Rural Rural Rural Rural Rural	 Eames Eames Eames Eames Eames	 Decorative and artistic supply company	 Ballet	 Grown, slow and steady growth on the ground, not artificial	 A glass of "Chateau Lafite" red wine	 "Little magazines," criticism of artists, poets, etc.	 Cubist	 Rock and roll, ten and other	 Go

The chart was a good joke at the time and still is, although Pierre Bourdieu’s work on cultural taste and social distinction might suggest we should take it a little bit seriously too. What it *does* tell us is that the conceptual framework of high, low and middlebrow was readily available as a way of organising cultural tastes and lifestyle choices in the 1940s.

Still, there is no single, fixed set of artefacts or tastes—or people for that matter—that embody once and for all the essence of middlebrow-ness. There is nothing essentially middlebrow about Vivaldi’s *Four Seasons*, for example, yet its place in contemporary registers of taste is something very like the middlebrow, whether or not we use the word. Just as clearly, there is nothing essentially middlebrow about “great books,” but repackaged as an attractive series, selected by well-known experts, and offered for sale at affordable prices they enter the field of middlebrow meanings. Thus the famous Harvard Classics: selected by Charles Eliot, president of Harvard University, packaged as the *World’s Greatest Masterpieces*, and offered with the advice that they could be consumed at a rate of only fifteen minutes reading per day. By 1946, if not earlier, they were available to Australian consumers.

¹¹⁾ “Chiteki kaikyū toso wa hajimatta [Intellectual Class Struggle has Begun],” *Bungei Shunju* 36, no. 5 (May 1958): 116–17.

THE HARVARD CLASSICS AN APPEAL TO INTELLECTUALS

Do you desire to increase your intellectual stature? Would you take pleasure in doubling or trebling your earning capacity? Assuredly!

Well, invest £33 in the Harvard Classics!...

The Harvard Classics contain 418 of the World's Greatest Masterpieces. They are by 302 supreme writers of all time. They are complete and unabridged.

This great array of the imperishable writings by the world's outstanding authors is contained in 50 volumes having a total of 22,407 pages.

Under the guidance of the inimitable Dr Charles W. Eliot, President of Harvard University for forty years, you read for fifteen minutes every day of the year the pages he has selected for you.

No intelligent person can do this, with devotion, for 365 days and fail to be transformed...

The beautiful books sell themselves! Their appeal to the intellect is irresistible!¹²⁾

Thus accredited by a well-known expert and packaged in consumable parcels, both as material objects to buy and as texts to be read, the classics become a new kind of commodity, accessible to every "intelligent person." They were to be read in the home rather than the library, and in the living room, I suspect, rather than the study. Above all, they promised to increase the consumer's intellectual stature and his or her "earning capacity." If such a claim now sounds vulgar or naïve, this might only reveal how far our own investment in high culture persists. In fact one of the challenges of the historical middlebrow is to learn to take such claims seriously. After all, they are not too far from what we promise our own students via a university degree: to increase their intellectual stature *and* their earning capacity.

In the kind of rhetoric represented by this advertisement, culture was its own reward, but it was also repurposed as new social and economic capital. The middlebrow appeal to self-improvement—being "tremendously transformed"—was rather different from earlier forms of working-class self-education, for it was less about being educated than being *modern*: well-informed, comfortable in the presence of "interesting talk" and up-to-date, even in relation to the classics. Its consumers, we might say, were already more or less educated and middle class, but they sought new forms of cultural insidership and social distinction.

Middlebrow culture can be defined by this mix of attributes and aspirations. Typically, the value of culture was affirmed and traditional voices of authority were evoked, but at the same time that value was transformed: culture was to be made much more widely accessible or, more precisely, more "consumable," whether in the form of cheap sets of classics, membership of an institution like the Book of the Month Club which offered the best of the new books sifted and selected by a panel of experts, or in the new commercial

¹²⁾ Advertisement in *View* (Melbourne), April 1946.

book magazines and radio book shows which equally performed the role of selecting and recommending (and offering familiarity with “book talk”). In the process, traditional high culture or “restricted” values were put into much wider circulation through the use of new media and new forms of marketing directed at an expanded reading and book-buying public. Thus it was that critics, educators and entrepreneurs could indeed find common cause. Joan Shelley Rubin links the development of the famous Great Books program at Columbia to the emergence of middlebrow culture, for it too depended upon the assumption that serious culture was accessible, relevant, and socially “useful” to an emerging class of professionals, and so should not be restricted to the scholars or specialists.¹³⁾

As the critics met the entrepreneurs, there was almost nothing that couldn’t be repackaged to appeal to a middlebrow market. Even *Ulysses*. In 1934, Random House advertised its new edition of Joyce’s novel in the middlebrow *Saturday Review of Literature*.

Ulysses is no harder to “understand” than any other great classic. It is essentially a story and can be enjoyed as such. Do not let the critics confuse you. *Ulysses* is not difficult to read, and it richly rewards each reader in wisdom and pleasure. So thrilling an adventure into the soul and mind and heart of man has never before been charted. This is your opportunity to begin the exploration of one of the greatest novels of our time...

... With a plot furnished by Homer, against a setting by Dante, and with characters motivated by Shakespeare, *Ulysses* is really not as difficult to comprehend as critics like to pretend. [There then follows a quite sophisticated how-to-read guide, after which the advertisement continues...]

But these things need not concern the general reader whose enjoyment of *Ulysses* depends on its humour, its wisdom, and its essential humanity. Beyond the esoteric significance of parts of the book... there lies as the solid basis of it one of the most exciting stories offered by modern fiction: the complete, unexpurgated record of a man’s uninhibited adventures, mental and physical, during the course of one full day.¹⁴⁾

Despite its own warnings about critics, the advertisement nonetheless includes a section devoted to “What the Critics Say.” Thus, as with the Harvard Classics, high cultural authority and expertise is invoked as a form of certification but simultaneously disavowed for the sake of the “general reader” (“Don’t let the critics confuse you”). The point to be insisted upon was that ultimately *Ulysses* was a *good read*. Readers were promised that greatness and pleasure, modernity and “essential humanity” could still be found together—although as far as I know nobody tried the same thing for *Finnegan’s Wake*.

¹³⁾ Joan Shelley Rubin, *The Making of Middlebrow Culture* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992), 27–29 and 148ff.

¹⁴⁾ Published in *Saturday Review of Literature* 10, no. 10 (February 1934): 474–75, reprinted in Casper, Chaison and Groves, *American Book History*, 342–43.

Middlebrow modernity

As this example suggests, the middlebrow was in part a means of absorbing the challenges of modernism, and as such it usefully puts modernist fiction back into its contemporary context: out of the *canon*, as it were, and back into the crowded marketplace of new books—high, middle and low—within which it first appeared (or in the case of *Ulysses* re-appeared). The rise of middlebrow institutions was itself a response to the rapid expansion of publishing and reading around the turn of the century. From the 1890s to the 1930s in Britain the annual number of new titles more than doubled despite a dip during the war, an increase largely driven by new fiction and condensed popular knowledge titles, such as H. G. Wells's best-selling *Short History of the World*. There were more books and more *new* books, as the book trade was reorganised around the category of the bestseller, the book of the week or month. Reading too was reorganised as part of modern leisure; there were new kinds of readers and reading occasions. As one commentator remarked, noting the new phenomena of pocket editions, “Civilisation comes to us today in exquisite fragments suitable for shelf, suitcase or car, purposely designed to meet the fleeting needs of the modern race of nomads.”¹⁵⁾

Although none of these developments was unprecedented in the 1920s, their effects were accelerating (after a moment of pause during the Great War). But while the boom in new books and new readers could be celebrated as a sign of a healthy culture and book trade, it could also be unsettling for critics, entrepreneurs and consumers alike. Again and again in the twenties, amateur and professional readers express an anxious sense of “drowning” in a sea of new books. The sense was that the sheer number of new publications made it increasingly difficult to discern the best and harder to inform oneself authoritatively; but as books and reading and new kinds of readers proliferated, it became increasingly important that one *should* be so informed, and so distinguished from the ignorant or indiscriminating consumer. As the famous publicity for the US Book of the Month Club put it: “How often have outstanding books appeared, widely discussed and widely recommended, books you were really anxious to read and fully intended to read when you ‘got around to it,’ but which nevertheless you *missed*? Why is it you disappoint yourself so frequently in this way?”¹⁶⁾

Such appeals manifested a form of social anxiety, a cultural imperative, and a market opportunity, all at once. Critics and entrepreneurs both could feel that the burgeoning consumer-oriented book culture needed to be sorted and regularised. Thus institutions built around the key tasks of keeping up with the best of the new books and getting to know the classics proliferated almost as fast as the new books themselves: subscriber book clubs; book magazines and radio book shows; books on how to read books; digests and “outlines”; and book selections, lists, series and compilations of all kinds.

¹⁵⁾ Arthur Thrush, “Pocket Editions of Today,” *All About Books* 14 (December 1928): 42.

¹⁶⁾ From the Club's first advertisement, quoted in Rubin, *Making of Middlebrow Culture*, 99.

The Australian magazine, *All About Books*, launched in 1928, defined good books as those “which you not only SHOULD read, but will enjoy reading.”¹⁷⁾ The magazine’s opening editorial is one of the best local examples of the middlebrow moment:

We launch this Journal on a sea already overcrowded with journals, magazines and daily and weekly papers of all kinds, to say nothing of a superabundance of books published each month—this is just the trouble. As very ordinary members of the great public, we have found much difficulty in sifting the grains of wheat out of so much chaff, and many in our circle of social and business friends are in the same predicament. We like reading, and welcome with open arms anyone who can tell us of a good book.

If we could only find some means of getting recommendations of the best new books without having to read long, critical reviews... We read mainly for recreation, and want some means of learning of the best new books—some summary that will enable us to decide quickly if a book is the kind that will give us the pleasure and recreation or the information we desire...

We intend to give information rather than criticism. We lay no claim to literary distinction. We do not even desire to be original. But we do aim to keep you advised of the best new books and what leading reviewers think of them, to give you interesting information about books and authors, to let you know of the books that are attracting worldwide attention and, perhaps, bring to your notice older good books you may have overlooked.¹⁸⁾

The magazine’s founder, D. W. Thorpe, was a book trade entrepreneur rather than a critic or man of letters. Like many other middlebrow institutions, the magazine’s aim was to make book selection efficient, timely and reliable, and it linked reading to pleasure, recreation and information rather than culture. And yet the whole point was to sort out the *best* new books, and this task did carry a cultural loading.

The duality in the magazine’s aims became explicit in its sixth anniversary editorial in 1934: “We have endeavoured to serve a dual purpose. Qualified critics such as Mrs Palmer and Professor Cowling give critical reviews regularly, whilst other reviewers, engaged for their ability to ‘sort’ books into different classes, give summaries of different types of novels.”¹⁹⁾ The magazine thus made a feature of its authoritative critics: Nettie Palmer, then the best-known critic of Australian books, and George Cowling, Professor of English at Melbourne University, both of whom contributed monthly columns. But most

¹⁷⁾ Phil Grim, “Russia, England, British Guiana [sic], Mexico,” *All About Books* 12 (May 1934): 94.

¹⁸⁾ Introduction, *All About Books* 14 (December 1928): 1. See David Carter, “‘Some Means of Learning of the Best New Books’: *All About Books* and the Modern Reader,” *Australian Literary Studies* 22, no. 3 (2006): 329–41.

¹⁹⁾ “We Turn Six,” *All About Books* 15 (January 1934): 3.

of the magazine's pages were filled with reviews that indeed did little more than sort and summarise, and that claimed little more authority than that of a fellow reader. Even Palmer's column was called "A Reader's Notebook," while Cowling, very much like Henry Seidel Canby, the Yale professor central to the US Book of the Month Club and *Saturday Review*, proved an ideal figure of middlebrow guidance. He brought his authoritative status as a Professor of English to bear in advising readers as to the "books everyone should read," but largely dissolved that authority in a familiar readerly manner, as a reader writing for readers rather than a critic writing for critics. By the late thirties, his column bears the impeccably middlebrow title "All Sorts of Reading for Everybody."

Cowling's reputation is as an Anglophile literary conservative, and so he was, but the very conventionality of his vocabulary—his insistence that good fiction required sincere emotion, unity of purpose, sympathetic characters and a good story—enabled him to find in the monthly bestsellers plenty of examples of the good and almost great. He thereby reassured ordinary readers that highbrow-ism was irrelevant to worthwhile reading and literary enjoyment. Dismissing a modernist novel under review he writes: "It is very provocative, and 'crowded with culture' of the highbrow sort that is now talked ... in the Café Francais, London."²⁰⁾ Not surprisingly, his hero was Arnold Bennett, and like Bennett he was happy for authors to achieve social distinction: "I should like to see Australian literary men sailing their own yachts, managing repertory theatres, travelling *de luxe*, filling the stalls at the theatres in immaculate evening dress, and collecting books, pictures and bric-à-brac."²¹⁾

In *All About Books* new habits of reading were also linked to new habits of book-buying or rather book *owning*. "Own the books you most wish to read. Have them in your library, carry them in your pocket."²²⁾ Whether by purchasing the Harvard Classics, or perhaps the ten-volume *Masterpiece Library of Short Stories* as my grandfather did, or through discriminating individual choices, the building of a personal library, no doubt within reach of many for the first time, carried important social meanings. Building a library meant taking responsibility for one's own recreation and "transformation"; but it was also pre-eminently a social act, defining a place within what we might call cultured sociability. Thus the home becomes the crucial site of middlebrow book culture, and the frequent recommendation that books and bookshelves made attractive living room furniture was not simply trivial; even these should be good books in good bookshelves. And here, too, the entrepreneur and the critic, even the *nationalist* critic, found common cause. As Nettie Palmer wrote, advising readers on gifts for Christmas 1930: "What are the books that we cannot afford to miss this year? [Those] I have noted are such as we shall want to have at hand in years to come ... either in our homes or in our libraries."²³⁾ Building a library and building a market were both

²⁰⁾ G. H. Cowling, "What is Good Literature?" *All About Books* 15 (May 1931): 107.

²¹⁾ G. H. Cowling, "Arnold Bennett, Ellen Terry and Others," *All About Books* 12 (September 1933): 139–40.

²²⁾ *All About Books* (May 1929): 178.

²³⁾ Nettie Palmer, "Australian Books of 1930," *All About Books* 5 (December 1930): 307–10.

part of building a reading nation.

The line between high ideals of cultural diffusion and commercial imperatives towards the commodification of cultural products was never clear. Middlebrow institutions were committed to broadening access to culture, even to its democratisation, but also to its role as a form of social distinction. They were committed to quality but also to expanding its markets. They evoked critical authority but largely in order to reassure ordinary readers that the best was within their reach (and in their interests). They repeated the lesson that culture could be acquired not just through inherited cultural capital, and not even necessarily through extensive disciplined study, but through discerning consumption (a book a month, fifteen minutes a day). Good books were promoted as the repository of timeless values while modern marketing promised to deliver them in a timely and efficient manner. Enduring classics were announced month after month.

The middlebrow notion of “good reading” was thus fairly generous both up and down the scale, multiplying the possible kinds of good books way beyond the limits of the literary canon. But at the same time it carefully policed the boundaries between good books and trash, at one end, good reading and highbrow affectation, at the other. Readers were assured that their own tastes mattered and that with *some guidance* they could appreciate quality themselves, whether in a challenging modern novel, a “virile” western, or the many good books in between. Two scales of value operated together, the vertical scale of universal quality and a horizontal scale where books were divided and sub-divided into so many types and tastes. On the latter plane, taking its bearings from the consumer, different tastes were just “a matter of taste.” On the former, by contrast, taking its bearings from the critic, taste was something rare and to be cultivated. Middlebrow culture emerges in the intersection between the two scales, mediating different *kinds* and different *values*, primarily through the flimsy but eminently flexible notion of “good books.” Of course, the very indeterminacy of the term left all the work of discrimination still to be done.

The (trans-)national middlebrow

Over the last decade there have been substantial studies of the middlebrow in the United States, especially Joan Shelly Rubin’s *The Making of Middlebrow Culture* and Janice Radway’s study of the Book of the Month Club, *A Feeling for Books*. The middlebrow has also emerged as an important category for new studies of mid-century modernity in British literature, for example in Nicola Humble’s *The Feminine Middlebrow Novel* or Chris Baldick’s recent volume in the Oxford English Literary History series, *The Modern Movement*.²⁴⁾ To date there has been no equivalent Australian study.

²⁴⁾ Joan Shelly Rubin, *Making of Middlebrow Culture*; Janice Radway, *A Feeling for Books: The Book-of-the-Month Club, Literary Taste, and Middle-Class Desire* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997); Nicola Humble, *The Feminine Middlebrow Novel* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Chris Baldick, *The Modern Movement* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

The US and British studies are largely pursued within national boundaries where, in each case, there was a substantial domestic publishing industry servicing a large national reading public. Imported books and magazines disappear, as it were, into the national market. But what of the Australian case, where books and reading for the most part meant books and reading from overseas? Were the institutions of middlebrow culture reproduced in Australia, and if so when and where? How does the middlebrow, as an analytical concept, change our understanding of Australian literature or the national culture?

As my earlier discussion of *All About Books* suggests, I would argue that middlebrow attitudes and institutions did emerge in Australia—in the 1920s—and began to dissipate in the 1960s (as they did elsewhere). The effect of the division of cultures was weaker, perhaps, because the institutions of high culture were less well established; there was nothing on the scale of the Book of the Month Club; and it is more difficult to separate mainstream from popular publishing. Nonetheless, we can trace the splitting of nineteenth century forms of literary journalism into separate cultural spheres as new forms of book talk begin to emerge and debates about high versus low culture break out everywhere. Further, we can observe an intense interest in the new books arriving from England and the USA, in a way that can be linked rather than opposed to the desire for a modern *Australian* culture. Australian cultural politics has sometimes been portrayed as a struggle between radical nationalists, on one side, and anti-nationalist conservatives or cosmopolitan modernists on the other. But there is another history to be written, a history of what we might call “middlebrow nationalism.”

The role of imported cultural products has often been interpreted as a form of cultural imperialism. But while this has a point, certainly in industrial terms, if we shift the frame slightly, away from the national towards a trans-national history of modernity, we can interpret the desire for the latest thing from England rather differently: not as the failure of nationalism but as a means of accessing the modern. Middlebrow culture, in other words, might be seen not just as the absence of an authentic Australian culture but as a sign of Australian culture’s participation in international modernity. The new modern books were the books modern Australians wanted to know about. Editors and reviewers so took for granted their contemporaneity with London and New York that the idea of imperial domination seems to miss the point. This is heightened perhaps in a local culture dominated by the ephemeral forms of newspaper and magazine, where it was the new and newsworthy books that mattered more than tradition (except where that tradition could be made new).

Let me give some examples, mostly drawn from those magazines that mediated the new books for their Australian readers. I can begin with the Sydney *Triad*, a commercial books and theatre paper from the 1920s. Relaunching the magazine in 1925, its new editor explained: “The Old *Triad*, rightly or wrongly, was dubbed High-brow. The New *Triad* is neither High-brow nor Low-brow. It is Broad-brow.” The public doesn’t want “tripe,” he continued, despite what the experts say, but “neither do they care for caviar, except in very small portions. The *Triad* menu henceforth is neither tripe nor caviar, but a properly

balanced diet from soup to sweets.”²⁵⁾ But finding the balance between high and low, art and entertainment, criticism and news, was a recipe the new *Triad* never quite managed and the magazine soon disappeared. Part of the problem was that the middle ground it sought was precisely that of the high quality magazines imported into Australia in large numbers from the USA and Britain.

By the 1930s the habit of dividing culture according to brows was thoroughly familiar in Australia, and widely dispersed across magazines that were by no means literary magazines — in the general, independent commercial magazines, offering reading for leisure and recreation (including cultural recreation), which dominated the market until the Second World War. For example *Man* magazine (Australia’s first “men’s magazine”) reversed the usual disclaimer about being neither highbrow nor lowbrow when it was launched in 1934, proudly announcing itself as “both highbrow and lowbrow.”²⁶⁾ On the other side of the gender divide, the *Australian Women’s Weekly* (Australia’s biggest-selling and longest-running women’s magazine), launched in 1933, featured a great deal of talk about good books and reading, and it followed the highbrow-lowbrow debate. Good books were opposed to “light fiction,” but they were also defined as the books that should be owned and kept in the home. In 1940 a worried stenographer wrote to the *Weekly* with exemplary middlebrow taste and typical middlebrow anxieties: “I like biographies, best-sellers, history and travel books and most of the classics, but the girls I have come in contact with cannot be bothered with any of these, and, if they read at all, just read light fiction.”²⁷⁾

These magazines can be contrasted to the manifesto-driven “little magazines” that emerged in the early 1940s with titles such as *Comment*, *Angry Penguins*, *Venture* and *Meanjin*.²⁸⁾ These were all expressly distanced from the market, as a sign of which they privileged poetry above fiction. In best avant-garde style, *Comment* announced proudly “Our public is practically non-existent.” *Angry Penguins* boasted that it was “not intended to be entertaining” and published three poems called “Poem” in its first number. *Meanjin* and *Venture* announced nationalist intellectual movements. The modern and the intellectually serious were thus dramatically divorced from the bestsellers and books of the month in the commercial papers. National culture was divorced from the marketplace.

The emergence of modernist and nationalist movements has been thoroughly written-in to Australian cultural history. What remains hidden is the substantial growth of a whole other

²⁵⁾ *Triad*, May 1925.

²⁶⁾ *Man*, June 1937, 7, quoted in Richard White, “The Importance of Being *Man*,” in *Australian Popular Culture*, ed. Peter Spearritt and David Walker (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1979), 149.

²⁷⁾ *Australian Women’s Weekly* 20 (July 1940), and see Patrick Buckridge, “‘Good Reading’ in the *Australian Women’s Weekly*, 1933–1970,” *Journal of the Association for the Study of Australian Literature* 1 (2002): 36.

²⁸⁾ See David Carter and Roger Osborne, ‘Periodicals’, in *Paper Empires: A History of the Book in Australia 1946–2001*, ed. Craig Munro and Robyn Sheahan-Bright (St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 2006): 239–57.

layer of institutions and agents—the booksellers, radio presenters, reviewers, schoolmasters and book lovers—committed to good books, good modern books and good Australian books but not in the way that we would normally associate with cultural nationalism or high modernism. The later 1940s represent something of a highpoint for this middlebrow nationalism as the social aspirations associated with good books and good reading were linked to aspirations for a new post-war Australian culture.

The “lifestyle” magazine *Australia: National Journal*, for example, shared the values of one of its book reviewers who expressed the hope that he would soon be able to read a novel about Sydney or Melbourne that would be “as neat and sophisticated as a recent novel about Montreal ... a city of strong charm, inhabited by civilised and cultured people.”²⁹⁾ From 1939, the magazine of the national broadcaster, the *ABC Weekly*, offered “guidance in reading” as well as music appreciation, and featured ongoing discussions, not least in its correspondence pages, of what a visiting American professor called the pointless “civil war between highbrow and lowbrow.”³⁰⁾ In 1946, the ABC launched a new monthly paper entitled *Talk*, for “really worthwhile material [presented] in an attractive, popular and easily-assimilated form.” Here university experts regularly turned their expertise into general culture. Professor Eric Ashby, for one, argued the case for a distinctively Australian and suspiciously middlebrow version of the highbrow:

The lowbrow in Australia already gets a pretty fair deal; and quite rightly, for he is the backbone of the country ... But the highbrow, who is the nerves of the country, does not get such a fair deal by any means. Of course, there are highbrows and highbrows. I do not mean the pansy sort who have none of the Australian vigour ... about them, and who live in a cloud of European ideas, mostly out of date. I mean men who put into words, music, and colour our way of life.³¹⁾

Also in 1946, an Australian Book Society was launched with a magazine, *Australian Books* (1946-48). This was to be a “rallying place for all book lovers who wish to see Australian writing of all kinds ... given its full place and prominence as our OWN expression of literature.”³²⁾ It was a magazine of book news and book talk rather than literary criticism, with a monthly Australian book selection in each issue. So had the more professional but otherwise very similar magazine from the same year, the *Australasian Book News and Library Journal* (1946-48). And to continue the links between radio and good books, the commercial radio magazine *The Listener-In* recommended a Book of the Week, had its own “great book” offers, and featured regular discussion of the highbrow-lowbrow debate. It

²⁹⁾ *Australia: National Journal*, August 1946.

³⁰⁾ Professor Dixon Wecter, *ABC Weekly*, 1946.

³¹⁾ Eric Ashby, “Give the Highbrow a Fair Deal,” *Talk* 1, no. 1 (April 1946): 37.

³²⁾ Mary Mansfield, Editorial, *Australian Books* 1, no. 1 (September 1946): 1.

carried a books feature usually on the Women's Page, edited by a Miss J. G. Shain who also presented a weekly radio books show in Melbourne called *Living Authors*. As Radway suggests, book talk in such places was intensely reader-oriented, feminised and managed though the trope of direct communication with "living authors" (even those long dead).³³⁾

The rise of middlebrow modernity was also reflected in an increased presence of American cultural models in the Australian book world (I think it was "increased" but we know so little of American-Australian connections in the book world that this point might need revision). There appears, in any case, to have been a much stronger presence of contemporary American book culture in Australia than has generally been acknowledged. There were the Harvard *Masterpieces* of course, and in 1940 Angus & Robertson, Australia's largest publisher, issued Mortimer Adler's middlebrow classic *How To Read a Book*, their edition "Australianised" for local readers with a foreword by Walter Murdoch, another candidate as Australia's Henry Seidel Canby. Unlike Canby, Murdoch remained a Professor of English to the end of his career, but he built his reputation as a man of letters writing genial newspaper columns about books and reading and other matters of broad or idiosyncratic interest. (Richard Wright's *Native Son*, a controversial Book of the Month Club selection in the USA, was also reprinted by Angus & Robertson in 1940.)

Henry Canby himself toured Australia in 1945 as a guest of the University of Melbourne, and Melbourne University Press subsequently published his lectures as a short book on "the importance of a national literature." Canby's message, however, stressed the importance of increased book-buying rather than anything specifically nationalist: "What every writer needs most of all in such new nations as Australia is a public eager to read and able to write intelligently. For its instruction, the best books should flow in from everywhere. As a slogan, 'buy Australian books' is of little use to the native writer, until his public has listened to the sounder appeal of 'buy books'."³⁴⁾

Another candidate for the title of Australian Canby is George Mackaness, Vice-President, with Murdoch, of the Australian Book Society, lecturer in English at the Sydney Teachers College, bibliophile, anthologist and historian. Writing in *Australian Books* in 1946, Mackaness defined literature as first and foremost a matter of "public interest, public opinion and public education."³⁵⁾ As such, literature depended upon the support of the writer, the publisher and the reader, but not of the *critic*, who was nothing but "an excrescence, almost a parasite upon the body literary." Nonetheless, Mackaness felt the lack of a "real critical journal" in Australia. There were "half a dozen small cultural magazines," he wrote, and there were newspaper reviews, but it was precisely the middle range that was lacking. His

³³⁾ Radway, *Feeling for Books*, 261ff.

³⁴⁾ Henry Seidel Canby, *A New Land Speaking: An Essay on the Importance of a National Literature* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1946), 27.

³⁵⁾ George Mackaness, "Are We Australians Book-Conscious?," *Australian Books* 2, no. 1 (December 1946): 1.

approved models were largely American (and largely middlebrow): “we need an authoritative monthly journal, a *Fortnightly*, a *Munsey*, an *Atlantic*, a *Harpers*, to which we could look for guidance in our reading.” This interest in contemporary American culture was not the opposite of a commitment to the local; quite the reverse.

Aspirations for a renewed Australian culture were present in government planning for post-war reconstruction and in the cultural optimism of nationalist intellectuals. But my examples suggest that they were also more widely dispersed, through a relatively dense middlebrow culture, crossing the universities, commercial media and public institutions, and defined explicitly between highbrow and lowbrow. Middlebrow nationalism projected a public culture of writers, publishers and readers that depended on discerning consumers rather than pioneering folk (as in other models of the national culture); a culture that was at home in the marketplace and the suburbs; and that was premised not on the opposition of Australian and imported cultures but on their contemporaneity. In distinguishing “good books” from the excesses of the mass-commercial and ultra-modernist, middlebrow nationalism offered to reunite, around the modern, precisely what modernity had seemed to drive apart—individuality and communal aspiration, cultural value and popular consumption, good taste and accessibility. This is a fascinating moment in which an Australian culture was projected as modern, middle-class, and even modestly cosmopolitan.

Critical reflections

Let me step back for a moment and summarise why I find working with the middlebrow a useful and productive process. First, as suggested, it brings a material “print cultures” perspective to the study of Australian culture. It focuses on books and print in Australian society, not just Australian literary texts, and on the institutions of ordinary reading not just on literary criticism. In doing so, it recasts the study of Australian literature, placing the national frame within a larger trans-national network, and revealing the history of what I’ve called middlebrow nationalism. It demands a “positive” history of literature’s circulation in the public sphere and the marketplace. Second, as part of that trans-national framework, it participates in some of the very interesting new work around the concept of modernity, and in particular the idea of colonial, popular or vernacular modernities (all these terms have been used). As Radway has shown, the Book of the Month Club must be understood not as conservative or residual but as a “characteristically *modern* cultural institution,” and the point can be generalised to the institutions of middlebrow book culture more broadly.³⁶⁾

Thirdly, the middlebrow is theoretically interesting in the way it recasts the high culture/popular culture binary. Of course, no-one believes in this opposition any more, at least not as an eternal hierarchy of values, but for good and bad reasons it still structures much of our work on culture. The good reason is that cultural institutions are still often structured themselves according to its binary logic. The bad reason has to do with disciplinary histories

³⁶⁾ Radway, *A Feeling for Books*, 15.

and institutional divides. The problem is that the high/low structure tends to produce an excluded middle, that vast slice of the cultural market where high culture values are folded back into the consumer forms of “quality entertainment.” This describes parts of television, much commercial theatre, much classical music broadcasting, and much of the literature that still today, and possibly more than ever, goes under the heading of “good books.”

In other words, the broad category of “popular culture” is just too broad (or in some uses too narrow) to adequately describe the range of cultural forms and tastes that have existed and continue to exist between pulp and the avant-garde. The middlebrow as a term won’t solve this problem but it gives it a name and a history.

But perhaps, after all, what really attracts me to the middlebrow is that it has *nothing going for it*. It’s neither high enough nor low enough to be interesting to literary/cultural studies. It’s neither transgressively avant-garde nor subversively vulgar; indeed, it’s about as far from subversive as it’s possible to get and never ever vulgar. In short, it combines the *worst* of both high and low: pretensions to good taste on one side and crass commercialism on the other. How could this not be attractive to a cultural historian!

Middlebrow or High-Pop?

Finally, the “historical middlebrow” of the mid-twentieth century can be read against the changes in contemporary book culture in Australia and more broadly across the English-language world—especially the emergence of a new culture of “good books,” perhaps even the resurgence of a middlebrow book culture after its collapse in the 1960s. Think of how much more than “airport novels” we now find in airport bookshops! Think of the new book stores in our cities and suburbs, the ones in fact that we call “good book stores,” those that sell good music and good coffee as well as good books. (A materialist definition of “good books” might be those that are sold in “good book stores.”) Think, too, of the classy literary novels that now become bestsellers; the boom in literary prizes, festivals, reading groups and book clubs; and a new obsession with book of the week recommendations, lists of the year’s best, and so on. These phenomena seem common across much of the English-speaking world at least.

Such developments reflect fundamental changes in the production, distribution, and quite possibly consumption of books and literature over the last two decades or so. Thus I can frame my enquiry at its beginning by the modernist reorganisation of the cultural field that occurred in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, and at the other end by the equally significant, perhaps post-modernist, reorganisation of the cultural field that occurred at the end of the twentieth century and is still unfolding.

One manifestation of the latter is what American cultural studies critic Jim Collins has termed “high pop”: the post-1980s phenomenon whereby high cultural values and artefacts are subject to exactly the same forms of dissemination and celebrity as popular forms. Whereas Pop Art in the 1960s was about bringing pop culture into the realm of Art, “high pop” reverses the equation, diffusing high culture through the means pop culture has

perfected, melding “institutions and tastes formerly thought to be mutually exclusive” and thereby “transforming *Culture* into mass entertainment.”³⁷⁾

Collins’s expressly distinguishes high-pop from the middlebrow. While the middlebrow is still present in forms such as the “popular classics,” high pop refers to the widespread diffusion of avant-garde style. Thus he argues that it’s “a serious mistake to conceive of the current popularisation of elite cultural pleasures as simply the most recent incarnation of middlebrow aesthetics.”³⁸⁾ Ultimately I think Collins is right, nonetheless it’s a mistake worth making for what it reveals about the new book cultures. Consider the following features they share with the historical middlebrow:

- a range of new institutions for increasing the circulation of good books and for increasing public access to them (e.g., direct internet ordering from newspaper books pages, books distributed digitally);
- new reader-oriented forums for book culture: reading groups, festivals and book clubs;
- a new culture of good reading outside the academy, indeed in some sense against the academy (the academy plays the antagonist role of the highbrow);
- a repackaging of good books as newly fashionable commodities, especially literary fiction and new genres of travel, essays, niche history and life stories, which are reconnected to lifestyle choices. Newspaper books pages now belong to what are lifestyle as much as cultural supplements; and in Australia we have the successful *Good Reading* magazine, which looks more like a lifestyle magazine than a literary magazine (because it *is* a lifestyle magazine).

These new book cultures do not simply reproduce old cultural capital; rather they suggest just how it might look when redistributed in an era of expanded tertiary education, new media and globalised cultural markets. Market analysts, for example, have identified a new class of “neo-consumers,” the new professional-managerial class, who apparently constitute 24 per cent of first world populations but possess more than the half the discretionary spending and “have a huge appetite for books.”³⁹⁾

Books today will have a range of social functions connected to lifestyle and social distinction. Perhaps what is distinctive about the new good books, though, is their promise of access to forms of cosmopolitanism, again as a kind of social distinction and self-transformation that is accessible, so the promise goes, through discerning consumption rather

³⁷⁾ Jim Collins, “High-Pop: An Introduction,” in *High-Pop: Making Culture into Entertainment*, ed. Jim Collins (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), 1, 6.

³⁸⁾ Ibid., 7.

³⁹⁾ R. Honeywill, “Neo-Consumers Set the Agenda for Booksellers,” *Australian Bookseller and Publisher* (October 2002): 16–17.

than disciplined study or traditional forms of cultural capital (although no doubt these help). From *Memoirs of a Geisha* to *The Joy Luck Club* to *The Life of Pi* or *Eucalyptus*, all reading group favourites, the internationalism of the quality contemporary literary best-sellers—new world, cross-cultural, hybrid texts—is one of their most distinctive features. Australian books, too, now find their place within this cosmopolitan order much more forcefully for most readers than in any national ordering. That task is left to the dull academics.

On Listening to the Un-Said: Julia Cho's *Durango* and Asian Americanist Critique

Karen Shimakawa

In Julia Cho's 2006 family drama titled *Durango*, first son Isaac Lee embarrasses his father Boo-Seng by failing to call on Boo-Seng's friend (and fellow Korean immigrant) while visiting Honolulu for a medical school admissions interview. Without instructing him outright, Boo-Seng mentions his friend and suggests that Isaac arrange a visit. Unbeknownst to Isaac, Boo-Seng has arranged the medical school interview by calling in a favor with this friend, now a medical school professor at the University of Hawaii, thus ensuring Isaac's admission. But Isaac has no ambition to be a doctor and so he not only does not call Boo-Seng's friend, he skips the interview altogether. Upon his return from Honolulu, though, Isaac lies to Boo-Seng, assuring him that the interview went well. When he later admits to having inadvertently snubbed Boo-Seng's friend, his father is enraged. Isaac defends himself by accusing Boo-seng of indirection. "Why didn't you [] say: *You Have To Call Him*. Don't make it sound like it's an option if it's not." "Are you so stupid that you can't understand what I mean?" Boo-Seng shoots back. "The most basic thing," he seethes in disgust, "and you can't even do what's right."¹⁾ Father and son have different ideas of what is "right," and how to accomplish it: Korean immigrant father Boo-Seng assumes Isaac will understand his familial obligation without being explicitly instructed, and American-born Isaac expects his father to express his wishes verbally and directly. And this is only the beginning—despite the obvious bonds of affection and loyalty that hold it together, the Lee family is full of secrets, shame, buried resentment, and pregnant silences. The gap in world views between father and son, between an unstated (but nonetheless over determined) network of social relations and obligations, and a world that is equally freighted with cultural assumptions but peopled by independent agents who openly declare their interests and desires, lies at the heart of this play. What can or cannot be said aloud, what is or is not heard and understood in the resulting silence, differs for each character; moreover, this gap translates into a corresponding "gap" for audiences, some of whom see *Durango* as a universal story about parents and children, while others see a detailed articulation of gender- and ethnic-specific relations, a portrait of Korean American immigrant family life and social dynamics.

¹⁾ Julia Cho, "Durango" (unpublished script, 2006), 25.

References to *Durango* are drawn from the unpublished script of the 2006 Public Theatre version. (The play was subsequently published by Dramatists Play Service in 2007.)

This was made clear at a post-performance discussion during the play's New York City run at the Public Theatre in 2006.²⁾ When asked for her inspiration or objective in writing this play, Cho responded that she set out to write a play with male characters—specifically Korean American fathers and sons. Much of her previous work, especially *99 Histories*³⁾ and *Bfe*,⁴⁾ focused on Korean- or Asian American female characters. With *Durango* Cho attempted to create a play that centered on male characters and relationships, one that was as complex and compelling as female-centered plays for which she is (deservedly) known. She set out to write a play about Korean American men and the father-son dynamics specific to them, and to locate the action in the desert Southwest of the United States, the region where she and her family lived for much of Cho's childhood. While one might take issue with the premise that there is an "authentic" version of Korean American masculinity or father-son relationship to represent, it did not seem to me that Cho was insisting on such an essentialization. As I understood her, Cho was suggesting that there was an interesting story to tell about families, specifically fathers and sons, and that her project was to explore that dyad as embodied by Korean American male characters and their ways of relating to one another.

Audience reaction was generally positive⁵⁾ but characterized by repeated assurances to Cho that her play's subject matter was not, in fact, Korean American men or Asian American families; rather, they suggested that the play was "universal" and "authentic," not as representations of Korean American families but as more generic father-son (or in the case of one audience member, father-daughter) relationships. Several audience members testified to the degree to which they identified with the characters (especially the sons). None of these audience members identified themselves as Asian or Korean American; all appeared to be white (though none identified themselves racially or ethnically). These respondents seemed to offer these comments in order to disabuse Cho of the idea that her play was "limited" to Korean American men, and they did so in ways that were, it seemed, intended as complimentary—as if to suggest that Cho's claim of cultural specificity was somehow understood to be self-deprecating or diminishing, an admission of the shortcomings of the play or its author. If anything, the only point of critique raised during the session was the one moment in the play that was resistant to such universalizing interpretations—a recorded telephone message in Korean that remains untranslated. Despite the fact that the contents of the telephone message were irrelevant (but could be surmised—the message, it may be

²⁾ *Durango* premiered at the Long Wharf Theater in New Haven Connecticut in September 2006. Immediately following the completion of this run, the production transferred to The Public Theatre in New York City, where it opened in November 2006.

³⁾ Julia Cho, *99 Histories* (New York: Dramatists Play Service, 2005) (premiered 2004).

⁴⁾ Julia Cho, *Bfe* (New York: Dramatists Play Service, 2006) (premiered 2005).

⁵⁾ Of course, this is to be expected—those choosing to stay after the play were more likely than not admirers of the play, and not a random or representative cross-section of all audience members.

assumed, is from the friend in Hawaii calling to ask about Isaac's no-show⁶⁾), one audience member suggested that Cho provide a translation—despite the fact that the intended listener, Boo-Seng, presumably would not need one.

In fairness, there is ample basis for audiences to identify with *Durango* on a “universalist” basis (rather than as an “Asian American” play): it was written (and was performed under Chay Yew's direction) largely in a realist mode; its setting in the American Southwest (the action takes place between Arizona and Colorado) is far from the typical urban “ethnic enclave” locale of much Asian American drama; and with rare (though, as I argue below, significant) exceptions the characters speak contemporary, conversational American English. *Durango* is largely a “road” story in which Boo-Seng and his two sons set out from their home in Arizona for Durango, Colorado (a popular vacation destination in the Rocky Mountains) and spend most of the play sitting in the family car, traveling the highways of the desert Southwest—a setting more likely to recall Sam Shepard's landscapes than David Henry Hwang's. Boo-Seng has instigated this family trip to Durango (over Isaac's vociferous objections), a place he has long dreamed of visiting—not with his family, but with his childhood friend (and possibly former lover), the unnamed medical school professor with whom he had long since lost touch. Boo-Seng hides from his sons the occasion for both the trip (he has just been laid off at age 56 and thus has plenty of free time) and his choice of destination (his prior plans made with a former lover), simply insisting “you need to see more of where we living.”⁷⁾

Boo-Seng's reticence is matched by that of his sons: in addition to Isaac's missed medical school interview, younger son Jimmy harbors even deeper secrets. A gifted swimmer (about which Boo-Seng is obsessive), Jimmy has quit the high school swim team after an awkward encounter with an older male teammate. Jimmy represses his homoerotic desires (and his homophobic fear and self-loathing), instead filling his sketchbook with nude drawings (“figure studies”) and fantasizing about the “Red Angel,” his blond, beautiful, superhero creation. Their mother, who died of cancer when Jimmy was an infant, looms over and between the Lee men, who mourn her privately but rarely share their grief with each other. In short, *Durango* has the makings of a classic American family drama: buried secrets, fathers and sons struggling for mastery against the desolate backdrop of the American desert—road trip as metaphor in a poignant coming-of-age story of sexuality and self-discovery. Perhaps for these reasons, Anita Gates of *The New York Times* concludes (in her review of the Long Wharf production) “[t]here is a universality to the cautionary message of ‘Durango’.”⁸⁾

⁶⁾ The origin of this call is confirmed in the unpublished script's stage directions: “*It's the voice of an older man, speaking in Korean. It is Boo-seng's old friend in Hawaii*” (Cho, “Durango,” 93).

⁷⁾ Ibid., 12.

⁸⁾ Anita Gates, “Traveling With Despair as a Constant Companion,” *The New York Times*, September 23, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/23/nyregion/nyregionspecial2/24cthea.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=%22julia%20cho%22%20durango&st=cse (accessed 12 January 2009).

Nevertheless, if *Durango* is in some sense a “universal” (or typically “American”) coming-of-age and/or father-son story, in another it tells a very *specific* story of failure, alienation, and estrangement: Isaac’s Honolulu debacle is finally revealed, but many more of the Lees’ secrets remain undisclosed: by the end of the play the sons still do not know about Boo-Seng’s layoff, or his former lover and his relation to Boo-Seng’s unhappy marriage to their mother; and Jimmy’s own sexual ambivalence is even more repressed than before, despite Isaac’s vindictive attempt “out” him to their father. Instead, Jimmy silences Isaac with a violence that surprises them both, later destroying his sketchbook and, he hopes, the desires it documents. The intended objective of the trip, a ride on the famous mountain top train at Durango, never happens and they return home to take up once again their heteronormative, middle-American (or perhaps, as I argue below, model minoritarian) familial roles. “I’ll call the school tomorrow, okay, Dad?” offers Isaac weakly, but far from a reconciliatory gesture, it clearly signals his resignation and failure to follow through on his desire to assert his independence. “Maybe I’ll be a doctor,” Jimmy tells Boo-Seng, “Is that what you want?” Each Lee retreats in silence to his respective space, defeated and alienated from the others.⁹⁾

I want to offer an Asian Americanist reading of *Durango*, and to suggest that doing so may enable us to see and hear the project of subject-making in new, different, or multiple ways. Here I am invoking Kandice Chuh’s formulation of Asian Americanist critique as “subjectless”: “as a conceptual tool,” she writes, subjectlessness “points to the need to manufacture ‘Asian American’ situationally.”¹⁰⁾ A problematic (but nonetheless politically efficacious) conglomeration, “Asian American” identity has long been the positivist focus of Asian American studies—describing, illuminating, and staking a representational claim to it—on the one hand; and a site of racist oppression and exclusion, on the other. Chuh proposes an Asian Americanist practice of “subjectless” critique, one whose aim is not to identify a coherent, *authentic* Asian American object of study but rather “to create the *conceptual space* to prioritize difference by foregrounding the discursive constructedness of subjectivity...by reminding us that a ‘subject’ only becomes recognizable and can act as such by conforming to certain regulatory matrices” (emphasis added).¹¹⁾ Might we see the very silences, withheld secrets, failures and denials that structure *Durango* as clearing precisely that sort of *conceptual space*? In other words, I am not aiming to prove that *Durango* is *really* about Korean Americans or Asian Americans (as a corrective to those audience members who saw the play as “universal”); I do, however, want to propose an Asian Americanist reading of the play wherein the specific ethnic and immigration histories of its characters do more than

⁹⁾ Cho, “Durango,” 92.

¹⁰⁾ Kandice Chuh, *Imagine Otherwise: On Asian Americanist Critique* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003)

¹¹⁾ *Ibid.*, 9.

simply provide them with particular names and faces.¹²⁾ Seen from a certain perspective, those histories arguably influence not only how the characters speak to each other, but the very forms their relationships take—what they do not say as much as what they do say—and the fact that these characters do not articulate (in words) this aspect of their relationships does not mean that it is not profoundly relevant. Indeed, what remains unsaid may be as meaningful (from an Asian Americanist perspective) as what is said; what an audience does or does not hear in those silences is another matter.

Cho describes Boo-Seng Lee (in the character list) as “a fifty-six-year-old *Korean* man” (emphasis added)¹³⁾ and references in the play establish that he and his wife emigrated from South Korea.¹⁴⁾ It is not the simple fact of Boo-Seng’s origins that constitutes grounds for an Asian Americanist reading, however; that non-Asian American audiences identified with these characters and saw the story as “universal” suggests that they were able to view biographical details as ways of fleshing out the characters, and otherwise superfluous. Indeed, it is not geography per se that defines Boo-Seng (or his children); his experience as an immigrant of a particular sort, however, might be seen as foundational. Most obviously, Boo-Seng’s experience as an immigrant (and an audience’s apprehension of him as such) is shaped linguistically: while his sons speak with the slangy, American-accented English typical of U.S.-born youth, Boo-Seng is the only Lee onstage who speaks non-native English and who (under Yew’s direction, at least) speaks with a pronounced Korean accent.¹⁵⁾ This accent does more than simply *identify* Boo-Seng as non-native to a listening audience; as the play unfolds, we see that this *conversational gap* (between Boo-Seng and U.S.-born English speakers, including his sons) produces material effects: “there are some areas where you’re a bit...less effective,” Boo-Seng recalls being told by his manager, Bob, as Bob is laying him off.¹⁶⁾ “Team building [...] *communication skills*” (emphasis added).¹⁷⁾ Of course,

¹²⁾ In other words, my larger aim is to suggest that works like *Durango* may offer multiple readings for disparate audiences, rather than to *disprove* the “universalist” interpretation of the Public Theater audience. To the extent my goal is to *challenge* that reading, it is merely to challenge its singularity — the impulse cited above to *discourage* Cho from situating the play as Korean American *in favor of* a single, universalist interpretation.

¹³⁾ Cho, “Durango,” 2.

¹⁴⁾ Although it is never specified, we may surmise that the Lees immigrated from *South* Korea given the (post-partition) timing of their arrival in the United States.

¹⁵⁾ Cho also creates Mrs. Lee (voiced by Isaac, Jimmy, and Boo-Seng in separate monologues) with specific linguistic traits that similarly mark her relation to immigration. But since “her” monologues are performed through the other characters and she does not appear onstage these monologues are best understood as establishing particular linguistic identifications and relations of and between Isaac, Jimmy, and Boo-Seng.

¹⁶⁾ Cho’s character list specifies that Bob is “a white man in in his late twenties, early thirties” (Cho, “Durango,” 2).

¹⁷⁾ *Ibid.*, 30–31.

“communication skills” may refer to much more than *English* fluency—and indeed, as he demonstrates throughout the play, Boo-Seng speaks English more than adequately. In the language of corporate human resources, “communication skills” can also denote the subtle intangibles of *cultural* fluency (amongst other things) that often translate into ways of speaking.

This gap in “communication skills” structures Boo-Seng’s familial relationships as well. Manifesting in seemingly innocuous exchanges, such as Boo-Seng’s asking Jimmy for pronunciation tips,¹⁸⁾ Boo-Seng’s English language disadvantage produces complicated and conflicted power relations within the family. During one of their arguments, Boo-Seng reminds Isaac of a betrayal that occurred many years ago, during a “Bring Your Family to Work Day,” when he caught Isaac joking with his co-workers:

BOO-SENG: I introduce you to my co-workers and then I turn around and what do I hear? They’re saying, *Hey, Isaac, how you understand your father? His English is so bad!* And you laugh and say, *I know. But lucky for me, I am fluent in bad Asian accents.*

ISAAC: I didn’t—it was the first thing that popped into my head—

BOO-SENG: You laugh at me so my co-workers will like you?¹⁹⁾

A disruption of traditional parental authority, such linguistic reversals are common to families whose immigration status, like the Lees’, stratifies by generation. Boo-Seng is humiliated by Isaac not simply because he makes fun of his father, but because in the logic of this workplace he apparently has grounds to do so. Isaac and Jimmy, like many second-generation children, move through American culture with an ease and assumed privilege not available to their “foreign”-accent-marked parents—a fact that may subordinate parents to children in public and subvert parental authority in private. The bond Boo-Seng once shared with his friend (the medical school professor) might thus be seen as all the more intimate and cherished: a fellow Korean male immigrant, he and Boo-Seng belong to a community demarcated by language, gender, and perhaps sexuality, one in which Boo-Seng is on equal footing. The untranslated phone message, in this reading, reminds us of the depth of his estrangement from his sons (and from the non-Korean-speaking audience), as well the richness of a life that might have been.

What “might have been,” moreover, might be imagined productively in the context of a Korean immigrant class (of which Boo-Seng would be a member), a wave of post-1965

¹⁸⁾ “BOO-SENG: Good sign. What is word for that? Good sign?

JIMMY: Lucky?

BOO-SENG: No...*Aus-pi-shss.*

JIMMY: (*Correcting him*) *Auspicious.*

BOO-SENG: *Aus-pi-shuss.*” (Ibid., 23)

¹⁹⁾ Ibid., 78.

immigration that brought men like Boo-Seng and his friend (as well as women like Mrs. Lee) to the United States.²⁰⁾ “Back where I come from,” Boo-Seng tells Jerry, the security guard waiting to escort him from his workplace when the play opens, “lot of my old friends, they are quite successful now...One is the owner of his own company, big company. Another is very high in the government, you know, close to president. Another is president of university.”

JERRY: Must be quite a reunion when you guys get together.

BOO-SENG: No, I haven't seen them in long time.

JERRY: Why not?

BOO-SENG: I haven't gone back in over twenty years.

JERRY: Not even once?

BOO-SENG: Here is my home.²¹⁾

Those who, like Boo-Seng and his wife, immigrated in the 1970s or 1980s watched from U.S. shores as South Korea underwent tremendous economic and social re-development, while many of them (like Boo-Seng) struggled here under the burdens of nativist prejudice, racism, linguistic disadvantages, and other factors that contributed to a professional “glass ceiling” that continues to hover over many immigrants. The comparative success enjoyed by his cohort that stayed in South Korea conceivably contributes to his sense of personal failure (in being laid off), to the imperative to conform to social norms of heteropatriarchy, and to his intense investment in his sons' professional and educational successes. The performativity of Boo-Seng's language (Korean, Korean-accented-English, or withheld altogether), then, might gesture toward a history of immigration regulation, heteronormativity, and patriarchy that could inform our construction of this character and his relationship with his native-born sons.

Likewise, when heard in the context of that history the Lee sons' speech—both verbalized and withheld—suggests not (stable) gendered, ethnic *identities* but processes of subject *formation*. In that light, Isaac's description of Honolulu as “the promised land” because “you can get kimchi at the corner store” in Hawai'i signals more than simple tourist enchantment, and more than a sentimental recognition of ethnic *identity*. The Lee sons don't spend time talking about it, but in the interstices of their speech one can hear their keen awareness of their minoritarian status in American culture and a longing for community. It is

²⁰⁾ The 1965 amendment to the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Act (Title 8, Chapter 12) under Public Law 89-236 radically re-organized the categories under which people were allowed to immigrate to the United States. One aspect of this revision was to create categories of immigrants (defined by professional and/or educational status) that were not subject to the per-country quota otherwise imposed; thus proportionally large numbers of immigrants were admitted with college and advanced degrees, or to seek such educational opportunities in the U.S.

²¹⁾ Cho, “Durango,” 5.

not accidental that Jimmy fantasizes his Red Angel as *blond* (Cho's character list describes him as "a beautiful, blond, young sun god"²²): "My superhero's going to be normal. He's not going to be, you know, like us," he tells Isaac. "I just don't want him to be limited." "Look in a mirror," Isaac responds dryly, "What do you think you are?"²³ Neither can name what is *abnormal* about them, but Isaac knows it when he sees it, knows what will be *missing* if and when Jimmy can bear to look.

Jimmy's Red Angel is an object of desire *and* identification: his fantasy epic tells a story that seems to fulfill Jimmy's own desire for power and transcendence (the Red Angel becomes a superhero after sprouting enormous wings that enable him to swoop down and save families in peril) but imagined as the naked, beautiful, *white* boy (as specified in Cho's list of characters) on Jimmy's swim team he is also an object of sexual attraction. Isaac's preference for Magneto (from the *X-Men* comic book series created by Stan Lee and Jack Kirby), too, resonates in the space of the unsaid: "Two words: the Holocaust. He's the best fuckin' villain ever, and you know why? Because...[m]aybe, if the world hadn't fucked him over so much, he mighta been someone—done something— good."²⁴ A survivor of the death camp at Auschwitz (in Marvel Comics orthodoxy²⁵) Magneto is, in the grand tradition of Stan Lee villains, psychologically complex, morally ambivalent, and inventive in his use of his superpower (telekinetic control over metal objects) and for these reasons, he is a favorite of many comic book enthusiasts; but Isaac is drawn to Magneto because he is shaped by *ethnic hatred*, and for what Magneto *might have* become/done/said (but didn't) as a result.

What is the longed-for unsaid for Isaac? "I just want him to be happy," Isaac tells Boo-Seng in their argument about Jimmy. "Don't you want him to be happy?"

BOO-SENG: Jimmy is happy.

ISAAC: How do you know? Have you asked him?

BOO-SENG: **I don't have to ask.**

ISAAC: Right, 'cause you know us *so* well. (emphasis in original)²⁶

Isaac's sarcasm conveys his frustration with Boo-Seng's refusal to ask—perhaps not just in this exchange, but ever—whether his children are happy or, for that matter, to ask anything at all about their well-being, feelings, or thoughts. The (stereotypical) Asian American patriarch Boo-Seng's relationship with his sons is far from that idealized in (equally stereotypical) representations of other "American" families. Theirs is not the dinner table of the Cleavers, or the Waltons, or even the polygamous Henricksons (of HBO Television's popular current

²² Ibid., 2.

²³ Ibid., 33.

²⁴ Ibid., 35.

²⁵ <http://www.marveldirectory.com/individuals/m/magneto.htm>

²⁶ Cho, "Durango," 77.

series drama *Big Love*). Adhering to the strict hierarchies of heteropatriarchy (as it is often associated with “traditional” Asian cultures), the Lee children follow their father’s orders—or keep silent. And just as, for Boo-Seng, it is (or should be) unnecessary to *tell* Isaac to call his friend in Honolulu, there is no need for Boo-Seng to inquire about Jimmy’s emotional state. From Boo-Seng’s perspective, Jimmy conforms to his expectations (swim-team champion, good grades) and therefore *must* be happy, assuming parental satisfaction is his child’s goal. But as we already know, Jimmy is deeply unhappy—with swimming, with his developing erotic imagination, and perhaps most of all, with the pressure to succeed applied by his father, and the concomitant withholding of affection. “He goes to every single one of your swim meets,” Isaac points out when Jimmy complains that their father never asks to spend time with them. “Yeah, and you know what he does?” Jimmy shoots back.

He comes, sits in the last row of the bleachers and he times me. And then he writes down all the times in this little book and after I swim, he comes and finds me, and tells me down to the last tenth of a second how far off I am from my personal record or the city record or whatever...It’s like he’s there to check up on me, not to support me. And definitely not to spend time with me.²⁷⁾

As noted above, Boo-Seng is painfully aware of the success of his childhood peers, those who stayed in Korea and prospered while he toiled uneasily and unappreciated in some middle-management position, only to be laid off for his poor communication skills. He places his hopes on his children instead: Isaac’s admission to medical school and, especially, Jimmy’s admission to a “*good* college” (unlike the state school Isaac attended) on the strength of a swimming scholarship. As children of immigrants often do, Jimmy bears the weight of his father’s thwarted aspirations, a driving force in the production of the “model minority” status to which Asian Americans have long been consigned. The focus on college admissions, in fact, might resonate for some audiences with the news magazine articles circulating in the 1980s that heralded the coming of an “Asian American Super Minority,” a group “Drive[n] to Excel” in its quest for “The Ultimate Assimilation,” i.e., college admissions.²⁸⁾ Articles such as these attributed Asian American (college) students’ success to strong family values, a prioritization of the value of education within such families, and submission to parental authority, or filial obedience. Jimmy’s fear of disclosure, and Isaac’s initial apprehension when Jimmy confesses to having homosexual desires, thus could be read as responses to the pressure Boo-Seng places on them to conform to such public perceptions: “That man’s got his hopes built on you. You’re his golden boy,” he tells Jimmy (thus channeling some vicarious “model minoritarian” pressure of his own), “you’re the swim

²⁷⁾ Ibid., 17.

²⁸⁾ “America’s Super Minority,” *Fortune*, November 24, 1986, 148-64; “The Drive to Excel,” *Newsweek on Campus*, April 1984, 4-13; “The Ultimate Assimilation,” *Newsweek*, November 24, 1986, 80.

champion who's going to get a full ride anywhere you want to go."²⁹⁾ Sadly (though perhaps perceptively), Isaac fears that Boo-Seng would not accept Jimmy's non-normative sexuality. "I don't even know if there is a Korean word for 'homosexual,' he says. "I don't know if Dad has even the slightest idea what that is." Regardless of whether Boo-Seng knows the Korean word for it, we know (as his sons do not) that he is familiar with the concept. Still, speaking it aloud to their father is simply out of the question; in this Korean *American* familial context, the word does not, cannot, exist.

Denying the possibility of that word constitutes the climax of the play. Attempting to enact a "typical" American family drama, one in which secrets are disclosed, histories are revealed, and relationships restored thereby, Isaac opts to "just throw it out there. I did not go to my interview," he finally confesses, expecting Jimmy to follow suit and air his own secrets as a way of loosening their father's hold on them.³⁰⁾ "Come on, Jimmy, don't you have something to share?" taunts Isaac, but Jimmy responds by hitting Isaac, hard enough to surprise him and knock him down. "I said, SHUT UP" he says menacingly, standing over Isaac's crumpled body.³¹⁾ And Isaac does—Jimmy's secret remains untold, and the family returns to Phoenix in apparent silence.

Perhaps we can listen to these (literal and figurative) silences in the play and hear that "conceptual space" to which Chuh directs our attention, and to hear the traces of those regulatory structures that produce Korean Americanness. But why, then, did the rest of the audience at the talkback fail to see/hear that space in the Public Theatre production? In *Infinitely Demanding*, Simon Critchley writes of "an ethical experience [] based on the exorbitant demand of infinite responsibility" and he argues that the task of the ethical subject is to acknowledge the impossibility of fully commensurate intersubjective understanding, and proposes "an ethics of *discomfort*, a hyperbolic ethics based on the internalization of an unfulfillable ethical demand" (emphasis added).³²⁾ Critchley's project is to theorize the contemporary ethical subject (via the theories of philosophers Alain Badiou, Knud Ejler Løgstrup, and Emmanuel Levinas). Drawing from the work of these thinkers, Critchley argues that the ethical subject is one characterized by *incommensurability* (because, in Levinasian terms, the "ethical subject is a subject defined by the experience of an internalized demand that it can never meet, a demand that exceeds it"³³⁾). In other words, I would suggest that the disparate responses to Cho's play point to the possibility for the production an *ethical* subject: that is, although the play's meanings, for different audience members, might seem to be definitive (hence some audience members' desire to *dissuade* Cho from asserting a Korean

²⁹⁾ Cho, "Durango," 65.

³⁰⁾ Ibid., 85.

³¹⁾ Ibid., 87.

³²⁾ Simon Critchley, *Infinitely Demanding: Ethics of Commitment, Politics of Resistance* (London: Verso Press, 2007), 11.

³³⁾ Ibid., 10.

American interpretation, on the one hand, and my reading of the play as deeply implicated in ethnic specificity, on the other). And while this proliferation of possible interpretations might logically produce *discomfort*—is this play *really* about Korean Americans or not?—I want to suggest that it's by making productive use of these moments of discomfort, by unpacking them and perhaps even aestheticizing discomfortingly proximate difference, that we might be able to actually learn how to be (beside) each other. What Chuh's *conceptual space* opens up, in this analysis, is the possibility of multiple, perhaps even conflicting, ways of articulating Cho's characters and of animating their relationships. For if we are uncomfortable with the un-said, I think it is not because of what we *don't* hear in that silence, it's because of what *else* might become audible instead.

論文

To the Bottom of the Lake: Trauma and Narrative in Tim O'Brien's *In the Lake of the Woods*

Mineo Takamura

要 約

本論は、1994年に発表されたティム・オブライエンの *In the Lake of the Woods* において、ヴェトナム戦争のトラウマ的記憶が、父親の自死の記憶と撚り合わせられながら、主人公ジョンの人生の様々な局面で噴出するさまを読解し、トラウマと仮構された因果性、及びそれを言語的に構築するナラティブの関係について考察している。オブライエンはこの作品において湖（や、そのアナロジーとしての鏡）を主人公ジョンのトラウマを照射し、彼の世界像を構成するような暴力的な根源として描いているが、本論ではそのような湖＝鏡の説話的機能に注目し、作品において示唆される主人公や主人公の妻の湖の方への失踪を反復脅迫的なものと捉えた。湖＝鏡は現実を映す表象機能のアレゴリーともなっており、オブライエンは鏡の前で奇術をする行為をフィクションの執筆行為になぞらえている。同様に、ジョンは自分（たち）を狂気から守るために、しばしば得意とする奇術を戦場で披露することで、把握不可能な現実の暴力の巨大さに対し防衛的に額縁を設定し、偽の「理解可能な」暴力の因果性を築きあげようとした。

父の自殺は、ジョンをして自殺した父を殺したいという矛盾した欲望を抱かしめる。父という近い存在の内なる暴力性はジョンの世界観に深く根を張る見えない脅威となるのだ。彼の奇術への傾倒は、シンボリックに父親を殺す行為の想像的な反復であり、ジョンはそれを通じて偶発的で統御不可能な暴力を彼自身の小さな世界の内に閉じ込める。作品において可能性として提示されているジョンによる妻キャシーの殺害というプロットについては、ジョンによるキャシーと父の同一視という解釈を示した。

様々なナラティブによる言語複合体として構成されたこの作品を通じて、オブライエンはトラウマの異種混交性と、フィクションと「現実」の相互浸透性を表現したと言える。

O brilliant kids, frisk with your dog,
 Fondle your shells and sticks, bleached
 By time and the elements; but there is a line
 You must not cross nor ever trust beyond it
 Spry cordage of your bodies to caresses
 Too lichen-faithful from too wide a breast.
 The bottom of the sea is cruel.
 — Hart Crane, “Voyage I”

The Father emerges from his own death.
 — Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen, “The Freudian Subject, from Politics to Ethics”

Introduction: Around the Lake

Over the course of his career as a writer, stretching from his debut work *If I Die in a Combat Zone, Box Me Up and Ship Me Home* (1973) till the most recent *July, July* (2002), Tim O’Brien has unflinchingly invested his ingenious literary imagination on one event and place, that is, the war in Vietnam, in which he participated as a young soldier from 1969 to 1970. Whether fiction or non-fiction, O’Brien’s descriptions of the atrocities that occurred there are so compulsive and recurrent—though not repetitious—that they function as an unchangeable center around which all of his writings slowly revolve. His persistency is particularly outstanding, given that many other soldier-authors who had, as Tobey C. Herzog points out, once devoted themselves to write war novels either moved away from the subject of Vietnam or more likely ceased to write at all.¹⁾ While American Vietnam narratives mostly exhausted their sources when the soldier-authors or journalists wrote down their experiences, O’Brien never ceases to ask the fundamental question: “What was the Vietnam War?” The trajectory of his long struggles as a writer of the Vietnam War shows the difficulty of speaking about Vietnam amid an ever-shifting phase of reality in the present. His exploration of the traumatic past strongly reverberates with the collective memory of both physical and psychological pains, which, as years pass, becomes submerged in daily lives. O’Brien’s ethical engagement with the representation of war urges the reader to (re)imagine and return to the place and moment of terror. Indeed, he often deplores the collective oblivion of Vietnam: “We’ve adjusted too well. In our pursuit of peaceful, ordinary lives, too many of us have lost touch with the horror of war. . . . That’s sad. We should remember. Not in a crippling, debilitating way, but rather a form of affirmation. . . . It would seem that the memories of soldiers should serve at least in a modest way, as a restraint on national bellicosity. . . . We’ve all adjusted. The whole country. And I fear that we are back where we started. I wish we were more troubled.”²⁾

¹⁾ Tobey C. Herzog, *Vietnam War Stories: Innocence Lost* (London: Routledge, 1992), 7.

²⁾ Tim O’Brien, “We’ve Adjusted Too Well,” in *The Wounded Generation: America after Vietnam*, ed. A. D. Horne (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice, 1981), 205–7.

O'Brien's works cannot be firmly placed within the tradition of war novels. His narrative is not predominantly concerned about the facts of the war, so much so that neither historical reflection nor direct description of battle scenes is given a central role in his novels.³⁾ In O'Brien's works, violence of the war is rarely reflected upon the body in the form of bruises, broken arms, or legs, mutilation and so on; instead, it often permeates into the sufferer's lives, affects one's behavior with a bizarre intensity, and often transforms one's life into a tapestry of schizophrenic actions. In other words, the uniqueness of O'Brien's works lies in his treatment of the war as the intangible extension of our life rather than as an immediate threat to our body. We see a series of metamorphosed violence in the form of personal obsessions in his various works: Paul Berlin's extraordinary search for Cacciato in *Going After Cacciato* (1979); William Cowling's interest in the underworld in *The Nuclear Age* (1985); and Professor Chippering's strange love in *Tomcat in Love* (1998). All of these obsessions show that the war goes on even in the place where no visible fighting takes place and that the traces of violence surface anytime and anywhere as symptoms.

O'Brien's expression of violence becomes even more radical and complex because of the role of narrative. His narrative often assumes an ambiguous indecisiveness in a way that blurs the distinction between the real and the fictive. In some lectures and essays, O'Brien manifestly states that the language of fiction can be more apt to telling the truth. The postmodernist premise that the truth is relational is thus rarely more intrinsic than in the case of O'Brien, who does not assume reality as being separable from the intricate complexity of cultural, psychological, and linguistic agencies.

Rather than categorize his fictions by some big words such as war and violence, I would be more inclined to call attentions to a particular image that repetitively appears in many of his works. A lake. Regardless of the difference of situations, contexts and plots, the imaginative topos of the lake has great significance in O'Brien's entire oeuvre. Take "Speaking of Courage"—a story collected in *The Things They Carried* (1990)—for example. O'Brien here dramatizes the difficulty of translating war experiences into a coherent narrative through a description of a young soldier, Norman Bowker, who has just returned from Vietnam to his small hometown in Iowa. Norman cannot feel at ease with his family, since he notices as he returns that it is very difficult to put his experiences into words. Without being able to find any "place to go," he spends time for an aimless drive.⁴⁾ He circles the lake in his hometown twelve times in his car. Through the clockwise movement, he exhibits his confused inner geography and temporality. Norman feels unhinged from the universal passage of time as well as from the universal extension of space. His sense of guilt derives from the fact that he could not rescue Kiowa, a Native American soldier who died miserably in Vietnam. The resemblance of the sounds of Kiowa and Iowa seems not coincidental, since

³⁾ In his speech given at Brown University in 1999, O'Brien clearly states that "War stories aren't always about war, per se." Tim O'Brien, "Writing Vietnam: Tim O'Brien, President's Lecture," <http://www.stg.brown.edu/projects/WritingVietnam/obrienpreface.html> (accessed November 29, 2008).

⁴⁾ Tim O'Brien, *The Things They Carried* (New York: Broadway, 1990), 137.

it represents his struggle with the irretrievability of past and his inevitable return to the scene of the decisive event through his inner geography.

Driving aimlessly, Norman thinks of the ways to recount his experiences to people in the little peaceful town, especially to his father, only to then recognize its astonishing difficulty. The little city in Iowa is in an order that is totally dissonant with the chaos of battlegrounds in Vietnam. The city with “the sanitary conveniences,” for example, does not appear to leave any room to accommodate a story about “a goddamn *shit* field” where shit is literally everywhere.⁵⁾ Norman is afraid that the badges and medals he received for his achievements in the war would speak for his “courage” in Vietnam instead of his account. He feels embarrassed by the foreignness of his own “courage” and recognizes that speaking of “courage” is a completely different experience from being courageous in the field.⁶⁾ Norman is forced to be silent because of the inevitable codification of his narrative.

“Speaking of Courage” was originally published separately in 1976. The fact that O’Brien circled back to the same scene with a revised version more than ten years later implies that the circular movement is not only Norman’s obsession but also O’Brien’s.⁷⁾ Indeed, as the narrator “Tim O’Brien” in *Things* admits, O’Brien heavily draws on his own hometown, Worthington at Minnesota, for the description of the story.⁸⁾ Creating a link between the otherwise irrelevant towns in the Midwest, O’Brien associates his efforts in inventing his war narrative with Norman’s struggles to represent his trauma. The significance of Norman’s obsessive driving, however, is not limited to the plot of the particular story: it is, in fact, O’Brien’s own driving, too. As Timmerman points out, we see a similar circulatory movement around the lake in *Combat Zone*, in which the protagonist “I” just being drafted thinks: “The war and my person seemed like twins as I went around the town’s lake.”⁹⁾ In *Northern Lights* (1975), a novel mostly embellished with watery images, both the Minnesotan lakes and Pilney’s pond are places for intertextuality as well as for sexual symbolism.¹⁰⁾ In *Cacciato*, the lake constitutes a central place of trauma; in the middle of a battleground in

⁵⁾ Ibid., 150, 145.

⁶⁾ See Maria S. Bonn, “Can Stories Save Us? Tim O’Brien and the Efficacy of the Text,” *Critique* 36, no. 1 (Fall 1994): 2–15.

⁷⁾ For other details and other intertextual echoes of “Speaking of Courage,” see Mark A. Heberle, *Trauma Artist: Tim O’Brien and the Fiction of Vietnam* (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 2001), 204.

⁸⁾ A vignette simply titled “Notes” in *Things* records “O’Brien’s” reflection on his experiences of writing the two versions of the story about Norman’s circular drive. Quite self-referentially, the narrator comments upon the symbolic effect of the lake in his story by acknowledging that he “uses the lake as a nucleus around which the story would orbit” (158).

⁹⁾ John H. Timmerman, “Tim O’Brien and the Art of the True War Story: ‘Night March’ and ‘Speaking of Courage,’” *Twentieth Century Literature* 46, no. 1 (Spring 2000): 100–14; Tim O’Brien, *If I Die in a Combat Zone, Box Me Up and Ship Me Home* (New York: Delacorte, 1973), 20.

¹⁰⁾ While the lake in the work is closely associated with Addie in Faulkner’s *As I Lay Dying*, Pilney’s pond is a place of masculinity and echoes Hemingway’s Nick Adams stories. See Heberle, *Trauma Artist*, 69–83; Patrick A. Smith, *Tim O’Brien: A Critical Companion* (Westport: Greenwood, 2005), 48–49.

Vietnam, puddles and muddy ground are filled with a number of dead bodies. Even in *July, July*, which only indirectly touches upon the theme of war, the lake remains a mythical dark topos because of its ability to carry the image of death. A dentist Harmon is drowned in the lake during a tryst with Ellie, who survives and later suffers from the sense of “lake in her lungs.”¹¹⁾ Thus, O’Brien tenaciously uses the lake as a location that evokes the sense of violence and death in his works.

In the Lake of the Woods most exemplarily presents the lake as a psychological sphere into which all the imageries abovementioned flow and interflow. As a work of fiction that comprises psychoanalytic speculation, *Lake* exhaustively explores the problem of both personal and collective trauma.¹²⁾ The obvious intertextuality of the work makes it something not wholly O’Brien’s product. Rather, the work is thrown into political, psychoanalytical, juridical, and communal discourse without losing its core image of the lake around which O’Brien weaves his fictional language. This self-referential structure of the novel allows for an interpretation of it to be easy and difficult at the same time. While the narrative of analysis within the novel provides contexts and background and thus works as guidance to the reader, its immanent plurality constitutes points of resistance against any narrative of critical language. My following exploration of the relation between traumatic events and fictional narrative in the novel does not claim any absolute truth behind the novel’s plot; rather, it aims at examining the mechanics of secrecy and revelation that the novel thematizes as an allegorical structure of writing.

1. The Sphere of Father and the Origin of Violence

At the beginning of the novel, John Wade has just lost the Minnesota Democratic primary for US senator. The revelation of John’s commitment to the massacre in the hamlet of Thuan Yen, an event known in the US as “the My Lai Massacre,” had decisively affected the result of the election. Depressed by his failure to become a politician, John Wade retreats with his beautiful wife, Kathy, to an isolated cabin in the lake country of northern Minnesota. The opening scene is immersed with silence; John, despite his situation, seems to enjoy the private life in the quiet place. One night, however, Kathy mysteriously disappears. The narrator presents several possibilities to the reader to explain her disappearance but does not give any decisive account. John barely remembers anything except some uncertain fragments of memories about the night. It is only the next morning that he is fully aware of her absence. One of the “hypotheses” that the narrator poses argues that John killed Kathy, while another suggests the possibility that Kathy crossed the lake by boat. John searches for Kathy with the help of local police and residents but fails to find any clue for weeks. The focus of the novel

¹¹⁾ Tim O’Brien, *July, July* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2002), 208.

¹²⁾ Frequent allusions to Judith Herman’s representative study *Trauma and Recovery* should be particularly noted. Since her text quotes O’Brien’s *Things* in three places, we can conceive that *Lake* is a response to Herman’s critical analysis of trauma. Judith Herman, *Trauma and Recovery* (New York: Basic Books, 1997).

oscillates between the story concerning the event and John's psychological development from his childhood to the present, although even at the end of the novel the relation between Kathy's disappearance and John's past remains obscure. Finally, John leaves the shore of the lake on his motorboat for the other side, which is in part of Canada.

The novel consists of distinctly different four types of narratives that are randomly arrayed throughout the text. These narratives cast lights in four different ways upon the central mystery of the novel, that is, the sudden disappearance of Kathy. While each of the narratives makes an attempt to provide an account of Kathy's disappearance from each different perspective, none of them can make a comprehensive analysis about the mystery. Kathy remains an invisible center where any attempt to explain the whole mystery fails. O'Brien emphasizes the relativity of reality by comparing four different narratives to four different angles of light shone onto the surface of the lake: "It is by the nature of the angle, sun to earth, that the seasons are made, and that the waters of the lake change color by the season, blue going to gray and then to white and then back again to blue. The water receives color. The water returns it. The angle shapes reality."¹³⁾ The change and transience of the colors on the surface of the lake represent the susceptibility of our cognizance to the external conditions that form a ground for truth. While the lake accommodates four different types of narratives on its surface, it retains its hidden sites within itself, never allowing penetrable perspective from the outside. As a result, only the effects of reflection are perceptible on the surface of the novel. Many events in John's life exhibit this symptom; in fact, the reader can surmise John's traumatic experience from the fragments of episodes that are scattered throughout the novel. And yet, it is impossible to describe what his trauma is a posteriori. For, at the center of his experience, John embraces a sense of loss; as Cathy Caruth says, traumatic experiences are always foreign even to the sufferer.¹⁴⁾

While John's trauma has its essential origin in his experiences in Vietnam, the text suggests that we should trace the trajectory of his melancholic grief further back to his relation with his father in his youth. The intensity of his ambivalent feelings of both love and hate for his father is manifestly shown through several testimonial comments made by his mother, Eleanor K. Wade. Whereas she attests that "John loved his father a lot," her comments often reveal the negative side of his father's existence to John: "His father made him feel—oh, made him feel—Oh—maybe overweight."¹⁵⁾ Indeed, his father's overshadowing presence in his life constitutes an inescapable reality of psychological restraint. The most important issue regarding John's relation to his father is his symbolic

¹³⁾ Tim O'Brien, *In the Lake of the Woods* (New York: Penguin, 1995), 288.

¹⁴⁾ In her *Unclaimed Experience*, Caruth explicates the anonymity of traumatic experience: "Trauma is not locatable in the simple violent or original event in an individual's past, but rather in the way that its very unassimilated nature—the way it was precisely not known in the first instance—returns to haunt the survivor later on." Cathy Caruth, *Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative, and History* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 4.

¹⁵⁾ O'Brien, *Lake*, 10.

patricide through his repetitive acts of cutting his father's necktie. John's simulation of murder through these acts is a manifestation of his hate for and anxiety about obscure violence, which seems to have determined his father's life-and-death problem. John wants to reach the origin of the primal scene of violence by performing the very violence that repetitively causes psychological pains for his father. John's emulative transgression of the law exposes the violent nature in the very act of identifying the origin of violence. Visualizing the invisible violence through repetitive assault on the symbolic object not only tells us about his timeless fetishism but also depicts his resistance against the temporality.

When John reaches the age of fourteen, however, his alcoholic father hangs himself in reality. The event urges him to embrace an impossible desire for killing his dead father:

At the funeral he wanted to kill everybody who was crying and everybody who wasn't. He wanted to take a hammer and crawl into the casket and kill his father for dying. But he was helpless. He didn't know where to start.¹⁶⁾

John's distinction between imagination and reality that he has barely maintained through the symbolic acts is suddenly invalidated by the real death of his father. Instead of feeling sad, John becomes infuriated by his own inability to control the real world. It is only after his father's death that John becomes aware that his father's alcoholism caused his death. Henceforth, secrecy of others, which is to him an uncontrollable reality, becomes his obsession. He tries "to pretend that his father was not truly dead," and begins to construct his "father" in the world of his fantasy.¹⁷⁾ John continues to reproduce his "father" by pretending that his father is not dead. But such a habit of make-believe makes John feel that his father does not "stop dying."¹⁸⁾ In the depths of melancholy, John cannot help but re-experience his father's death because he is unable to comprehend "what it is he has lost."¹⁹⁾ This otherness of the other, in fact, does not come from the absolute sense of foreignness but always arises from one's feelings of intimacy and insufficiency in one's relationship with the other. While, as Julia Kristeva says, the depressed person inevitably possesses "an aggressiveness toward the lost object," which takes the form of the tense ambivalence of love and hate, such emotional reactions are concomitant with one's misrecognition of the psychological distance separating the one from the other.²⁰⁾ Therefore, internalization is inevitable for both the feelings of love and hate, even if it brings aggressiveness, and even if the lost object delimits one's relation to the other because of its inherent narcissism. The autonomous mental

¹⁶⁾ Ibid., 14.

¹⁷⁾ Ibid., 14.

¹⁸⁾ Ibid., 15, 42.

¹⁹⁾ Sigmund Freud, "Mourning and Melancholy," in *General Psychological Theory*, trans. James Strachey (New York: Touchstone, 1997), 166.

²⁰⁾ Julia Kristeva, *Black Sun: Depression and Melancholia*, trans. Leon S. Roudiez (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), 11.

activities that foster both formulations and deformulations in terms of one's relationship with the other disrupt one's senses of reality and temporality. The death of John's father thus does not mean an end to his relationship with his father; rather, it causes him to feel even more obsessive with his ideal figure of the "father."

John's twofold desire of loving and killing is reminiscent of the Freudian theory of psychological dynamics between the pleasure principle and the death drive. In his "Beyond the Pleasure Principle," Freud describes his observation of a child at the age of one and a half. The child is well trained as a "good boy" in the norm of Western society so that he represses his desire, for instance, to touch his mother when she is absent. Freud notes, "He never cried when his mother left him for a few hours."²¹⁾ However, a symptom of the boy's fear and anxiety can be perceived in his play:

The child had a wooden reel with a piece of string tied round it. It never occurred to him to pull it along the floor behind him, for instance, and play at its being a carriage. What he did was to hold the reel by the string and very skillfully throw it over the edge of his curtained cot, so that it disappeared into it, at the same time uttering his expressive "o-o-o-o." He then pulled the reel out of the cot again by the string and hailed its reappearance with a joyful "da" ["there"]. This, then, was the complete game—disappearance and return.²²⁾

In this play, the child instantly creates the pleasure of "da" by producing (or rather, pretending to produce) his mother's disappearance by his own hands. Since the child is in the pre-symbolic stage, the tactile sense is very conducive to forming his *Weltanschauung*, or "world view"; in fact, for the child at this age, his mother's disappearance would not be very different from her death, given that both events would simply mean his physical isolation from her. Though it is seemingly strange that the child through his play chooses to make himself uncomfortable, he can find stronger pleasure in seeing the objects moving at the edge of the realm of his sight than looking at things that are stably existent. The "complete game" that he invents makes him confident about his ability to have control over the world. A twinned phenomenon of "disappearance and return" creates a sense of certainty and completeness in his mind because of its structural formulation firmly wedged by a beginning and an end, that is to say, the formulation of story. The completeness of his play thus helps him to dispel the anxiety about his mother's real disappearance.

The child's defensive fiction-making against the reality in the Freudian depiction of the anti-pleasure principle echoes back to John's habit of cutting his father's necktie. By utilizing the metonymic formulation, John constructs his fictional world in which his father would never disappear or die. It is important to note that John's habit of cutting and restoring his father's necktie precedes the traumatic event of his father's death, since the precedence of

²¹⁾ Sigmund Freud, *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, trans. James Strachey (New York: Norton, 1990), 6.

²²⁾ *Ibid.*, 6.

fiction over reality solidifies the false causality between his trick and his father's death, authorizing once and for all a pervasive vision of reality. The question of reality for John thus becomes a question of how he can believe his own fiction. Restoring his father's necktie in a way represents his ability to construct his view of the world through fiction. John does "the tricks in his mind" at his father's death and develops a habit of conversing with his father in his imagination: "they'd talk for a while, quietly, catching up on things, like cutting a tie and restoring it whole."²³⁾ John's addiction to the magic thus becomes a supplement to his irretrievable loss of his father.²⁴⁾

The vicarious nature of John's trauma suggests how the violence functions as an agency that simultaneously establishes and disrupts his relationship with his father. Since the sense of intimacy arises only from John's internalization of the "fort-da" system where John fictively impersonalizes himself into the entity of his father, the intense reality of violence for John is importantly related to the sphere of his "father." Violence and intimacy are thus not two polar extremities for John; instead, violence never ceases to assume intimate immediacy for him. In *The Sublime Object of Ideology*, Slavoj Žižek describes how a person's "fantasy" mediates the desire of the Other: "Fantasy appears ... to the unbearable enigma of the desire of the Other, or the lack in the Other; but it is at the same time fantasy itself which, so to speak, provides the co-ordinates of our desire—which constructs the frame enabling us to desire something."²⁵⁾ The epistemological "frame" makes objects of desire not only visible but also compliable so that one can access the objectified otherness. In John's case, his hobby of magic is an important device for his "frame" in which he creates his tactile sense of "reality." John's mother attests that John "used to practice down in the basement, just stand in front of that old mirror of his and do tricks for hours and hours."²⁶⁾ In order to defy any contingency in the world, he tries to limit his world to within the frame of the "old mirror" where everything can be controlled by his own will. He thus satisfies his desire through this "frame": "The mirror made things better. The mirror made his father smile all the time."²⁷⁾ As Timothy Melley appropriately points out, John "simply internalizes the image of the mirror in which he witnesses his own capacity for deception and control, until eventually he conceives of his memory as a creative, fictional power and not a faithful record of events."²⁸⁾ John's internalized mirror thus functions as a screen where his "fantasy"

²³⁾ O'Brien, *Lake*, 31, 32.

²⁴⁾ Why is the necktie a particular place where John finds his object-cathexis? In *Interpreting Dreams*, Freud comments upon the symbolic meaning of the necktie in dreams: "In men's dreams, the necktie often symbolizes the penis, presumably not only because it is longitudinally extended, hangs down and typifies the male sex but also because a man can choose it at his discretion—a freedom that in respect of the actual object behind the symbol nature withholds." Sigmund Freud, *Interpreting Dreams*, trans. J. A. Underwood (New York: Penguin, 2006), 369.

²⁵⁾ Slavoj Žižek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology* (New York: Verso, 1989), 118.

²⁶⁾ O'Brien, *Lake*, 25.

²⁷⁾ *Ibid.*, 66.

²⁸⁾ Timothy Melley, "Postmodern Amnesia: Trauma and Forgetting in Tim O'Brien's *In the Lake of the Woods*" *Contemporary Literature* 44, no. 1 (Spring 2003), 119.

is projected: “He felt calm and safe with the big mirror behind his eyes.”²⁹⁾ John believes that even “happiness” can be crafted from the mirror.³⁰⁾

John cannot see the world without this internalized mirror. His desire to become a politician, for one, is in fact a part of his more general desire to control things. When he is still a student at the University of Minnesota, John talks with Kathy, who is at the time his girlfriend, about his future plan:

“Sounds fine,” she said, “but what’s it all for?”

“For?”

“I mean, *why*?”

John hesitated. “Because—you know—because it’s what I want.”

“Which is what?”

“Just the usual, I guess. Change things. Make things happen.”³¹⁾

His desire of changing things or making things happen exhibits how he conceives of the world, himself, and the relation between them, within the protected framework of his fantasy. One of the characters named Anthony L. Carbo comments on John’s political ambition: “I think politics and magic were almost the same thing for him.” Or, “Transformations—that’s part of it—trying to change things. When you think about it, magicians and politicians are basically control freaks.”³²⁾ The narrator’s explanation makes magic and politics even more closely associated: “Politics *was* manipulation. Like a magic show: invisible wires and secret trapdoors. He imagined placing a city in the palm of his hand, making his hand into a fist, making the city into a happier place. Manipulation, that was the fun of it.”³³⁾ John’s political desire is barely supported by his illusion that politics makes it possible to manipulate reality. Such a mechanical understanding of the relation of politics with reality again exposes the intensity of his obsession with the intangible otherness of others.³⁴⁾ Politics is a kind of “game,”

²⁹⁾ O’Brien, *Lake*, 66.

³⁰⁾ Ibid., 65. In his essay “The Magic Show,” O’Brien compares the effect of the story to that of the magic: “...the fundamental seemed very much the same. Writing fiction is a solitary endeavor. You shape your own universe. You practice all the time, then practice some more. You pay attention to craft. Your aim for tension and suspense, a sense of drama, displaying in concrete terms the actions and reactions of human beings contesting problems of the heart.” “The Magic Show,” in *Writers on Writing*, ed. Robert Pack and Jay Parini (Hanover: Middlebury College Press, 1991), 176.

³¹⁾ O’Brien, *Lake*, 34–35.

³²⁾ Ibid., 27.

³³⁾ Ibid., 35–36.

³⁴⁾ In this work, O’Brien alludes several times to Woodrow Wilson’s naïve comments on his own life, which are cited from Richard Hofstadter’s *The American Political Tradition and the Men Who Made It* (New York: Knopf, 1948). These cited comments show O’Brien’s ironic distance toward politicians and politics.

in Carbo's words, where one can "accomplish things."³⁵⁾

John's mirror is brought into use in the Vietnam War, too. The absolute contingency in the battlefield leads John into sheer confusion. As he limits the "reality" within the frame of the mirror, John, or the "Sorcerer," as his comrades call him, attempts to transform the unbearable reality of the war into his own fiction through his magic. Because what really happens in Vietnam is too atrocious to be "real," John's magic works *realistically* in the battlefields: "In Vietnam, where superstition governed, there was the fundamental need to believe—believing just to believe—and over time the men came to trust in Sorcerer's powers."³⁶⁾ The fictional causality of things created by John's magic replaces the inhuman arbitrariness of the war. The narrator describes how John transforms the horrible reality of the massacre in Thuan Yen into his magic show:

He displayed an ordinary military radio and whispered a few words and made their village disappear. There was a trick to it, which involved artillery and white phosphorus, but the overall effect was spectacular.

A fine, sunny morning. Everyone sat on the beach and oohed and ahed at the vanishing village.

"Fuckin' Houdini," one of the guys said.³⁷⁾

In this scene, John's spectacular "magic" acquits the soldiers of their sense of guilt about the massacre. John the magician, called "Houdini" here, allows them as well as himself to consume the massacre as a commodity of spectacle. In the classic study of the modern spectacle, Guy Debord writes, "The spectacle is the stage at which the commodity has succeeded in totally colonizing social life. Commodification is not only visible, [but] we no longer see anything else; the world we see is the world of the commodity."³⁸⁾ The visual effect of John's magic totalizes the world by eliminating any element of secret and unclarity. No doubt, John's strong will to clarify every phenomenon is deeply rooted in his personal fear of uncontrollable violence, i.e., the outside of his internalized mirror. In this sense, John is an incessant fiction writer; he responds to the call of his traumatic past through his repertoire of magic, which modifies and invents the meaning of the world.

2. Repetition-Impulse and Kathy's Death

John's perpetual effort to replace fiction with reality, however, is not always successful. Kathy discerns the otherness in him when she hears John saying "Kill Jesus" with a distinctly different voice from his usual one.³⁹⁾ John's unconscious compulsion to say these words

³⁵⁾ O'Brien, *Lake*, 150.

³⁶⁾ *Ibid.*, 37.

³⁷⁾ *Ibid.*, 65.

³⁸⁾ Guy Debord, *The Society of the Spectacle*, trans. Ken Knabb (London: AK Press, 2006), 21.

³⁹⁾ O'Brien, *Lake*, 53.

expresses his failure to reduce the otherness in him to signification. John suffers from the returned memory of Thuan Yen where he fails to cover the reality with his fantasy. In the village, John sees his senior officer Weatherby shooting “two little girls in the face.”⁴⁰⁾ He also sees Roschevitz shooting people, again, “in the head.”⁴¹⁾ John tries to believe that the whole event is “the most majestic trick of all,” but he cannot deceive himself.⁴²⁾ The scenes of killing imprint themselves on his mind, and John cannot forget them, regardless of his will:

Yet he could not stop returning. All night long he revisited the village of Thuan Yen, always with a fresh eye, witness to the tumblings and spinings of those who had reached their fictitious point of no return. Relatively speaking, he decided, these frazzled-eyed citizens were never quite dead, otherwise they would surely stop dying. Same-same for his father.⁴³⁾

John’s compulsive return to Thuan Yen always makes him face the moment of indescribable violence, since he cannot consume it as part of a spectacle. If trauma speaks for an aspect of atemporality, it is because the primal event is always already unhinged from the mechanism of memorization. John’s imaginative revisiting of the scene of violence causes him to witness the scene of the killings as a new event, where the internalized mirror becomes unsustainable. As the passage shows, the infinitely renewed experience of Thuan Yen forms psychological reference in John’s unconscious to the memory of his father’s death. When John finds the “same” structure of otherness in these two distinct events of uncontrollable violence, it shows that the absence of his “father” in its proper place, irrespective of whether it is before or after his father’s physical death, significantly matters for the way in which John involves himself with the Vietnam War.

The logic of corollary that dominates John’s relationship with others blurs the distinction among people around him. Given the sense of intimacy and isolation that significantly restricts his view of others, his finding of the “same” among different others results in his ultimate failure to relate himself with others. A hypothesis that posits John’s murder of Kathy is based on John’s identification of her with his father; John loves Kathy as a person who unfailingly loves him in the way that his idealized “father” ought to do. Since for John, love is a form of objective relation, he cannot stand any of Kathy’s secrecy; in other words, he burdens a sense of obligation to put all the aspects of Kathy into perspective. When he knows Kathy’s sudden disappearance, John cannot help accusing her in his mind: “No notes, no diagrams. You don’t explain a thing. Which was the art of it—his father’s art, Kathy’s art—that magnificent giving over to pure and absolute Mystery.”⁴⁴⁾ By using the language of

⁴⁰⁾ *Ibid.*, 106.

⁴¹⁾ *Ibid.*, 108.

⁴²⁾ *Ibid.*, 108.

⁴³⁾ *Ibid.*, 286.

⁴⁴⁾ *Ibid.*, 241.

magic tricks, John attempts to understand the event of Kathy's disappearance with a frame of his fiction. John tries to place himself in the position of the audience of a drama in order to mitigate the shock he received from the sense of loss. The disappearance of Kathy overlaps with the disappearance of his father in his mind because of his narcissistic identification of others.

John's internalized "fort und da" mechanism postulates the existence of his "father" as a lost object that should, and will, return. After his father's death, John often looks for his father by "opening closets, scanning the carpets and sidewalks and lawns as if search of a lost nickel."⁴⁵⁾ As a game of tag, John's search for his lost object is no more than a guise: a ritual of identification that is founded upon his reliance on the stability of the lost object. Not surprisingly, John's efforts are always rewarded by his discovery of his imaginative "father." But his finding does not in fact bring him to any true discovery of the reality; instead, it covers the reality with his fiction.

John's defense mechanism in which such hide-and-seek operates conditions his relationship to his silent partner, Kathy. Indeed, from the beginning of his acquaintance with her, John spies on Kathy in fear of losing her. For John, Kathy is a visualization of his lost object. John supposes that the act of spying makes it possible to feel a sense of love to her, since constant surveillance gives him a chance to regain his "father" in his relationship with his real father.

When he engages in the Vietnam War, John attempts to maintain his connection with Kathy by exchanging mails. Most of the letters from Kathy bring him a sense of comfort. However, one of the letters that Kathy sends to John makes him tremble. In it she writes: "A piece of advice. Be careful with the tricks. One of these days you'll make *me* disappear."⁴⁶⁾ Since John's anxiety is obviously inscribed in the letter, and since her voice in the letter sounds quite different from that in other scenes, the tone of the letter makes the reader suspicious about whether it is really written by Kathy or invented by John's imagination. Reading the letter makes John feel "the old terrors rise up again."⁴⁷⁾ The "old terrors," of course, are the terrors that he felt when he lost his father. His fear of losing Kathy thus uncannily resonates with his experience of losing his father.

Thus, one can consider John's possible murder of Kathy in terms of the mechanism of John's identification. Kathy is metonymically associated with John's father through the place of John's pillow, which he self-deceivingly identifies with his "father." Such identification provides a rationale for the "hypothesis" that John pours hot water onto Kathy's face lying on the pillow. Kathy's body substitutes the place of his "father" at the very moment of the murder through the violent force of identification. To be further noted, "father" but also his experience in Vietnam that influences him to murder her. As I pointed out, John witnesses his

⁴⁵⁾ Ibid., 15.

⁴⁶⁾ Ibid., 38.

⁴⁷⁾ Ibid., 38.

comrades shooting Vietnamese people in the head in Thuan Yen. The act of shooting in the head thus constitutes a central image of his trauma, which John emulates in the act of pouring water on Kathy's head. Although this "event" is presented as no more than a "hypothesis" in this novel, the posited scenario illuminates the predominance of symbolic structure in John's world view. John's trauma thus urges him to create a fictional world where the symbolism is dominant over any material event.

3. To the Bottom of the Lake

Consideration of John's relation with the problem of violence directs us to examine the meaning of his engagement in Vietnam with a fresh perspective. When the narrator attests that "it was in the nature of love that John Wade went to the war," it touches upon John's inner necessity to place his body in the midst of violence.⁴⁸⁾ Indeed, going to Vietnam, for John, in a way signifies a return to the origin of his father, which is simultaneously a return to his own origin. Intimacy with violence, or his avid curiosity of what conditions violence, primarily motivates him to go to Vietnam. One of John's secrets, the narrator says, is "how much he loved the place—Vietnam—how it felt like home."⁴⁹⁾ John identifies Vietnam, or the notion of violence, as his "home" and by so doing negotiates with his own melancholy. John incessantly trifles with violence in battlefields through his performance as "Sorcerer," and attains a freakish and transitory sense of intimacy:

Sorcerer was in his element. It was a place with secret trapdoors and tunnels and underground chambers populated by various spooks and goblins, a place where magic was everyone's hobby and where elaborate props were always on hand—exploding boxes and secret chemicals and numerous devices of levitation—you could *fly* here, you could make *other* people fly—a place where the air itself was both reality and illusion, where anything might instantly become anything else.⁵⁰⁾

The passage is far from a realistic description of the landscape in Vietnam. Instead, it shows John's keen intimacy with a place where he can transform anything into anything he wants. John's attachment to a place that would enable him to hide himself from the gazes of the others finds its exquisite expression in Vietnam. The reason for his feeling Vietnam as "home" is that the formulation of John's desire is metonymic. The sense of being at ease that he attains by hiding his body leads him to a fortification of psychic space as well as a dismissal of geographical space.

Within the same trajectory of the question of John's topography, one can explore the psychological topos of the lake. In order to examine the placeness (and the placelessness) of

⁴⁸⁾ Ibid., 59.

⁴⁹⁾ Ibid., 73.

⁵⁰⁾ Ibid., 72.

the lake in the fiction, let us refer back to the beginning of the novel, where John and his wife come to the isolated cottage on the lake in order to evade the harsh reality of the world:

Beyond the dock the big lake opened northward into Canada, where the water was everything, vast and very cold, and where there were secret channels and portages and bays and tangled forests and islands without names. Everywhere, for many thousand square miles, the wilderness was all one thing, like a great curving mirror, infinitely blue and beautiful, always the same.⁵¹⁾

The description of the scenery is not objective but reflective of John's inner landscapes, represented by the "mirror" and the "secret" places. In other words, John's sense of place quite reducibly serves to turn the geography into issues of intimacy. John's unconscious call for the return to the primal scene definitively affects his relationship with the circumstances. A sense of no way out brings him to the border of his nation, namely, the Northern Minnesotan border with the land of Canada where the lake in question exists. Here, as well as in other works by O'Brien, Canada is a place of liberation or evasion from the military service, and the lake symbolizes moments of hesitation and decision.⁵²⁾

One of the "hypotheses" suggests that Kathy crosses by boat to the other side of the lake. This supposition is seemingly contradictory with the another scenario where John kills his wife. But if the lake is a reflection of John's mind, these two different scenarios do not necessarily contradict each other. The lake is not a solid object but a collective reflection. When Kathy disappears into the lake, she is also engulfed into the hollow lack of John's mind. If, as Cathy Caruth says, the agony of the trauma comes from the "perplexing experience of survival" rather than "the life-threatening events," the traumatized person is forced to live one's life only in the possibility of death.⁵³⁾ As he goes to the lake in search of Kathy on a boat with his helpers, Claude and Pat, John gradually feels that he is surrounded by familiar echoes of violence. At a small village on the lakeshore named Angle Inlet, John hears the somber voices of the men who surround the bonfire. The scene reminds John of his days in Vietnam: "Even from a distance, Wade decided, there was something distinctly mournful in their voices.... It reminded him of the way men talked in the hours after a firefight. After Weber died, or Reinhart, or PFC Weatherby. That same melancholy. The same musical rise and fall."⁵⁴⁾ The intensity of his identification of objects through the repetitive acknowledgment of the sameness turns his search for Kathy into the exploration of his own "heart of darkness." All of John's traumatic memories merge into one in the hollow room of

⁵¹⁾ Ibid., 1.

⁵²⁾ In *Combat Zone*, for example, the protagonist plans to escape to Canada before deciding to go to Vietnam.

⁵³⁾ Caruth, *Unclaimed Experience*, 60.

⁵⁴⁾ O'Brien, *Lake*, 235.

his mind as the echoes of his past reverberate in the air. Surrounded in the echoes of the returned voices, John goes farther and farther into the lake. While the narrator suggests the possibility of John's disappearance to the north, the text shows another scenario where he drowns himself to the bottom of the lake. This possibility figures in his affection for Kathy, who "stares up to him from beneath the surface of the silvered lake."⁵⁵⁾

Through the self-questioning structure of narrative in *In the Lake of the Woods*, O'Brien engages with the relation between trauma and narrative. As John considers the uncertainty of memory in his coinage of the word "sub-memories," O'Brien suggests that human memory is always vulnerably exposed to the influence of various agencies.⁵⁶⁾ If the four angles of the light shone onto the surface of the lake are the metaphor of the four different kinds of narratives, the ungraspable bottom of the lake presents violence as an origin of creativity. The reason for the association of Kathy with the invisible bottom of the lake is that John desires to see her at the solid bottom of its reality: "The way he'd looked at her, no tricks at all. Just young and in love. Sentimental, maybe, but it was one of those times when all the mysteries of the world seemed to condense into something solid."⁵⁷⁾ Perceiving "no trick" in the gaze of the other, John establishes "something solid" through his relationship with Kathy. The disappearance of Kathy is, then, a negative form of response to John's belief.

The relation between John and the narrator repeats the relation between John and Kathy as the footnote records the author's voice: "John Wade—he's beyond knowing. He's an other."⁵⁸⁾ While Kathy is an invisible center to the characters within the novel, John remains "an other" to the narrator. Through such distancing, O'Brien seems to suggest that narrative can be possible only in the recognition of its impossibility.

At the time the novel was published, about a quarter of a century had passed since the events in Thuan Yen. O'Brien attempts to resist the politics of forgetting by depicting John's self-defensive response to the violence. John's difficulty of relating himself with the traumatic past poses a question about the easiness of oblivion that the American public seems to share. In an interview with David Louis Edelman, O'Brien made critical comments on the massacre in Thuan Yen.

[Interviewer]: What did you think about [the massacre] at the time?

[O'Brien]: I thought it was murder, the same thing I think today. It makes me angry that so many people got off, the charges were dropped, people got off on technicalities, only one person was convicted. That was Lieutenant Calley. People who testified that they killed 20 people, they were never prosecuted. What really bugs me is that of all the people who were there, about 150 or so, the American public only remembers Calley's

⁵⁵⁾ Ibid., 288.

⁵⁶⁾ Ibid., 131.

⁵⁷⁾ Ibid., 173.

⁵⁸⁾ Ibid., 101.

name. But what about the rest of them? Those people are still among us, all over, maybe even some in Baltimore. What are they telling their wives and children? Are they guarding their secrets, too?⁵⁹⁾

In his response to the interviewer, O'Brien clearly accuses not only "the people who were there" but also "the American public" who wants to guard the secrets of American soldiers' guilt in Vietnam. Through *In the Lake of the Woods*, O'Brien indicates Americans' collective amnesia of the traumatic event, which is allegorically represented in the function of John's internalized mirror.

By exploring the relation between trauma and narrative through his intricate formation of metafiction, O'Brien poses the question of the narrative of historical memory. Against collective oblivion, O'Brien continues speaking about the Vietnam War. As Maria Bonn insists, it is his belief in the potentiality of stories that sustains O'Brien's narratives.⁶⁰⁾ It is true that knowing the reality of the war in absolute terms is impossible. But O'Brien finds a way to resist the reducibility of history by exhibiting multiple fictional narratives for a single event. He creates the Vietnam *wars*, which are always imagined, looked back on, referred to, and narrated again and again both by the author and the reader. The events are always renewed through the work of narrative and the collective memory of the past, since any event is inseparable from the narrative. O'Brien describes the war as a living phenomenon, provoking our imagination for the unspeakable, silent, yet lingering past.

⁵⁹⁾ "Interview with Tim O'Brien," *Baltimore City Paper*, October 19, 1994.

⁶⁰⁾ Bonn, "Stories," 3.

Preparing for the “Next War”: Civil Defense during the Truman Administration

Masako HATTORI

要 約

本稿は、トルーマン政権期の連邦民間防衛局（FCDA）が、民間防衛への市民の動員を目的に実施した一連の宣伝・教育事業に着目し、そこで将来の戦争がどう語られたかを考察する。民間防衛に関する従来の研究の多くは、1945年の夏に原爆が開発されて以来、民間防衛は原爆対策として行われるようになった、という前提に立つ。しかしながら、民間防衛を通じて人々が描いた戦争像は、果たして原爆の登場とともに即座に変化したのであろうか。

1940年代末の米ソ対立の危機的悪化を受けて設立されたFCDAは、全国的な民間防衛体制構築のために1750万人の市民の参加が必要であると想定し、人々に民間防衛の急務を訴えるための様々な事業に着手した。まず、各地で民間防衛の指導を担う人材の養成機関が設立され、卒業生は全米各地で市民の動員と指導に当たった。大学の研究機関や各種メディアも大きく貢献した。さらに、トルーマン期FCDAの一大事業として、1952年に一連の「アラート・アメリカ」事業が実施された。これは、民間防衛に関する展示品を載せたトラックが全国各地に出向き、訪問先で展示行事を催す企画を中心に、人々に民間防衛への参加を促そうとするものであった。展示では、現代戦の恐怖や民間防衛の手順が、人々の五感に訴える特殊効果を駆使して説明された。

以上の事業を通じ、米国本土が攻撃対象となる「次の戦争」では、敵は、原爆をその攻撃の中核としながらも、焼夷弾、細菌・化学兵器、破壊活動等を含むあらゆる攻撃手段を総動員して戦うと想定された。すなわち、市民を敵の攻撃による被害から守るべく民間防衛に精力を注いだ人々の間では、原爆の登場によって即座に戦争観が「核戦争」へと変化したわけではなかったのである。当時の人々の描いた「次の戦争」は、「核戦争」より、先の大戦の「総力戦」に近いものであった。

Introduction

“See the Show that may Save Your Life!”¹⁾

This rather strange, puzzling catchphrase appeared in newspaper advertisements, store windows, and theaters throughout the United States in 1952 as part of the “Alert America Convoys” conducted by the Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA). This was a nationwide tour of exhibits intended to offer to the public “highly dramatic visualizations” of the fear of modern warfare and the know-how for civil defense.²⁾ Receiving official status as an independent agency in January 1951, the FCDA attempted various programs of civil defense in order to find ways to protect Americans and their properties from

¹⁾ Federal Civil Defense Administration, *Civil Defense Alert* [hereafter *CDA*] 1, no.11 (Washington DC: GPO, 1952): 5.

²⁾ FCDA, *Annual Report for 1951* (Washington DC: GPO, 1952), 15.

the ravages of future “enemy attacks” on U.S. homeland. The officials dedicated themselves to a range of programs such as commissioning studies, drawing up evacuation and shelter plans, training civil defense volunteers, and disseminating information on civil defense.

Much literature on U.S. civil defense has explained the effort in the context of how the government’s Cold War policies intruded into the lives of American people. These studies have made considerable achievement in revealing how McCarthyism, the Korean War, and other severe conditions of the Cold War surrounded the U.S. society and its people.³⁾ Thus, the “Alert America” appearing in some of these studies is explained as an example of government “propaganda”—how civil defense understated the power of the atomic bomb and contributed to the government’s efforts to gain public support for their Cold War policies.⁴⁾ The underlying assumption in these studies is that the dawn of the “atomic age” in the summer of 1945 fundamentally changed how people viewed the nature of war.⁵⁾ In other words, they assume that civil defense became directed at atomic weapons from the very moment the atomic bomb came into existence. In retrospect, indeed, the advent of the atomic bomb was a momentous turning point in the history of science and technology, diplomacy, and war. American people in 1945 surely had grasped, albeit with ambiguity, the extraordinary nature of this new weapon. Still, when considering how the atomic bomb transformed people’s images about what the “next war” would be like from those based on their experiences during the previous World Wars, a question remains of whether the invention of the atomic bomb in 1945 had immediately changed their views of war to something the later generations would call the “nuclear war”—a nightmare of Armageddon.

Such a perspective is derived from my concern that previous studies do not seem to fully explain why people who dedicated themselves to civil defense in the “atomic age” did so instead of solely relying on the military for national defense. To situate them merely in the context of propaganda would be to dismiss the serious efforts of the FCDA and other civil defense workers who tried to protect fellow Americans from future tragedy. This is especially so since many of them, including those in the FCDA, were not informed of critical information about atomic weapons.⁶⁾ Life with civil defense was a “reality” for those who

³⁾ Here I mainly referred to Andrew D. Grossman, *Neither Dead nor Red: Civilian Defense and American Political Development during the Early Cold War* (New York: Routledge, 2001); Laura McEnaney, *Civil Defense Begins at Home: Militarization Meets Everyday Life in the Fifties* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000); Guy Oakes, *The Imaginary War: Civil Defense and American Cold War Culture* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).

⁴⁾ Dee Garrison, *Bracing for Armageddon: Why Civil Defense Never Worked* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 43; Grossman, *Dead nor Red*, 62–65, 72–79.

⁵⁾ Thomas J. Kerr, *Civil Defense in the U.S.: Bandid for a Holocaust?* (Boulder: Westview, 1983), 6; Grossman, *Dead nor Red*, 16.

⁶⁾ Crucial information concerning atomic energy was concealed not only from the general public but also from those concerned with the issue such as many scientists and public officials. Lyon Gardiner Tyler Jr., “Civil Defense: The Impact of the Planning Years, 1945–1950” (PhD diss., Duke University, 1967), 239–40; McEnaney, *Civil Defense*, 29–30.

lived during that era. Thus, their rich and vivid history deserves further study.

Since myriads of policies were conducted by the FCDA, no brief overview can adequately narrate or analyze its history. Therefore, I will look into those policies concerned with spreading the ideas of civil defense to the public and mobilizing them into their programs, and situate “Alert America” as the culmination of these efforts in this period. Since the participation of a vast numbers of ordinary citizens was critical to civil defense, these “public education programs,” as the FCDA officials called them, were essential. I seek to argue that the view of war that the civil defense workers in this period envisioned as the “next war” was something closer to the “total war” vision of the World War II, situating the atomic bomb at its core but also as one of many weapons that a potential enemy might use. I do not intend to understate the government’s concealment of information concerning “national security,” the horror of nuclear weapons, and other dark Cold War legacies, but rather will try to explore the history of civil defense from a new perspective.

While civil defense in the U.S. has a long history up to this day, the story in this paper focuses on the years of President Harry S. Truman, the turbulent years which include the end of World War II and the beginning of another severe international situation symbolized by some crucial events such as the Soviet’s successful development of its own atomic bomb, the deterioration of the war in Korea, and the growing anti-Communist crusade at home. My story ends in late 1952, which coincides with the first successful detonation of a hydrogen bomb by the United States. Arguing whether the “next war” images were transformed as the appalling effects of this bomb came to be known from the mid-1950s, and whether or how those images interacted with the course of civil defense programs requires another series of in-depth examinations beyond the scope of this paper.

My interpretation advanced in this paper is mainly based on a review of pamphlets, newsletters, annual reports, and other materials produced by the FCDA, as well as contemporary studies done by universities and newspaper articles concerning civil defense.

1. The Beginning of Civil Defense

The history of civil defense can be traced back to the two World War periods. During the First World War, with the development of aircrafts and the rise of mass armies conscripted from the general public, the traditional distinction between combatants and non-combatants collapsed, and nations at war began to direct attacks on civilians. When German zeppelins assaulted English cities, the concept of civil defense came into being as a way to protect civilians from the effects of enemy attacks.⁷⁾

The idea of civil defense was soon introduced to the U.S., where it was exercised during the World Wars. Without serious danger of being attacked, however, the term mainly implied not so much preparation for actual military attacks but mobilization of popular support for the war. This purpose included maintaining anti-saboteur vigilance, promoting recruitment of

⁷⁾ Kerr, *Civil Defense*, 9–10.

the armed forces, and encouraging the sales of war bonds, just to name a few. Still, in these years, organizational precedents and basic ideas were established in the U.S. that offered a framework for civil defense planning in the post-WWII period.⁸⁾

The brutal, tragic war came to an end in August 1945 and Americans heartily celebrated the coming of peace. After the long period of suffering, people enjoyed the promise of a growing consumer economy and their new prosperity.⁹⁾ Yet, for those concerned with international relations, this postwar period was far from a long-awaited peace. The faith in “Fortress America”—a sense that the U.S. was protected by its geographic isolation—was shaken by the technological advances in war weapons, which seemed to make the U.S. homeland highly vulnerable to enemy attacks. The experience of “total war” established an assumption that there was no longer a clear distinction between combatants and non-combatants in a war. In addition, the memory of the Pearl Harbor attack in 1941 produced a special fear of sudden, surprise attacks. As Washington pursued the construction of a national security state, “preparedness” became a key issue.¹⁰⁾

In the late 1940s, various civil defense studies were conducted in Washington which would serve as a basis for much of the thinking of civil defense planners in the following period. Among the most influential was the *Hopley Report*. Named after Russell J. Hopley, director of a temporary office established by the Secretary of Defense James Forrestal to prepare proposals for national civil defense, this report provided a blueprint of an operational civil defense organization for FCDA planners.¹¹⁾ It recommended that a federal office to direct civil defense be established, and that the organizing and operating of civil defense be the joint responsibility of federal and state governments with the participation of local communities throughout the U.S. It envisaged that those local communities would have well organized and trained units of volunteers—15 million men and women in total—to be prepared to meet “hazards of atomic or any other modern weapons” that an enemy might use.¹²⁾

In the meantime, issues concerning the atomic bomb prompted various public arguments. On the one hand, voices of unease were heard. For example, some people questioned the morality of the use of atomic bombs on civilians at Hiroshima and Nagasaki while a majority

⁸⁾ Ibid., 6–19; McEnaney, *Civil Defense*, 17–20; JoAnne Brown, “‘A is for Atom, B is for Bomb’: Civil Defense in American Public Education, 1948–1963,” *Journal of American History* 75 (1988): 69; Allan M. Winkler, *Life under a Cloud: American Anxiety about the Atom* (1993; repr., Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1999), 109–11.

⁹⁾ Many scholarly works, including those on civil defense, have challenged this simple, blissful image of the postwar 1940s and the 1950s. For example, see Elaine Tyler May, *Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era* (New York: Basic Books, 1988).

¹⁰⁾ In fact, the military departments had begun planning for the “next war” during World War II. What they envisioned was not a limited, short-term conflict but a “World War III.” Tyler, “Civil Defense,” 7–8.

¹¹⁾ U.S. Office of Civil Defense Planning, *Civil Defense for National Security* (Washington DC: GPO, 1948), 291.

¹²⁾ Those organizations were to operate in natural disasters as well. Ibid., 1–17.

of people accepted the explanation of the federal government that it had had a crucial role as a strategy to win the war and that it symbolized the technological and scientific accomplishment of the U.S.¹³⁾ One of the most influential was the Pulitzer-prize-winning journalist John Hersey's account entitled "Hiroshima," which appeared in the *New Yorker* on August 31, 1946. Its dreadful descriptions shocked many Americans who had hardly been informed of how "ordinary citizens" had suffered the event.¹⁴⁾ How to manage atomic energy was also a serious subject to them. The failure of the United Nations' conference on the international control of atomic energy seemed to reject the prospect of U.S.–Soviet cooperation on this matter.¹⁵⁾ On the other hand, however, peaceful use of atomic energy also seemed to promise a brilliant future. Atomic cars, atomic pills, and other dreams that had been depicted in science fiction novels suddenly seemed realizable.¹⁶⁾ Was the atomic energy a good or an evil? This question was never resolved.

The United States' monopoly on atomic bombs suddenly ended in August 1949 with the successful Soviet detonation of its own atomic bomb. The Truman Administration's supposed "loss of China" in October 1949 and the opening of the Korean War in June 1950 accelerated the fear toward Soviet aggression. Congressman John F. Kennedy warned the public that the slowness of civil defense planning made the U.S. vulnerable to an "atomic Pearl Harbor." Other anxious politicians, scientists, and citizens pressured the administration for something more than mere studies.¹⁷⁾ The answer was the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 which created the FDCA.

According to this act, an "enemy attack" meant any attack by an enemy of the U.S. which might cause substantial damage to civilian properties or persons by sabotage, or by atomic, chemical, bacteriological, or any other weapons or processes. The term "civil defense" meant all activities and measures designed or undertaken to minimize the effects on the civilian population caused by such an attack, to deal with the immediate emergency conditions, and to effectuate emergency repairs and restoration of the vital utilities destroyed.¹⁸⁾

¹³⁾ Many historical works have been written concerning American people and the use of atomic bombs on Japanese cities. See Gar Alperovitz, *The Decision the Use the Atomic Bomb and the Architecture of an American Myth* (New York: Knopf, 1995); Michael J. Hogan, ed., *Hiroshima in History and Memory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Robert J. Lifton and Greg Mitchell, *Hiroshima in America: A Half Century of Denial* (New York: Avon Books, 1995).

¹⁴⁾ The article was later published as a book. John Hersey, *Hiroshima* (New York: Knopf, 1946). For a detailed study on the impact of Hersey's "Hiroshima" on Americans, see Michael J. Yavenditti, "John Hersey and the American Conscience: The Reception of 'Hiroshima,'" *Pacific Historical Review* 43 (1974): 24–49.

¹⁵⁾ Paul Boyer, *By the Bomb's Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the Atomic Age* (1985; repr., Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press, 1994), 52–58.

¹⁶⁾ *Ibid.*, Part 4, 5; Winkler, *Life under a Cloud*, Chap. 6.

¹⁷⁾ "Defense Lack Seen as 'Pearl Harbor,'" *New York Times* [hereafter *NYT*], Oct. 10, 1949; McEnaney, *Civil Defense*, 12–15.

¹⁸⁾ "Public Law 920 [Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950]," in FCDA, *Annual Report for 1951*, 90.

2. Public Education of the FCDA

Given the nature of its mission, it was clear that the FCDA programs required the cooperation of various people and agencies. In the course of policy planning, the planners referred to academic professionals for surveys and researches, as well as to the *Hopley Report* and other studies done previously. Soon they came up with the estimation that the involvement of 17.5 million citizens was needed in order to sustain an efficient nationwide civil defense system. As table 1 shows, in its first years the FCDA designated eleven services for these civil defense volunteers.¹⁹⁾ Two points in this categorization require attention.

First, it shows that the U.S. consisted of “target areas” and “support areas.” Not many people knew exactly where the assumed “target areas” were. According to “Project East River,” a report presented to the federal government by a consortium of research universities, 100 major cities, areas, and industrial centers in the U.S. and Canada were selected as primary target areas of an enemy attack.²⁰⁾ The “support areas” represented other relatively rural areas where, in the aftermath of an attack against the target areas, people were expected to take care of the refugees or to rush to those devastated areas as rescuers.²¹⁾

Services	Men and women workers per 1,000 population	
	Target area	Support area
Emergency welfare	14.0	14.0
Engineering	19.0	13.0
Fire	3.4	2.0
Health and special weapons defense	39.0	8.0
Police	4.0	4.0
Rescue	2.4	1.0
Staff and miscellaneous	5.0	5.0
Training and education	1.0	1.0
Transportation	19.0	13.0
Warden	38.0	10.0
Warning and communications	2.0	1.0
Total	146.8	72.0

Table 1. Volunteer services needed for civil defense.

Source: FCDA, *Annual Report for 1951*, 20.

¹⁹⁾ The services changed from time to time, which reflects the FCDA’s uncertainty about what the sufficient and realistic civil defense would be like. FCDA, *Annual Report for 1951*, 20; FCDA, *Annual Report for 1952* (Washington DC: GPO, 1953), 73.

²⁰⁾ I argue in the next section of this paper that the Alert America Convoys covered many of these target areas.

²¹⁾ “Project East River” was conducted by the Associated Universities, an university consortium hired by the Department of Defense, the National Security Resources Board (NSRB, a federal agency which dealt with industrial protection in the event of an attack), and the FCDA to develop comprehensive plans for national defense. Associated Universities, “Project East River: Destructive Threat of Atomic Weapons, Part III of Project East River,” 18–22, Sept. 1952, NSRB, Box 19, Record Group 304, National Archives, Maryland; FCDA, *Annual Report for 1951*, 19–20.

Second, the table indicates that the quota of people required for “Health and special weapons defense” services was set considerably high. These people were expected to detect radiological, chemical or biological contamination and to treat the casualties suffering from enemy attacks.²²⁾ This coincides with the definition of the Civil Defense Act of 1950. In other words, the officials of civil defense imagined the “enemy attack” as a combination of various means of war, including these sneaky, invisible weapons located at home, as well as combat planes and atomic bombs coming from the sky.

Based on this calculation, new civil defense volunteers were needed immediately. Data from a survey conducted in September 1950 by another university institute, the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan, illustrated that many citizens showed a willingness to participate in civil defense, but that one-third of them had not heard any detailed information about it.²³⁾ Recruiting 17.5 million workers was definitely not a task that the FCDA could manage on its own. Therefore, they embarked on training local civil defense leaders who would give instructions to other citizens at the local level.

The Federal Civil Defense Staff College was established in Maryland in April 1951 to cover this task. The establishment of three Training Schools in Oklahoma, California, and Pennsylvania soon followed. The Staff College was intended to instruct state and local administrators on topics such as military and international situations, plans and policies for organization and training of civil defense, and practical operations under attack. In contrast, the Training Schools were expected to train instructors who would contribute to the education in local communities. Courses on rescue, first-aid, and other specialized phases of civil defense were provided there.²⁴⁾ The FCDA reported that 3,800 people graduated from one of these schools by the end of 1952. They took leadership in 650 local civil defense schools established throughout the nation from which 200,000 people graduated by this year.²⁵⁾

The use of mass media was another major tactic of the FCDA. Newspaper articles, television programs, and movies were distributed under the leadership of this agency. The FCDA also published a large amount of pamphlets and booklets concerning civil defense information and activities which totaled over 55,000,000 in 1951.²⁶⁾

²²⁾ FCDA, *Annual Report for 1951*, 52–55.

²³⁾ Since 1946, this center had been conducting studies on the reactions of people to the threat of war. The FCDA commissioned the center to study people’s perceptions of war, atomic bomb, civil defense, and other related subjects. “A Preliminary Report on Public Attitudes toward Civil Defense,” in Dennis Merrill ed., *Preparing to Survive Atomic Attack: The Truman Administration’s Civil Defense Program*, vol. 26 of *Documentary History of the Truman Presidency* ([Bethesda, MD]: University Publications of America, 1999), 517–27; Stephen B. Withey, *4th Survey of Public Knowledge and Attitudes Concerning Civil defense: A Report of a National Study in March, 1954* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1954), iii, 18–19.

²⁴⁾ FCDA, *Annual Report for 1951*, 21–23; *CDA* 1, no.1 (1951): 1–2; *CDA* 1, no.2 (1951): 4, 6; *CDA* 1, no.9 (1952): 1; *CDA* 1, no.12 (1952): 2.

²⁵⁾ FCDA, *Annual Report for 1952*, 2.

²⁶⁾ “How Civil Defense Built Public Interest,” *Tide*, April 11, 1952; FCDA, *Annual Report for 1951*, 10–11, 46; McEnaney, *Civil Defense*, 35–36.

By the end of 1951, the FCDA officials were confident that their public education programs were making substantial progress, but the fact that only 1.9 million people had volunteered for civil defense by that time clearly demonstrated that they were still far from their goal of recruiting 17.5 million citizens.²⁷⁾ How should they mobilize more people? The second survey carried out by the Survey Research Center revealed that almost half of the respondents had not heard or read that local authorities were recruiting volunteers. It pointed out that the distribution of information was still insufficient.²⁸⁾ Then, the answer seemed to be to inform the public, or “Alert America,” in a more direct form “to bring home the job of civil defense to the man who needs it the most—the man on the street.”²⁹⁾

3. Going on the Road: The Alert America Convoys Tour the Nation

(1) The Planning

The Alert America Campaign was launched in late 1951 and implemented during 1952. The main part of this campaign was the Alert America Convoy, which were trailer-truck tours designed to show “exhibits of war destruction and home defense techniques across the country” and to spur the recruitment of civil defense volunteers.³⁰⁾

To some extent, the planning of the campaign was stimulated from the outside. For example, the National Advisory Council for the FCDA referred to the Survey Research Center reports, and declared in June 1951 that “a campaign to alert America” (the slogan was adopted here) was a matter of great urgency to overcome “public apathy” toward civil defense.³¹⁾ A conference of concerned civil defense leaders from thirty-two states also adopted a resolution criticizing the FCDA for its “slowness” in advancing civil defense.³²⁾ In replying to these demands, the FCDA promised to launch the “Alert America” campaign which consisted of three major objectives: first, to inform “American citizens about fundamentals of self-protection” from various types of weapons; second, to motivate them to volunteer and participate in local civil defense activities; and third, to create “public recognition of civil defense as the co-equal partner of the military in the common defense of the country.” The Alert America Convoy was situated at the core of this campaign.³³⁾

For assistance in its planning and implementation, the FCDA drew considerably on a

²⁷⁾ FCDA, *Annual Report for 1951*, v, 19–20; CDA 1, no.9 (1952): 6, 7; CDA 1, no.10 (1952): 1.

²⁸⁾ “Preliminary Report on Public Attitudes,” 517–27; CDA 1, no.12 (1952): 6.

²⁹⁾ “Alert U.S. Convoy to Arrive May 17,” *Los Angeles Times*, May 9, 1952.

³⁰⁾ “Defense Exhibits Going on the Road,” *NYT*, Oct. 12, 1951.

³¹⁾ This council consisted of six governors and mayors, and six people from the general public “on the basis of their qualifications and interest in the matters affecting the national interest.” “Alert U.S.’ Drive Urged on Apathy,” *Washington Post* [hereafter *Post*], June 17, 1951; “Alert America Campaign: Progress Report,” in Merrill ed., *Preparing to Survive*, 322–23; FCDA, *Annual Report for 1951*, 71–72.

³²⁾ “States Seek Data on Civil Defense,” *NYT*, Sept. 22, 1951.

³³⁾ “Alert America Campaign: Progress Report,” 322–36.

non-profit organization called the Advertising Council. Famous for creating “Rosie the Riveter,” this consortium of advertising agencies and corporate advertisers had been contributing to government propaganda efforts from the World War II period by offering public services.³⁴⁾

The Advertising Council’s relations with the FCDA had begun in March 1951. An advertising executive from Johnson & Johnson Inc. led this partnership as volunteer coordinator, with the support of the then world’s second largest advertising agency, Batten, Barton, Durstine & Osborn, Inc. The Council led various FCDA projects such as distributing civil defense pamphlets and producing “recruitment kits” for civil defense workers.³⁵⁾

The project of the Convoy was announced to the public at a press conference on October 11, 1951. It was called a “Paul Revere on wheels” to appeal to people’s patriotism and urgent action.³⁶⁾ A non-profit organization named the Valley Forge Foundation (clearly, a patriotic name) was set up specifically to handle this project. With the support of this NPO and the Advertising Council, the FCDA planners hastened to elaborate the plan in the latter half of 1951.³⁷⁾ They decided that a unit of ten 32-foot trailer trucks painted red, white, and blue would make a convoy, and three identical convoys would tour around the nation. Each convoy was to travel the East, the Central States, and the South through the Pacific Coast respectively, stopping at scheduled cities to hold exhibits. The Department of Defense provided the truck drivers.³⁸⁾ The convoys were scheduled to visit the principal target areas to diffuse critical information to those who needed it most, and ultimately cover all forty-eight states. Each exhibit was to be set up in an armory, exhibit hall, or other public spaces, and remain there for approximately three to five days. It was originally planned to occupy a space of 55 by 100 feet, “somewhat larger than a standard basketball court.”³⁹⁾ The actual exhibit covered an area of 120 by 160 feet. It was “the

³⁴⁾ On the history of the Council, see Robert Griffith, “The Selling of America: The Advertising Council and American Politics, 1942–1960,” *Business History Review* 57 (1983): 388–412; Daniel Lee Lykins, “Total War to Total Diplomacy: The Advertising Council, Domestic Propaganda and Cold War Consensus” (PhD diss., University of Kentucky, 1998).

³⁵⁾ This kit contained materials such as advertisement mats, recruiting speeches, radio fact sheets and announcements, and window display suggestions. It was available free of charge. *CDA* 1, no.8 (1952): 1, 7; “Status Report—January to July 1952, Government Public Service Campaigns,” July 1952, in Merrill ed., *Preparing to Survive*, 649–51; McEnaney, *Civil Defense*, 35.

³⁶⁾ *CDA* 1, no.7 (1951): 1, 7; “Defense Exhibits Going on the Road,” *NYT*, Oct. 12, 1951.

³⁷⁾ The executives in the Foundation included war veterans, university professors, Congressmen, and other prominent opinion leaders. “Defense Exhibits Going on the Road,” *NYT*, Oct. 12, 1951; Millard Caldwell, to Matthew J. Connelly, Secretary to the President, letter with attachment, Dec. 11, 1951, in Merrill ed., *Preparing to Survive*, 370–72.

³⁸⁾ FCDA, *Annual Report for 1952*, 47; J.J. Wadsworth, Deputy Director of FCDA, to Secretary of Defense, Nov. 2, 1951, in Merrill ed., *Preparing to Survive*, 345.

³⁹⁾ *CDA* 1, no.7 (1951): 1, 7.

largest public service show ever taken on tour in this country,” the FCDA boasted.⁴⁰⁾

In the meanwhile, publicity activities were also set forward. In Washington D.C., for example, forty-five different advertisements produced by the Advertising Council with a total of more than 11,000 lines appeared in four daily newspapers before and while the exhibit was held. It goes without saying that news, editorials, photographs and other information related to Alert America also appeared in these newspapers. Radio listeners heard more than 1,000 spot-announcements as well as eighteen special shows on local networks or on the “Voice of America.” Live shows and coverage was also broadcast on the new visual medium of television, although radio was still more popular at this time.⁴¹⁾ In addition, the Boy Scouts of Washington distributed red, white, and blue streamers and placards urging the public to see “the show that may save your life,” which were displayed in windows of many business establishments and on taxicabs, in hotel lobbies, theaters, restaurants, and other public spaces.⁴²⁾

(2) The Exhibit

As the curtains rose in cities throughout the country, what did the visitors see at the event? At the entrance and exit of an U-shaped exhibit room stood the figure of Paul Revere to greet them (figure 1).



Figure 1. An overhead view of a part of the Alert America exhibit.

Source: CDA 1, no.9 (1952): 8.

The exhibit was divided into three phases. The theme of the first section was “Americans at peace and at war.” It opened with a panel explaining how humans had expanded their world

⁴⁰⁾ Caldwell to Connelly, 370–72; “Alert America Campaign: Progress Report,” 324; FCDA, *Annual Report for 1952*, 47–48; “Alert Show Aims to Draw CD Recruits,” *Post*, Dec. 30, 1951; “Defense Display on in Hempstead,” *NYT* Jan. 19, 1952.

⁴¹⁾ Beth Bailey et al., *The Fifties Chronicle* (Lincolnwood, IL: Publication International, 2006), 128.

⁴²⁾ “The Alert America Convoy Comes to Washington!” Jan. 1952, in Merrill ed., *Preparing to Survive*, 452–67; CDA 1, no.9 (1952): 5.

through scientific discoveries. Then they discovered the atom. What would the future world be like due to this important discovery? “Will it be this?” First introduced were the industrial, agricultural, and other peaceful uses of atomic energy. “[O]r will it be this?” Next came a series of images of fearful modern warfare. Fears of sabotage were expressed by repeated flashes which highlighted the vividness of a fake plant explosion; psychological warfare was described in pictures pasted randomly on the wall which symbolized doubt, suspicion, fear and panic; and incendiary warfare was depicted by simulated flames and a display of actual incendiary bombs. A model of germ warfare blighting a sheaf of corn and a retort with simulated nerve gas bubbles representing chemical warfare were also on display to aggravate the visitors’ sense of fear.⁴³⁾

The second section of the exhibit included a show of City X, which represented “a typical American community.” Stepping into a dark room, visitors found a three-dimensional diorama of City X and over it the words: “This could be YOUR city.” They heard someone warning that “if war comes to America, here’s what happens to you.” It was Edward R. Murrow, prominent journalist and a mass-media figure. A moment later, air-raid sirens sounded the alert and a voice of someone ordering defense forces to take up their emergency stations was heard. Enemy planes came into view and flak bursts followed. As the visitors’ tension reached a climax, an atomic bomb plummeted into the city with “the ominous whistling sound.” The mushroom cloud appeared, while most buildings had “disappeared, leaving only burning rubbles.”

Thus, this show intended to reveal the real horror of modern warfare “without civil defense.” The voice of Murrow encouraged visitors that “we can beat this menace” with civil defense, and a picture of a mother and her son standing in the debris was highlighted with a beam of hope.

Led to the third section of the exhibit, visitors were welcomed with a panel asserting that “Civil defense is YOU,” and that civil defense was a “co-partner with the military.” Here, a revolving turntable and a flashing model of the “attack warning system” explained to them the volunteer actions that they should undertake. Other displays also portrayed basic steps and techniques of self-protection and mutual aid—two responsibilities that the citizens were required to bear. “Half of the casualties could be avoided through proper defense precautions,” the exhibit emphasized.

Finally, the visitors got through “one of the most moving parts” of the exhibit, where panels symbolizing “America’s freedom” were displayed along with banks of live flowers and “typical American music.”⁴⁴⁾ As they left the main exhibit room, they were invited to

⁴³⁾ “What You Will See in the Civil Defense Alert America Exhibit,” program, Jan. 1952, in Merrill ed., *Preparing to Survive*, 471–89; Caldwell to Connelly, 370–72; “Defense Display on in Hempstead,” *NYT*, Jan. 19, 1952; “Alert America Exhibit Ready as Graphic Civil Defense Aid,” *Post*, Jan. 6, 1952; “City to be Alerted on Defense Perils,” *NYT*, May 11, 1952. Hereafter, I referred to these sources for the descriptions about the three parts of the exhibit.

⁴⁴⁾ Unfortunately, I could not identify what kind of music this had been.

volunteer for civil defense and take some booklets home. Outside were supplementary civil defense features such as rescue truck demonstrations, radiological equipment, and fire-fighting devices.⁴⁵⁾

(3) The Outcome

In Washington D.C., the grand opening of the nationwide tour was announced on January 7, 1952. The exhibit was scheduled to be held in an auditorium located at the center of the capital for the duration of six days. The District Civil Defense Commissioners eagerly proclaimed this period to be the local “Civil Defense Week” to stimulate greater public interest in the city’s civil defense programs. In fact, although the commissioners had hoped to have 100,000 volunteers signed up by that time, they had only been able to recruit one-third of that number.⁴⁶⁾

Overall, the organizers reported that the exhibit was a “success.” Being held over for another day, more than 32,000 people visited the exhibit during the duration of a week, and 3,500 of them enrolled as civil defense volunteers. Local newspapers reported that officers were urgently calling for additional instructors to teach the new applicants that had flowed into the office that week.⁴⁷⁾

In New York City, the exhibit was open from May 12 to 19 at an army armory. The rhetoric of patriotism to mobilize the public was clearly seen here. As the Alert America convoy arrived in the city, Mayor Vincent R. Impellitteri greeted the drivers, most of whom were veterans of World War II or the Korean War, and proclaimed the opening of the city’s “Alert America Week.”⁴⁸⁾ On the day of the public opening, nearly one out of five adults who visited the exhibit signed up for civil defense, considerably above the national average.⁴⁹⁾ A part of the exhibit room occupied an exhibit of the city’s own civil defense programs which hammered the theme: “Know your freedoms, Live your freedoms, Guard your freedoms.”⁵⁰⁾ Held at Times Square was an Alert America rally, which included a performance by the

⁴⁵⁾ Much of these supplementary devices were provided locally. For example, in Chicago, visitors of fifteen to eighteen years old were given free airplane rides in privately owned “civil air patrol planes” departing from a nearby airport. “Parade Opens Civil Defense Show by Lake,” *Chicago Daily Tribune*, May 4, 1952.

⁴⁶⁾ FCDA encouraged local agencies to hold these “civil defense weeks.” Caldwell to Connelly, 371; “Jan. 7–12 to Be Civil Defense Week Here,” *Post*, Dec. 7, 1951; *CDA* 1, no.7 (1951): 1.

⁴⁷⁾ “Alert America Convoy Comes to Washington!” 451–68; *CDA* 1, no.8 (1952): 1; “Jan. 7–12 to Be Civil Defense Week Here,” *Post*, Dec. 7, 1951; “‘Alert America’ is Held Over,” *Post*, Jan. 13, 1952; “More Instructors are Needed for CD Applicants,” *Post*, Jan. 27, 1952.

⁴⁸⁾ “City to be Alerted on Defense Perils,” *NYT*, May 11, 1952; “Defense Exhibits Previewed Here,” *NYT*, May 13, 1952.

⁴⁹⁾ One out of sixteen visitors signed up nationwide. “Wallander Calls for Civil Defense Aides,” *NYT*, May 14, 1952; FCDA, *Annual Report for 1952*, 49.

⁵⁰⁾ “Defense Exhibits Previewed Here,” *NYT*, May 13, 1952.

popular singer June Valli, who sang the National Anthem under the Stars and Stripes while 1,500 New Yorkers stood at attention.⁵¹⁾

Interestingly, the “New York Industry for Defense Week” arranged by the New York City Department of Commerce also took place, with the participation of a twenty-eight foot trailer truck of the Naval Bureau of Ordnance containing another exhibit. According to newspaper reports, this exhibit included “torpedoes, guns and rockets, and objects made of plastic, steel, felt, and copper produced by small businesses” designed to show how those small manufacturers had “a place in the defense effort.”⁵²⁾ This example implies that civil defense was introduced as a potential business opportunity as well as a patriotic service.

At about the same time, in May 1952, another convoy arrived in Los Angeles, being greeted by a twenty-two-year-old “Miss Alert America” who placed leis of carnations around the truck drivers.⁵³⁾ According to the *Los Angeles Times*, a group of American-Japanese who had survived the atomic bomb in Hiroshima was invited to tell their experiences. For example, Jean Kanda had been just eight blocks from the center of the blast, and Micky Nagamoto had had her hair and most of her clothing burned off.⁵⁴⁾ It is not easy to state why the planners invited the Hiroshima survivors to speak and what the audience thought. In one sense, the planners seem to have intended to stir the sense of fear of the audience toward the atomic bomb. In another sense, however, the survivors may have unintentionally reassured the visitors that the atomic bomb was terrifying but also survivable.

Would atomic attacks really be survivable? What would “sufficient” civil defense look like? Such ambiguity underlay the whole event without anyone giving a clear answer. In New York City, when a student press conference with civil defense officials was held as a preliminary event to the Alert America exhibit, a high school boy who had experienced bombings in Europe during World War II expressed his fear toward the city’s civil defense policy of using school corridors as shelters. He insisted that they might be flattened in an attack. In response, one of the officials tried to reassure him that the corridors used in school buildings were “relatively the safest area” in schools and that those school corridors as shelters gave students a “better chance” of survival even if a blast occurred nearby—unless it happened at the very point. Yet, he added that as high school students the boys were old enough to understand that “I can’t give you a life insurance policy.”⁵⁵⁾ Thus, the mood in Alert America was both optimistic and pessimistic at the same time. While showy entertainments attempted to attract the public, other aspects revealed the vague uneasiness

⁵¹⁾ “Wallander Calls for Civil Defense Aides,” *NYT*, May 14, 1952.

⁵²⁾ *Ibid.*; “City to be Alerted on Defense Perils,” *NYT*, May 11, 1952.

⁵³⁾ The mayor of Los Angeles was a member of the National Advisory Council which insisted on the planning of Alert America. “‘Alert America’ Convoy Welcomed,” *Los Angeles Times*, May 16, 1952; *CDA* 1 no. 9 (1952): 7; FCDA, *Annual Report for 1951*, 71–72.

⁵⁴⁾ “Hiroshima Blast Witnesses Speak,” *Los Angeles Times*, May 21, 1952.

⁵⁵⁾ “Boy Bomb Survivor Fears Our Shelters,” *NYT*, May 6, 1952.

that people—the planners as well as the audience—had toward the “next war.”

In its *Annual Report for 1952*, the FCDA evaluated the outcome of this project. According to this report, the three convoys visited eighty-two cities in thirty-six states and Washington D.C. In response to “numerous requests from State and local civil-defense authorities and from various State fairs,” they were proud that the convoys had been rearranged to visit additional cities.⁵⁶⁾ Obviously, this result did not fulfill their initial goal to cover all forty-eight states. However, considering that one of the main purposes of this exhibit was to give critical information to people in the “target areas,” it is likely that priority was given to visiting those areas as well as the cities which had shown enthusiasm for additional exhibits. In fact, as shown in figure 2, the convoys mainly concentrated on visiting the cities with large populations or industrial centers in the East, the West Coast and the Midwest. Fifty-eight of the cities which the convoys covered were those “target areas.”⁵⁷⁾



Figure 2. The cities where the Alert America convoys visited.

The dots represent the cities visited. Data from: FCDA, *Annual Report for 1952*, 48; U.S. Department of Interior, *Nationalatlas.gov*, <http://www.nationalatlas.gov> (accessed Sept. 1, 2008).

⁵⁶⁾ CDA 2, no.1 (1952): 1, 8.

⁵⁷⁾ Out of the one hundred areas which the “Project East River” selected as “target areas,” four were those in Canada. Metropolitan areas such as New York and Los Angeles were divided into several districts, so they counted more than one area each. Considering these facts, fifty-eight cities which the convoys covered meant that they actually covered approximately seventy out of ninety-six target areas. FCDA, *Annual Report for 1952*, 48; Associated Universities, “Project East River: Destructive Threat of Atomic Weapons,” 18–22.

Consequently, the total attendance nationwide was 1,108,472, the average attendance in each exhibit was 13,518, and the number of those signed up for civil defense was 67,171. Moreover, the FCDA stressed that the convoys had created “a tremendous amount of public interest” in civil defense among the 67 million residents of the cities visited.⁵⁸⁾

In short, those who enrolled themselves in civil defense work at the Alert America exhibit were approximately one out of sixteen visitors. To evaluate the meanings of this result does not go beyond assumption since details about how many of the visitors were those who had already signed up for civil defense before the exhibit were not offered in FCDA reports. If most visitors were those who had been enrolled in civil defense previously, the actual portion of new enrollments at the exhibit would have been much higher than the number given above. If this was the case, however, it would also mean that the exhibit only drew those who already had certain interest in civil defense, and that the FCDA failed to attract a larger population. By contrast, if many of the visitors were those who previously had not had much interest in civil defense, the results would imply that the publicity activities of the FCDA made a considerable achievement in attracting those local residents, but that the contents of the exhibit itself did not convince those visitors of the need for volunteering in civil defense.

In any case, these kinds of face-to-face programs of public education continued. In 1953, civil defense exhibits were shown to over 850 million people at 135 conventions, state fairs, and professional meetings. One of the three Alert America convoys was loaned to Canada, to be included in a tour of seven trailer trucks which covered a route of more than 10,000 miles to visit key Canadian cities under the slogan of “On Guard, Canada.”⁵⁹⁾

Finally, to what extent did the FCDA organizers achieve their goal concerning public education during the Truman years? The number of civil defense volunteers increased from 1.9 million in 1951 to 4 million at the end of 1952. Although this was still far from their initial goal to recruit 17.5 million people, this result enabled those involved in civil defense to pin their hopes on projects undertaken in the following years.⁶⁰⁾ In fact, the “success” of the Alert America Campaign led to public education programs somewhat more operational, complicated, and large-scale in the following period.⁶¹⁾

Conclusion

The Cold War indeed prompted the formulation of postwar civil defense. At the same

⁵⁸⁾ FCDA, *Annual Report for 1952*, 46–49.

⁵⁹⁾ CDA 2, no.2 (1952): 2; FCDA, *Annual Report for 1953* (Washington DC: GPO, 1954), 72–75; “Mobile Exhibit Returns after Tour of Canada,” *Post*, Dec. 16, 1953. For comparative analysis on civil defense in the U.S., Canada, and Britain, see Tracy C. Davis, *Stages of Emergency: Cold War Nuclear Civil Defense* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2007).

⁶⁰⁾ FCDA, *Annual Report for 1951*, 19; FCDA, *Annual Report for 1952*, 2, 56.

⁶¹⁾ For example, massive nation-wide drills named “Operation Alert” were repeated between 1954 and 1960. Oakes, *Imaginary War*, 84–96.

time, many of the central rhetoric and methods used here, such as the use of patriotism and the allure of business opportunity, were not fully unique or new to the Cold War era. Likewise, although the weapon itself was new, the atomic bomb was not offered a distinct position in the public education programs of the FCDA during the Truman years, and its images remained just as ambiguous as those in the late 1940s when people had debated whether atomic energy was an evil or not. As the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 included any type of war measure as part of an “enemy attack,” as the need of volunteers to tackle special weapons was emphasized, and as the Alert America exhibit devoted considerable space to display sabotage, incendiary bombs, and other modern warfare, civil defense efforts were not only targeted at atomic attacks. Similarly, while the FCDA emphasized the vast explosiveness of the atomic bomb as a main war measure of a future enemy, they also situated the bomb as something that could be met with civil defense measures designed for other weapons.

The ways in which the atomic bomb appeared in civil defense is inextricably linked with the ways in which civil defense workers in this period visualized the “next war” situated in the U.S. homeland. That is, the atomic bomb appeared as one of many weapons, which suggests that the people envisioned a future war not exactly as a “nuclear war” but rather close to a “total war.” If so, when and how did their images gradually or suddenly transform into an image of a “nuclear war” when referred to nuclear weapons? This question is left for further study.

Finally, this conclusion also implies that civil defense in the early Cold War era had considerable continuity from the “pre-atomic” period in terms of the ways in which the people viewed war.⁶²⁾ This questions the assumption of many previous studies which divides the history of civil defense into the “pre-atomic” and the “atomic” age. My next step, then, is to explore civil defense in the “pre-atomic” age, which has not been a major subject in the historiography of civil defense. I believe that to focus on the continuities and discontinuities between these two periods would deepen our understandings of the meanings of “civil defense” in the United States. This, I hope, would also contribute to the sophisticated efforts of rethinking the meanings of “Cold War culture.”⁶³⁾

⁶²⁾ Kerr, *Civil Defense*, 10.

⁶³⁾ For thoughtful arguments on this issue, see Peter J. Kuznick, and James Gilbert, eds., *Rethinking Cold War Culture* (Washington and London: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2001).

ベティ・クロッカーの表象とアメリカ社会の変遷

久野 愛

Summary

This paper investigates the role of Betty Crocker, a fictitious woman created by the milling company General Mills in 1921, who conveyed the messages of the company to its customers. As the author of many cookbooks and a speaker on a popular radio program, Betty Crocker provided specific advice about women's roles as good mothers and wives. In this paper, I specially focus on the portraits of Betty Crocker, which were changed seven times between 1936 and 1996, in order to examine the complex relationships between the company, its customers, and Betty Crocker.

Betty Crocker's portraits have been intimately concerned with the transformation of twentieth-century American society, including baby boom after the WW II, the increase of women at workplaces, feminist movements, and multiculturalism. While the transformation of the portraits reflected the social changes in the United States, at the same time, Betty Crocker actively influenced American women by offering an image of ideal womanhood which changed over the years. After the 1960s, however, the company stopped showing the portraits on their products and advertisements. The withdrawal of Betty Crocker's face indicates that her/the company's messages which had always been deeply tied to the ideas of cooking and family were not necessarily accepted by many American women. With the diversification of social values, Betty Crocker came to have difficulty communicating with women as a "mediator" between the company and its consumers.

序

アメリカ広告業界の歴史において 1920 年代から 30 年代は、特に人間のイメージが多用された時代である。歴史家ローランド・マーシャンドによれば、各企業の宣伝広告は「客観的」に商品の説明を行う従来の宣伝から、商品がいかに関心者の悩みや欲求に答えるかを友達のよう語りかけるものへと変化した。消費者の感情に訴える広告が増加したのは、都市化や工業化、急速な産業の発展が、希薄な人間関係や大量生産・大量消費型社会を生み出したためだとマーシャンドは指摘している。非人間化・没個性化が進む社会において多くの人々は、より深い人間関係を望み個人として扱われることを求めるようになった。企業・商品の人格化は、不満や悩みを抱える消費者に人間味あるアドバイスを提供し、個々人の問題解決の手段として商品の購入を促すものであった。¹⁾

¹⁾ Roland Marchand, *Advertising the American Dream: Making Way for Modernity, 1920-1940* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985), 9-16, 115.

本稿では、1921年に製粉会社のゼネラル・ミルズ社が作り出した架空の女性、ベティ・クロッカーに注目し、企業を人格化した表象がいかに消費者と企業を繋ぐ役割を果たしてきたかを考察する。ベティ・クロッカーは、主婦に向けて栄養価の高い料理や経済的な買い物を教えるアドバイザーとして登場した。1920年代当時、ゼネラル・ミルズ社には主婦から料理や買い物に関する質問が多数寄せられており、同社は、その返事としてベティ・クロッカーという女性の名で手紙を出すようになったのだ。実際には、同社に勤めるホーム・エコノミストと呼ばれる女性たちが手紙を書き、後には料理本やラジオ番組の台本を執筆し、架空の女性の名の下で主婦たちにレシピや料理のコツを教えていた。1936年にはベティ・クロッカーの肖像画が作られ、1996年までの60年間に8つの異なる姿が描かれた。こうしてベティ・クロッカーは、「声」や「顔」を持つ生身の人間として構築され、商品を宣伝するだけではなく、企業のメッセージを消費者に伝える仲介者として役割を担ってきた。²⁾

女性を対象に料理や家事を教える「アドバイザー」を用いた販促手法は、20世紀初頭に食品会社や家電メーカーの多くが利用するようになった。例えばリーバー・ブラザーズ社は、同社ブランドのショートニングを宣伝するため1936年にアント・ジェニーという架空の女性を作り出した。ベティ・クロッカーと同じく、アント・ジェニーは料理本やラジオ番組を通して料理を「教え」、特にそのラジオ番組 *Aunt Jenny's Real Life Stories* (1937-56年) は女性から大きな支持を得た。そのほかペット・ミルク社のメアリー・リー・テイラー (1933年) など「女性アドバイザー」は、広告のみならず女性雑誌のコラム欄などで商品販促を兼ねた料理のアドバイスを提供した。だが20世紀半ばまでに多くの企業は「アドバイザー」の利用を取りやめるようになった。その理由として、ジェンダーと食文化史に関する論文の中でローラ・シャピロは、食品産業の発展に伴い1950年代までに冷凍食品やレトルト食品など加工食品の利用が急増したことを挙げている。シャピロによれば、加工食品を利用することで女性たちは専門家の知識に頼らずとも簡単に料理を作れるようになり、多くの「アドバイザー」は「職を失う」こととなった。³⁾ ただシャピロは、ベティ・クロッカーが他の「女性」とは異なり今日まで存続しえた理由や人気の源泉について明確な考察を提示していない。またメアリー・J・パーキンによるジェンダーと食品広告の関係を論じた研究でも、消費者の信頼を獲得する手段として「女性アドバイザー」の有効性を指摘している一方、ベティ・クロッカーを「最も人気を集めた女性」として結論づけるにはより深い検討が必要である。⁴⁾

²⁾ 久野愛「ベティ・クロッカーと20世紀のアメリカ女性」2004、東京大学修士論文。

³⁾ Laura Shapiro, "‘I Guarantee’: Betty Crocker and the Woman in the Kitchen," in *From Betty Crocker to Feminist Food Studies: Critical Perspectives on Women and Food*, ed., Arlene Voski Avakian and Barbara Haber (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2005), 39.

⁴⁾ Katherine J. Parkin, *Food is Love: Advertising and Gender Roles in Modern America* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006), 57. ベティ・クロッカーに関しては下記も参照。Harvey Levenstein, *Revolution at the Table: The Transformation of the American Diet* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988); Karal Ann Marling, *As Seen on TV: The Visual Culture of Everyday Life in the 1950s* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994); Mary D. McFeely, *Can She Bake a Cherry Pie? American Women and the Kitchen in the Twentieth Century* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2000).

ベティ・クロッカーの特異性の一つは、表象や役割が大きく変化してきたことである。だが従来の研究では、その表象について十分な分析が行われてこなかった。ジュリアン・シブルカは、アメリカ広告業界の歴史を扱った著書でベティ・クロッカーの肖像画に触れているものの、社会変化を反映したものだと述べるに留まっている。⁵⁾ 7回にわたる肖像画の変更は、社会状況や女性を取り巻く環境の変化と密接に関係しているが、それらを表層的に反映していただけではない。1960年代以降、フェミニズム運動や多文化主義の高まりの中、女性と料理、家庭を結び付けてきたベティ・クロッカーは批判に晒され、消費者とベティ・クロッカーとの関係は大きく変化した。家族のために献身するよき母・妻という女性像が米国社会で広く受け入れられなくなると、ベティ・クロッカーはビジネス・ウーマンの姿となり、さらに90年代末には複数の消費者を混合した肖像画へと変化した。こうした表象の変遷は、ベティ・クロッカーが提示する女性像が変化してきたこと、またその女性像が常に社会で受け入れられたわけではないことを示すと同時に、ゼネラル・ミルズ社が何らかの女性像・消費者像を提示しベティ・クロッカーを仲介者として機能させ続けてきたことを示唆している。肖像画の変遷を社会的コンテクストの中に位置づけ分析を行うことは、表象の変化を辿るだけではなく、ベティ・クロッカーが仲介する企業や消費者がいかに変化してきたかを明らかにするものでもある。

肖像画の変遷とベティ・クロッカーの役割との関係を分析するため、本稿は以下三点を中心に考察を進める。初めに、1950年代から60年代半ばに作製された肖像画に焦点を当てる。ベビーブームや核家族化、都市化が進行したこの時期、料理本や商品パッケージ、広告に掲載された肖像画は、ケーキ・ミックスの利用を促進するとともに家族のために料理を作る女性を理想的な姿として提示するものであった。次に、1960年代半ば以降、肖像画を通して特定の女性像を提示することが困難となった背景を考察する。これまで提示してきた理想の女性像に批判が向けられる中、ゼネラル・ミルズ社は肖像画の公開を控えるようになった。これは、ベティ・クロッカーが仲介者としての役割を従来と同様には果たせなくなったことを示唆するものである。最後に、同社が消費者との新たな関係構築のために作り出した肖像画に注目する。1996年に作製されたこの肖像画は、75人の女性の顔をコンピューター合成したもので、特定の女性像を理想として掲げることが困難となる中、ベティ・クロッカーは実在する消費者を体言する姿として提示された。これら肖像画と米国社会の変遷および企業のマーケティング戦略との関係を検証することで、ベティ・クロッカーがアドバイスや肖像画を通してゼネラル・ミルズ社と消費者とをいかに仲介してきたのかを明らかにする。肖像画のイメージは、ベビーブームや女性の社会進出、多文化主義など社会変化を取り込みつつ構築されてきたものの受動的に社会を反映してきたわけではなく、理想の女性像を提示し消費者に働きかけるベティ・クロッカーの役割を示している。さらに、表象の変遷と企業と消費者を結ぶ仲介者としての役割を分析することで、消費・生産という経済活動のみならず、食文化、ジェンダー、人種・エスニシティなど米国社会における社会・文化的要素の複雑な関係性にも目を向けることができる。

⁵⁾ Juliann Sivulka, *Soap, Sex, and Cigarettes: A Cultural History of American Advertising* (Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1998).

1. 家庭と女性

1955年、ゼネラル・ミルズ社は、20年にわたり商品や料理本に掲載してきた肖像画を描き直した。1936年に描かれた前回の肖像画は、同社の社史を著したジェームズ・グレイによると「上品な北欧系の眉と頭の形、顎はスラブ系の特徴で、目はアイルランド系、鼻は典型的なローマ系という様々なヨーロッパ系民族の特徴を合わせた、20世紀の女性として完璧な」ものだった。⁶⁾ 軽いウェーブの髪の毛に白髪が混じった中年の女性で、目は青色、鼻筋が通った顔立ち、さらにチークを入れた淡いピンク色の頬は肌の白さを際立たせてもいる。またレースの襟がついた白いブラウスと赤いジャケットを身につけた姿は清楚な印象を与えている。肖像画に対する消費者の反応は好意的なものが多く、ある女性は「私が思っていた通りの顔です!」と、ベティ・クロッカーの「本当」の顔を見て興奮した手紙を送っている。⁷⁾ だがこの肖像画は、1950年に放送を開始した同社のテレビ料理番組でベティ・クロッカー役を演じた女優のアデレード・ホーリーの姿とかけ離れていたこともあり描き直されることになった。⁸⁾ また、ゼネラル・ミルズ社が肖像画のベティ・クロッカーに似た女性を探すことはせず肖像画の方を変更したのは、1953年の市場調査の結果、従来の顔は親しみやすさに欠けると多くの消費者が感じていたためでもある。⁹⁾ 心理学者で同社の市場調査に協力したアーネスト・ディヒターは、「恐慌期に作られたイメージは戦後の好況にわくアメリカに相応しくない」としてイメージの変更を提言した。¹⁰⁾

新しいベティ・クロッカーは、全体の髪の色は茶色になったものの、前作と同じく白髪が混じった中年の女性である。唇の間からはわずかに歯が見え、微笑んだ目元はあたたかさを伝えている。少しふっくらとした赤らんだ頬には柔らかさが表れ、前回より親しみやすい表情だ。衣服も大きく変化した。服の色は前回と同じく赤と白を基調としているが、白い大きな襟と赤い身頃がつながった作りで前作よりもシンプルである。顔立ちや表情、アクセサリを何もつけずカジュアルな服装であることなどから、企業で働く女性というよりも台所に立つ母親のような姿を連想させる。

柔和で母親のようなイメージになったことは、ベティ・クロッカーの役割の変化を示唆している。多くの消費者が親しみやすさに欠けると感じた前回の肖像画は、家事に関する知識と経験を兼ね備えた威厳ある女性として描かれていた。¹¹⁾ 「家事の専門家」であるホーム・エコノミストとしてベティ・クロッカーは、1920年代から30年代には経済的な買

⁶⁾ James Gray, *Business without Boundary: The Story of General Mills* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1954), 174.

⁷⁾ Susan Marks, *Finding Betty Crocker: The Secret Life of America's First Lady of Food* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2005), 218.

⁸⁾ Laura Shapiro, *Something from the Oven: Reinventing Dinner in 1950s America* (New York: Penguin Books, 2004), 191-96.

⁹⁾ Colin Covert, "Betty Crocker, at 65, Looks Like a Million Bucks," *Minneapolis Star and Tribune*, May 23, 1986.

¹⁰⁾ Marks, *Finding Betty Crocker*, 223.

¹¹⁾ Ibid., 218.

い物の仕方や料理の作り方を教え、第二次世界大戦中は、米戦時情報局（OWI）が主宰するラジオ番組のパーソナリティとして銃後を守る主婦に戦争協力を訴えるなど政府の「代弁者」を務めた。戦後、物質的豊かさや科学技術の発達を象徴するかのようには食品会社各社による加工食品の販売が相次ぐ中、ゼネラル・ミルズ社は、それまで主力商品としていた小麦粉「ゴールド・メダル・フラワー」にかわり製菓用製品の販売に力を入れ始めた。そして1947年に同社は、水や牛乳を混ぜるだけでケーキが焼けるケーキ・ミックスを発売した。¹²⁾ ケーキ・ミックス販売の背景には、ベビーブームにわく米国社会で女性に母親らしさが強く求められるようになり、特に手作りのケーキは母親の愛情の象徴だとみなされていたことがある。¹³⁾ 女性たちの中には、失敗を恐れ自分でケーキを焼くことに消極的な者も多かった。そのためゼネラル・ミルズ社は、だれでも失敗なく簡単にケーキ作りができることをアピールしケーキ・ミックスを販売した。¹⁴⁾ だが、失敗なく家庭で作れるようになった一方、ケーキ・ミックスを使うことは手抜きをしているという罪悪感を少なからず主婦に抱かせることとなった。そこで同社は、ベティ・クロッカーを通して、時間の短縮や手軽さは決して怠惰なことではなく、ケーキ・ミックスを使って「完璧な」ケーキを作ることこそ家族への愛情表現だと訴えたのである。1956年11月3日号の *Saturday Evening Post* に掲載された広告を見ると、「I guarantee a perfect marble cake（下線原文）」という一文とともに1955年のベティ・クロッカーの顔が描かれており、その下には「Homemade-fresh because you add fresh eggs（下線原文）」とある。ただ材料を混ぜるだけでなく消費者が新鮮な卵を加えるからこそ「ホームメイド」のケーキを作れるのだとアピールし、ケーキ・ミックスを使うことは愛情の不足ではないのだと伝えた。¹⁵⁾

ベティ・クロッカーの母親のようなイメージは、親から離れて暮らす若い主婦の増加とも関係している。女性の結婚年齢は20世紀初頭から若年化が進み、戦後さらに低下した。¹⁶⁾ また1920年代以降、都市部の人口は漸増し1950年には全世帯の85%以上が都市部に居住するようになった。¹⁷⁾ 急速な都市化に伴い、高い教育や仕事を求め若者たちが親元から離れて都市で生活し家庭を築くことで核家族が急増した。結婚年齢の低下や核家族化で、若い妻・母親たちは自分の母親や祖母から料理や家事を直接習う機会が減り、料理本などの指南書に頼るようになった。¹⁸⁾ 多くの女性が身近な相談相手を欠く中、1955年のベティ・クロッカーは、彼女たちの母親代わりとして、簡単に「完璧」な料理を作る方法を教えるとともに、優しい母親のイメージを通して家族に愛情を注ぐ理想的な妻・母親の姿を提示していた。

¹²⁾ Marling, *As Seen on TV*, 209.

¹³⁾ Elaine T. May, *Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era* (New York: Basic Book, 1988), 135-61.

¹⁴⁾ Marling, *As Seen on TV*, 226-28.

¹⁵⁾ *Saturday Evening Post*, November 3, 1956, back cover.

¹⁶⁾ May, *Homeward Bound*, 136-37.

¹⁷⁾ U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970* (Washington DC: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1975), 43.

¹⁸⁾ Parkin, *Food Is Love*, 49.

1960年代に入りゼネラル・ミルズ社は、台所仕事をする「おばあちゃん」のようなベティ・クロッカーのイメージは時代遅れだとし、1965年に肖像画を一新した。¹⁹⁾ スーツ姿のベティ・クロッカーは前作と大きく異なるものの、その姿は依然として理想的な妻・母親像を提示するものでもあった。ミネアポリスの地元紙は、この新しいベティ・クロッカーを「ジャッキー・ケネディに似た」髪形で「現代的な主婦」になったと報じた。²⁰⁾ 真っ赤なスーツに真珠の三連のネックレスを身につけた姿は、髪型のみならず服装までも1961年1月20日号の *Time* で表紙を飾ったケネディ夫人の姿と酷似している。²¹⁾ ジャッキーの名で親しまれた前大統領夫人のファッションは、マスコミでたびたび取り上げられ国民から注目を浴びていた。*Dress Codes* の著者ルース・ルービンシュタインは、「大統領一家とのつながりを感じる」ため、「大統領夫人が身につけている洋服の色やスタイルを真似ることは長くアメリカで行われてきた」と述べている。²²⁾ ベティ・クロッカーの肖像画が描かれた1965年には、ケネディ夫人は既にファースト・レディではなかったものの「ファースト・レディ・オブ・フード」と呼ばれたベティ・クロッカーは、国家のファースト・レディが持つイメージと重ね合わせて肖像画が作られたと考えられる。²³⁾

ケネディ夫人は、ファッションだけでなく理想の母親かつ妻としても注目されていた。前述の *Time* に掲載された記事の中で、夫人は「子どもに献身的で、一日のほとんどを（娘の）キャロラインと遊んだり本を読み聞かせたりしている」と紹介された。さらに大統領である夫に対する気遣いも紹介されており、彼の業務が忙しくなってくると「ジャッキーは、（夫が）昼食をとらずやせてしまうのを心配」していた。²⁴⁾ 家族に愛情を注ぎ家庭を守る女性の姿は、常にベティ・クロッカーが主婦に伝えてきたことである。公務をこなすと同時に家族にも献身する前ファースト・レディの姿に似たベティ・クロッカーの肖像画は、夫人から連想される「よき妻、母」というイメージを伝えるものでもあった。

加工食品の販売を重視し始めたゼネラル・ミルズ社にとって、インスタント食品の普及は業績を左右する重大な問題であった。そこで同社は、ベティ・クロッカーの肖像画を通して、ケーキ・ミックスを使えばだれでも簡単にかつて自分の母親が作ってくれたようなケーキを再現でき、家族に愛情を注ぐことができるのだというメッセージを主婦に伝えていた。料理を一から教える従来のアドバイスの代わりに、この時期のベティ・クロッカーは、ケーキ作りは母親の愛情の象徴だと強調するとともに、ケーキ・ミックスに対する怠惰や手抜きといった否定的イメージを払拭し、母親らしさを象徴する姿として描かれたのだ。

¹⁹⁾ Marcia Copeland, interview by Linda Cameron, August 6, 2002, Oral History Interviews of the Mill City Test Kitchens Oral History Project, Minnesota History Center, Minnesota Historical Society, St. Paul, MN.

²⁰⁾ Covert, "Betty Crocker, at 65."

²¹⁾ *Time*, January 20, 1961, front cover.

²²⁾ Ruth P. Rubinstein, *Dress Codes: Meanings and Messages in American Culture* (Boulder: Westview Press, 2001), 285.

²³⁾ Gray, *Business without Boundary*, 170.

²⁴⁾ "U.S. Affairs," *Time*, January 20, 1961, 17.

2. 理想像への反発

「ジャッキー似」のベティ・クロッカーが描かれた1965年以降、ゼネラル・ミルズ社は約20年間に5枚の肖像画を制作した。同社が頻繁に肖像画を描きかえたのは、当時、広報責任者だったジェームズ・フィッシュによれば、ベティ・クロッカーのイメージの陳腐化を防ぎ時世の変化に合致させるためであった。²⁵⁾ この間に描かれたベティ・クロッカーは、すべて真っ赤なスーツを着たフォーマルな格好をしている。これは、女性の社会進出に伴い、ゼネラル・ミルズ社が米国社会の変化を肖像画に取り入れようとしたためである。「会社の副社長」のようだと報じられた1972年のベティ・クロッカーの姿は、*The Woman's Dress for Success Book* の中でジョン・モロイが薦める「ビジネス・ユニフォーム」に近い。²⁶⁾ モロイは女性がビジネス界で成功するための格好を紹介し、最も効果的な服装はスカートスーツとブラウスで、髪型は肩までのストレートヘアが最適だが強すぎないウエーブや短すぎないショートヘアでもよいとアドバイスしている。²⁷⁾ このときのベティ・クロッカーは、赤いジャケットに白いブラウスを身につけ、肩上までのゆるやかなウエーブがかかった髪型である。また、化粧も本書にあるような「男性が見て、化粧しているのかどうか分からない」程度のものだった。²⁸⁾ さらに、1986年に描かれたベティ・クロッカーは、80年代に女性のビジネスライクなファッションとして流行したボウタイをつけており、(ビジネス界で)働く女性として描かれた。この時期には、*Betty Crocker's Working Woman's Cookbook* (1986年)や*Betty Crocker's Family Dinner in a Hurry* (1973年)等の料理本も出版され、ベティ・クロッカーのメッセージが主に「仕事で忙しい女性」に向けられていたことが分かる。²⁹⁾ これら肖像画や料理本は、短時間で作れる料理を教えるだけではなく、家庭の外で仕事を持っても女性は料理を作り家族へ愛情を注ぐことを忘れてはならないと示唆するものでもある。

だが、これら「ワーキング・ウーマン」の表象は必ずしも米国社会全体の反映というわけではない。1980年代にベル・フックスがベティ・フリーダンを糾弾したように、³⁰⁾ 職場における男女の完全な平等や家庭からの解放を主張するいわゆる第二派フェミニズム運動は、白人ミドル・クラスの女性の権利擁護にすぎないという批判が、1970年代当時よりマイノリティグループの女性の間で高まっていた。人種差別や貧困に直面するエスニックマイノリティや白人労働者階級の女性たちの多くは、第二派フェミニストらが女性の社会進出を訴える以前から経済的必要性のために家庭の外で働いており、必ずしも家庭は解放さ

²⁵⁾ Marks, *Finding Betty Crocker*, 229.

²⁶⁾ Lee Egerstrom, "Corporate Betty Crocker Improves with Age," *St. Paul Pioneer Press*, October 28, 1980; John T. Molloy, *The Woman's Dress for Success Book* (Milwaukee: Reardon and Walsh Book, 1977), 34.

²⁷⁾ Molloy, *Woman's Dress*, 34, 49-61, 83-86.

²⁸⁾ *Ibid.*, 86.

²⁹⁾ Betty Crocker, *Betty Crocker's Working Woman's Cookbook* (New York: Random House, 1982); *Betty Crocker's Family Dinner in a Hurry: Home-Tested Menus That Make the Most of Minutes* (New York: Golden Press, 1973).

³⁰⁾ bell hooks, *Feminist Theory: From Margin to Center* (Boston: South End Press, 1984).

れるべき場所ではなかった。さらに、当時のフェミニストらが平等な権利を求める職場はホワイトカラーが中心で、マイノリティ女性にとってはそうした仕事に就くことさえ現実的ではなかった。1960年代以降「ワーキング・ウーマン」として描かれたベティ・クロッカーが反映していたのは、白人ミドル・クラスの女性を中心とした社会進出であり、第二派フェミニズム運動に対する批判はベティ・クロッカーの表象にも向けることができる。

女性の社会的地位や価値観をめぐる議論は、ベティ・クロッカーの肖像画にも大きな影響を与えた。1960年代半ば以降、ゼネラル・ミルズ社は、巨額の投資のもと制作した肖像画を広告や商品に掲載せず、代わりに赤いスプーンのロゴマークを添付するようになった。³¹⁾これについて同社は、1980年に顔を変更した際、顔を広く公開しないのは「消費者が持つベティ・クロッカーのイメージを混乱させたくない」ためだと説明した。³²⁾しかし、ゼネラル・ミルズ社が肖像画の公開を控えるようになった理由は、消費者層の変化とも密接に関係していたのではないだろうか。ベティ・クロッカーのイメージを消費者の目から遠ざけたということは、それまで同社が肖像画を通してある一定の女性像を提示していたことにほかならない。そして、その姿が多くの消費者から受け入れられなくなったことで一般公開を避けたのである。³³⁾ベティ・クロッカーが誕生した20世紀前半には、 그레이が1936年の肖像画を「完璧な女性」と評したように、ゼネラル・ミルズ社が対象とした消費者の大半は白人ミドル・クラスの女性で、その存在が疑問視されることもなかった。だが、1964年に公民権法が成立するなど、1960年代以降、米国社会では人種問題が顕在化し激しく議論が交わされてきた。こうした中、同社は「白人」であり続けたベティ・クロッカーの公開を控えざるを得なかったのだ。一方で、肖像画の公開が限定的であったために、「ワーキング・ウーマン」として描かれるようになったベティ・クロッカーを多くの消費者は目にすることがなく、人々の間には1960年代以前のイメージ、つまり母親のような専業主婦のイメージが残っていた。肖像画を描きかえることはベティ・クロッカーを時世に合わせるためだとゼネラル・ミルズ社が考えていたならば、同社の意図は消費者に効果的には伝わっていなかったことになる。経済雑誌 *Forbes* が「ゼネラル・ミルズ社が抱えるジレンマはベティ・クロッカーの歴史のようだ」と指摘したように、³⁴⁾同社は肖像画の非公開という形で消費者の多様化や社会変化に対応しようとしたが、消費者が抱くベティ・クロッカーのイメージが更新されないままとなり、必ずしも多くの消費者の支持を集めることにはつながらなかった。

³¹⁾ Marks, *Finding Betty Crocker*, 221.

³²⁾ “Betty Crocker Gets a Facelift,” *New York Times*, November 6, 1980.

³³⁾ ゼネラル・ミルズ社が肖像画を幾度も変更しながら公開を控えた理由は、本稿で触れた同社の説明だけでは疑問が残る。ベティ・クロッカーの姿は料理本には掲載されていたことから、一定の消費者に対しては肖像画が提示された。1986年の肖像画は *Betty Crocker Cookbook* 第六版の出版に合わせて制作されたことから、料理本と肖像画との間には何らかの関連性が存在したといえる。ベティ・クロッカーの料理本を選ぶ消費者は、ベティ・クロッカーに肯定的イメージを持つものが多い。スプーンのロゴマークを用いてブランド名を不特定多数の消費者に周知させるとともに、ある程度料理に関心を持つ料理本の購入者に肖像画を見せることで、同社はベティ・クロッカーを従来のように「一人の女性」としても示そうとしていた。

³⁴⁾ Steve Weiner and Janis Bultman, “Calling Betty Crocker,” *Forbes*, August 8, 1988, 88-89.

ベティ・クロッカーの専業主婦としてのイメージが残っていたこと、そして家族のために料理を作る女性像が米国社会で広く支持されなくなったことは、全米女性機構 (National Organization for Women、以下NOW) の訴えに象徴される。1972 年 7 月、NOW のツイン・シティ支部 (ミネソタ州) は、ベティ・クロッカーの表象が性差別および人種差別にあたるとしてゼネラル・ミルズ社に対し集団訴訟を起こした。NOW は、ベティ・クロッカーは「アッパーミドルクラスの白人女性」の表象で、「女性は主婦であるべきだというステレオタイプ」を助長していると主張した。さらに、50% 以上のアメリカ女性は家庭の外で仕事を持っており専業主婦は少数派だと訴えた。またゼネラル・ミルズ社の雇用体制に対しても、女性やマイノリティの雇用に消極的で社内では白人男性が優遇されていると非難した。³⁵⁾ 同社に NOW が訴えを提出した 2 ヶ月前には、折しも男女平等憲法修正条項 (ERA) がアメリカ連邦議会を通過している。その後、ERA は批准州の数が成立必要数に届かず廃案となったものの、この時期は 60 年代から続く公民権運動やフェミニズム運動が高揚していた。また、1970 年代前半には、大学や企業等における人種・性差別への抗議活動が盛んに行われていた。³⁶⁾ こうした中、NOW が訴えを起こしたことは、ベティ・クロッカーの役割と存在そのものに疑問を投げかけるものでもあった。これまでベティ・クロッカーは、巧妙に商品を宣伝しながらも主婦に料理や家事のアドバイスをを行い、新しい知識や価値観を女性たちに伝える役割を担ってきた。だが同時に、女性は家族のために料理を作り愛情を注ぐべきだというメッセージもこめられており、常に女性・家庭・料理・愛情が強固に結びつけられてきた。女性の社会進出や家事・育児をめぐる家庭環境の変化により、ベティ・クロッカーが伝えるメッセージとそれを受け取る女性の価値観との間に隔たりが生まれたことは否めない。家事と女性を結びつけてきたベティ・クロッカーの仲介者としての役割は、従来と同様には果たせなくなってきたのだ。

1960 年代から 80 年代にかけてゼネラル・ミルズ社は、ベティ・クロッカーを「ワーキング・ウーマン」のイメージとして描き、家庭の外で働く女性に向けたメッセージを多く伝えてきた。これまでベティ・クロッカーは、家事の専門家であるホーム・エコノミストとして、また 1950 年代には若い母親・妻たちの母親代わりとして女性たちにアドバイスを提供していた。ベティ・クロッカーの表象が変化したことは、女性の社会進出などの社会変化を受け、同社が新たな消費者層に対応しようとしたためでもある。だが、そうした女性の社会進出の反映そのものは、白人ミドル・クラスの女性を表象したのものであった。さらに、同社が肖像画の公開を控えるようになった事実は、社会や女性の変化を取り入れた肖像画の表象以上に、消費者層の多様化と固定化されたベティ・クロッカーのイメージ、さらには「仲介者」としてのベティ・クロッカーの役割の限界を意味している。

3. 多様化する消費者

1996 年、ベティ・クロッカー誕生 75 周年を記念してゼネラル・ミルズ社は新しい肖像画を制作した。当時「よりポリティカリー・コレクトな顔になるだろう」と報道された新

³⁵⁾ Mary Hart, "Betty Crocker: A Symbol or Sexism, or of Service?" *Minneapolis Tribune*, July 27, 1972.

³⁶⁾ サラ・M・エヴァンズ『アメリカの女性の歴史：自由のために生まれて (第二版)』小樽山ルイ、竹俣初美、矢口祐人、宇野知佐子訳 (明石書店、2005 年)、459-60 頁。

しい肖像画は、目と肌の色、洋服が大きく変化した。³⁷⁾ 目は緑色だった前作を除き、これまでは全て青色だったが今回は茶色である。さらに従来よりも濃い肌の色で、外見上、前作までのようなアングロ・サクソン系の女性ではない。また金色のイヤリングと同色の細いチェーンネックレスを身につけ、ジャケットではなく赤いVネックのカーディガンと白いカットソーというシンプルな服装である。比較的カジュアルなこうした格好は、当時のフェミニズム運動との関連が窺える。1980年代以降、フェミニズム運動は社会変化に危機感を抱く保守層などから批判を受けるようになり、ERA不成立後やや下火となった運動について多くのメディアが「フェミニズムは死んだ」と報じた。マスコミが批判を煽っていたとも言われるが、増加する未婚・未産女性の「悲惨」な姿がメディアを通して映し出された。³⁸⁾ こうしたフェミニズムを取り巻く環境を考慮すれば、1990年代半ばに制作されたベティ・クロッカーが、前回までのスーツ姿とは異なりカジュアルなものに変化したことも偶然ではあるまい。スーツの着用と「ワーキング・ウーマン」のイメージが必ずしも同一ではないにせよ、少なくともゼネラル・ミルズ社は、60年代から80年代の肖像画を「ワーキング・ウーマン」の姿として描いていたのであり、同社がそのイメージを和らげたことは、家庭の外で仕事を持つ女性のみに限らず多様な消費者を映し出そうとしたからでもある。

この肖像画は、表象だけでなく制作方法も従来と異なっていた。前作までは同社から依頼を受けたイラストレーターが描いていたが、今回は複数の女性の顔をコンピューター合成したものが使用された。顔を合成する女性を選ぶためゼネラル・ミルズ社は、記念行事の一環として「ベティ・クロッカー・スピリット・コンテスト」を開催し、4,000通以上の一般応募の中から75周年に因んで「ベティ・クロッカーのような」75人の女性を選出した。³⁹⁾ このコンテストは、ベティ・クロッカーに愛着を持ち商品を頻繁に利用する消費者層を探し出す作業でもあり、ゼネラル・ミルズ社の経営戦略と大きく関係していた。同社の1996年度アニュアル・レポートによると、前年度の業績不振を受けて96年度は「企業の再出発」年度とすることが謳われており、その戦略の一つとしてベティ・クロッカーブランドの強化が挙げられていた。⁴⁰⁾ つまり一連の75周年記念行事は、キャラクターの誕生を祝うだけではなくベティ・クロッカーを「再出発」させるためのものでもあった。

今回の肖像画制作は、コンテストに応募した女性の顔を利用することに大きな意味があった。応募には、ベティ・クロッカーの商品またはレシピの中から自分の好きなものを挙げるのが条件とされ、応募者はすでに同社商品の利用者であることが前提となっていた。さらに選考では「ベティ・クロッカー・スピリット」をいかに反映しているかが問われ、1) 料理やお菓子作りが好きか 2) 家族や友人を大切にしているか 3) 様々な工夫やアイディアを凝らして日々生活しているか 4) 地元地域に貢献しているか、という4点を基準とした。⁴¹⁾ このことから、応募者の中でも特に「ベティ・クロッカーらしい」

³⁷⁾ Tony Kennedy, "Betty Crocker's About to Receive a Makeover," *Star Tribune*, September 12, 1995.

³⁸⁾ Davis, *Moving the Mountain*, 472-75; Susan Faludi, *Backlash: The Undeclared War Against American Women* (New York: Doubleday, 1981).

³⁹⁾ Marks, *Finding Betty Crocker*, 240.

⁴⁰⁾ General Mills, Inc., 1996, *Annual Report 1996* (Minneapolis: General Mills, Inc.), 1, 5.

⁴¹⁾ "General Mills Announces 75 Winners of Betty Crocker Search," *Business Wire*, January 31, 1996.

受賞者 75 人は、料理好きでベティ・クロッカー商品を利用する、同社にとって理想的な消費者であった。1970 年代の NOW による批判が象徴するように、女性の価値観や家庭のあり方が変化する中、女性と料理を結びつけ家族に尽くす女性を理想として掲げてきたベティ・クロッカーの役割はもはや果たし難いものとなっていた。そこでゼネラル・ミルズ社は、コンテストを開催し消費者の顔を肖像画に利用することで、同社商品を利用する消費者を代表した姿としてベティ・クロッカーを描いたのだ。

1996 年に肖像画が作製された 3 年前、*Time* は「アメリカの新しい顔」と題してイヴという一人の女性の顔を表紙に掲載した。⁴²⁾ 異なるエスニックバックグラウンドの男女それぞれ 7 人の顔をコンピューター合成して作られた顔は、当誌によると、アングロ・サクソン系 15%、中東系 17.5%、アフリカ系 17.5%、アジア系 7.5%、南欧系 35%、ヒスパニック系 7.5% の割合で各グループの特徴が混合されており「アメリカの将来を象徴するマルチ・エスニックな顔」を表していた。⁴³⁾ 人類学者のレオ・チャベスは、ヘクター・セント・ジョン・ド・クレヴクールが 1782 年に記した『アメリカ農夫の手紙』の言葉を引用し、イヴは個々のエスニック・グループの「特性が消え」、「単一の統合された」文化に吸収されていくというメルティング・ポットの考えに立ち戻るものだと述べた。⁴⁴⁾ だがこれは、ショーン・スミスが論じるように、ある人種やエスニック・グループに典型的な顔が存在するという言説を再確認させるものでもある。イヴはエスニック・グループの特徴や境界を消しているのではなく、人種のタイプ分けができるという考えを強化するものだとスミスは主張する。⁴⁵⁾ 多文化主義を唱える研究者・知識人の間には、人種・エスニシティの差異を重視する主張もあれば、多様性や融合を標榜する立場も存在する。⁴⁶⁾ 多文化主義論が孕む多義性・多元性を鑑みれば、顔を融合することが果たして多様性や多文化主義を象徴しているとは言い切ることはできない。

イヴもベティ・クロッカーも同様の制作方法が用いられたものの、両者が作製された意図は大きく異なっている。前者は、人種・エスニシティの多様性、特に異人種間結婚の増加を象徴する姿として作製されたのに対し、ベティ・クロッカーは、同社商品を利用する消費者の姿を体言するものとして描かれた。ゼネラル・ミルズ社は、肖像画制作後、受賞者 75 人のプロフィールやコンテスト応募時の作文を掲載した *Betty Crocker's Best-Loved Recipes* という料理本を出版している。これは、個々人のエピソードや顔写真などを紹介することで、ベティ・クロッカーに具体的な消費者のイメージを与えるものでもあつ

⁴²⁾ *Time*, November 18, 1993, 142: cover.

⁴³⁾ James R. Gaines, "From the Managing Editor," *Time*, November 18, 1993, 142: 21.

⁴⁴⁾ Leo R. Chavez, *Covering Immigration: Popular Images and the Politics of the Nation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 62-63, 167-70.

⁴⁵⁾ Shawn M. Smith, *American Archives: Gender, Race and Class in Visual Culture* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 224.

⁴⁶⁾ 多文化主義については下記参照。Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Disuniting of America: Reflections on a Multicultural Society* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1998); David A. Hollinger, *Postethnic America: Beyond Multiculturalism* (New York: BasicBooks, 1995); Ida Susser and Thomas C. Patterson, eds., *Cultural Diversity in the United States: A Critical Reader* (Malden: Blackwell Publishers, 2001); Ronald Takaki, *A Different Mirror: A History of Multicultural America* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1993).

た。⁴⁷⁾ また受賞者の一人、サンディ・ワークは、ベティ・クロッカーが「若い頃の自分にそっくりで他人だとは思えない。このベティ・クロッカーはエスニックな顔立ちで、私にはチェロキー族の血も入っているから」と話し、ベティ・クロッカーに好感を寄せている。⁴⁸⁾ 今回の肖像画は、ワークを含め、「ベティ・クロッカーらしい」女性たちの姿を混合させたもので、ベティ・クロッカーを消費者の体现者として提示していた。スーツでもなくエプロン姿でもないベティ・クロッカーは、家庭の外で働いているようにも、専業主婦のようにも捉えることができる。ある意味、決定的な特徴を欠いた今回のベティ・クロッカーは、年齢やエスニシティ、職業、家庭環境など様々に異なる女性たちの顔をもとにすることで、消費者層の多様性を映すとともに、理想的な消費者像として提示された。

結 び

1920年代以降、米国社会で消費主義が拡大する中、ゼネラル・ミルズ社は顔の見えない企業からのメッセージを「人間の声」を通して消費者に伝えていた。手紙の差出人、料理本の執筆者、ラジオやテレビ番組のパーソナリティとして提示されたベティ・クロッカーは、企業を人格化した姿として構築されてきた。そして、本稿で焦点を当てた肖像画は、架空の女性に「生身の人間」の視覚的なイメージを付与するものであった。また8つの異なる姿は、消費者に伝えるゼネラル・ミルズ社のメッセージが変化したことを示唆している。主婦へのアドバイスや肖像画を通して、ベティ・クロッカーは企業と消費者とを繋ぐ仲介者としての役割を果たしてきたのだ。

企業を人格化した表象は、商品販促の手法や企業と消費者の関係等、生産・消費という経済活動以上の問題を提起している。1972年にNOWがゼネラル・ミルズ社に対して訴訟を起こしたことは、ベティ・クロッカーが女性のステレオタイプを表象したものだという批判を顕在化させた。これは、ベティ・クロッカーが仲介者として、商品の購入を促進するだけではなくジェンダーや人種の問題と深く結びついていたためである。ベビーブームや女性の社会進出、フェミニズム運動、多文化主義など社会問題と密接に関連してきたベティ・クロッカーは、食文化、女性、家庭、エスニシティ等をめぐる一定の価値観や理想像を社会に提示する存在でもあった。

一連の肖像画は、こうしたベティ・クロッカーが伝える価値観や女性観を視覚的に表したものだ。1950年代から60年代半ばにかけて母親のような姿のベティ・クロッカーは、若い妻・母親が増加する中、家族のために完璧な料理を簡単に作るためのアドバイスを提供した。加工食品を用いることと家族に愛情を注ぐことは矛盾するものではないと伝え、ベティ・クロッカー商品を使って家族のために料理を作る理想的な母親像を提示した。女性の社会進出が拡大した60年代以降は、「ワーキング・ウーマン」のイメージとともに、家庭の外で働く女性に対して短時間で簡単に作れる料理を教えるアドバイスが増加した。ゼネラル・ミルズ社は、ベティ・クロッカーの表象を「時世に合わせる」ために肖像画を

⁴⁷⁾ Betty Crocker, *Betty Crocker's Best-Loved Recipes* (New York: Wiley, 1998). 本書は、受賞者の顔写真や氏名、居住地などプロフィールに加え、コンテスト応募時の作文を紹介している。

⁴⁸⁾ Sandy Work, Interview by Harry Levins, "Blending In: Affton Woman's Face Becomes Part of Latest Betty Crocker," *St. Louis-Post Dispatch*, February 1, 1996.

幾度も更新する一方、常に女性と料理、家族への愛情を結び付けてもきた。だがフェミニズム運動や公民権運動が高揚すると、人種やジェンダーをめぐる問題が米国社会で表面化し、ベティ・クロッカーが提示する従来の女性像を理想として掲げることが困難となった。そこで同社は、「ベティ・クロッカーらしい」消費者 75 人の顔を混合した肖像画を制作することにより、消費者の多様性を取り込もうとした。75 人の女性たちは同社商品を利用しベティ・クロッカーに愛着を持つ理想的な消費者であり、ベティ・クロッカーは、そうした女性たちを体現する姿として提示された。ゼネラル・ミルズ社は、ベティ・クロッカーの肖像画を制作し、またそれを変化させることで、「一人の女性」を通して消費者にメッセージを伝えてきたのだ。

本稿では、ベティ・クロッカーの肖像画と企業・消費者の関係に注目し分析を行ってきたが、これら三者の関係をより深く解明するには、食品産業のグローバル化や米国社会のさらなる多様性に注目することも重要である。これまで論じたように、企業の人格化は、社会・文化的要因と密接に関わっており、ビジネスのグローバル化に伴い米国内外における企業のマーケティング戦略や人格化には変化があるはずだからだ。また、ベティ・クロッカーに留まらず、アント・ジャマイマやアンクル・ベン、本稿でも触れたアント・ジェニーなど複数の事例を広く比較検討することで、ジェンダーやエスニシティを含め様々な歴史的・社会的観点から企業の人格化の意味を明らかにする必要がある。

Place, Community, and Identity: The Preservation Movement of San Francisco's Japantown

Yoko Tsukuda

要 約

カリフォルニア州サンフランシスコ市のジャパントウンは20世紀初頭に日本人移民の集住地域として誕生した。現在の日系人人口は郊外など各地に分散しているが、日系アメリカ人の多くにとってジャパントウンはエスニシティの象徴として今なお重要とされている。本論文は近年の人文地理学の空間理論を援用し、1990年代末から活発化したジャパントウンの保護運動が日系アメリカ人のアイデンティティ形成に果たす役割を考察した。2006年、一日本企業の撤退に伴いジャパントウンのショッピング・モールやホテル等が一度に売却されることになった。これに危機感を募らせた日系コミュニティの指導者たちはサンフランシスコ市行政委員の支援を受けてロビー活動を展開し、ジャパントウンを「Special Use District (SUD)」という土地利用が制限される特別地区に指定することに成功した。SUD制度は「場所」の境界線を定め、場所のアイデンティティを「日本・日系アメリカ文化」に限定した。

本論文は場所の永続性と開放性という対照的な観点から、SUD制度の利点と問題点を指摘した。場所を永続的なものとみなした場合、SUDにより場所の境界とアイデンティティを再定義することはジャパントウンの求心力低下に直面しているコミュニティ指導者たちにとって喫緊の問題であり、SUDの熱心なロビー活動は当然の行動だったといえる。SUDはジャパントウンの経済的・文化的な発展を促すばかりでなく、多文化都市サンフランシスコの観光産業にも利益をもたらす可能性がある。しかし、場所を開放的なものとみなした場合、SUDはジャパントウンに居住する非日系人グループらを周縁化し、「我々」と「他者」の境界を益々強固にするという危険性も孕むといえるであろう。

Introduction

I'm sure that J-town is always going to be there....It's important to maintain community spirit and to maintain [J-town] for younger Japanese Americans, so they have a sense of identity and can be proud of who they are and where they came from.¹⁾

This statement accompanies a photograph of a middle-aged Japanese American man in *Generations: A Japanese American Community Portrait*, a book that commemorates the 25-year anniversary of the Japanese Cultural and Community Center of Northern California

¹⁾ JCCNC, *Generations: A Japanese American Community Portrait* (San Francisco: JCCNC, 2000), 124.

(hereafter JCCCNC), a Japanese American community organization located in San Francisco's Japantown. This photograph also shows the landscape of Japantown at night in the background, including the location of a nightclub that he once owned. As the former owner of this business and a long-time community organizer, the man in this portrait believes that the maintenance of Japantown as a physical space is an essential source of ethnic identity, from which the younger generations may learn ethnic history and take pride in being Japanese Americans. This is just one example of the personal accounts collected in *Generations*, which affirm a strong and deep connection between Japantown as a place and Japanese American identity.

The purpose of this paper is to examine how the preservation of San Francisco's Japantown as a place (Figure 1) conditions the identity formation of the Japanese American community as a whole. Identities are formed through connections to particular places and often a strong ethnic consciousness results in the making of "ethnic places." Many of these places have become heritage tourism sites where the acculturated and assimilated generations of ethnic groups may discover and celebrate their own ethnic identities.²⁾ For Asian Americans, place can also be a useful tool for mobilizing themselves as a community and



Figure 1. Peace Pagoda, a cultural icon of San Francisco's Japantown, located between malls of the Japan Center. (photograph taken by author, September 2006)

²⁾ M. R. Esman, "Tourism as Ethnic Preservation: The Cajuns of Louisiana," *Annals of Tourism Research* 11 (1984): 451-67; Steven D. Hoelscher, *Heritage on Stage: The Invention of Ethnic Places in America's Little Switzerland* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1998).

calling for recognition of their contribution to US society.³⁾

This paper especially focuses on the Japanese American community's successful lobbying for the creation of the "Japantown special use district" in San Francisco in 2006. The community's effort culminated in the passing of legislation that designated an eight-square-block of Japantown as a special use district (hereafter SUD) in order to protect the unique cultural characteristics of the area from developers who might potentially have destroyed local traditions. The case of the Japantown SUD shows a spatially dispersed Japanese American community trying to formulate its ethnic identity by preserving a certain area of the city.

San Francisco's Japantown was established as an urban ethnic enclave of Japanese immigrants about a century ago. As more Japanese Americans experienced upward mobility and dispersed into suburbs in the postwar period, the nature of Japantowns began to change, and today they are no longer at the center of the everyday lives of the majority of Japanese Americans. Rather, they have become symbols of community and ethnicity. In the late 1990s, the preservation movement of the San Francisco Japantown was initiated by some leaders of the city's Japanese American community, who had growing concerns over its decline. Under these conditions, the designation of the area as an SUD was considered meaningful to the community because it re-emphasized and re-defined Japanese American identity by stabilizing the significance of Japantown as a place while also clearly demarcating and fixing its boundaries.

"Place" is one of the most common terms used in our everyday lives. For geographers, however, it is a highly complex concept, and debates over the nature of place have long been a central concern within the discipline. In the light of these debates, this paper shows that the creation of the Japantown SUD depended on a particular set of commonly-held assumptions about the nature of place and its relation to community. One of the main ideas that has developed within geography since the resurgence of interest in place in the 1970s, has been that place is not "just a thing in the world but a way of understanding the world."⁴⁾ In this paper, I will use this view of place as a "way of understanding" to reconsider the case of the Japantown SUD in relation to two contrasting conceptualizations of place: first, a view of place as something permanent and introverted, and second, a view of place as something open and extroverted. The first view understands place as essentially stable, homogeneous, and bounded, while the second understands it as unstable, heterogeneous, and unbounded. This double perspective makes it possible to expand the range of ways in which the significance of the preservation movement of Japantown has been understood.⁵⁾

³⁾ Linda Trinh Võ, *Mobilizing an Asian American Community* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2004).

⁴⁾ Tim Cresswell, *Place: A Short Introduction* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), 11.

⁵⁾ Many geographers have discussed the nature of place in relation to race and ethnic identity. For example, Kay Anderson, *Vancouver's Chinatown: Racial Discourse in Canada 1875-1980* (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press); Youngmin Lee and Kyonghwan Park, "Negotiating Hybridity: Transnational Construction of Migrant Subjectivity in Koreatown, Los Angeles," *Journal of Cultural Geography* 25, no. 3 (October 2008): 245-62.

The remainder of this paper consists of five sections. The first section is devoted to the development of the concept of place and its recent discussion in human geography. The second section is a brief historical description of San Francisco's Japantown, especially the process of its symbolization in the postwar period. Based on this history of the place, the third section discusses the recent formation of the Japantown SUD in detail, including its background and the process of its proposal and approval. In the following two sections, I analyze the overlapping and contested meanings Japantown had for different interest groups, drawing on two different conceptualizations of place: one focusing on permanence and the other on openness. These contrasting conceptualizations help us see both the positive and the negative effects of the SUD. On one hand, it enabled the Japanese American community to protect the bounded space of Japantown institutionally, as a physical symbol of their community, while also making possible a future cultural and economic revitalization of the neighborhood by bringing in more Japanese/Japanese American and other visitors. On the other hand, the SUD might also lead to the marginalization of non-Japanese residents and businesses and to the construction of a rigid division between "us" and "Others."

1. Place in the globalized world

The concept of place has been dramatically developed in human geography since the era when the primary objective of geography was to identify differences among regions and draw boundaries between them.⁶⁾ For humanistic geographers such as Yi-Fu Tuan and Edward Relph, place was "a concept that expressed an attitude to the world" that "emphasized subjectivity and experience."⁷⁾ John Agnew provides one useful way of defining place in his argument that place is constituted of the following three major elements: location (a quantitative segment on earth's surface), locale (material components forming social relations, e.g. building, walls), and sense of place (subjective affection).⁸⁾ This concept has contributed to articulating the complexity of the term "place" as it has been used in a variety of ways in geography.

The growth of globalization exerted a great influence on the meanings of place among the general public as well as geographers. Manuel Castells argues that the homogenization of the world caused by the globalized economy, culture, and politics has led to "the end of place."⁹⁾ "Time-space compression"¹⁰⁾ has greatly influenced our sense of place as the global

⁶⁾ Noel Castree, "Place: Connections and Boundaries in an Interdependent World," in *Key Concepts in Geography*, ed. Sarah L. Holloway, Stephen P. Rice, and Gill Valentine (London: Sage, 2003), 165–85.

⁷⁾ Cresswell, *A Short Introduction*, 19–20.

⁸⁾ John Agnew, *Place and Politics: The Geographical Mediation of State and Society* (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1987).

⁹⁾ Manuel Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996).

¹⁰⁾ David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990).

flows of commodity, capital, and people have been accelerated. On the other hand, David Harvey points out that the distinctiveness of place has become more important not despite but because of globalization:

While the collapse of spatial barriers undermined older material and territorial definitions of place, the very fact of the collapse...has put renewed emphasis upon the interrogation of metaphorical and psychological meanings which, in turn, give a new material definition of place by way of exclusionary territorial behavior.¹¹⁾

Harvey also argues that the uniqueness of each place has begun to be emphasized in order to attract investment from global capital in close competition with other places, as seen in the Olympic Games and the World Expos. In this way, while Harvey's work can be understood to represent a theoretical advance from the works of humanistic geographers, it tends to sustain the commonsense view that place is something stable, discrete, and bounded; in other words, it is in line with the way in which place has been generally thought of as a "container" in a metaphorical sense.

Questioning this enduring "container" view of place, some contemporary geographers have developed an alternative concept of place that focuses on the interdependency among multiple places. Especially, the "global sense of place" proposed by Doreen Massey emphasizes that place is constituted out of changing social relations in the contemporary globalized world.¹²⁾ This provides several alternative metaphors for place, such as "a switching point in a larger global system" or "a node in translocal networks."¹³⁾ It regards the identity of place as shifting and heterogeneous, and its boundaries as tenuous. In other words, place is not stable but unfixed and is itself a *process* because the social interactions constituting a place are always changing and never static.¹⁴⁾ The case of San Francisco's Japantown is a useful example with which to explore and compare different concepts of place underlying contemporary ethnic communities in the US, which might contribute to the further study of the relationship between identity and location.

In this context, it is worth considering the difference between the concept of place and that of community, and the difficulty in separating them.¹⁵⁾ These two different concepts have often been conflated and used interchangeably among those dedicated to the preservation of Japantown. However, as Sheila Muto points out, the term "community" has an unusual

¹¹⁾ David Harvey, "From Space to Place and Back Again: Reflections on the Condition of Postmodernity," in *Mapping the Futures: Local Culture, Global Change*, ed. Jon Bird et al. (London: Routledge, 1993), 4.

¹²⁾ Doreen Massey, *Space, Place, and Gender* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994).

¹³⁾ Castree, "Place," 174.

¹⁴⁾ Massey, *Space, Place, and Gender*, 155.

¹⁵⁾ Nicholas J. Entrikin, *The Betweenness of Place: Towards a Geography of Modernity* (London: Macmillan, 1991).

meaning in the case of Japantown since “most of the people who consider Japantown their community actually live outside the area.”¹⁶⁾ Although Japantown was originally established as a segregated ethnic enclave for Japanese immigrants in the early twentieth century, today the Japanese American population is widely dispersed and few of them remain in this neighborhood. Their ethnic community is not necessarily place-based but has become more network-based.¹⁷⁾ Still prevalent, however, even among the geographically dispersed Japanese American population is the notion that an ideal community consisting of the same ethnic cohorts exists in a discrete location.¹⁸⁾ Throughout this paper, I use the term community to indicate certain groups composed of individuals who share a significant overlap in social interests, such as the Japanese American community, and clearly distinguish this community from the concept of location.

2. Japantown as a symbol of community

San Francisco’s Japantown is officially and publicly called “Japantown” or *Nihonmachi* in Japanese today, but it was once called “Japanese town” or *Nihonjin machi*, meaning an area where Japanese people live. This slight difference is not a mere abbreviation but actually implies the shifting role and meanings of Japantown. It was established as an urban enclave for Japanese immigrants in 1906 and was at its most thriving just before all Japanese and their descendants living in the West Coast military zones were forced to move to internment camps in 1942. Currently Japantown is no longer a place for the everyday lives of the majority of Japanese Americans in the area, but rather a place to visit occasionally for shopping, dining, or community events. As Japanese American populations dispersed residentially and became acculturated, the necessity of visiting Japantown decreased. Nevertheless, a strong emotional attachment to the place is still retained among the dispersed community. This section describes the process by which “Japantown” became a symbol of the Japanese American community as a whole.

The redevelopment project led by the City of San Francisco in the 1950s to 60s dramatically changed Japantown from an ethnic residential area to a tourist attraction.¹⁹⁾ The

¹⁶⁾ Sheila Muto, “3 Generations of S.F. Japantown,” *Asian Week* (Mar. 8, 1991).

¹⁷⁾ Stephen S. Fugita and David J. O’Brien, *Japanese American Ethnicity: The Persistence of Community* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1991).

¹⁸⁾ This notion is reflected on Japanese American community leaders’ hope that the younger generations come back to old ethnic enclaves and choose them as their new residences. Associated Press, “LA’s Little Tokyo Seeks to Get Back Japanese Vibe,” *International Herald Tribune*, Oct. 8, 2008, <http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/10/08/america/NA-FEA-US-Little-Tokyo.php> (accessed Dec. 13, 2008).

¹⁹⁾ Sheridan Tatsuno, “The Political and Economic Effects of Urban Renewal on Ethnic Communities: A Case Study of San Francisco’s Japantown,” *Amerasia Journal* 1 (1971): 33–51; John H. Mollenkopf, *Contested City* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983); Tadashi Sugiura, “San Francisco Japantown Saikaihatsu no Kozo to Kenzo Kankyo no Henyou: Katsudoshutaikan Kankei ni Chakumoku Shite” (The structure of redevelopment and changing built environment of San Francisco Japantown: Focusing on the interactions of local actors), *Kikan Chirigaku* (Quarterly Journal of Geography) 59, no. 1 (2007): 1–23.

project led to the removal of about 8,000 residents including many African Americans and Japanese/Japanese Americans from the Western Addition, the district including a part of Japantown, and the demolition of 6,000 units of low-rent housing.²⁰⁾ The city offered the north side of the project area to Japan-based corporations, which were eager to establish themselves in the US at that time of rapid economic growth in Japan. Although some residents and young Japanese American community activists were strongly opposed to the eviction, those Japan-based corporations managed to open luxury hotels, a Japanese theater, and the Japan Cultural and Trade Center (today known as the Japan Center), consisting of three shopping malls, in 1968.²¹⁾ The mall not only provided a showcase for both traditional and modern Japanese cultural products for domestic and international tourists but also housed overseas branch offices of many Japanese companies. By 2000, Kintetsu Enterprise Co. of America, an overseas subsidiary of a major railroad corporation in Japan, owned two malls of the Japan Center, two hotels, and a bowling alley, while the rest of the Center belonged to a Chinese investor and Kinokuniya Bookstores of America, an overseas branch of a major bookstore in Japan.

The redevelopment marked an important transformation in the role and meanings of Japantown within the great social upheaval of the nation and the local demographic changes involving Japanese Americans of that time. Many ethnic and racial minorities began to assert their ethnic identities and pride and to demand recognition from the mainstream society in the 1960s Civil Rights Movement era. Japanese Americans, especially Sansei (the third generation of Japanese Americans), also began to seek a symbolic meaning for their ethnicity in Japantown. The process of symbolization coincided with the younger generations moving out of the urban ethnic enclave to suburban residential areas. According to the 2000 US Census, Japanese constituted just 8.8% of Japantown residents, with non-Hispanic whites as the majority (52.6%), followed by African Americans (14.4%), Japanese, Chinese (8.7%), and Korean (5.9%).²²⁾ Despite the decrease in the percentage of Japanese/Japanese American residents, many Japanese American community organizations still have offices and hold community activities in Japantown today. San Francisco's Japantown is no longer *Nihonjin machi*, where Japanese residents are concentrated, but rather it has turned into "Japantown," a place which was expected to represent and preserve Japanese/Japanese American culture and the Japanese American historical legacy.

The preservation movement of Japantown was initiated by community leaders who were worried about the unstable economy and the fading Japanese features of Japantown in the late 1990s. Long-time Japanese American residents were aging and Japanese American

²⁰⁾ Shizue Seigel, "San Francisco: Nihonmachi and Urban Renewal," *Nikkei Heritage* 12, no. 4 (Fall 2000): 6.

²¹⁾ Committee Against Nihonmachi Eviction, *One Year of Struggle* (San Francisco: CANE, [1974]).

²²⁾ U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Census 2000*, Summary File 1, P1, P9, PCT7. The definition of Japantown is Census Tracts 152, 155, and 159.

family-owned shops closing one after another since they could not find anyone to take over their businesses.²³⁾ Accordingly, Korean and Chinese merchants transformed those properties into their own ethnic businesses.²⁴⁾ The economic recession in Japan in the early 1990s caused the withdrawal of Japan-based companies from Japantown and led to a decrease in the number of tourists from Japan. At the same time, real estate values in Japantown skyrocketed and profit-seeking developers became interested in its land and properties.²⁵⁾ Concerned about this situation, community leaders of San Francisco's Japantown launched the preservation and revitalization planning of Japantown by collaborating with two other established Japanese American communities in Los Angeles and San Jose. The coalition of these communities claimed that there were only three Japantowns left in the US—Los Angeles' Little Tokyo and the Japantowns in San Jose and San Francisco—and emphasized their historical significance. Their efforts resulted in California Senate Bill 307, approved in 2001, which provided \$450,000 for the preservation of those historic Japantowns.²⁶⁾ San Francisco's Japantown, first built as a segregated urban ethnic enclave of Japanese immigrants a century ago, is now regarded as a symbol of the Japanese American community; the preservation of the physical space has been a consistently important issue.

3. The Japantown Special Use District

In the midst of the preservation planning, the unexpectedly introduced “Special Use District” enabled the community to territorialize Japantown and to define the identity of the place. This section will detail the Japantown Special Use District (SUD) and how it was introduced and approved in the end. In early February of 2006, the year of the centennial celebration of San Francisco's Japantown, the community was stunned to learn that Kintetsu was intending to sell all of its properties in Japantown.²⁷⁾ Since the time when the city's redevelopment project had started, Kintetsu had owned two hotels with a total of more than 300 rooms and two shopping malls that encompassed 80,000 square feet and housed more than seventy Japanese-related retail stores and restaurants. However, their declining business in Japan had forced the head office to decide to restructure the overseas branches. In the end, Kintetsu decided to sell its properties to 3D Investments LLC, a Beverly Hills-based firm run by a Jewish-Iranian family, who also owned condominiums and shopping centers in Southern

²³⁾ *San Francisco Chronicle*, May 16, 1988; Joyce Nishioka, “Japantown's Mission: To Re-Crete Community; Inclusion of Others Seen as Key,” *Asian Week* (July 8, 1999).

²⁴⁾ *Nichibei Times*, Jan. 1, 1996.

²⁵⁾ *San Francisco Chronicle*, July 26, 2000.

²⁶⁾ “Senate Bill 307,” Japantown Task Force, Inc., <http://www.jtowntaskforce.org/> (accessed Aug. 28, 2008).

²⁷⁾ *Hokubei Mainichi*, Feb. 10, 2006. To make matters worse, at almost the same time as Kintetsu's news, AMC Entertainment, the owner of the Kabuki 8 Theater adjacent to the Japan Center, announced that it had to sell the theater because of its merger with another theater chain. *San Francisco Chronicle*, Feb. 10, 2006.

California and Hawaii.²⁸⁾

The local community kept pressuring both Kintetsu and the buyer to listen to their concerns over Japantown. Several community-based organizations, such as the Japantown Task Force²⁹⁾ and the JCCCNC, held meetings with them many times and expressed their emotions in community newspapers. Some claimed that Kintetsu should return its properties to the local community since it had just bought a part of the Japantown “during [the] wholesale auction” of the 1960s redevelopment.³⁰⁾ Others even tried to buy the properties on sale by collecting money from several community members after they learned that the prospective buyer was neither Japanese nor Japanese American and “not from our community.”³¹⁾ The younger generations initiated a “Save Japantown” movement and collected more than 16,000 signatures through online petitions. This movement led to a rally at the City Hall, in which not only Japanese Americans but also many other Asian Americans, including politicians, participated.³²⁾

What made this sale of the private properties unusual was the high degree of involvement of the City of San Francisco as well as the local community. As the term of the redevelopment project for the area covering Kintetsu’s properties had already expired, the community thought that public protection of the land use within the area was necessary. The city’s Supervisor Ross Mirkarimi, whose district included Japantown, led a successful initiative to request the city to enforce covenants between Kintetsu and 3D.³³⁾ In addition, Mirkarimi proposed legislation to designate San Francisco’s Japantown as a “special use district” in order to be able to apply special zoning rules to the land use (see Figure 2). The ordinance was also quickly adopted within two months.

Designating Japantown as an SUD meant defining its geographical boundaries and restricting the land use within it exclusively to those that matched the “identity” of the place. While the SUD Planning Code was usually applied for such purposes as keeping liquor stores out of particular neighborhoods,³⁴⁾ the major purpose of the Japantown SUD was its preservation and development “by revitalizing its commercial, recreational, cultural and spiritual identity as a local, regional, statewide, national, and international resource.”³⁵⁾

²⁸⁾ *Hokubei Mainichi*, Mar. 8, 2006. 3D also purchased a luxury hotel and a shopping mall in Little Tokyo, Los Angeles, in the following year. *Rafu Shimpo*, Aug. 27, 2007.

²⁹⁾ Japantown Task Force is a non-profit organization established in 2000 in order to plan for the preservation of San Francisco’s Japantown. It was initially organized as the Japantown Preservation, Planning, and Development Task Force as a community-based mayor’s task force in 1999.

³⁰⁾ *Hokubei Mainichi*, Mar. 22, 2006.

³¹⁾ *Hokubei Mainichi*, Feb. 25, 2006.


³²⁾ *Hokubei Mainichi*, Mar. 17, 2006.

³³⁾ *Hokubei Mainichi*, Feb. 11, 2006.

³⁴⁾ *Nichi Bei Times Weekly*, May 11, 2006.

³⁵⁾ City and County of San Francisco Municipal Code, Planning Code, Sec. 249.31. Japantown Special Use District, <http://www.municode.com/Resources/OnlineLibrary.asp> (accessed Nov. 24, 2008).

Figure 2. Japantown Special Use District (Map by author)



Developers were required to follow these criteria. Authorization from the city would become mandatory for any new land use of more than 4,000 gross square feet or any new merger of existing buildings with more than 2,500 gross square feet within the designated area in order to assess if they were appropriate to Japantown. Local residents and community members had to be informed of any changes in land use by a notice being posted in advance. In order to avoid the “invasion” of huge corporations such as Wal-Mart and McDonald’s, chain businesses with more than eleven retail stores would also be required to receive authorization from the city to start a business in Japantown.³⁶⁾ Although the SUD did not include any control over sales of land, it provided the local community with a means to control land use to a considerable degree. The SUD prevented current property owners from building anything in Japantown without listening to the opinions of the community.

4. The permanence of place

The geographer David Harvey argues that “the process of place formation is a process of carving out ‘permanences’ from the flow of processes creating spatio-temporality.”³⁷⁾ In those terms, the SUD can be considered as an attempt to embed certain “permanences” into a bounded geographical location. It set boundaries of Japantown, defined its meanings in relation to the Japanese/Japanese American cultural core within its bounded area, and assured its stable and cohesive identity. Although Harvey points out that the permanences are conditional and subject to change due to the flow of global capital in the contemporary world,

³⁶⁾ Japanese corporations were exceptional to this anti-chain business policy as long as they were approved by the community members. *Nichi Bei Times Weekly*, May 11, 2006.

³⁷⁾ David Harvey, *Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), 261.

he believes that a search for “authenticity” and “rootedness” is central to the process of constructing place. The case of the Japantown SUD shows that both the city and Japanese American community leaders reconstructed and redefined Japantown as a place by carving out “permanences” from the changing social, economic, and political conditions surrounding them, even though each has different interests in preserving Japantown.

The city regarded the stable Japanese cultural characteristics of Japantown as a vital economic resource to attract domestic and international tourists and investment. The economy of San Francisco has traditionally been highly dependent on money spent by tourists. The city’s revenue drawn from tourists was as high as 473 million dollars in 2005, the third highest of all US cities after New York and Los Angeles.³⁸⁾ As Supervisor Mirkarimi emphasized at the Land Use and Economic Development Committee hearing for the resolution of the SUD, Japantown has been one of the most successful tourist destinations in San Francisco. The economy of Japantown has relied on money spent by tourists, not by residents. According to a study about tourism in Japantown, more than 500,000 tourists visited, 143,500 dined, and 127,100 shopped there in 1998. The same year’s data also showed that the estimated average sales per square foot of small businesses in Japantown was higher than or as high as that of Ghirardelli Square, one of the famous tourist destinations in San Francisco.³⁹⁾ Japantown is an indispensable piece of the multicultural package that the city “sells” to tourists and global capital in order to compete with other leading tourist cities.⁴⁰⁾

In addition, the city’s multicultural politics preferred that the authentic identity of Japantown remained Japanese rather than non-ethnic or even Asian. Chinatown and North Beach, a historical Italian neighborhood, had already been given some zoning restrictions about two decades earlier.⁴¹⁾ That precedent was well recognized by the city’s ethnically and racially diverse Planning Commission. At the Planning Commission hearing for the resolution of the Japantown SUD, a Latina commissioner shared her personal experiences of going to a concert at the theater and eating Japanese noodles at a restaurant in Japantown and noted American culture’s exposure to Zen. A Chinese American male commissioner was also supportive of the SUD, mentioning the benefits that would arise from the large number of Japanese tourists who visited San Francisco and the sister-city relationship with

³⁸⁾ San Francisco Convention and Visitors Bureau, “San Francisco Visitor Industry Statistics,” <http://www.sfcvb.org/research/> (accessed Aug. 18, 2007); U.S. Department of Commerce, Economics, Statistics Administration, Bureau of Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States: The National Data Book*, 126th ed. library edition (Lanham, Md.: Bernan Press, 2007).

³⁹⁾ Japantown Planning Preservation and Development Task Force (hereafter JPPDTF), *Concepts for the Japantown Community Plan* (San Francisco: n.p., 2000), 10.

⁴⁰⁾ Gerry Kearns and Chris Philo, eds., *Selling Places: The City as Cultural Capital, Past and Present* (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1993).

⁴¹⁾ For planning codes for Chinatown and North Beach, see, for example, Sec. 810. 1. Chinatown Business Community District (adopted in 1987) and Sec. 722. 1. North Beach Neighborhood Commercial District (adopted in 1987).

Osaka, Japan. Not only the commissioners but also other city politicians supported the Japantown SUD.⁴²⁾ Regionally, the San Francisco Bay Area is the home of many Japanese American politicians, including Norman Mineta, the former Secretary of Transportation, and Congressman Michael Honda, to mention just a few. Although the Japanese American population is relatively small compared to other Asian American groups, they have held on to a strong political influence in the Bay Area for a long time. The political economy surrounding Japantown was compelling enough for the city officials to approve the SUD very quickly. However, this does not necessarily mean that the city's interests always match those of the local Japanese American community. The city once dismissed the community's objections to the sale of a bowling alley in Japantown and its replacement with a luxury condominium.

While the city viewed Japantown as an economic and cultural resource in the context of the political economy, Japanese American community leaders regarded it as a necessary component for the survival of their spatially dispersed community and the maintenance of their ethnic identity. The SUD ordinance enabled the community to reconfirm a coherent identity for Japantown by institutionally defining its rigid boundaries and restricting the land use within it to the "culture" deemed suitable to the identity of the place. The community leaders held a strong sense of mission to save Japantown because they felt a growing fear that the Japanese American community as a whole and even the identity of being Japanese American might fade away in the future. They believed that its preservation was indispensable to the maintenance of the community and that the place offered a stable source of identity to those who identified themselves as Japanese American. What the community leaders sought was to fit a single *sense of place* (a symbol of Japanese American community) and a particular *locale* (a Japanese-themed landscape) into a specific *location* (Japantown).

Japanese American community leaders have seen the presence of Japanese-related businesses in Japantown to be vital to the survival of the community organizations, for which many of them work as full-time employees. In their understanding, the business management of the Japan Center has a significant impact on the sustainability of small businesses and community organizations located within Japantown.⁴³⁾ Many of those community organizations are experiencing a decline in Japanese/Japanese American membership and as a result are expanding their target clientele to non-Japanese. The community leaders are aware that Japanese-related businesses encourage Japanese Americans living at a distance and with few ties to their ethnic community to visit. The Japan Center was once unwelcome to some community members who saw it as the glossy commercialization of Japanese culture. However, many now recognize that the Center has played a key role in keeping the

⁴²⁾ *Hokubei Mainichi*, Mar. 16, 2006.

⁴³⁾ JPPDTF, *Concepts for the Japantown Community Plan*, 8.

primary characteristics of Japantown “Japanese enough.”⁴⁴⁾ The city’s interests in the tourist industries of Japantown matched those of the Japanese American community leaders.

Preceding the SUD, community leaders made elaborate efforts to maintain a stable Japanese American identity within the bounded territory of Japantown. Geographers have often pointed out that defining “Others” is a critical element in the process of constructing a place,⁴⁵⁾ and clearly this community has consistently defined and distinguished the Other or outsiders in order to construct, reinforce, and maintain the uniformed identity of Japantown. Different kinds of Others were identified according to changing social circumstances: African Americans during and after the wartime internment, Japan-based corporations in the redevelopment, Korean and Chinese population and their businesses later, and developers and representatives of global capital like Wal-Mart and McDonald’s today. Although many Japanese American community individuals recognize the importance of actual racial and ethnic diversity within Japantown as one source of its economic and cultural strength, they often assume that the authentic characteristics of the place were derived from Japanese/Japanese American culture.⁴⁶⁾ For example, many Japanese Americans have been concerned over the Hangul signboards of Korean businesses at the corner of Laguna and Post Street, and Chinese and Hangul signboards on the south side of the Japan Center.⁴⁷⁾ The degree of visibility of those Others, especially their racial/ethnic visibility, has been deliberately controlled in order to maintain the cohesive identity of Japantown.

In addition to the presence of Others, the community was also afraid that global forces represented by large corporations would make Japantown “placeless”. For example, Starbucks was offered a tenant retail space in a newly-built luxury condominium in Japantown in 2005. When the community learned about the offer, they organized a campaign to oppose Starbucks’ entry into the neighborhood, and, as a result, Starbucks gave up the plan of opening a shop there. One organizer of the campaign stated that “we don’t want [Japantown] to be like Anywhere, USA.”⁴⁸⁾ That is, the community feared that the invasion of global capital represented by Starbucks would deprive Japantown of its unique identity and lead it to become “placeless”.⁴⁹⁾

⁴⁴⁾ Although the Japanese American community of San Francisco has gradually been admitting Japan-based corporations’ economic contributions to Japantown, it is important to note that the community still retains an antagonistic view to the corporations and often sees them as outsiders as found in the community leaders’ criticism to Kintetsu.

⁴⁵⁾ Relph, *Place and Placelessness*; Tuan, *Space and Place*; Massey, *Space, Place, and Gender*, 157-73.

⁴⁶⁾ Muto, “3 Generations of S.F. Japantown”; *Nichibei Times*, Jan. 1, 1996; *San Francisco Examiner*, Mar. 21, 1999; Nishioka, “Japantown’s Mission”; JPPDTF, *Concepts for the Japantown Community Plan*, 8, 63.

⁴⁷⁾ *Nichibei Times*, Jan. 1, 1996.

⁴⁸⁾ Scott Sherwin, “Starbucks Booted from Japantown,” *San Francisco Observer* [online edition], June 13, 2005, <http://news.sfoobserver.com/> (accessed Aug. 27, 2008).

⁴⁹⁾ Relph, *Place and Placelessness*.

The process of forming the Japantown SUD shows the “exclusive territorial behavior” of the city and the community leaders. The two groups had different but partially overlapping interests in setting boundaries and redefining the stable identity of the place. Both groups saw permanence—the permanence of boundaries and identity—as essential components to constitute the place in order to resist the changing political economy under the influence of global capital and the shifting identity and geography of the Japanese American community. This case exemplifies Harvey’s point about the increasing importance of place-identities in response to the homogenization of the world caused by globalization. The SUD is certainly beneficial to both the city and Japanese American community as a whole. The preservation of Japantown contributes to revitalizing the economy of Japantown and the city by attracting tourists and Japanese visitors and by fueling a multicultural atmosphere in San Francisco. It also helps Japantown to remain as a symbol of Japanese American community. However, has the process of defining Japantown always come out of a defensive move against fears of outside forces such as globalization, “Others,” and the competition with other places?

5. The openness of place

The “global sense of place” proposed by Doreen Massey focuses on the openness of place rather than its permanence and offers alternative ways of seeing Japantown. This conceptualization of place takes it for granted that a place does not stand independently but is instead connected and interdependent.⁵⁰⁾ The “sense of place” is as a result not single or unitary but multiple and heterogeneous, and its boundary is tenuous. This alternative conceptualization of place enables us to see Japantown as open and extroverted rather than closed and internalized.

Japantown has never been a homogeneous place defined by its Japanese American community; indeed, as Massey points out, the “persistent identification of place with ‘community’ in any simple way is problematic.”⁵¹⁾ Japantown has consisted of many ethnic and racial groups since its beginnings, and there have existed multiple senses of place for Japantown even within Japanese American community. Such a heterogeneous sense of place can be identified in the discussions over the SUD designation. Several public comments at the commission hearing on the SUD revealed that the identity of Japantown as a place was neither necessarily fixed nor cohesive and that its boundary varied according to the mental maps of different individuals. At the first commission hearing, 6 out of 17 speakers stated their opposition to the SUD. One of the opponents was the Japantown Merchant Association, an organization consisting of Japanese, Japanese American, Chinese, Korean, and other ethnic groups’ business owners in Japantown. They claimed that the SUD was too restrictive, that prospective businesses would hesitate to enter the neighborhood and that it would make it

⁵⁰⁾ Massey, *Space, Place, and Gender*.

⁵¹⁾ *Ibid.*, 153.

difficult for existing businesses to expand.⁵²⁾ At the commission hearing, a representative of Kinokuniya Bookstores of America insisted that the SUD would become an obstacle to their future expansion plan in Japantown, and that the requirement for authorization would delay the commercial development of the area. Similar oppositions also came from a Chinese property owner, who stated that the SUD was against the idea of free market economy. A Korean business owner, believing that his office is not a part of Japantown, claimed that the boundary be changed.⁵³⁾ In the end, the Merchant Association reluctantly agreed to the establishment of the SUD as long as it would not interfere with the growth of Japantown businesses.

Not only merchants but also some non-Japanese residents opposed the SUD, questioning the Japanese/Japanese American identity of the place. A long-time Caucasian resident claimed that the north border of the SUD should be changed from Bush Street to Sutter Street since he doubted that the historical Victorian houses on the south of Bush Street could be characterized as Japanese. He also mentioned that there were few Japanese or Japanese American residents among his neighbors. The bounded area of the Japantown SUD also overlapped with the Fillmore District, another historically designated district which was once the center of African American jazz clubs in the 1940s to 60s.⁵⁴⁾ An elderly African American woman, the owner of a famous bookstore specializing in African American Studies on Fillmore Street, also questioned the inclusion of her store in the SUD since she had never been invited to “community” meetings held by Japanese American organizations. These public comments demonstrated that there existed different views regarding the historical values and boundaries of the place. That is, the sense of place or place-based identity of Japantown was actually diverse and flexible rather than singular and fixed.

Massey also argues that place is constructed out of social interactions with “Others” or “outsiders.” The uniqueness of a place is constantly reproduced by continuous interactions with the “outside” since each place is interconnected and interdependent.⁵⁵⁾ While what constitutes a place is its specificity or uniqueness, connectedness to other places is simultaneously an indispensable part of what constitutes a place. Although it might sound paradoxical, the specificity of a place does not stand on authenticity or rootedness in a history that generates nostalgia and emotional affections toward particular past memories. It is instead derived from “the fact that [a place] is constructed out of a particular constellation of social relations, meeting and weaving together at a particular locus.”⁵⁶⁾ Rigid boundaries enclosing places are not always required for conceptualization of place, either. Place can

⁵²⁾ Planning commission hearing on May 25, 2006. The video was available online through the website provided by the City and County of San Francisco.

http://sanfrancisco.granicus.com/ViewPublisher.php?view_id=20 (accessed Aug. 8, 2007).

⁵³⁾ Ibid.

⁵⁴⁾ Robert Oaks, *San Francisco's Fillmore District* (San Francisco: Arcadia, 2005), 54.

⁵⁵⁾ Castree, “Place,” 175.

⁵⁶⁾ Massey, *Space, Place, and Gender*, 154.

retain its specificity even if it is unstable and heterogeneous and has no enclosed boundaries.

From this viewpoint, what has kept San Francisco's Japantown uniquely distinct from other places is not rootedness in the Japanese American history. Rather, it is the fact that people, information, and commodities that came from "outside" met at or through a particular location which later became to be called *Nihonjin machi* and then Japantown. This alternative concept of place makes it possible to avoid simply distinguishing "us" from "Others" and to recognize the different viewpoints and the variety of social relations that constitute Japantown. *Nihonjin machi* or the early Japantown was constituted of Japanese immigrants who came from "outside." When Japanese immigrants came to California at the beginning of twentieth century, they were seen as threats from outside. Before *Nihonjin machi* was built, a number of Jewish lived there.⁵⁷⁾ From the viewpoint of those Jewish residents, Japanese immigrants were outside forces. Japanese immigrants brought a wide range of connections between Japantown and other places such as immigrants' hometowns in Japan, other Japanese communities in the US, for example those in Los Angeles and San Jose, and other overseas Japanese communities. Those contingent intersections generated a particular network of social relations that contributed to constructing the place.

The appreciation of hybridity and heterogeneity of place in Massey's alternative conceptualization suggests the negative effects of the Japantown SUD. First, the SUD runs the risk of marginalizing the multiple views of Japantown as a place constructed by Japanese, Chinese, and Korean merchants, white and African American residents. Since Japantown has never been homogeneously Japanese, from its beginnings until today, fixing the identity of the place as Japanese through the SUD is an attempt to preserve a place that never existed. Many of those who expressed their opposition to the SUD at the commission hearing see Japantown as a place for their everyday lives, while most Japanese Americans see it as a symbol of their community. The different meanings and roles of Japantown given by merchants and non-Japanese residents should be appreciated as well as that of Japanese Americans. Secondly, the "exclusive territorial behavior" embodied in the creation of the SUD tends to emphasize the division between "us" and "Others" and to see the latter as simply threatening. From a different viewpoint, however, the Japanese were once and are still now often seen as outsiders. Being aware of connections and interdependences between Japantown and outside would help to form behavior able to include outsiders. Finally, it is unlikely that the SUD could reverse the tendency of dispersion among Japanese Americans and lead them to go back to the old urban ethnic enclave; what it could achieve would be to help Japantown to remain a symbol of the community. The challenge that Japanese American community leadership faces will be how Japantown can continue to offer symbolic meanings to Japanese Americans while Japanese American identity is shifting and the form of the community is changing.

⁵⁷⁾ Japantown Task Force, "Japantown Historic Context Statement," Prepared for Landmarks Preservation Advisory Board (Oct. 2003), 5.

Conclusion

The sale of major properties in San Francisco's Japantown led to the introduction of the Japantown SUD and resulted in the metaphorical territorialization of an actually dispersed Japanese American community. As there are few Japanese/Japanese American residents in Japantown, the SUD re-defined and re-confirmed the meanings of the place as the symbol of the community and the source of the ethnic pride for the future generations of Japanese Americans. The community leaders sought for control over what the place should represent by legislation. This zoning rule allowed them to set its boundaries and restrict the use of land and properties inside only to those considered representative of Japanese American cultural identity.

By applying spatial theories of place, this paper investigated the taken-for-granted definition of "place" and "community" and offered different ways of understanding the SUD and the preservation movement of Japantown. Harvey's conceptualization of place in terms of "permanence" supports the idea that creating the SUD was a reasonable decision, given the increasing dispersion of Japanese American populations and the decreasing Japanese characteristics of Japantown as a symbol of their community. The SUD may help the economic and cultural rejuvenation of the neighborhood, which would be beneficial to the city as well. On the other hand, Massey's conceptualization of place as open and extroverted shows how the exclusiveness of the SUD simultaneously runs the risk of marginalizing non-Japanese and making an excessive differentiation between "us" and "Others." Recent spatial theories of place suggest that meanings of a place vary according to each individual or group. However, as the case of the Japantown SUD indicates, there are many competing efforts to define meanings and boundaries of places in order to adapt to the mobility of global capital, the shifting identity of ethnic minorities, and changing racial politics in the US.

In the framework of the long-term city planning, the Japantown SUD, encompassing only eight square blocks, can be understood as a prologue to a much larger-scale city planning that is currently in the process. In September 2007, the San Francisco Planning Department launched the Japantown Better Neighborhood Plan, whose project area consists of about thirty blocks surrounding Japantown.⁵⁸⁾ This new plan aims "to improve connections" between Japantown and the Fillmore District, and is a part of the Geary Corridor Bus Rapid Transit project that expects to start the special rapid bus transportation service on Geary Boulevard in 2012.⁵⁹⁾ This plan will have a far greater impact on the physical space and landscape of Japantown than the withdrawal of Kintetsu; consequently, it might change the role and meaning of Japantown to the Japanese American community of the

⁵⁸⁾ Japantown Task Force, "Japantown B.N.P.," <http://www.jtowntaskforce.org/> (accessed Dec. 13, 2008).

⁵⁹⁾ San Francisco Planning Department, "Japantown Better Neighborhood Plan," <http://japantown.sfplanning.org> (accessed Dec. 13, 2008).

San Francisco Bay Area yet again. As this extensive planning area includes many non-Japanese neighborhoods and residents, it will be important to pay attention to how Japantown retains its unique Japanese characteristics while simultaneously keeping and constructing harmonious relationships with other places.

緑の灯火と黄金の輝き ——*The Great Gatsby*における貨幣とアメリカの夢——

宮 本 文

Summary

The purpose of this paper is to clarify the relationship between love and money in the context of the American Dream in F. Scott. Fitzgerald's *The Great Gatsby*. In general, those who try to buy or sell love tend to be punished in the end in American novels, such as Kate Croy in *The Wings of the Dove*, Lily Bart in *The House of Mirth* and Carrie Meeber in *Sister Carrie*. However, love and money in *The Great Gatsby* are closely related with each other in terms of the concept of the self-made man who pursues success in both love and money. By employing the concepts used in the money system as metaphors such as convertible paper money, inconvertible paper money and trust, I examine how Gatsby's love for Daisy is harmonized with his money-making and how the process of his money-making equals that of making his "self."

In the end, Gatsby is killed and his American dream seems to fail. However, this is neither his failure nor a punishment for Gatsby as the system of the American Dream requires some kind of difference to maintain itself: we gain profit from difference but difference vanishes through gaining profit; therefore, to retain profit, we have to keep difference. In his narrative, Nick Carraway tries to underline the gap between Daisy in the present and Daisy in the past to avoid the restoration of the relationship between Gatsby and Daisy, which, as a result, prolongs our expectation for the fulfillment of the American Dream.

はじめに

「愛はお金で買えない」という耳慣れた言葉から始めることにしよう。私たちは日常、愛をお金で表現したり、計ってみることに嫌悪を感じる。圧倒的な財力を背景にお金でも——愛ですら——買うことができるのだと人がうそぶくとき、私たちは戸惑い傷つきそして怒りを覚える。この紋切り型は、愛をお金で買うことはタブーであり、そのタブーを破ったものは罰せられることを私たちが内面化していることの証左である。このような愛とお金の相克は多くの小説でドラマとして描かれてきた。アメリカ文学に限って例を挙げてみよう。ヘンリー・ジェームズ（Henry James）の『鳩の翼』（*The Wings of the Dove*, 1902）では、お金持ちの叔母の家に身を寄せている貧しくも美しいケイト（Kate Croy）は、当時は新興階級であったジャーナリストのマートン（Merton Densher）とお金がなくて結婚できない。そこでマートンに思いを寄せる大金持ちのミリー（Milly Theale）を利用しようと企てる。しかし、ミリーの死後、財産を手にしたケイトとマートンには後ろめたさが残り、二人の愛は以前とは同じではなくなってしまう。またニューヨークの上流階級と新興勢力の葛藤を多く描いてきたイーディス・ウォートン（Edith Wharton）は、『飲

楽の家』(*The House of Mirth*, 1905)において、結婚を愛でなくお金、すなわち上昇の機会と捉えたりリー・バート (Lily Bart) に破滅という結末を与えている。セオドア・ドライサー (Theodore Dreiser) の『シスター・キャリー』(*Sister Carrie*, 1900)においては、購買力で人が定義づけられる社会の中で、キャリー (Carrie Meeber) はより経済力のある男たちの間を渡り歩きながらも、最後には女優になり経済的にも登り詰める。しかしながら、小説の最後の場面では、キャリーが揺り椅子に一人座り、愛の不在が強調される。このように、愛を社会的・経済的な上昇と結びつけようとするときに、愛は捨て去られるか、不純なものとなり、その結果、登場人物は罰せられる。

愛をお金で買おうとする者、あるいは愛をお金に替えようとする者が、ことごとく罰せられるアメリカ小説群の中で、『グレート・ギャツビー』(*The Great Gatsby*, 1925)は一見その流れに名を連ねているように見える。この小説でもお金は愛の障害として主人公の前に立ちのかるからだ。無産階級のジェイ・ギャツビー (Jay Gatsby) は大金持ちになってかつての恋人デイズー (Daisy Buchanan) の前に現れて、彼女の愛を取り戻そうとする。しかし、彼はデイズーをかばって殺されてしまうものの、彼の愛は報われることなく小説は終わる。ギャツビーの死は愛をお金で買おうとした罰なのだろうか。しかしながら、「愛はお金で買えない」ということを作品のモラルと解するのであれば、なぜ「お金で買えないものはない」ということをもっとも体現するデイズーの夫、トム・ブキャナン (Tom Buchanan) は罰せられないのであろうか。ニック・キャラウェイ (Nick Carraway) はギャツビーの死後、トムが何も変わらずに、またこれからも変わらないであろうことをわざわざ語っている。そもそもギャツビーとトムのデイズーに対する愛は、お金によって裏打ちされているという点で変わらないのだろうか。そして何よりもデイズーへの愛の表象である商品があれほど魅力的に描かれているのはなぜだろうか、と次々に疑問が浮かんでくる。

これらの疑問は、『ギャツビー』において、お金と愛は対立するのかという問題に集約する。愛とお金の位相を把握するには、セルフメイド・マン (the self-made man) というモチーフを補助線とするのが有効であろう。ギャツビーがジミー・ギャッツ (Jimmy Gatz) だった頃、小説の裏表紙に書き付けた自己実現のためのスケジュールがはっきりと示すように (言うまでもなくベンジャミン・フランクリン [Benjamin Franklin] の十三徳のパロディーであるが)、小説全体を通してセルフ・エジュケーティッド (self-educated) なアメリカの伝統的なセルフメイド・マンのモチーフが散見している。先程、愛とお金の相克は小説にドラマを与えてきたと書いたが、その逆の例として、ベンジャミン・フランクリンの『フランクリン自伝』(*The Autobiography of Benjamin Franklin*) を挙げることができる。フランクリンにとってピューリタンの勤勉さは、結婚生活 (女性関係) の成功と経済的生活における成功の両方へ導くものであり、愛とお金はどちらかがどちらかに従属するのではなく、同次元で扱われている。¹⁾ 『ギャツビー』においてもまた、愛とお金は無邪気に寄り添う。ギャツビーは自分よりも上の階級に属するデイズーと結婚するた

¹⁾ 特に『フランクリン自伝』第5章はフランクリン自らの立身出世と結婚に至る道が平行して描かれている。(ベンジャミン・フランクリン『フランクリン自伝』松本慎一、西川正身訳、岩波文庫 [岩波書店、1957年])

めに、無産階級から有産階級へ移行し、デイジーに相応しい男「ジェイ・ギャツビー」を自ら生み出しいく。そして稼いだ富はデイジーに示され、その富が彼女に対する愛の深さを証明するのである。デイジーへの愛はお金で表現されながらも、愛とお金の結びつきは奇跡的にも愛を純粋なものにしている。

そう考えると、『ギャツビー』のお金と愛をめぐる物語はアメリカ小説群にあって特異な位置を占めていると言うことができる。お金があればデイジーにふさわしい自分になり、デイジーの愛を取り戻せることができる、という思いは「愛はお金で買える」という様に言い換えられるかもしれない。しかしながら、トムが「愛はお金で買える」と言った場合、愛はお金に従属している（デイジーは言わばトロフィー・ワイフであり、トムの財力と地位の証として仕えている）。それに対して、ギャツビーの場合、フランクリン的なセルフメイドの文脈において考えると、愛とお金は対等な関係にあることが明らかになってくる。セルフメイドというギャツビーの夢に——その夢はアメリカン・ドリームと重ねられるが——愛とお金は仕えているのである。言い換えれば、愛とお金は等しくアメリカン・ドリームの様態なのである。

1. 神秘的なお金

『ギャツビー』において、男性たちの欲望の対象であるデイジーをお金と切り離して考えることは難しい。悪役であるトムにとってデイジーは自らの財力を示す財の一つであることが明白であるが、この小説のヒーローであるギャツビーにとっても、デイジーを手に入れるということは、デイジーに見合う財力を持っていること、そして成功と同義なのである。その意味で両者にとってデイジーはお金で表現される存在である。更に、この図式を強化するのが語り手ニックである。デイジーと親戚筋でありながらもオールドマネーというほどでもなく、ギャツビーほど貧しい出でもないニックは、デイジーに対しても、お金に対しても、その欲望は抑圧された形で表出される。ニックは即物的にお金と結びつけられたトムのなデイジーを志向しながらも、間接的に「声」をほめることしかできない。それゆえ、「デイジー／金」を手の届かない神秘的なものとして語るのである。そうした神秘化は、ギャツビーのデイジーに対する愛と結びつき、彼はギャツビーの物語を語ることを通してデイジーに対する欲望の遂行を体験するのである。だからこそ、ニックの語りはトムとギャツビーの対比を一層明らかにし、ギャツビーのデイジーに対する欲望を——すなわちお金に対する欲望を——ロマンチックに仕立て上げるのである。

まずは小説全体でお金がニックによってどのように表象されているのか辿っていこう。次の場面は、ニックが証券業界に入り身を立てようと東部にやって来たばかりのことを回想するシーンである。

銀行業とクレジットと有価証券についての本をひと抱え買い込み、書棚に並べた。その赤と金色の背表紙は、鑄造されたばかりの新しい貨幣のようで、ミダス王やモルガンやマエケナスしか知らなかった光り輝く秘密を、もれなく解き明かしてくれるように見えた。²⁾

²⁾ スコット・フィッツジェラルド『グレート・ギャツビー』村上春樹訳（中央公論新社、2006年）、15頁。

手に触れるものをすべて黄金にする力を持つギリシア神話のミダス王、証券業界でのアメリカン・ドリームの実現者J. P. モルガン、古代ローマの政治家マエケナス³⁾をニックは並列させる。金ぴか時代のアイコンであるモルガンを加えることで皮肉な色合いを付与しているものの、古今東西のお金持ちを並列させることにより、ここではやはりお金が喚起する生々しさや俗っぽさは弱まり、神秘的な様相を帯びるのである。また「鑄造されたばかりの新しい貨幣のようで (like new money from the mint)」という下りの“mint” (造幣局) も、即物的な響きと同時に、ぱりとした緑色の新札を想起させ、ニックのセルフ・エジュケイティッドな勤勉さと呼応するのである。⁴⁾ ニックにとってお金に対する欲望は、魔法的な力を帯びた神秘的なものとして表現されるのである。

ニックの目を通して観察されるお金の神秘性は、トムの「お金／デ이지」の表裏一体となった欲望に反射して、デ이지を光まばゆいものにしてその神秘性を一層高める役割をする。ニックはイースト・エッグ (East Egg) のトムの邸宅に入った時からデ이지を形容するのに太陽の光のイメージを多用している。この輝きはお金の換喩としてデ이지と貨幣の類推を強化する。更に興味深いのが、ニック自身はギャツビーに指摘されるまで、デ이지とお金の類推を抑圧していることである。

「彼女の声には何か無分別なものがあるね」と僕 [ニック] は指摘した。「あの声には——」、そのあとの言葉を僕はためらった。

「彼女の声にはぎっしり金^{かね}が詰まっている」とギャツビーはあっさりと言った。

まさにそのとおりだ。でも彼に言われるまでそのことに思い至らなかった。そう、そこには金が詰まっていた。蠱惑がそこから尽きることなく立ち上り、そして降りていくのだ。その心地よいちりんちりんという音、シンバルの歌……純白の宮殿の高楼には、王様の娘にして黄金色の少女……⁵⁾

ニックはこの場面に先立ち、光のイメージに加えて、繰り返しデ이지の声の魅力に触れている。そしてここに来て初めて、それまでニックが持たざる者であるゆえに控えめに憧れていた二つのもの——すなわちデ이지とお金——の正体が同一であったことをギャツビーに言い当てられる。ギャツビーの直裁的な物言いは、ニックによってそのまま引き受けられ、シンバルやベルの甲高い金属音になぞられて、コインの「ちりんちりん」という物理的な音でお金の即物性が強化される一方、「シンバル」、「宮殿」とロマンチックな方向にイメージが重ねられ、最終的にはデ이지とお金が美しく結びついた「黄金色の少女」というイメージに到達するのである。

この場面が典型的なように、お金に対する欲望に通常は付随する生々しさや俗っぽさ

³⁾ マエケナスはローマ皇帝アウグストゥスと親交を結び、「親譲りの財産のほかに、さらに富を付け加えることができたらしい」人物で文人のパトロンをしていた。 (『マエケナス』『ブリタニカ国際大百科事典』電子辞書対応小項目版、[ブリタニカ・ジャパン、2004年])

⁴⁾ もちろん、ここでも皮肉な色彩が皆無なわけではない。このセルフ・エジュケイティッドな仕草は、ジェイ・ギャッツのフランクリンのパロディー (311-12 頁) と呼応させると、ニックの滑稽さとなって戻ってくる。

⁵⁾ フィッツジェラルド『グレート・ギャツビー』218-19 頁。

が、この小説でほとんど脱色されている。ニックの語るギャツビーの物語において、ギャツビーの金に対する欲望は、デイジーを取り戻す行為と結びつく。その結合はギャツビーの金に対する欲望を卑しい成金的なものから、イノセントで慎ましやかなものに変容させる。例えば、ギャツビーがパーティを開く真意が、デイジーに自分が富を築いたのを見てもらう為だということニックが知ったとき、「その願いのあまりのつつましさに、僕は言葉を手放してしまった」⁶⁾と、ギャツビーが費やした金額の莫大さに比して、求める見返りがあまりにも控えめなことに驚くのである。この時点を境にニックの語りの上では、ギャツビーの下品なお金の使い方・財の成し方は、高潔なものへと転換するのである。

2. 金色の輝きと兌換紙幣

それではデイジーがお金と結びついたときに、ギャツビーの欲望がよりロマンチックな夢になるのは何故だろうか。『ギャツビー』において、直接的にも比喩的にもお金への言及が満ち溢れている。が、そのお金の形態が実は一つではないことに答えを求められるのではないか。トムにとってデイジーは、結婚式の前に送った35万ドルの真珠の首飾りが象徴するように財宝であり、貨幣制度の比喩の中では兌換紙幣を支える金なのである。先述したとおり、語り手ニックはイースト・エッグのトムの家にいるデイジー（特にギャツビーと再会する以前の彼女）に対して、まばゆい光のイメージを多用するのも、金という比喩ゆえのことである。そうすると、トムは金に裏書きされた兌換紙幣と言うことになる。兌換紙幣は当然ながら不換紙幣より、金という現物に裏打ちされているので信用が厚く、何世代にもわたって財を成し富を蓄積してきたオールドマネーを類推させる。トムとデイジーの結婚は、デイジーと金の類推を更に強化するのである。

しかしながら、金本位制において皮肉な顛倒是不可避に起こる。本来、金の方が本物であり、兌換紙幣の方はあくまでもその代理に過ぎない。だが流通という市場の要請に従うとき、世の中を流通するのは金ではなく兌換紙幣なのである。金本位制は、誰もが実物の金を目にするこなしに、ただどこかにある金をイメージし信じることによって成立するものであり、金はいわば隠されたアイコンである。金はどこかの蔵の底で神々しい光を誰にも見せることなく輝きを放ちながら死蔵されているのである。その一方で、兌換紙幣は不在の金のオーラをまといながら、自身を身軽に流通させていくことができる。

『ギャツビー』において、金が死蔵されているのがイースト・エッグのブキャナン邸であり、デイジーが描写される場所もほとんど家の中なのである。トムがよその女性たちと出歩いているときも、彼女は一人家に残される。金が独立して循環することが許されないように、デイジーも一人で出歩くことは許されないのである。イースト・エッグ以前の結婚生活において、行く先々で彼女は人気者であった一方で、はめをはずすこともなく、ギャツビーとの交際を再開するまでは、家の中でジョーダンと所在無さげにただずんでいる以外、彼女の社交生活の描写は一切ない。ニックとデイジーがイースト・エッグの家で最初に再会した場面で、デイジーは「私ね、幸福すぎて身体が、ま、マヒしちゃった」⁷⁾と、どこまでもどこか芝居がかった言葉を発する。「幸せで」と付け加えられているものの、

⁶⁾ 前掲書、147頁。

⁷⁾ 前掲書、23頁。

麻痺状態——身体的にも思想的にも停止状態にあると告白している。このデイジーのセリフは、のちにトムが浮気しているらしいことや、デイジーがあまり幸せではないことなど、一連の事情をニックが察するにつれて皮肉に変わる。ニックは「デイジーのとるべき道は、どう考えても、子供を両腕に抱きかかえてすぐにでもあの家を飛び出すことだ」⁸⁾と、義憤にかられるが⁹⁾、しかしながら、ブキャナン家に嫁いだデイジーは、蔵に眠る金であり、あくまでトムの影であるから、外の世界流通することは許されず、家を出るという選択肢はこの時点ではあり得ないのである。

トムにとってデイジーが死蔵されるべき金であることは、トムの浮気相手であるマートル (Myrtle Wilson) と比較するとより明らかになる。ニックはマートルの肉感的な魅力をもとめながらも、「顔にはとくべつな美のしりや輝きはなかった」¹⁰⁾と、わざわざ輝き——金の換喩——がないと断りを入れる。つまり、デイジーのみ金の比喩が付与されていることがわかるのだ。トムがマートルに犬を買い与えるエピソードも、マートルが決して金ではないことを再確認させるものである。そこでマートルは売り主に犬が雄なのか雌なのか尋ねる。そうすると、トムは「これは雌さ」、「ほら、金だ。これであと十匹ばかり犬を仕入れてくるんだな」¹¹⁾と断言する。「雌」はトムがこれまでに何人も作ってきた愛人であり、十把一絡げに買うことができる代替可能な商品であることを——そして、マートルもその一人であることを暗示しているのだ。

3. 緑色の灯火と不換紙幣

その一方で、ギャツビーにとってデイジーは貨幣そのものである。しばしばギャツビーがウェスト・エッグ (West Egg) の家の庭からイースト・エッグを眺め、手を伸ばして掴もうとしている「緑の灯火 (single green light)」¹²⁾であり、この緑の灯火はギャツビーにとって一義的にはデイジーである。そして、緑はアメリカ合衆国紙幣の色であり、貨幣の換喩なのである。この「緑の灯火」は、小説を通して反復され、ギャツビーの死んだ後もなおも灯り続ける。小説の最後には、ニックの目を通して、「緑の灯火 [...] 陶醉に満ちた未来 (the green light, the orgasmic future)」¹³⁾とアメリカの行く末と重ね合わされる。「緑の灯火」がアメリカ全体の夢を内包する力を持つのは、「緑の灯火」すなわち「貨幣」が、その性質上あらゆるモノと交換可能性を有しているからであり、いわば全能の夢 = 可能性であるからである。¹⁴⁾

ギャツビーにとって、「緑の灯火」で象徴されるデイジーに対する欲望は、デイジーが他者の欲望を映し出せば映し出すほど高まるものである。ギャツビーが将校時代に初めてルイヴィルのデイジーの家に行った時、彼はその豊かさに圧倒され、そしてほかの男たちの

8) 前掲書、44-45 頁。

9) このニックの考えは、皮肉なことにすぐ後の2章でトムが浮気相手のマートルに対して繰り返される。

10) 前掲書、53 頁。

11) 前掲書、58 頁。

12) 前掲書、46 頁。

13) 前掲書、325 頁。

14) 貨幣の持つあらゆるモノとの交換可能性については、岩井克人『貨幣論』ちくま学芸文庫 (筑摩書房、1998 年) 第2章を参照。

欲望の残滓をみとめる。「数多くの男たちがこれまでにデイジーに夢中になったという事実も、彼の心をそそった。そのことで、彼にとってのデイジーの価値はますます高いものになった」。¹⁵⁾ またデイジーの気持ちを確かめた直後、その戸惑いと驚きを、ギャツビーはニックに次のように語る。「私は野心なんぞ放つたらしにして、日ごとに深く恋に落ちていった。そしてあるとき、もうかまうものかと腹を決めた。偉業を達成することにどんな意味があるだろう。自分がこれから成そうと目論んでいることを、彼女に語っている方が遙かに楽しいというのに」¹⁶⁾ デイジーは他者の欲望を引き受ける。他者の欲望をいくらかでも投影できるのは、デイジーの貨幣性ゆえである。またギャツビーの「野心」、すなわちまだ実現されていない可能性を、彼女に語ることが「夢」の実現を凌ぐかもしれないことは、デイジーの貨幣性がギャツビーの色とりどりの可能性をいつまでも担保してくれるからである。

かつてデイジーが持っていた貨幣性、すなわち無限の交換可能性は、5年を経た後、逆にギャツビーからデイジーに再提示される。それは、彼女の目を引く為に行う過剰な商品の消費という形で表現される。その象徴がウェスト・エッグの家であり、煌々と輝く人工的なパーティの灯、オレンジとレモンの山、あるいは彼女にふさわしい教養のある男として振る舞うために必要な頁の切られていない「本物」の本。¹⁷⁾ ウェスト・エッグのギャツビー邸の隅々までも、すべてギャツビーのデイジーに対する欲望の具体的な姿であり、デイジーの化身である。ギャツビーがデイジーに初めて邸宅を見せたとき、シャツの山から一枚一枚シャツをほおって見せる場面がある。

ギャツビーは一山のシャツを手にとって、それを僕らの前にひとつひとつ投げていった。薄いリネンのシャツ、分厚いシルクのシャツ、細やかなフランネルのシャツ、きれいに畳まれていたそれらのシャツは、投げられるとほどけて、テーブルの上に色とりどりに乱れた。僕らがその光景に見とれていると、彼は更にたくさんのシャツを放出し、その柔らかく豊かな堆積は、どんどん高さを増していった。縞のシャツ、渦巻き模様のシャツ、格子柄のシャツ。珊瑚色の、アップル・グリーン、ラヴェンダーの、淡いオレンジのシャツ。どれにもインディアン・ブルーのモノグラムがついている。¹⁸⁾

布地の肌理や素材、色や柄を一つ一つ提示したシャツは無一文の若者だった男が、デイジーへの欲望を具現化するために買った商品の一つ一つであり、溢れる商品のバラエティーはトムの送った35万ドルの真珠の首飾りと対照的である。5年間、トムを陰から支えるためだけに塩漬にされていたデイジーは、「なんて美しいシャツでしょう」¹⁹⁾ 「だって私——こんなにも素敵なシャツを、今まで一度も目にしたことがなかった」²⁰⁾ とシャツの

15) フィッツジェラルド『グレート・ギャツビー』268頁。

16) 前掲書、271頁。

17) ここで本のページが切られていないということが重要である。「本物」の本であることは、その使用価値を評価することを意味していない。ただ交換可能性を示すことができれば、役割は果たしたと言える。むしろ、それを本来の用途、すなわち読書することは目的ではないことが強調されていると言えよう。

18) 前掲書、171頁。

19) 前掲書、171頁。

20) 前掲書、172頁。

一枚一枚の美しさに涙を流すのである。

岩井克人は貨幣について、「貨幣が貨幣であり続けるためには、それは流通して、ほかの商品との等価関係をたえず更新していかなければならない」²¹⁾と述べている。すなわち、貨幣にとって流通（循環性）とは、命なのである。紙幣の持つ無限の交換可能性という性質は、兌換紙幣を支える金とは違い、循環されればされるほど貨幣としての本質を発揮するのである。つまり、デイジーの場合、多くの欲望になぞらえられるほどにその魅力が発揮されると言うて良い。

実際にデイジーはギャツビーによって自らの無限の（交換）可能性を示されたこの日之境に、蔵に眠る金ではなく循環する不換紙幣のように動きを取り戻すのである。ギャツビーとデイジーの再会の直後、夏の昼下がりにトム、ギャツビー、ニック、ジョーダン（Jordan Baker）がブキャナン邸に集まる。何をして過ごそうかと相談していると、デイジーはそれまでとは違って外へ行こうと主張する。先ほど引用したニックとデイジーの再会シーンと比較すると、デイジーの変化は際立っている。しかしながら、小説はデイジー循環性の獲得を悲劇の引き金と設定する。デイジーの主張に従って、4人はマンハッタンのプラザホテルへ移動するが、そこで彼女を待ち受けていたのは、ギャツビーとトムの修羅場であり、彼女は板挟みになってしまう。更に悪いことには、帰り道にデイジーとギャツビーの乗った自動車は「灰の谷（a valley of ashes）」でトムの愛人マートルをひき殺してしまう。このときにハンドルを握っていたのが、デイジーであることは重要だ。デイジーが動き始めたことがマートルの死を引き起こしたことは、それまで交換可能性を享受してきた兌換紙幣としてのトムと（それを裏打ちする）金という実体と影の関係を転覆させる契機にもなり得たからだ。トムは交換可能性を享受しながら世界を循環してきたのであるが、その交換可能性の一つであるがマートル、影であったはずのデイジーが動き始めたことによって消されたことは、トムとデイジーの関係を転覆する可能性を孕んだ出来事でもあったのだ。

4. セルフメイドと利潤

今度はギャツビーを中心に貨幣のアナロジーを考えてみよう。これまでデイジーを中心とした貨幣の比喻から『ギャツビー』における愛とお金の位相を検討してきた。ギャツビーのデイジーに対する愛は、彼が獲得した富が持つ購買力——溢れるばかりの商品——で表現され、不換紙幣の持つ無限の交換可能性をデイジーに保証することによって表されることを確認してきた。ギャツビーの富がデイジーの化身だと言えるとすると、翻ってその富はギャツビー自身でもあると言えるのではないか。ギャツビーが富を獲得する軌跡は、無一文の田舎者ジミー・ギャッツがデイジーの化身の一つとも言えるウエスト・エッグの豪邸に住むギャツビーへと変貌する軌跡でもある。²²⁾「ロング・アイランドのウエスト・エッグ在住のジェイ・ギャツビーは、彼自身のプラトンの純粋観念の中から生まれ出た像なのだ」²³⁾とニックは述べるが、富こそがこのウエスト・エッグ在住のジェイ・ギャツビ

²¹⁾ 岩井克人「ヴェニスの商人の資本論」『ヴェニスの商人の資本論』ちくま学芸文庫（筑摩書房、1992年）、55頁。

²²⁾ 名前自体はダン・コーディーと出会ったときに、ジミー・ギャッツからギャツビーへ変えている。

²³⁾ フィッツジェラルド『グレート・ギャツビー』181頁。

ーを作り上げたに他ならない。スコット・A・サンデー（Scott A. Sandage）によれば、「わずかな例外はあるものの、アメリカにおいて唯一正当とみなされるのは、資本主義者としてのアイデンティティである」。²⁴⁾ その例証の一つとして、「failure」という単語が「南北戦争前にはこの言葉が一般的には『破産』を意味していたが、[...]それが『欠陥のある人』をさすようになった...」ことを挙げる。²⁵⁾ また別の例証として、ウォルト・ホイットマン（Walt Whitman）の『草の葉』第一版（*Leaves of Grass*, 1855）所収の「仕事を讃える歌」（“A Song for Occupations”）を引用し、「無数の商売や道具をずらずら並べ上げたこの詩は、『身体とアイデンティティの奇妙な感覚』に仕事がいかなる影響を及ぼすか、思いをめぐらしている。[...]『粗野な事物と姿の見えぬ魂が一体になっている』。いいかえれば、商業的民主主義において、商品とアイデンティティは融合している」と指摘している。²⁶⁾ つまり、アメリカのセルフメイドの伝統の中では、富が（より正確に言えば、富を稼ぐ過程そのものが）アイデンティティを規定するということである。ギャツビーについて言うならば、彼はお金を稼ぐ過程こそがジェイ・ギャツビーを生み出す過程と言えるのだ。

ギャツビーと貨幣（お金）の類推を考える上で、ニックが神秘化して語ったように彼が無から生まれたわけではなく、無一文のジミー・ギャッツという人間から生まれたことは重要である。なぜならば、資本を持たざる者が富を増やす場合には、まさに裸一貫、自分自身を資本とするほかないからである。ギャツビーのような資本を持たない人間にとって「信用」こそ唯一の資本なのである。²⁷⁾ また、サンデーは、19世紀初頭から半ばにおいて、アメリカの商人たちが、セルフメイド・マンの象徴する美徳に後押しされ、強迫的に投資を繰り返す様が描かれている。それに伴い、現金取引だけでは追いつかずに「信用取引」という商習慣が定着するが、この信用取引が連鎖的に破産者を生み出すのだと書かれている。²⁸⁾ 結果として、セルフメイド・マンの美徳は負け組を生み出すという構造的な瑕疵をも内包していることが窺える。このことはまた5章でニックの語りと併せて詳しく論じるつもりである。

資本を増やすには言うまでもなく利潤を生み出す必要がある。先程の岩井は貨幣の流通と利潤の関係を以下のように説明する。

では、利潤とは一体どこから生み出されてくるものなのであろうか。

もちろん、利潤は無からは生まれない。それは、かならず貨幣とモノとの交換、すなわち売りと買いを通して生み出されてくるものである。… おたがいに異なったふたつの価値体系のあいだを媒介して、一方で相対的に安いものを買い、他方で相対的に高いものを売る… 利潤とは、すなわち、差異から生まれる。²⁹⁾

²⁴⁾ スコット・A・サンデー『「負け組」のアメリカ史——アメリカン・ドリームを支えた失敗者たち』鈴木淑美訳（青土社、2007年）、13頁。

²⁵⁾ 前掲書、10頁。

²⁶⁾ 前掲書、152-53頁。

²⁷⁾ サンデーによれば、「19世紀のアメリカ人は、支払い能力と自我こそが投機対象であると理解していた」（前掲書40頁）。

²⁸⁾ 前掲書、1-3章；宮本文「スコット・A・サンデー『「負け組」のアメリカ史——アメリカン・ドリームを支えた失敗者たち（青土社、2007年）』『図書新聞』2007年4月7日。

²⁹⁾ 岩井「ヴェニスの商人」57-8頁。

差異が利潤を生むもっとも典型的な例として、岩井は遠隔地交易を挙げているが、このことは重商主義時代と大航海時代が表裏一体だったことを考えれば理解することは容易い。かつて差異は物理的な距離であったのだ。また、アメリカの文脈にあてはめれば、西漸運動やゴールド・ラッシュ、またベンジャミン・フランクリンがボストンからフィラデルフィア、ニューヨーク、ヨーロッパへと移動するたびに社会的・経済的に上昇していったことがすぐに思いつくだろう。移動は富を得る機会であり、またアメリカン・ドリームの成功者にとっては富の蓄積の軌跡だと言えるのだ。

このように考えると、『ギャツビー』が愛とお金の物語であると同時に「移動」の物語でもあることが必然だということに気づく。小説に背景として通底するのが中西部と東部の差異である。ニック、ギャツビー、デイジー、トム、そしてペイカーまで主要登場人物は中西部出身であり、彼らは移動を繰り返し、東部のニューヨークに辿り着く。それに対してニューヨークの地理に内在する差異が主旋律として前景化される。小説内部に差異を生み出すべく、とにかく登場人物たちは動く。ニックとギャツビーは第一次世界大戦に従軍する。戦争は、ギャツビーがまさにその典型であったように無一文の若者を社交界の華と変える。ニックは親族会議の結果、新たな立身出世のルートであるニューヨークへと送り出される。また、トムとデイジーもシカゴへヨーロッパへと動き続ける理由がはっきりと示されていないものの、灰の谷の住人であるウィルソン夫妻と対比すれば移動が富の問題であることがわかるであろう。彼らは灰の谷に留まり、何も生み出すことなく、亭主は生きているのかわからないように暮らし、マートルはくすぶっているのである。

移動による差異が利潤を生むとすれば、登場人物の中で一番動きが激しいのがギャツビーであることも納得がいくだろう。オールドマネーと新興階級^{ニューリッチ}の差は、後者は端的に言って財を成すスピードが速いのである。コーディーとのやや時代がかった出会いと世界を巡る大航海は、差異が利潤を生む典型例として岩井が挙げる大航海時代にぴったりとあてはまる。また戦後の——ニックに比べても遥かに長い——遠回り、このオデュッセイア的な周回道でのエピソードは、同時にこの富の獲得がいかに怪しげな方法によるものかを伝えている。一文無しの彼にとって自分自身という資本を流通させ、差異を生み出すことでしか、利潤を得て財をなすことはできないのだ。しかもデイジーを取り戻す為に、財を成すスピードを上げなければならないギャツビーは、移動のスピードと規模を上げる必要がある。だからこそ、ウエスト・エッグの邸宅に不吉に割り込んでくる電話も、フィラデルフィアからだったりデトロイトからだったり遠隔地からなのである。

ギャツビーの財の成し方がどこか怪し気で且つ危ういのは、比喩的な意味でも、文字通りの意味でも、彼が「信用」で取引しているからである。特に無一文で急激に財を成さなければいけないギャツビーにとっては、より身軽で——すなわち裏打ちがなされていないハイリスクな金融商品を扱わなければならない。さらにスピードを加速させるためには、小説の中でおぼろげに語られる裏稼業に手を染めなければならない。デイジーとの仲が壊れてしまうのは、プラザホテルでトムが彼女の前でこのことを指摘したからである。いわばスピードの出し過ぎでギャツビーはデイジーとの失われた過去を取り戻すという夢に破れてしまうのだ。

5. ニックの語りとアメリカの夢

ギャツビーの視点から、フランクリン的なセルフメイド・マンのモチーフを補助線にして、デイジーとお金の間に比喻を結ぶことができるのは、デイジーとの失われた過去を取り戻すというギャツビーの夢がアメリカン・ドリームと軌を一にしているからである。加えて、差異という要素を考えると、語り手ニックがギャツビーの物語に意識的に差異を組み入れることによって、ギャツビーの夢をアメリカの夢に昇華させて、更にアメリカの夢を永遠に支えるメカニズムを生み出しているのがわかる。

ニックとギャツビーの、ウェスト・エッグから灰の谷を経てマンハッタンに至るドライブは、移動によって差異を可視化する。

巨大な橋を渡るとき、^{はり}梁を抜ける太陽の光が、進んでいく車の上にちかちかと絶え間なく光った。そして河の向こう側に、純白の大きな山となり、砂糖の塊となって、都市にぽっかりと浮かび上がる。嗅覚を持たぬ金の生み出す願望によって築き上げられたものがそこにある。クイーンズボロ橋から街を俯瞰するとき、それは常に初見の光景として、世界のすべての神秘とすべての美しさを請け合ってくれる息を呑むような最初の約束として、僕らの目に映じるのだ。³⁰⁾

車のフロントガラス越しにクイーンズ側からのぞむマンハッタン³¹⁾の描写は、はっとするほど神々しい。先程、ニックがデイジーとお金の描写に光を多用することによって両者の神秘性を高め、両者の間に類推の関係を結ばせていることを確認したが、ここでもマンハッタン³²⁾の姿は「純白の大きな山 […] 砂糖の塊 (white heaps and sugar lumps)」として遠く光の中にたたずんでいる。砂糖の持つ白さ、軽さ、甘さ、華奢さも相まって、マンハッタン³³⁾の姿はニックがブキャナン邸で初めて目にした、白いドレスを着てほとんど質量を持たないかのように漂っているデイジーの姿に重なる。ギャツビーの夢であるデイジーは、ここではニックによって、アメリカの夢、マンハッタン³⁴⁾の姿に読み替えられるのである。

マンハッタン³⁵⁾の姿に、ニックは遠隔地交易によって利潤を求めアメリカにやって来たオランダ人の視線を見いだす。この水辺を挟んで反対側から眺める視線は、ギャツビーの「緑の灯火」を眺める視線の変奏——すなわちデイジーを求める視線——であり、また小説の最後に描かれる「オランダ人の船乗りたち」³⁶⁾の視線に重なる。またそれと対になって、「緑の灯火」に手を差し伸べるギャツビーの仕草は、最後にはアメリカの夢をつかもうとする「明日はもっと速く走ろう。両腕をもっと先まで差し出そう」³⁷⁾という仕草に反復されるのである。これらは単に仕草を反復しているだけではなく、夢に手を差し伸べようとしている者と、差し伸ばされることを光の中で待つ夢の住人との間にある距離をも反復しているのである。マンハッタンへのドライブの場面にはクイーンズボロ橋という差異／距離がニックによってしっかりと差し挟まれており、「緑の灯火」とギャツビーの間にはイースト・エッグとウェスト・エッグの双子の地形を挟む入り江によって距離が確保さ

³⁰⁾ 前掲書、128-29 頁。

³¹⁾ 前掲書、324 頁。

³²⁾ 前掲書、325 頁。

れている。また重要なのは、「緑に灯火」と「黄金の輝き」の本来違うはずの二つの比喻が、遠くを眺める視線、手を差し伸べる仕草を媒介として、ニックによって重ねられているところである。つまりニックは、反復という行為によって両者を同一のものであるように錯覚を誘いながらも、そのずれを差異として語りに取り込むのである。³³⁾

差異／距離を搾取して利潤を生むのがアメリカン・ドリームの根底を支えるメカニズムであるならば、ここにアメリカン・ドリームは最大のジレンマを抱えこむことになる。差異を保ちつづけなければいけないというジレンマを。差異が利潤を生み出し、利潤が差異を消滅させるという一続きの運動は、アメリカン・ドリームの原型ともいべきフロンティアが辿った道筋と一致する。人は利潤を求めてフロンティアを押し上げていった。その結果、フロンティアは消滅してしまう。このことはアメリカン・ドリームを根幹から揺るがす事実であったはずである。オランダ人がマンハッタンを眺める視線の下に伸びている「距離」を保ち続けなければ利潤は生まれず、アメリカン・ドリームというメカニズムはたちまち機能しなくなる。岩井によれば、移動が差異を搾取して利潤を生んでいく一方で、「利潤が差異から生まれるのならば、差異は利潤によって死んでいく。すなわち、利潤の存在は、遠隔地交易の規模を拡大し、商業資本主義の利潤の源泉である地域間の価値の価格の差異を縮めてしまう」。³⁴⁾ そうなると、内部に差異を生み出しそこから利潤を得ようとなるのは必然である。架空の双子の地形、ウェスト・エッグとイースト・エッグは、同じお金持ちのコミュニティーでありながらも、カテゴリーを細分化——すなわち、オールドマネーとニューリッチに細分化——することによって差異を生み出す。しかしながら、遅かれ早かれその差異が搾取し尽くされて消滅してしまうことは皆知っている。

それでは差異を差異のまま保つにはどうすればいいのか——それには、夢の実現を永遠に引き延ばせば良いのだと簡単に言ってみよう。そうなると、欲望を実現することよりも、欲望する主体とその対象の間の差異を保つことが至上命令になり、顛倒がここに生まれる。すなわち、アメリカン・ドリームは実現不可能性によって、更に言えば失敗という結末に支えられなければいけないという逆説を内包することになる。「緑の灯火」に手が届きそうで手が届かない——この永遠に差異を引き延ばす仕草こそが、物理的な利潤はもちろん期待感やときめきといった心理的な利潤を担保し続けるのだ。

このことに一番自覚的であったのは語り手のニックだ。第一次世界大戦後、ヨーロッパから帰還したニックは「中西部」がもはや「世界の心温かき中心 ([t]he warm center of the world)」³⁵⁾ではなくなったと書いていることから、彼がギャツビーに出会うに先立ち、差異の消滅を経験的に知っていたと言える。だからこそ、彼の語りは欲望が実現する手前の段階で、何とか押し留めておこうとする企てでもあったのだ。ニックにとって、ギャツビーが遠くから眺める「緑の灯火」、すなわち過去のデイジーこそが、今そこにいる生身のデイジーよりも欲望を惹起させるものなのだ。ニックは差異が利潤を生むと同時に搾取

³³⁾ 太陽の光が差し込む中、白く浮かぶマンハッタンの姿は、ブキャナン邸のデイジーの姿と重なりと論じたが、両者は共に他者の夢のために——前者は入植者たちによって、後者はトムによって——搾取される存在だと言える。

³⁴⁾ 岩井「ヴェニス商人」67頁。

³⁵⁾ フィッツジェラルド『グレート・ギャツビー』13頁。

され消滅してしまうことを熟知して、巧みに「緑の灯火」が象徴するデイジーと生身のデイジーを引き離して距離を保とうとしている。

「霧さえ出ていなければ、湾の向かいにあなたのうちが見えるんだが」とギャツビーが言った。「お宅の栈橋の先端には、いつも夜通し緑色の明かりがついているね」

デイジーはふいに、彼の腕に自分の腕をからめた。しかしギャツビーは、自分が口にした言葉に深く囚^{とら}われているようだった。その灯火の持っていた壮大な意味合いが、今ではあとかたものなく消滅したことに、自分でもおそらく思い当たったのだろう。デイジーと彼を隔てていた大きな距離に比べれば、その灯火は彼女のすぐ間近に——彼女に触れるくらい間近に——あるものとして見えた。月に対する星ほどに近いものに思えたのだ。しかし今ではもう栈橋の先端についた、何の変哲もない緑色の灯火に戻っていた。彼が魅了されていた事物が、またひとつ数を減らしたわけだ。³⁶⁾

デイジーが彼の夢に追いつけないという事態は、その午後にだって幾度も生じたに違いない。しかしそのことでデイジーを責めるのは酷というものだ。結局のところ、彼の幻想の持つ活力があまりにも並み外れたものだったのだ。それはデイジーを既に凌駕^{りょうが}していたし、あらゆるものを凌駕してしまっていた。³⁷⁾

一番目の引用では、ギャツビーの夢の中にいる過去のデイジーと現実のデイジーに（この場合、時間的な）差異があるからこそ、デイジーには意味があり、ギャツビーの夢を惹起させる力があるのだと、夢の舞台裏をニックは明かしている。続いて二番目の引用では、ニックは、生身のデイジーと、ギャツビーの夢の中に住んでいるデイジーを、全く別のものとして語ることによって、ギャツビーの夢を実現不可能なものとして語り、あらかじめ失敗に終わるように導いている。

但し、ニックが全知の語り手のように振る舞い、ギャツビーの思いを全て熟知しているかの如く語っているが、実際にギャツビーが現実のデイジーに幻滅したということを直接、ニックに語るエピソードもなければ、ギャツビーが明言している箇所はない。むしろ、ニックのデイジーに対する欲望の在り方と一致するのだ。ニックの欲望は生身のデイジーそのものではなく、「声」に対するフェティシズムとして表されている。ニックは生身のデイジーを貶める一方で、彼女の「声」を現実が追いつかない場所へと崇め奉り、両者の間に差異を保ち続けようとする。³⁸⁾ ニックの語りは、言うなれば、ギャツビーの夢——ひいてはアメリカの夢に、実現不可能という瑕疵を埋め込む作業であるのだ。

むすび ポートを早く漕ぎすぎたギャツビー

小説を閉じる最後のニックの言葉は、決して解消されることのない時間的な差異を、現

³⁶⁾ 前掲書、172 頁。

³⁷⁾ 前掲書、177-8 頁。

³⁸⁾ 「なぜならその声だけは、どれほどの夢をもってしても凌駕することのできない特別なものであったからだ。その声はまさしく不死の歌だった」(前掲書、178 頁)。

疵としてアメリカの夢に埋め込む。

だからこそ我々は、前へ前へと進み続けるのだ。流れに立ち向かうボートのように、絶え間なく過去へと押し流されながらも。³⁹⁾

過去へ流されながらも「前へ」——すなわち未来へボートを漕ぐという構図は、過去のデイズという再現不可能なものを希求する仕草の陽画なのである。しかしながら、過去が再現不可能だと一体、誰が決めたというのだろうか。

「彼女にあまり多くを要求しない方がいいんじゃないかな」と僕「ニック」は思い切って言ってみた。「過去を再現することなんてできないんだから」

「過去を再現できないって!」、いったい何を言うんだという風に彼「ギャツビー」は叫んだ。「すべてを昔のままに戻してみせるさ」と彼は言い、決意を込めて頷いた。⁴⁰⁾

「過去は再現できる」というギャツビーの思いこみの強さは、しばしばこの小説で、ギャツビーの過剰さが質に転化する瞬間——「グレート・ギャツビー」の「グレート」が滑稽さから偉大さの形容に転化する瞬間——の一つと言える。デイズの目を引くためだけの過剰な消費、財をなすスピードの過剰な速さ、その圧倒的な過剰さにニックは打たれ、ギャツビーに傾いていくのがこの小説の大枠である。ここでも「過去は再現できる」と言い切るギャツビーの滑稽さは、ある種の偉大さに転化している。⁴¹⁾

過剰なまでの規模と速度で、あらゆる差異を搾取し、利潤を得て、ウエスト・エッグの豪邸に住む「ジェイ・ギャツビー」へと自らをセルフメイドしたギャツビーの周りでは、確かに差異が消滅しつつある。ウエスト・エッグとイースト・エッグの差異も、ギャツビーのパーティのリストに、イースト・エッグの住人が名を連ねていることからわかるように、実際には消滅しかかっているのだ。そして今度は、ニックが巧みなレトリックによって分け隔てていた生身のデイズと過去のデイズの差異は、「過去は再現できる」というギャツビーの思いの過剰さによって消滅しようとしている。ニックが実現不可能という瑕疵を埋め込み、期待感を引き延ばし、保持しようとしたアメリカン・ドリームの、その約束事を破って、ギャツビーは過去へ押し戻そうとする流れを遙かに凌ぐスピードでボートを漕いだ。あと少しのところで「緑の灯火」に手が届きそうであったのだ。

結局、ギャツビーの死によって、「緑の灯火」は実現不可能という瑕疵を内包したアメリカン・ドリームに回収される。そして「緑の灯火」は、ニックにとって期待感を永遠に喚起し続ける装置として光り続けるのである。

³⁹⁾ 前掲書、325-26 頁。

⁴⁰⁾ 前掲書、202 頁。

⁴¹⁾ ここでニックは過去を能弁に語るギャツビーの「感傷性に辟易しながらも」何かを思い出しかける。「何か」は「捉えがたい韻律、失われた言葉の断片」と置き換えられ、それが重要で意味があるという期待感が高められる。しかしながら、結局、それは「意味のつてを失い」、ニックによって永遠に消されてしまうのである（前掲書、204 頁）。

書評

戦後日本の「審級」としての「アメリカ」： 吉見俊哉著『親米と反米——戦後日本の政治的無意識』

(岩波書店、2007 年)

遠 藤 泰 生

はじめに

2001 年 9 月 11 日の「9.11」同時多発テロ直後、アメリカ合衆国（以下、アメリカと略記）に多くの国々が同情を寄せた。しかし 2003 年 3 月、国際世論の十分な支持を得ぬまま同国がイラクとの戦争に突入してからは、「反米」の気運が世界にみなぎった。これは多くのアメリカ国民にとっては予想外のことであったらしい。国際関係論や現代史を専門とするアメリカ人研究者の多くが、世界で自国が嫌われる理由を自問し、「反米」あるいは「反米主義（anti-Americanism）」をテーマとする著作を次々と刊行した。翻訳を含めた「反米」論は日本でも出版の世界を賑わした。保守派の「侮米」論から知米派の「譴米」論まで、その例は枚挙にいとまがない。ただジャーナリスティックな視点から特定地域における「反米」の現状を分析したものを除くと、その中に読み応えのあるものは必ずしも多くはなかった。歴史的視野と客観的な論証を兼ね備えた学術的著作となると、その数はさらに限られる。吉見俊哉が著した『親米と反米——戦後日本の政治的無意識』はその限られた学術書の一冊である。

とは言え、「9.11」後に出版された数多の「反米」論と本書は必ずしも目的を同じくするものではない。『親米と反米』と題されたこの著作は、一見「アメリカ論」を展開するかのそぶりをみせながら、実は、戦後日本社会の分析を第一の目的としている。それが読者を惑わす。そのせいであろうか、『週刊文春』や『望星』に掲載された短いものを除くと、公にされた書評の数が意外に少ない。綴られた逸話の面白さも、本書の主眼を逆に読者に見えにくいものにしているかもしれない。「反米」「親米」の類型的整理が必ずしも鮮明でなく、本書は期待したアメリカ論にはなっていなかったという読後感想を寄せる学生が実際多い。しかし、そうした「反米」「親米」のイメージの整理が本書の目的では全くない。序章の内容をまとめる際に再度指摘するが、吉見がここで試みるのは、「政治的無意識」と彼がよぶ戦後の日本における社会思潮の構造的把握であり、その「無意識」的意識の生成に果たした「アメリカ」の役割の検討である。その検討を経て、アジアに対する日本の帝国主義的な眼差しが戦前から戦後に受け継がれたことを吉見は解明し、「アメリカ」がその引き継ぎを可能とする日本の超自我として作動したことに批判的反省を加えていく。おそらくは心理学からの援用であろうと思われるが、「審級」という言葉で吉見はその「アメリカ」の役割を捉える。もちろん、政治軍事の地政学を踏まえたアジアにおける「反米」の視点を本書から学び取るとは十分に可能であろう。興味深い逸話に溢れた戦後日本の裏の文化史として本書を読むこともできる。しかし、それらの誘惑に抗いながら、戦後日本社会の構築に超自我あるいは「審級」として作動した「アメリカ」を捉えることが、吉見が読者に求める本書の正当な読み方に違いない。以下、各章の内容を概括し

ながら、それを試み、書評者の責を果たすことにする。とは言え、戦後の日本社会に関する社会史的な理解が十全でない評者が行った作業は、書評と呼ぶよりは読書ノートの作成に近いものであったことを始めにお断りしておく。なお、以下で括弧内に示される数字は、当該の議論が記された本書の頁数を示す。

序章 戦後日本は親米社会？

イラク戦争開戦以来の世界各国における「反米」「嫌米」の高まりは我々の記憶に新しい。イスラーム教徒が国民の過半を占める国々での話ばかりでない。2003年3月の段階でフランスやドイツでは80パーセントを超える国民が「ブッシュの戦争」と呼ばれたこの戦争の正当性に疑義を唱え、カナダ、イギリスなどの「親米」国でもアメリカを「嫌い」と感ずる国民の比率が飛躍的に伸びていたという(8)。しかしそうした中で、なぜか日本だけは「親米」が対米基調であり続けた。そのような揺るぎない日本の「親米」意識が近年形成されたものではなく、戦後半世紀以上をかけて醸成されたものであることに吉見はまず注意を促す(11)。その背景に冷戦下におけるアメリカの対アジア政策が横たわることは言うまでもない。例えばアジアにおける経済、軍事のアメリカの橋頭堡の役割を日本と韓国はそれぞれ割り振られた。戦後日本における「親米」の基礎はこの国際政治の文脈の中で培われたと考えなければならない。そこに吉見は日本の戦後主体の構築に介入した超自我、「超越的審級」(16)としての「アメリカ」をまず見出す。さらに大きな問題は、少なくとも日本の場合、そうした「アメリカ」の存在が50年代の半ばを境に構造的な変質を遂げたことにあったという。すなわち、各種のメディアを通じて純化されるアメリカのイメージは、消費の欲望をかき立てる明るく心地よいものばかりとなり、それに反比例して米軍基地が象徴する暗く暴力的なイメージが後景に退いたというのである(15)。日本の例を引くまでもなく、戦後世界に占めた「アメリカ」には様々な相貌があった。軍事基地はたしかにその一つであり、ジャズ、ポピュラー・ミュージックが象徴する音やリズムの解放感、生産性向上運動が代表する経済における効率至上主義、住宅や車が象徴する暮らしの豊かさ、コカコーラ、マクドナルドなどが象徴する食の平準化なども、「アメリカ」の相貌の一つであった。そうした様々の相貌が交差し並走する中で日本人の日常意識を内側から再編していく「超越的な審級」としてアメリカが作動したプロセスを吉見は解明していく。その最終的な目的は何か。吉見は言う、「そのねらいを要約するなら、戦時期までの東アジアにおける日本の帝国主義から、戦後におけるアメリカのヘゲモニーへの、大衆的なまなざしのレベルでの構造的な連続性の解明、これである」、と(17)。ジョン・ダワーの『敗北を抱きしめて』(岩波書店、2000年)が敗戦を契機とする日本の「解放」に力点をおいた著作であったのに対し、アメリカと日本の大衆が同じ敗戦を契機にいかなる「抱擁」関係を結ぶにいたったのか、その「抱擁」の性格を明らかにしようと吉見は努める。

こうした作業はアメリカの国外で展開するアメリカニゼーションの断面を切り取る作業ともなる。アメリカニゼーションの諸側面を、「内的アメリカニゼーション」「境界的アメリカニゼーション」「外的アメリカニゼーション」の三側面に分類し、世界に存在するアメリカの広がりを評者はかつて考察したことがある(油井大三郎・遠藤泰生編『浸透するアメリカ、拒まれるアメリカ——世界史の中のアメリカニゼーション』[東京大学出版

会、2003年] 参照)。そこではアメリカニゼーションの多義性、重層性を指摘するにとどまったが、吉見はさらに踏み込んで、国内外に存在する複数のアメリカ、「アメリカニゼーション」が、実は同一のアメリカ、「アメリカ化」の表裏にほかならず、その構造的把握が政治軍事におけるグローバルな動きと我々が生活のなかで経験する意味や欲望の結びつきを理解する鍵になると考える(26)。言ってみれば、横須賀の原子力空母と浦安のディズニーランドが深いところで分かち難く結びついているのではないかという問題を、吉見は提起しているのである。対抗イメージとして外在化されたアメリカと生活のモードとして内在化されたアメリカとが戦後日本の主体の構築にどのように影響を与えてきたのか、次章以下で、より具体的な考察が始まる。

第一章 アメリカというモダニティ——「自由の聖地」と「鬼畜米英」——

第一章において吉見は、幕末明治期以来の日本におけるアメリカのイメージ、アメリカ理解を概括する。亀井俊介や佐伯彰一らの先行研究を参照しながら行われるこの概括は、知識人から大衆までのアメリカ理解をバランスよく配したものとなっている。

太平洋上での捕鯨船との邂逅から始まる漂流民のアメリカ理解、文明開化のモデルとして福沢諭吉らが掲げたアメリカ理解、さらには自由民権運動家らが日本の体制を批判するための規範として憧れたアメリカ理解から議論は始まる。ただ周知のごとく、これらの理想化されたアメリカと実地に見聞されるアメリカとの間には大きな隔たりがあった。明治中期以降、渡米経験者の数がますにつれそれが鮮明となった。当然、失望を露わにする者の数も増え、「拝米」と「排米」、「親米」と「反米」の二極化が進んだ。皮肉なことに、憧れの対象としてアメリカを内在化、内面化すればするほど、そこから逸脱したアメリカの現実に悲憤の声をあげるのが知識人の常であり、内村鑑三(35)や徳富蘇峰(42)がその最たる例であったという。最初に記した通り、これら明治期、大正期の知識人の対米認識をまとめる吉見の筆致は極めて手際がよい。

ただそのまともに問題がないわけではない。例えば、愛憎半ばする日本の知識人のアメリカ理解が互いにどのような内的連関を有するのか、実はまだ十分な研究がなされていないという問題が研究史上ある。「親米」「反米」「嫌米」「侮米」などの対米認識が特定の個人や集団の中に互いを排除することなく同時に存在する「矛盾」を、研究者は十分に説明せずにいるのである。対米認識と大雑把に呼ばれるものはそれ程に重層的で一貫性を欠く場合があることを認めないと、日本人の対米理解の入り組んだ奥行を我々は掌握しきれない。そうした研究史上の陥穽を本書が十分に補完し得ているとは言えない。例えば、大正期のウィルソン主義の欺瞞を批判する近衛文磨らの対米認識を、「親米」から「反米」への反転の好例として吉見はとりあげている(41-42)。しかし、この「反転」という見方は妥当であろうか。近衛が抱いた「親米」と「反米」における二つの「米」は同一の「米」を指しているのでは必ずしもない。だとすれば、対米認識の反転としてよりは異なる対米認識の併存もしくは衝突の事例としてそれを理解した方が正確ではないだろうか。同じ問題を別の事例で考えてみる。やはり大正期、ウィルソン主義への支持を抱いたものに吉野作造がいる。その吉野の「親米」は、高邁な理想の担い手としての「米」に向けられるが、近衛や蘇峰らの「反米」における「米」が、高邁な理想を掲げる「米」の存在そのものを全否定しているわけではない。むしろ、その理想にも関わらず人種差別や帝国主義的な態

度を改めないアメリカに失望し憤慨していると理解すべきである。であるならば、高邁な理想には共鳴しつつ、人種差別には非難を続けるという意味で、近衛や蘇峰の対米認識においては「親米」と「反米」が同時に存在していると考えた方が正確な理解ではないであろうか。その二つが存在して初めて彼らのアメリカ認識は立体的な奥行きを持つ。こうした「親米」と「反米」の共存関係は、世界の各地における「反米」論と「親米」論の連関を把握するうえで重要な論点だけに、その内容と文脈をさらに注意深く我々は読み取る必要がある。

一方、序章で吉見が注意を促した戦後日本の大衆とアメリカとの「抱擁」「共犯関係」を探るには、知識人のアメリカ論を検討するだけでは不十分なことは論を俟たない。この陥穽を補充する吉見の手腕は、カルチュラルスタディーズの推進者として面目躍如たるものがある。

手始めに吉見は、大正の都市文化に現われたアメリカン・モダニティの検討を始める。明治期以来、日本の大衆はこのアメリカン・モダニティに欲望をかき立てられ、強い憧れを抱いていた。浅草六区の大衆オペラやアメリカ流のヴォードヴィルショーの伝統に繋がる大衆演劇がそのモダニティを先取りした例だという(45)。そうした都市型の娯楽、大衆的アメリカニズムは、ジャズや映画、野球見物などの具体的な形をとって大正期の人々の暮らしに根を下ろし始める。日本における「アメリカ」が変質を遂げるそれが最初の時期と呼べよう。先に挙げた福沢も蘇峰も吉野も、憧れもしくは批判の対象として「アメリカ」を外在化していたのに対し、大正のモダンボーイ、モダンガールが享受したこれらの「アメリカ」は、すでに「われわれ自身の一部」(46)として日本人の暮らしに内在化し始めていたと吉見は考える。そうした「アメリカ」を生活レベルのデモクラシーの事例として称揚する研究はすでに数多く存在する。しかし吉見の炯眼は、東京や大阪に現われたアメリカニズムが、京城、上海、マニラなどのアジア各地にも同時期姿を現し始めていたことを発見し(50)、東アジアとアメリカとの文化関係という大きな枠組みのなかで日米の二国間関係を相対化してみせるところにある。これは従来のアメリカ研究にはなかった視点であり、非常に重要な指摘と評価したい。日本の対米経験を個別の体験としてではなく、20世紀におけるアメリカ体験の一部として理論化することが今強く求められている。吉見の指摘はまさにその要請に応えるものである。

さらにもう一つここで指摘すべきは、谷崎潤一郎の『痴人の愛』に見られるアメリカの存在に関する吉見の考察であろう。自らの性を商品化することで伝統的男性秩序に対抗する視座をあっさりと獲得してしまう『痴人の愛』におけるナオミ。そこに、アメリカに寄託することで日本の伝統社会に対抗するジェンダー・ポリティックスの新たな可能性を吉見は読み取る。生きることの奔放さを尊ぶアメリカの価値観を素直に受け入れた者として、従来のアメリカ研究者もナオミのような女性の出現を肯定的に指摘することが多かった。例えば前掲の亀井も、明治期の女子体育教育などに現われた身体の解放感などに触れつつ、日本における新しい女性像の生成にアメリカが影響を与えてきた点を幾度となく称揚してきた。しかし吉見の考察はそこに留まらない。そうした大衆文化に浸透した解放のモメントとしてのアメリカが、実は明治以来の日本の近代を支えていたもう一つの軸である、天皇制を頂点とする家父長的社会秩序と相互補完的な存在である可能性を吉見は意識しているのである。この論点は、戦前からの日本の帝国主義的な眼差しを戦後補完した

のが、アメリカを「審級」とする日本人の「政治的無意識」であるとする著者の主張にも繋がる重要な論点となる。ただ、評者の理解力の不足を露呈する恐れを顧みずにいうならば、その議論の展開が本書においてはまだ不十分であると思う。いわく、「この種の「下から」の、ナショナルな自己の外部に向けての個人の欲望を開放していくベクトルを含んだ近代は、たしかに天皇を頂点とする家父長的な近代に一見対抗するようでありながら、実のところ両者は互いに補完的な関係を内包していたのではないだろうか」(59)。例えばこの記述は理解が必ずしも容易でない。近代の日本にとって「アメリカはモダニティそのものだったようにも思われる」(58)と、明治大正の日本におけるアメリカの存在を吉見は言いまとめるのだが、要するに、「モダニティ」という言葉自体があまりに広範のことがらを我々に想起させるため、吉見が伝えようとする「アメリカ」の意味がかえって曖昧になってしまっている。戦後の日本をアメリカのヘゲモニーが呪縛できたのは、天皇制とアメリカニズムが戦前から対立していたからではなかったからだ、それらは実は相互補完的であったのだ(60)というのが吉見の主張なのだが、その理論化にはさらに言葉が必要ではないだろうか。ここは従来のアメリカ研究者と吉見の見解が大きく割れる点でもあるだけに、その考察が今後さらに洗練されることを期待する。

第二章 占領軍としての「アメリカ」

戦後の日本とアメリカとの関わりを「占領」の事実を抜きにして考えることはできない。その占領期にどのような日米関係の礎が築かれたのか、一方的な支配服従の関係が強調されたと憤慨するものから、占領を両者の共同作業とみなすもの、さらにはそれが日本の自主的な選択であったとするものまで、さまざまな論考が存在することは周知のとおりである。しかし本章で吉見が企図するのは、占領期に造られたアメリカの表象を通し、あるいはまた逆にアメリカの表象の不在を通し、戦前の日本の「ナショナルな主体」が戦後に引き継がれていく経緯を明らかにすることである。

最初に指摘される興味深い問題は、占領に対する日本人の記憶を象徴する最良の事例とされるマッカーサーの表象が、新聞等のメディアにおいて、占領期厳しく管理され、占領体制の確立とともに逆に後景に退いていった問題である。1945年9月に撮られたマッカーサーと天皇の有名な会見写真の分析から議論は始まる。新たに日本の実質的支配者となったマッカーサーが居丈高に天皇を出迎えた姿を捉えたものとしてこの写真はひろく記憶されているが、写真撮影時に真に緊張していたのはむしろマッカーサーであり、天皇は写真に撮られ慣れていない居心地の悪さを示しているだけではないかと、北原恵らの論を引きながら吉見は疑問を投げかける。では何故この写真のマッカーサーは緊張しているのか。それは、日本国民に占領軍の存在を自覚させてはいけないと彼が過剰に意識しているからだと吉見は考える。むしろ天皇を引き立てることにマッカーサーは腐心していたのだと(69-76)。実際、主要新聞の調査を通して吉見が明らかにしているとおり、日本のメディアにマッカーサーがその姿をさらす頻度は占領が進むにつれて減少し、そのイメージの希薄化に反比例して人間天皇のイメージが前面に押し出されたのだという(79-86)。明治の始め以来天皇に寄託することでしか自己のナショナルな主体を表現してこなかった日本人は、終戦後においても、占領軍の総司令官たるマッカーサーと、その代理を務め始めた人間天皇に寄託する形でしか、新たなナショナルな主体を立ち上げられなかった。マッ

カーサーと天皇の会見写真に読み取るべきは、その問題であると吉見は結論するのである(90-91)。これらの問題の背後に吉見が見据えるのは、何かしらの権威に寄り添わなければ自己のナショナルな主体を表現できない日本の大衆の精神構造であろう。戦後の日本にとってアメリカは「超越的な審級」だったと吉見が指摘していることは既に述べた。人間天皇の表象は占領軍が持つその「審級」のイメージのネガに過ぎないということになる。吉見のこの解釈は刺激的である。その視点を援用すれば、他にも興味深い問題が幾つも浮上する。例えば、小津安次郎の映画を支えた俳優の一人に笠智衆がいる。彼が演じた「父親」は人間天皇のイメージと映像的に重なり合う部分が多いと評者は考えている。フロックコートと山高帽の笠智衆が白黒の画面をゆったりと横切るイメージを思い出してもらえれば、その意味が伝わるだろうか。この推論が正しいとすると、笠智衆演じるところの戦後日本の「父親」は、アメリカの代理的「審級」を映像メディアで演じていたという仮説が生まれる。それはまた、占領期における「アメリカ」の存在が小津という映像作家にどこまで内面化されていたかといった興味深い議論を呼び起こす。「まなざしの構造としては、旧体制からの根深い連続性を残し」(91)「戦前との断絶よりも連続性が際立つ」(93)と吉見がいう戦後日本の「政治的無意識」が、映像文化の領域にまで浸透していたと考えるこの仮説は、日米文化干渉論の論題としてもきわめて魅力的ではないであろうか。

もちろんそうした「審級」としてのアメリカとは異なる、より具体的な存在としてのアメリカの表象も終戦後の日本社会には氾濫した。そのうち吉見がもっとも注目するのは、「パンパン」のイメージ、占領軍の支配を肉体的な次元で実感させる女性の身体表象である。戦後日本で大量に発生した米軍相手の街娼問題やその契機としての特殊慰安施設協会(RAA)の開設については、吉見も指摘する通り、既に数多くの研究がある。例えばジェンダーの権力関係を占領がパラレルに内包することを指摘した有賀夏紀ほかの研究を思い出せばよい。しかし吉見が本章で注目するのは、物質第一主義と消費至上主義が象徴するアメリカニズムの体现者たるパンパンあるいは街娼が、戦前の日本における男性中心の秩序をあっさりとは転覆させた構図であり、その構図をさらに逆転させる戦後の主体は誰であったのかという問題である。「アメリカ」への消費的欲望を体现し、一般男性には手の届かない豊かな生活物資を獲得する者として、彼女たちは占領のある時期たしかに羽振りを利かせた。けれども、占領体制の終結とともに、占領軍に暴力的に汚された悲劇的な女性という特殊な意味を彼女たちは付与されるようになり、それを慨嘆することでナショナルな主体を回復する男性社会の周縁的存在へと押しやられていった。そこに、「アメリカ」を媒介とするもう一つの戦後主体の構築を吉見は読み取る。男性編集者の意図的編集が際立つという『日本の貞操』(1953年)の読解に、ナショナルな主体の構築とジェンダー・ポリティクスを交錯させるこれらの議論(107-12)は、大衆文化の細部にまで「親米」「反米」の綾を読み取る吉見の卓越した力量を伝え、スリリングですらある。アメリカをめぐる表象が一つの時代のなかで複雑かつ重層的に絡み合っていたことをここでも吉見は見事に描き出している。

第三章 米軍基地と湘南ボーイ

社会に刻まれた「アメリカ」の残像を切り口に戦前の日本と戦後の日本との連続性を明らかにしようとする意図が本章にはある。それが最も鮮明に表れているのが第三章ではないだろうか。従来のアメリカ研究などでは十分に掘り下げられることがなかった、アメリ

カの軍事基地の戦後日本における軌跡を追うことで吉見はそれを行っている。より具体的には、東京周辺の都市景観や若者の風俗などの変貌を基地文化の所産として取り上げ、分析していく。

今現在も日本には100を超える米軍施設が存在し、約5万人におよぶ兵が駐留しているという(117)。その記述に我々が驚くとすれば、第一の理由は、その規模に見合った存在感を米軍が醸し出していないことにある。しかし米軍のその不在感こそが問題だと吉見は考える。戦後日本における米軍基地の問題の根底には、戦前の日本軍の存在を受け継ぐ形で増強を重ねた米軍が、ある時期を境にその存在を後景化させつつ、他方では日本人の欲望をかきたてる消費文化を撒き散らし、姿を見せない「アメリカ」として生活の隅々にその残像を刻印している問題がある。そう吉見は考える。なるほど、占領期における銀座界隈の米軍施設をめぐる逸話や、原宿や六本木がアメリカ風の街並みを整えた経緯、横須賀や沖縄のコザに芽生えた日本のジャズやロックの盛衰の歴史、それらを詳述しながら、米軍基地の存在が日本の都市景観、大衆芸能にどれだけ大きな影を落としているかを吉見は説得力をもって語っている。原宿や六本木のモダンが米兵相手の商売に始まるものであり、さらに遡れば、代々木の練兵場や麻布界隈に存在した憲兵隊本部、近衛歩兵連隊の存在につながるなど、本書を読むまで評者も詳しくは知らずにいた(127)。それらの逸話だけでも興味深いのだが、例えばその話が現在の湘南カルチャー全般の淵源にまでおよび、茅ヶ崎や藤沢周辺が米軍演習のビーチであった事実まで知らされると、若い読者などしばし唖然とせざるを得ない。石原裕次郎からサザン・オールスターズのカッコ良さの源もそうした基地文化に行きつくことを示唆されれば(147)、暴力としての米軍の基地文化が消費の対象に振じれ返った戦後日本の文化景観にある種のおぞましさを覚え始める。実際学生と本書を読む際に、多くの者が一定の不快感を示すのがこの章の記述であり、意識せずに親しみ馴染んできた東京周辺のアメリカな景観の多くが、その起源を基地文化に持つという事実にはほとんどの学生が衝撃を受ける。学生が示す無知ゆえのその驚きを、吉見はむしろ期待しているのであろうか。反基地運動の対象となりうる「暴力」としての基地文化と横須賀や福生などで「欲望」の対象へと商品化された基地文化が、同一のアメリカの表裏であること、そして、50年代を境にその二つの分離が静かに進み、やがては前者、すなわち「暴力」の主体としての基地の記憶が希薄化していく歴史を、たんと、けれども執拗に吉見は綴っていく。村上龍『限りなく透明に近いブルー』(1976年)などの小説によってひろく知られ、これは吉見もまだ指摘していないが、近年では山田詠美『風味絶佳』(2005年)などにその深化したイメージが描かれる米軍の基地文化に長いこと我々は晒されてきた。その影響下で我々の生活空間が変遷を余儀なくされた事実改めて目を見開かされる。それを促す本章の記述を率直に評価したい。またそれと同時に、村上や山田が作品に描く、深層に沈んだ「アメリカと日本の混住」(158)のイメージに、生理的嫌悪を示す学生が実は少なくないことをあらためて付言しておこう。それほどに、我々の文化の深層にアメリカは根を下ろしており、それを突かれることへの不安や反発が若者の中にある。その事実を深刻に私は捉えたい。我々の暮らしに降り積もった戦後日本のアメリカニゼーションの断片を一つ一つ掘り起こし、明らかにする気持がなければ、日米関係の拠って立つ足元を確認することもできはしないからである。そうした意味で、本章での吉見の目論見には全面的な支持を表明する。

第四章 マイホームとしての「アメリカ」

戦後日本のアメリカニゼーションの広がりや奥行きを測るのに、大衆の間に浸透したアメリカンホームのイメージに着目する研究は多い。1949年から51年にかけて朝日新聞に掲載された4コマ漫画『ブロンディ』の内容を分析した論考などその最たる例であろう。滝田佳子や岩本茂樹の研究をここでは思い出せばよい。マイホームとしての「アメリカ」に付与された意味と機能に吉見も強い関心を寄せ、50年代、60年代におけるその系譜を本章で細かくたどっていく。しかしアメリカンホームのイメージの伝播などに議論の主眼はない。吉見の議論の焦点は、アメリカのまなざしの中で「家庭」という新たなナショナルな空間を立ち上げた戦後日本の社会思潮にある。その意味で、憧れや豊かさの象徴としてのアメリカを強調する多くの戦後日米文化論と吉見の議論は一線を画す。しかし、そこには十分な説得力がある。

そもそも占領期の日本で人々が「アメリカ」を最も具体的に経験したのが、アメリカンホームであり、住宅であった。吉見の議論はそこから始まる。現在の代々木公園にかつて存在した広大なワシントンハイツや三宅坂のパレスハイツ、練馬区成増にあったグラントハイツなど、豊かさの見本とも言うべき米軍関係者の住宅は東京のあちこちに存在した。主に時代小説家として知られる山本一力の作品に『ワシントンハイツの施風』（2003）といったある種の青春風俗小説があり、そこにアメリカ人家族の豊かな生活ぶりが活写されていることなど、ここで想起してもよい。この米軍関係の住宅需要を満たすために日本の住宅産業は戦後新たな技術を学び、日本の資材を用いたアメリカン・ウェイ・オブ・ライフの創出に力を注いだという（165）。日本における「アメリカ」のローカリゼーションの一例ということになるだろうか。その逸話自体がまず十分に面白い。しかしもちろん、家庭が体现するアメリカン・ウェイ・オブ・ライフのイメージを日本人に刷り込む最大の力となったのは、新聞に掲載された先に触れた『ブロンディ』であり、アメリカ製のホーム・ドラマの数々であった。戦後日本社会が追い求めるべきモデルとしての「アメリカ」を最も具体的に表象したのがそれらに描かれたアメリカンホームの数々であり、そのアメリカンホームの獲得に50年代、60年代の日本人は邁進したのである。ここまでの議論はあるいは旧聞に属すといってもよいだろう。吉見の議論の独自性はむしろそこから先にある。すなわち、アメリカのまなざしの中で自己の主体を再構築する戦後日本人の姿がここに再び透けて見えると吉見は考えるのである。家庭の電化こそが生活の民主化を推し進める最良の手段であり、その担い手たる主婦こそが新たな国民として主体化される存在であったという分析は、とくに説得力がある（193）。アメリカンホームの夢を受け入れることが日本の生活の民主化に繋がると多くの人が捉えた。しかしそれは、アメリカに寄託する形で自己を構築して見せる、ある視点からみればきわめて植民地主義的な受け身の行為であり、言い換えれば、占領期におけるマッカーサーと天皇との「共犯関係」が、豊かな生活の探求という形をとって60年代の日本に沁み渡ったことを意味するにすぎない。そう吉見は分析する。この結論に至る吉見の考察はたしかに新しい（206）。ただ、政治の領域における日米の「抱擁」と生活文化における日米の「抱擁」を文字通り抱き合わせて結論を導くこのくだりには、若干の不安も覚える。あらためて指摘するまでもなく、アメリカニゼーションという言葉で語られる事象には様々の側面がある。そこには例えば、政治の民主化

の側面もあれば、生活の科学技術化の側面もある。そのため、アメリカニゼーションを十分に細分化して捉えずに称賛あるいは非難すると、そこに含まれる次元の異なる社会の変容を、まとめて称賛あるいは非難することになりかねない。言葉を換えて述べよう。戦後日本の家庭電化の試みが、吉見が指摘する意味での「アメリカニゼーション」の試みであったときっぱり言い切る自信が評者にはないのである。それが「アメリカンホーム」という表象を伴って推進されたことは事実であろう。吉見が引く多くの宣伝文句がそれを証明している（189-90）。しかし、その「アメリカンホーム」の「アメリカ」が占領期以来の例えばマッカーサーが表象した「アメリカ」と同義の「アメリカ」であるのか否か、評者にはまだ分からない。生活の利便を象徴するもう少し普遍的な意味での「アメリカ」が「アメリカンホーム」の「アメリカ」であったという議論は成立しないのであろうか。マッカーサーの「アメリカ」とアメリカンホームの「アメリカ」を同一に捉えることの研究上の功罪は何にあるだろうか。これらの問いに答えるのに今しばらく時間をかけたいと評者は思う。グローバルな政治軍事の地政学と人々の暮らしを上部構造と下部構造のような構図に分けて理解しないことが本書の狙いだと吉見は強調するだけに（26）、その議論に首肯したい気持ちもある。しかし、「親米」「反米」「嫌米」「恨米」と、世界で語られる「米」の存在はあまりに多層的、多義的であり、それらは同一の個人や集団内に矛盾しつつも否定し合うことなく併存できる。その可能性をこの書評では既に述べた。同じ問題をここでも指摘しておきたい。

終章 「親米」の越え方——戦後ナショナリズムの無意識——

幕末明治期の日本の知識人にとってアメリカは理想のモデルとして存在した。その意味で当時のアメリカは日本にとっての「外なる」アメリカと言えた。しかし、大正昭和に入るにつれ、理念上の憧れとしてばかりでなく、暮らしに快楽をもたらす具体的な存在としてのアメリカが現れ始めた。それはもはや「内なる」アメリカと呼ぶべきものであった。そうした「内なる」アメリカがより深く、強く、日本人の間に根を下ろすのは、戦後の占領期以降のことになる。本書の議論の大半は、その戦後の日本における「内なる」アメリカの成長を幾つかの局面に分けてたどったものであった。例えば、マッカーサーを中心とするアメリカの眼差しに寄託する形で戦後、新たに国民が自己を表現し始めたこと（2章）、戦後の東京の都市景観や原宿、六本木、湘南などに生まれた大衆文化が実は米軍基地の影響を強く受けており、占領の終了とともに基地の暴力性が後景に退くことで現代に受け継がれるファッションとなったこと（3章）、アメリカのマイホームを豊かで民主的な生活の理想ととらえた結果、アメリカの眼差しによって縁取られた生活空間の中で戦後日本の家庭が形成されることになったこと（4章）、等々が「内なる」アメリカの具体例として各章に綴られている。しかし終章で綴られるのは、「平和」と「繁栄」の獲得とともに進んだその「内なる」アメリカとの共存、「共犯関係」は、戦前におけるアジア諸国への帝國的態度を温存して初めて可能となったものであり、その結果醸成された戦後日本の「親米」を越えることこそが日本の取るべき道ではないという、吉見の大きな問いかけである。

もちろんアメリカと戦後日本との「抱擁」関係を問い直す「反米」が、50年代、60年代の日本に現われなかったわけではない。冷戦下の国際政治の力学の中で展開された共産

党を中心とした「反米」がその一つであり、もっと直接的には、基地の存在に抵抗する農民らの大衆運動を伴った「反米」が存在した。それらの「反米」には、民族ナショナリズムの色合いが共通して存在した。日本の国土がアメリカの植民地主義によって「犯されている」という主張がどの「反米」にも顕著だったのである（214）。しかし、朝鮮戦争が生み出す戦時特需で経済が潤い、60年代安保闘争が終息していくなかで、いずれの「反米」も広く国民の支持を取り付ける力を失っていった。その中で、アメリカとの「共犯関係」により日本が獲得したアジアにおける地位を、同じアジアに対する加害者責任を自覚することで乗り越える可能性を示したのは、65年に結成されたベ平連の「インタナショナルイズム」ではなかったかと吉見は評価する（221）。鶴見俊輔、良行らがとらえたベ平連に象徴される「反米」が、戦前以来の日本のアジアに対する帝國的態度の払拭を可能とし、戦後日本の「無意識」に根を下ろした「親米」を越える一つの有用な道筋を示すと吉見は捉えるのである。「基地」の暴力を伴って日本に沁みわたった「アメリカ」が主導するグローバルな帝国秩序から日本が脱却する必要を強調して、吉見は議論を結ぶ（235）。自己の存在を透明な膜のように包むアメリカの存在を感じ取っている者は多からう。その膜を破る知的勇気を持つことへの呼びかけと本章を読んだ。その呼びかけそのものへの疑問はない。ただ、ナショナルな主体の構築をアメリカ抜きに行った場合の可能性とリスクについて評者はもう少し学びたいと考える。あらためて指摘するまでもなく、国際政治における日本の自律と対米自律とは必ずしも同義ではないからである。

終わりに

書評の結びに私見を短く述べておきたい。世界各国で展開される「反米」「親米」の議論を分析することの意味は複数ある。アメリカの特定の外交政策や個別の政治家に対する一過性の「反米」や「親米」を追うとすれば、それは国際政治の分析であり、近未来の外交指針の模索といった意味合いを強めよう。一方、ある程度の年月にわたる特定集団の対米認識を定式化しようと試みれば、それはむしろ「反米主義」「親米主義」の研究といった性格を帯びてくる。例えば近藤健『反米主義』（2008年）とともに、吉見の議論は後者の系譜に入れることができる。そして他の「反米主義」「親米主義」の研究が行ったのと同様、多層的、重層的に存在するアメリカ理解を群像として描き、アメリカが戦後日本のアイデンティティの形成にどのような役割を果たしたのかを鮮やかに描いてみせた。彼が導きだした結論は、戦後の日本においては、ナショナルな主体が再構築させる際の「審級」としてアメリカが作動したというものであった。しかしそれ故に、アジアに対する帝國的な眼差しが戦前から戦後へと日本に温存されることとなった。さらに、「審級」としてのアメリカがその姿を後景化させるにともない、その眼差しに潜む暴力性に日本人は無自覚になった。そのことへの批判的反省が本書を貫く。

吉見の豊かな記述に身を任せ、時にその分析に共感し、時に留保をつけながら、小文を綴ってきた。ただ既に述べたように、そもそも「反米」「親米」は必ずしも一貫した体系を備えた思想などではなく、一人の人間、一つの集団のなかに、同時並行的に存在する矛盾に満ちた情念にも近いものだと評者は考えている。そうした情緒的な反応をとりわけアメリカ合衆国が世界中の人々に呼び起こすことこそが問題なのである。同国の世界大の存在を理解するには、その理由を問わないわけにはいかない。この問題自体はおそらくはア

メリカ研究者を自認する者たちが立ち向かうべき問題であり、吉見が一人で解決しなければならぬ問題ではない。戦後の日本においてもナショナルな主体を立ち上げる媒介として「アメリカ」が機能した事実を炙り出した時点で、本書の価値は既に十分に定まっている。吉見がまだ議論していない「親米」「反米」ももちろん存在する。例えば、空気のように存在する無自覚な「親米」とは異なる確信的「親米」も、50年代、60年代の日本では強い力を持っていたろう。冷戦の只中であっただけに、その存在は小さくなかったはずである。科学技術や生命倫理の領域において世界を先導するアメリカを人類の先鋭として支持する「親米」も日本には根強い。逆に絶対平和主義からの「反米」やフェミニズムの視点からの「反米」も日本には存在する。幕末明治期以来の日本の知識人にとってそうであったように、アメリカ合衆国が放つ訴求力は存在と当為の二つの側面から、いまだに日本人を誘惑し、反発させる。「親米」「反米」はその合衆国の訴求力をめぐる無限の語りと考えられよう。早急な判断を下すことなく、それに粘り強く耳を傾けることが人類史における「アメリカ」の広がりを把握することに繋がる。「親米」「反米」研究の成熟はそうした作業の後にしかもたらされ得ないのではないだろうか。少なくともその一つの道筋を日本とアジアに関し示唆した小さな大作として、あらためて吉見の著書を評価したい。それにしても、戦後の日本に対しアメリカが果たしたと吉見が指摘する「超越的な審級」の役割は、他国においても見出すことができるのであろうか。仮にそれが世界中に遍在するとして、それが作動する条件に共通の要素を認めることは可能であろうか。ドイツ、フランス、韓国、イスラーム諸国などを含めた、世界における「反米」「親米」の比較研究が待たれる。また、戦後の日本が内に抱えた「審級」は果たしてアメリカだけであったのだろうか。ロシアや中国の役割はどうであつたろう。対米認識はそれら諸外国への眼差しと無関係に自律して生まれ得るものではない。これらの問題を踏まえつつ「親米」「反米」の考察をさらに深めたい。

渡辺利雄著『講義アメリカ文学史—— 東京大学文学部英文科講義録』（全3巻）

（研究社、2007年）

伊 藤 章

欲張りな読者が一国の文学史の書物に望むものとは、一体どういうものであろうか。まず、作家と作品を年代順に配列し、解説しただけのものではなく、その国の文学の歴史を、すなわち起源から現在へ至る生成のプロセスを、独自の歴史観のもとに叙述してほしい。そのうえで、ほかの国や地域とは異なる文学的な特徴を提示してもらいたい。文学の歴史のみならず、社会の姿が浮き彫りになるような社会史でもあり、思想の発展の歴史でもあるようなものであってほしい。無論のこと、歴史的、社会史的、思想的でありながら、それ以上に文学的でもあるようなものであってほしい。作家と作品についての単なる印象や解説を超えた、文学批評を縦横に実践してもらいたいのである。

読者の望みはつきない。作家の伝記的情報もほしいし、代表作の粗筋もほしい、解説もほしい、作品の価値評価もほしい。作品は作品が生まれた歴史的コンテクストのなかに位置づけてもらいたい。と同時に、永遠の相のもとに論じてほしい。文学の流れを過去から現在まで記述するにとどまらず、主だった文学的伝統と文学運動に言及してもらいたい。時代を超えて作家間に共通するテーマやモチーフ、傾向を拾いあげ、ある作家のある作品が、先行するどの作家のどの作品に影響されているのか、逆に、ある作品がのちの作品にどのような影響を及ぼしたのか、作品間の影響関係にも目を配ってほしい。最終的には、ある作家なり作品なりが文学的伝統のなかでどのような位置を占めるのか、ようするに傑作はどれであり、主要作家は誰なのか、という問題にも勇気をもって踏み込んでもらいたい。そしてなにより、啓蒙的なものであると同時に、読み物として一気に読み通すことができるような、読者を飽きさせない工夫も凝らしてほしい。読者は、学生や一般読者であれ、専門家であれ、面白くてためになるものを望んでいるのである。

さて、こうした贅沢な望みをほとんどすべて叶えた文学史が、渡辺氏の『講義アメリカ文学史』全3巻である。以下、3巻計1500頁近くある大著執筆の契機と著者の狙いを紹介し、本文学史が類書と異なる点はどこあるのか、どの点で優れているのか、どういう工夫がなされているのか、評者が二度、三度と（飽きもせず）読み通して気づいた点、感心した点、共感した点などを指摘したい。

本書は、氏が東京大学文学部で約15年間担当した通年の授業、「米文学史概説」の講義ノートに基づいて書き下ろした文学史である。したがって、よくある共同執筆ではなく、ひとりの視点からアメリカ文学全体を眺めた文学史となっている。氏は、本書のもととなった（なんと）1時間40分もあるこの授業を毎年30回近く、3年を周期に、1年目は南北戦争まで、2年目は第2次世界大戦後まで、3年目は1950年代以降というように、繰り返してきたという。氏によれば、「文学者の伝記、作品の表題、粗筋、発表年、文学史上の位置などの基本的事実とともに、それぞれの文学者、作品の現代的な意義や、魅力

を特殊講義のように少し時間をかけて論じる」(I, iii)というのが狙いであった。受講者のなかには、英文学科のアメリカ文学を専攻する学生だけではなく、教職関係の必修科目として他学科の学生も履修していたということなので、すべての学生に満足感を覚えさせる授業にするには、難しい面もあったに違いない。授業を面白くするための工夫のひとつとして、氏は英文の抜粋を読んで、解説するというのを毎回試みた。文学の魅力に触れるためには、1頁程度の抜粋でも原文を読んでみるのが、一番の近道であるという氏の常日頃の信念もあってのことである。

授業におけるこうした狙いと工夫を活かし、実際に講義を受講しているような臨場感を残したまま、専門家の通読にも堪えるように、質量とも充実させたのが今回の書物である。文学研究者なら、いずれは文学史の本を執筆したいと思わないではないだろうが、共同執筆ならまだしも、文学史を(しかもこれほどの大作を)単独で著すという冒険を完遂することができたのは、15年以上も文学史の授業を担当してきたことが直接の契機となっている。それ以上に、アメリカ文学研究者として常に第一線で活躍してきた氏の30有余年に及ぶキャリアの蓄積によるところも大きいだろう。その意味では、氏のアメリカ文学研究の集大成でもあり、総決算でもある。結果的には、斉藤勇『アメリカ文学史』(1941年)、大橋健三郎・斉藤光・大橋吉之輔編『概説アメリカ文学史』(1975年)に続く(いやそれらを凌駕した)、最新の本格的な文学史として出色の仕上がりとなっている。

内容上の特徴として、まず、従来のアメリカ文学史では無視されるか、あまり論じられなかった作家を取りあげている。インディアン捕囚物語のメアリー・ローランドソン(第12章)、18世紀のセンチメンタル小説のウィリアム・ブラウンとスザンナ・ローソン、ハナ・フォスター(第15章)、ケイト・ショパン(第41章)。文学研究の新しい潮流を反映するように、ネイチャー・ライティング(第76章)を取りあげ、先住民とマイノリティ作家も扱う(第81章)。最近のアメリカ文学史やアンソロジーでは黙殺されるか、軽視されている作家も忘れない(第16章「チャールズ・ブロックデン・ブラウン」、第40章「シンクレア・ルイス」)。きちんと文学史的な位置付けと評価を行い、忘却の淵から掬いあげようとする。

大衆文学やベストセラー作家にも目配りを怠らない。第27章「ハリエット・ビーチャー・ストウ」、第28章「ルイザ・メイ・オールcott」、第36章「ホレイショー・アルジャー」、第86章「ジョン・アーヴィング」。しかもありきたりな読み方はしない。最近の批評動向をしっかりと押さえた議論を展開する。たとえば、ストウを論じた章では、女性のほうが「社会的な利害関係に制約されていないだけに、奴隷制度の究極的な悪を批判する視点をもつことができるのではないか。ストウは女性の領域は家庭であるという神話を否定し、女性による社会変革という意味で、フェミニズム思考に先鞭をつけたと評価できるだろう」(I, 404)と結ぶのである。オールcottを論じた章でも、彼女が *Little Women* の光り輝く少女像から想像されるのとは正反対の「影」の部分も見つめた作家でもあったことを明らかにしようとする。そして「従来肯定されてきた、女性の家庭的な面こそ、むしろ、社会が女性に投げかける『影』であり、女性は『仮面』をかぶって生きてきたのではないか」とじつに恐ろしいことをおっしゃり、つづけて「オールcottの生涯、作品は時代に先駆けてそのことを示している」(I, 418)と評価するのである。ストウとオールcottへの最大の讃辞であろう。

ジャンルも、小説、詩、演劇、その他の散文（日記、歴史書、自伝など）、批評と、アメリカ人の多岐にわたる文学的営為を取りあげようとする。しかも緻密な解釈にもとづき、けっして流行の批評におもねることはしない。研究者であれば、得手不得手があるものなのに、散文が専門のはずの氏は、詩人と劇作家にも立ち向かう。たとえば、第2巻の後のほうに、フロストからスティーヴンス、パウンド、ウィリアム・カーロス・ウィリアムズと4人の詩人、最後に、オニールからウィリアムズ、ミラーと3人の劇作家を並べる。そして切れ味鋭い、解釈を展開するのである。国民に敬愛されたフロストの暗い影の部分に焦点を当てたフロスト論は秀逸である。散文の専門家で、これほど詩がわかる研究者はちょっといないだろう。いや、研究社の『英米文学辞典』や『20世紀英語文学辞典』で、かなりの数のアメリカ詩人も担当していることから、氏はアメリカ詩の専門家でもあるのだ。劇作家を扱った3章でもそう。それぞれの個性を要領よくコンパクトにまとめる手腕は見事である。ときに、演劇の専門家でも気づかないような鋭いコメントが挿入される。たとえばミラーの章に「哀れな声で泣きながら轟音とともに自爆する虚ろなセールスマンの死」というサブタイトルが付いているが、これは渡辺氏が『セールスマンの死』にT. S. Eliotの“The Hollow Man”のエコーを聞き取っているからだ。この文学的センスに脱帽。

取りあげられた作家の陣容を見て、白人男性作家中心主義が色濃いと批判するのはやさしい。たとえば第2巻、独立した章を与えられている作家26人中、女性はショパンとウォートン、キャザーのわずか3人、比率にして11.5%でしかない。これでは、近年目覚ましい、フェミニズム文学批評による女性作家の見直しの成果が活かされていないのではないかと思うが、それを埋め合わせるかのように、ウォートンの章では、一枚岩ではない多様なフェミニズム文学批評の概略を試みるほか、多数のフェミニズム批評家によるウォートン論を紹介する。その上で「20世紀初頭、アメリカでは、創作活動は男性の領域とされ、女性はまだ『自分自身の文学』をもたなかった。そうした時代の女性文学者の先駆者、それが歴史的なウォートンの姿であった」（218）と結ぶのである。同様に、黒人文学への言及が少ないうちにみえるかもしれない。しかし、第51章「リチャード・ライト」では、短いけれども要を得た、アメリカにおける黒人文学の歴史を挿入し、その長い豊かな歴史と伝統を紹介してくれる。ただ、ベロー以前のアメリカのユダヤ系作家の前史にあたるものがどこかの章に挿入されていればよかったか。

本書の構成上の特徴として、大作家でも、ひとりの作家を1回の講義で紹介する、しかもその作家の代表作のうち、ひとつを重点的に解説するということがあげられる。各章の工夫として、すべての章に、内容を的確にまとめたサブタイトルが付いているし、各セクションにも小見出しがついている。たとえば、第8章のエドワード・テイラーを扱った章のサブタイトルには、「20世紀に発見されたピューリタン時代最大の詩人」とあり、各セクションの見出しは、「200年も大学図書館の書庫に眠っていた聖職者の詩の原稿」「正統的なピューリタニズムの教義を守る」「大胆な象徴性ゆえにイギリスの形而上詩人に通じる詩風」「神の存在を身近に感じる顕現の神秘体験」「自らの汚れた存在、罪の重みを告白する」「ヨブの苦難と忍耐を思わせる神との和解、神への感謝」と内容を簡潔に要約したものとなっていて、親切である。

アメリカ文学史によくあるような、文学運動や思潮傾向、年代によってまとめるという体裁をとらず、主要作家に1章ずつ与えるという作家第一主義はともすれば、作家に序列をつけない悪しき相対主義につながるように思えるが、そうではない。紙数を割かず、さらにと済ます作家もいれば、倍以上の分量を割く作家もある。ここから、著者なりの評価を読み取ることができる。たとえば第1巻では、キャプテン・ジョン・スミスに7頁しか割かないのに対し、ソローやホーソーン、メルヴィル、ポー、ホイットマンには20頁以上を割いている。これに続くのはフランクリンとディキンソンである。第2巻では、全3巻のなかでも最大の紙数29頁を割いているのはマーク・トウェインであり、つづいてヘンリー・ジェイムズ、フォークナー、ウォートンと続く。現代作家を扱った第3巻はまだ評価が定まっていないということもあって、メイラーからオースターまでほぼ同じ分量が与えられている。それでも、2割程度紙数の多いのは、サリンジャーとカポーティ、マラマッド、ナボコフである。

作家第1主義だと、重要な文学運動や批評動向の解説が不十分になりそうだと思うが、そうではない。いくつもの章にうまく織りこもうとする。たとえば、第37章、フランク・ノリスとステイヴン・クレインのふたりを扱った章。ヨーロッパの自然主義とアメリカの自然主義を比較し、アメリカの自然主義の特徴を浮き彫りにするという作業を前段できっちり行う。そして、次章のドライサーにうまくつなげてゆく。あるいは、20世紀中葉のサザン・ルネッサンスの概説は、第57章のウィリアムズ論と第66章のマッカーズ論に収められている。ビート・ジェネレーションについては、第79章のケルアック論で言及される。1960年代のカウンターカルチャー運動については、第82章のキーザー論のなかで、1970年代から80年代にかけてのミニマリズムの文学傾向については、第87章のカーヴァー論のなかで、というように万事抜かりがない。無い物ねだりをすれば、ストウの章で、あるいは独立した章を立てて、サラ・オーン・ジュエットとメアリー・ウィルキンス・フリーマンに代表されるニューイングランドのローカル・カラー文学について触れて欲しかったと思わないでもない。

主要作家に独立した1章を与え、各章が読み切りで完結しているので、他の章とうまくつながらないように思えるかもしれないが、そうではない。いつでも他の作家との影響関係に目を配り、個々の作家を論ずるに際し、同時代の作家や資質を共有する作家と比較するのである。そればかりか、アメリカ文学全体を眺め渡して、鳥瞰的な眼差しのもとに文学史的な位置づけを試みようとする。その結果、どんな章においても、それ自体で小さくまとまることがなく、他の章と響きあっている。

たとえば、第13章でベンジャミン・フランクリンを論じたあと、次の章では、ジョナサン・エドワーズを論じるというように、時代を代表する、ふたりの典型的かつ対照的な人物像が、1回の読みきりではなく、2回連続でバランスよく、つながっている贅沢さ。第39章アンダソンと次のルイスの章もそう。比較することによって、作風の違い、個性の相違を明らかにし、本質を切り取る——「アンダソンのほうは、アメリカ社会の特定の時代、地域の問題を扱っていながら、人間のより普遍的な真実を捉えているように思われ、時代を超えて読み継がれてゆく。その点、ルイスの文学には時代的な制約があることは否定できない」(II, 174)。第43章のキャザー論であれば、同じく中西部を題材にする同時代作家のルイスとの比較からはじまるし、第47章のフォークナー論も、ヘミングウェイ

エイと比較することからはじまる。第72章のロスと次のアップダイクの章もそう。「物質的、経済的にある程度豊かな生活が保証されたアメリカの中産階級、小市民の精神的に不毛な生活を題材に、現代アメリカの社会状況」(III, 200)を描いている、ふたりの作家が対比されることで、それぞれの作家の個性がより鮮明に浮かびあがるのである。

複数の章が有機的に結びつくと、単行本を読んでいるような充実感を生み出す場合もある。たとえば、第20章のエマソンからソーロー、ホーソーン、メルヴィル、ポー、ホイットマンへと続く章。もちろん各章それだけで自立した読み物として読むことができるが、これら6章はたがいに越境しあい、木霊を呼び交わし、総体をなしている。第1巻のなかでもとりわけ秀逸な部分かもしれない。同じような統一感が、「失われた世代」を扱った、第45章ヘミングウェイからフィッツジェラルド、フォークナー、ドス・パソスに続く4章にもみられる。単独でも読み応えのある論を展開しているうえに、それが4章も続いて、あたかも1冊の研究書を読んだような充実ぶりである。第70章ベローからマラマッド、ロスのユダヤ系を扱った3章と、ロスの同時代作家のアップダイクを扱った計4章も、連続講義として成功しており、第3巻の白眉である。第80章のヴォネガットからキージー、ヘラーと、60年代の若者に圧倒的に支持された作家を扱った3章も、60年代の時代風潮の適切な解説もあいまって、負けてはいない。この3巻本には一体何十冊の本が詰まっていることか。

鳥瞰的な眼差しといえば、たとえば、ジョナサン・エドワーズの章。「人間の内に潜む悪の要素にメスを入れるとともに、人間と超越者との関係や、人間の自由意志と宿命の問題などを論じ、[ブラウンからホーソーン、メルヴィル、ポーを経て、ジェイムズやアダムズ、フォークナー、カポーティ、ピンチオンにつながる]アメリカ・ロマン主義伝統の始祖ともいうべき存在となった」(I, 156)とアメリカ文学総体を俯瞰した評価をあたえる。あるいは、近年評価が下がるばかりのハウエルズの章。「人生のより微笑ましい側面」のみに目を向けた退屈な文学者ではなかったことを検証したのちに、「彼のこうした社会批判、抗議精神は、このあとHamlin Garland, Stephen Crane, Theodore Dreiser, Sinclair Lewis, John Dos Passos, John Steinbeckなど、社会意識の強い文学者によって継承されてゆく」(II, 44)としかるべき位置づけをおこなう。また、エマソンの影響をさまざまな作家や文学運動に見出そうとするところは、この文学史の特徴のひとつであろう。リアリズムを論じた章でも、エマソンの影響を指摘しているし、ノリスやクレインなど自然主義の文学者にも彼の影響を聴き取ろうとする。

博覧強記の著者であることから、いままで知らなかったこと、あるいは気にも留めなかったが教わってよかったと思うことを本書からたくさん学ぶことができる。たとえば、Captain John Smithのキャプテンが船長ではなく、陸軍大尉という意味であることを、氏は伝記的事実から明らかにしてくれる。あるいは、フランクリンの*The Way to Wealth*が最初は*Father Abraham's Speech*として出版され、死後に現在の表題になったこと。あるいは、一口知識に類するものではあるが、クレヴクールというフランスの家名が英語で“broken heart”という意味であること。詩人ウィリアム・カーロス・ウィリアムズのミドルネームは、母親がプエルトリコ系であったからだということなど。こうしたことは些細かもしれないが、ひとつひとつの事実を明らかにしないではすまない徹底した探求心は

見習いたいものだ。

オコナーの章に、彼女のわずか1篇の短篇を翻訳するにも、氏はほとんどすべての作品に目を通したというエピソードがさりげなく置かれているように、大変な勉強家であり、その対象はアメリカ文学全般を対象としているから、特定の作家を専門としている研究者でも抜けているような情報がぎっしり盛り込まれていることには驚かされた。たとえば、ワシントン・アーヴィング論。メルヴィルに“Rip Van Winkle’s Lilac”という遺稿があること、ハート・クレーンの*The Bridge* (1930)に“Van Winkle”という詩があり、リップという少年が登場すること。あるいは、ソロー論で、シンクレア・ルイスが若いころ、*Walden*に強い影響を受けたこと。あるいは、オールcott論で、ユダヤ系現代作家のシンシア・オージックが*Little Women*を1万回も読んだこと、ポーヴォワールも少女時代、この小説を読んで影響を受けたこと。フィッツジェラルドのミドルネームはScott Keyであったということからわかるように、父方にアメリカ国歌を作詩した人物がいること。ラルフ・エリソンのフルネームはRalph Waldo Ellison といって、Ralph Waldo Emersonに因むこと。マッカーズが思春期にオニールの芝居に夢中になっていたこと。スタインベックの『怒りの葡萄』というタイトルは、聖書に直接由来するというよりは、“Battle Hymn of the Republic” (1862)に由来すること。こういう、目から鱗がぼろぼろ落ちるようなエピソードが散りばめられているのである。

さらに見習うべきは、語義をOEDにあたるなど、厳密に解釈しようという姿勢である。たとえば、リアリズムのイズムが「主義」という意味ではなく、リアリズムは動詞realizeの名詞形であって、たんに「リアルにすること」「リアルな状態」という意味にほかならないという。リアリズムを考えると、これまでの思い込みを修正させてくれるだろう。フロストの有名な詩、“The Gift Outright”をテキスト分析するに際し、このギフトが他動詞giveから派生した名詞であるから、こちらが受け取る「贈り物」ではなく、こちらから与える「捧げ物」とみるべきであろうと述べ、これまた思い込みを正してくれる。そのうえで、詩の研究者でもこれほど説得力ある解釈を行うのはむずかしいくらい、綿密な解釈を展開していくのである。

本書のさらなる楽しみとして、アメリカの作家が日本でどのように受容されたのか、氏は折にふれて紹介してくれる。日本人ならではのアメリカ文学史の賜物である。たとえば、ワシントン・アーヴィングの代表的な短篇が明治時代から紹介されていて、英語の教科書に採用されていたこと、1886年に「リップ・ヴァン・ウィンクル」の韻文訳がでているほか、1889年に森鷗外がドイツ語経由で「新世界の浦島」として翻訳したこと。受容史にとどまらず、よっぽどの専門家でもなければ知らないエピソードも交えてくれる。たとえば、フランクリンの13徳目にならって、明治天皇の后が「弗蘭克林十二の歌」という和歌を詠んでいること、明治天皇の侍講が帝王学の一端として『フランクリン自伝』について進講したこと、同書を読んで正岡子規が感激したこと。ホイットマンの章では、夏目漱石が大学3年生のとき(1892年)に、ホイットマン論を書いたことも触れられている。ドライサーの章では、谷崎潤一郎が『文章読本』において、しつこいくらい濃密な文章の例として、『アメリカの悲劇』を引用していること。石川達三が『青春の蹉跎』においてドライサーのこの小説を下敷きにしていること。昭和のはじめから、尾崎士郎や高橋新吉などがアンダーソンの作品を愛読していたこと。社会主義者の堺利彦がロンドンの

『荒野の呼び声』を翻訳したこと。渡辺氏の恩師である、東大英文科のアメリカ文学担当の初代教授、西川正身がこの訳を読んでアメリカ文学の魅力に目覚めたこと。有島武郎がアメリカ帰国後、東北帝国大学農科大学予科の英語教師としてこれを教科書に使ったこと。経済小説で知られる城山三郎が大学時代、スタインベックの『怒りの葡萄』に烈しい感動を受けたこと。こういう、知って得するエピソードが満載なのも、この文学史を読む醍醐味である。

そのほか、本書には英文の抜粋をふんだんに盛りこみ、アメリカ文学のアンソロジー（詩文選）ともなっていると、各章の作家論が作家の個性に応じて、多様な語り口と段取りで展開し、何章続けて読んでも飽きないようになっているとか、講義の枕から読み手をぐいと引きつけてしまう工夫が凝らされているとか、数々の美点を備えているのだが、書評子としては、氏の姿勢に顕著なバランス感覚の絶妙さに感心させられた。現代の視点から過去を断罪するような極端さ（あるいは愚）を避けようとするのである。たとえば、キャプテン・ジョン・スミスの章で、ポカホンタスの物語を白人の進出を正当化するフィクションだと決め付けるのは、「一方的な解釈」（I, 99）ではないか、白人と先住民の武力衝突の責任を一方的に白人の側にもとめるのは、「ある種の自虐史観」（I, 101）ではないか、と漏らす。あるいは、インディアンによる捕囚物語を評価するに際して、捕囚物語を、白人による、西欧文明中心的な自己正当化の記録として読むよりも、「自らの魂の救済が人生の最大関心事であった時代に、真摯に生きた人間の記録として価値をもつ」（I, 135）のではないかと述べる。あるいは、フランクリンの章。彼をアメリカ文学史にきちんと位置づけたあと、最後のほうで、彼の人間味あふれる性格を浮き彫りにするような書簡——愛人は年配の女性を選ぶようにという若者への助言——を紹介する点などにも、絶妙なバランス感覚を看取できよう。

ほんのときたま、吐露される著者の文学観には共感することしきりであった。たとえば、安易な映画論で卒論を書く学生が増えていることについて、「私は文字で書かれた文学作品の世界の奥深さを思って、英文科ではやはり文学作品を研究の対象とすべきではないだろうか」（III, 108）という。サリンジャーの *The Catcher in the Rye* の一場面について、「小説は人生の教科書ではないのであり、具体的な生き方について読者に指示、忠告をあたえる必要はないのであって、人生におけるこうした幸福な一瞬を捉えて、それを読者に伝えるほうがより重要なのではないか」（III, 147）という。トニ・モリソンの *Beloved* について、「すぐれた文学は一般化された真実（platitudes or generalities）ではなく、特定の細部の事実（specifics）から成り立つもので、それによってこそ、読者の偏った常識は打破されるのである」（III, 375-76）と述べる。滋味あふれる文学観である。

すばらしい作品を残してくれた作家への敬愛と感謝の念が氏にはいつもあるのだろう。作家の人間性まで、これほどいきいきと描かれた文学史は稀有である。好き嫌いがあってしかるべきなのに、著者にはどんな作家と作品も受けとめることのできる、海のような包容力がある。たとえば、マーク・トウェインとヘンリー・ジェイムズを、あるいはアップダイクとピンチオンを、あるいはジョン・アーヴィングとレイモンド・カーヴァーを、同じような情熱とエネルギーをこめて、論じきれる研究者がいるだろうか。フィッツジェラルドはあるエッセイで「一流の知性の証明は心にふたつの対立する考えを同時にもちながら、それでもなお機能する能力である」と述べたが、こういうダブル・ヴィジョンは、著

者にこそあてはまると言うべきであろう。

講義録という体裁をとっているものの、その実、研究者がじっくり読んでも勉強になる、深い解釈が展開している。たとえば、クレヴクールを扱った第18章。*Letters from an American Farmer* (1782) を丁寧に読み解きながら、クレヴクールは「ただ単にアメリカの明るい未来を予言し賛美しただけではなく、アメリカ人の意識の底にある不安や、根源的な衝動をいち早く指摘した」(230)、その点でメルヴィルや晩年のマーク・トウェイン、初期のフォークナーの暗い思想に通じていると結ぶ。あるいは、アップダイクを扱った第73章。彼を文学史的にどう位置づけるべきか問うた後、「彼は社会のタブー、ことに性のタブーに挑戦する社会意識の強い文学者であると思う。しかも、社会通念を根底から覆す革命的な文学者ではなく、体制内にあって社会問題と対決し、漸進的に社会改革を目指すタイプの文学者である。そういう意味で、唐突だが、彼は20世紀の William Dean Howells といってよいように思われる」(III, 212) と述べる。このように、大学でアメリカ文学史を講じている方はもちろんのこと、狭い専門を抜け出して、アメリカ文学の大きな流れを頭に入れておきたいと考えている方も、文学研究に行き詰まりを感じている方も、全3巻を読み通すべきである。今後の文学研究に役立つヒントがもらえるだけではなく、より広い視野を得て、いま一度専門に立ち返ることができるであろう。

入念に校正がなされた結果、瑕疵となるような誤植がほとんど見られず、全3巻1500頁近い書物であることを考えると、奇跡である。気づいた限りで誤植は3箇所のみ。いずれも大きな瑕疵とはならないが、版を重ねてほしい書物であるから、指摘したい。第1巻vi頁、下から6行目。「昭和16年(1941)年」と年がひとつ余計である。後は第3巻に集中している。318頁、下から4行目のマーク・トウェインがなぜかエマーク・トウェインになっている。345頁、下から8行目の「*One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest* は」と「は」がイタリック体になっている。誤植ではないが、79頁、下から4行目と163頁、下から2行目において、行頭を揃えるべきところ、最初の活字が半角分字下げになっている。こんな程度の驚くほどの少なさである。

最後に、もうひとつ、本書の美点を付記したい。書評子も本体にばかり目を向けて、最後の最後まで気づかなかったのではあるが、人名索引と作品名索引からなる索引がじつに丁寧に、かつ親切に作られていることに驚き、感動もした。一見すると、すっきりした(いや、あっさりした)外観を呈しているのだが、どうしてどうして、使い勝手のよい仕上がりになっている。シンプルでしかもじつに美しいのである。こういうことも含めて、本書は総括するに、日本において本格的なアメリカ文学研究が開始されてから早や半世紀以上、そう短くはないアメリカ文学研究の最高到達点を画す、記念碑的な著作である。日本のアメリカ文学研究もここまできたのである。ひとりの研究者でもここまで到達することができるのだということに、驚きと感動を禁じえない。今後のアメリカ文学史研究は、参照枠として常に本書に立ち返りながら、さらに先を目指して進むにちがいない。この偉業をひとりで達成した著者に深甚なる敬意と謝意を表したい。

本間長世著『アメリカ大統領の挑戦—— 「自由の帝国」 光と影』

(NTT出版、2008年)

中山 俊 宏

本書は、著者自身が「アメリカ史物語三部作」と呼ぶシリーズの最終巻である。¹⁾ 前二作は、それぞれエイブラハム・リンカーン、ジョージ・ワシントン両大統領を軸に、最終巻の本書はウッドロー・ウィルソンとフランクリン・D・ローズヴェルト両大統領を通して、それぞれの時代のアメリカが直面した逆説や矛盾に着目しつつ、ひとつの「物語」としてアメリカをあらためて語ろうとする試みである。

ここで語られる物語は、前衛劇のように、主人公もプロットもなく、ただただ漂っている小状況の連鎖ではなく、はっきりと主人公がいて、大状況もあり、人間の意志が（常に思い通りにいくということではないにせよ）意味をもつ世界の中で成立している。「個」を構造の網の目の中で成立する「偶然」とみなす最近の潮流に対して、著者は敢えて「個」を中心に据えた物語の語り手たらしめている。しかし、ここで語られる「個」も実は脇役に過ぎない。本シリーズの主人公はあくまで「アメリカ」であって、登場する大統領たちは（著者がかつて用いた言葉を借りれば）「一種の観念性ないし抽象性を漂わせ続けているアメリカ」²⁾ に具体性を与える舞台道具に過ぎない。本シリーズの二巻目にあたる『共和国アメリカの誕生』に関し古矢旬氏が鋭くも指摘しているように、本シリーズはアメリカをひとつの物語として再構成しようとする「大きな物語への意志」に支えられている。³⁾ この姿勢は、このシリーズを貫いている著者の基本姿勢といっても差し支えないだろう。

なぜいまさら「アメリカ」を語る必要があるのか。「アメリカ」を語ることなど、そもそも可能なのだろうか。長年、日本におけるアメリカ研究を支え、方向性を示してきた著者の該博な知識と見識が、この壮大ともいえる試みに安定感を持たせていることは間違いないだろう。この安定感ゆえに、このシリーズを一般読者向けにアメリカ史を平易に説いた、教科書的（＝退屈）ではない良書として受容してしまいがちである。本書は、赤ペンを片手に線を引きながら読まなくてもいい本、つまり個々の情報が物語として記憶に沈殿していく質の高い一般書であることは間違いない。⁴⁾ しかし、著者の意図したのはたしてこうした啓蒙書の執筆だったのだろうか。評者にはそうとは思えない。巻末のきわめて

¹⁾ シリーズ第一巻が『正義のリーダーシップ—リンカーンと南北戦争の時代』（NTT出版、2004年）、第二巻が『共和国アメリカの誕生—ワシントンと建国の理念』（NTT出版、2006年）、そして第三巻が本書にあたる。

²⁾ 本間長世『理念の共和国』（中公叢書、1976年）、まえがき。

³⁾ 古矢旬「書評—『共和国アメリカの誕生—ワシントンと建国の理念』『アメリカ太平洋研究』第7号（2007年）、160頁。

⁴⁾ 岡山裕氏は、本書を「（初学者でも）『わかった』という感覚を得られる」書と表現している。岡山裕「Book Review—本間長世『共和国アメリカの誕生』『正義のリーダーシップ』『アメリカ大統領の挑戦』『論座』（2008年9月号）、313頁。

短い抑制された「あとがき」において、著者は本シリーズを構成する三冊が、それぞれ2004年の大統領選挙（『正義のリーダーシップ』）、2006年の中間選挙（『共和国アメリカの誕生』）、そして2008年の大統領選挙（本書）が行われた年に出版されたのは、自分の中では偶然ではないと述べている（271頁）。

21世紀初頭のアメリカは、著者がいままで見てきたアメリカとは対極の存在、より正確に言えば、アメリカの悪い部分が最良の伝統を押しのける形で突出しているような状況にあり、これに対してなんらかの発言をしなければならない、そのような切迫感をもって書かれたのが本書ではないか。つまり、本書を、単に啓蒙書としてではなく、時代状況にひとつの言葉（＝行為）として投入された書であるということを念頭に読み解いていくと、ひとつひとつの仕掛けやエピソードの選択の意味がよりはっきりと見えてくる。しかし、実はこのことは著者自身が「あとがき」で述べていることでもある。著者は、「ブッシュすなわちアメリカではない——アメリカは確かにブッシュを生んだけれども——というメッセージを伝えたかった」（272頁）とはっきり述べている。本文中でもジョージ・W・ブッシュ大統領に対する辛辣な批判が、本書執筆時に彼が大統領であるという以外には特に理由が見当たらないような文脈で唐突にたびたび登場する（時にそれはブッシュ大統領／政権というよりもジョージ・W・ブッシュという個人に対して向けられたものと思わずにはいられないものもある）。

評者が、本書を「時代状況に投入された書」と感じるのは、実はブッシュ批判のくだりとはまったく関係ない。むしろ、ブッシュ批判は、本書のリズム感の良さを時に妨げていると思わせることさえあった。本書を読みながら、ハッとさせられたのは、本書が執筆されていた頃はまだ泡沫候補に過ぎなかったであろうバラク・オバマ候補が、多くの専門家の予想を裏切るかたちで、しかもこれまでの政治的構図を大幅に覆すかたちで勝利した時代状況を説明する際に必要な言葉や概念、そしてエピソードが、本書のいたるところに散りばめられていることに気づいたときであった。それは、いまのアメリカが、20世紀前半の両世界大戦の規模ではないにせよ、出口がなかなか見えない二つの深刻な戦争を戦い、さらに100年に一度と形容される未曾有の金融危機に直面している状況が、本書の主要登場人物の一人であるローズヴェルト大統領が直面した状況と似通っていることとも確かに無関係ではないだろう。ひょっとすると著者の意図とは離れて、本書が現在の状況と意図せず共鳴しあったということなのかもしれないが、それだけとも思えない。この共鳴は著者のアメリカに対するコンパッション、アメリカを総体として把握しようとするその姿勢に根ざしているように思えてならない。いくつか実例を示そう。

さしあたり強く印象に残ったのは「ボーン・アゲイン（再生）」という言葉である。近年は、とりわけジョージ・W・ブッシュ政権が誕生してからは、「ボーン・アゲイン」といえば、「ブッシュの信仰」と同一視されてきた。それは、2004年の大統領選挙で、強い逆風にもかかわらずブッシュ大統領の再選を実現させた福音派を理解する際のキーワードとしてもっぱら語られた。しかし、本書では、この言葉を「アメリカ史全体を通じての、個人・集団・国家にわたってのキーワード」（15頁）として位置づけている。オバマ・キャンペーンのスローガンが「チェンジ」であったことはよく知られている。しかし、潜在的メッセージは一貫して「再生」であった。オバマ・キャンペーンの「世直し運動」的なエネルギーは、単に社会を「変える（チェンジ）」のではなく、「新たに生まれ変わる（ボ

ーン・アゲイン)」という感覚があってこそのもだった。アメリカ史を貫流する「ボーン・アゲイン」という精神的雛形にオバマ候補の存在は違和感なくはまったといえる。他にも、「ヴァイタル・センター (Vital Center)」という言葉への着目がある (220-22 頁)。「ヴァイタル・センター」は、ジョン・F・ケネディ大統領のブレーンでもあった歴史家のアーサー・シュレジンガー・ジュニアが戦後アメリカのリベラリズムの核心を定めるべく著した本の書名だが、著者はシュレジンガーの言葉を再構成しつつ、単に「中道を歩む」という妥協的姿勢ではなく (それではセンターは「死点」になってしまう)、中央より少し左に力を集約させる姿勢と説明している。まさにこれこそオバマ・キャンペーンの真髄ではないか。著者は「ヴァイタル・センター」を、オバマ候補を論じるなかで引いているわけではない。しかし、今日のアメリカ政治の重心がセンターに移りつつあり、そこを活気づけない限り、党派政治に疲れきっているアメリカを動かすことはできないという風景が著者には見えたのだろう。

また、ニューディーラーたちに言及する中で、「連邦政府で働くことが、野心を持つ若者にとって大きな魅力となったことは、やはりローズヴェルトが政治の空気を変えたことを示すものだった」(179 頁) という一節がある。オバマ候補も、決して動かすことはできないといわれた若者たちを動かした。オバマ氏は、ひとつひとつの小さな波紋が大きな変化を引き起こす可能性について語り、そして現にそうやってアメリカは変わってきたのだということを雄弁に訴えかけた。そして、安易なシニシズムに陥りがちな若者たちが、オバマ候補のメッセージには素直に反応した。まさに政治の空気を変えたといしか形容しようがない。いま 9.11 テロ攻撃直後とはまったく別の文脈で、ワシントンで (というよりもオバマ政権の下で) 働きたいという若者が増えているという。

オバマ・キャンペーンといえば、とにもかくにも巨額の政治資金のみが注目されがちだったが、なにをにおいてもオバマ氏の最大の武器は言葉だろう。その点は、ウィルソンもローズヴェルトも同じだった。「運命とのランデヴー」、「恐れるべき唯一のことは恐れること自体である」など、単に選対本部が政治的効果を狙って編み出した「キラー・フレーズ」ではなく、国民の心に響き、時代と共鳴する指導者の言葉が、いかにアメリカを変えてきたかを本書でも再三にわたって強調している。「雄弁家で、ラジオを通じてでも聴衆の心をつかみ、明るい雰囲気をもき散らすことができたローズヴェルト」という本書の一文を読んで、ブッシュ及びマケイン・キャンペーンで選挙アドバイザーを務めたマーク・マッキノンが若干皮肉まじりにオバマ候補のことを評した言葉を思い出さずにはいられなかった。「彼は歩く希望生産機だよ。彼ならアメリカ政治を変えてしまうかもしれない (He's a walking, talking hope machine, and he may reshape American politics.)」。

他にもいくつかもある。評者にとって、長く続いた 2008 年大統領選挙でもっとも印象に残ったエピソードのひとつは、アメリカの「ユニポラー・モーメント (Unipolar Moment)」を自ら讃え、タカ派を代表する論客であるチャールズ・クラウトハマーがオバマ候補のことを評して、「彼は一級の知性と一級の気質の双方を兼ね備えている (he's got both a first-class intellect and a first-class temperament.)」⁵⁾ と述べたことであった。このクラウトハマーの発言のもとになったローズヴェルト大統領とオリヴァー・ウェンデル・ホ

⁵⁾ Charles Krauthammer, "Hail Mary vs. Cool Barry," *Washington Post*, October 3, 2008, A23.

ームズ連邦最高裁裁判官とのやりとりもしっかりと本書で紹介されている(157頁)。

そもそもオバマ候補は本書ではほとんど登場しない。しかし、本書中盤過ぎでR・ブルックハイザーの『ワズプ流の仕方』(1991年)からの引用というかたちで、「今日アメリカに残っているワズプだけが占めている職の一つとして、大統領職が(ある)」(142頁)という一節が紹介されるが、この箇所は(著者の意図は別にして)オバマ候補の存在を本書の背後に感じさせる効果をもった(オバマ候補が当選したいま、その効果はよりはっきりと感じられるだろう)。

なお、ウィルソン大統領については、アメリカにおける最も深い政治的伝統である孤立主義を放棄し、戦争には勝利するも、その妥協を許さない理想主義が祟り、挫折に追い込まれた失意の大統領として描かれている。しかしながら「主義(イズム)」という接尾語が、名前につけられ記憶されることになった例は「ウィルソニアニズム」以外にはあまり例がないという(86-87頁)。たしかに他は皆ドクトリン(トルーマン・ドクトリン、レーガン・ドクトリン、ブッシュ・ドクトリン等)で、「主義」がつく例は減多にない。ウィルソン大統領は、「自由の帝国」との関連で、主として新保守主義の意図せざる源流として言及されているが、果たしてオバマ次期大統領の外交政策が「オバマイズム」と称せられるような刻印をアメリカ史に残すのであろうか。「世界におけるアメリカの役割」という点で、オバマ政権は歴史的な岐路に立っていることは間違いない。また、学者から大統領への経歴を辿ったのはこれまでのところウィルソン大統領だけだというのが(90頁)、オバマ次期大統領もシカゴ大学で憲法を講じ、終身在職権のオファーもされたという。オバマ氏の学者的な気質がどのように展開していくかも興味のあるところだ。

細部に入り込みすぎてしまったかもしれない。本書がオバマ候補の勝利を予感しているとか、選挙が終わってみるとそう読めるとか、そのようなことを云おうとしているのではない。また、本書が「政治的な書」でないのはいうまでもない。ここでの関心事は、オバマ政権の誕生という例外的な状況を説明する際に必要な言葉や概念、そしてエピソードが、どうして本書に散りばめられていたかということである。答えは意外に簡単かもしれない。オバマ政権の誕生は、実は例外的ではなく、むしろアメリカ政治の伝統に連なる言葉で説明できる典型的にアメリカ的な現象ということなのかもしれない。筆者は、最終章で『『ポスト・エスニック・アメリカ』を象徴するようなオバマ候補』の存在について淡々と短めに論じている。オバマ氏の「ブラックネス」に踏み込んでいないことは卓見といわざるをえない。オバマ・キャンペーンでは、外からそういわれた時以外は、オバマ氏の「ブラックネス」が自覚されたことはほとんどなかったという。いずれにせよここで例示したような言葉を迷うことなく拾い上げることできた著者に敬意を表しつつ、いまアメリカという国を、コンパッションをもって総体として語ることができる識者がどれほどいるだろうかと疑問を感じずにはいられない。

たしかに実際に存在するのは個々の「アメリカ」である。しかし、その個々の「アメリカ」が大きく共鳴し合い、「アメリカ」を総体として語らなければならないような力学が生まれてくるのもまたアメリカという国の特色である。そして、そのような「アメリカ」は必ずしも、「排除」や「支配」といった言葉のみを用いたのでは語りきれない部分があることを本書は改めて気づかせてくれる。

網野徹哉著 『インカとスペイン——帝国の交錯』

(講談社、2008 年)

染 田 秀 藤

はじめに

本書は単なるインカ史でもスペイン史でもなければ、「帝国」の比較史でもない。著者の言葉を借りれば、スペイン史を交えて、「先スペイン期のインカから、19 世紀のインカまで」を通覧した作品である。すなわち、本書は、アンデス社会で生成した複数のユートピア像と「ペルー人」のアイデンティティを鋭く分析したペルーの歴史家フロレス・ガリンド (Flores Galindo, Alberto, 1949-1990) の名著『インカを探して』(*Buscando un Inca*) に感銘した著者が未刊史料はもとより、数多くの先行研究を踏まえ、また、図像分析など、近年の新しい研究方法を取り込んで、インカ期から独立期 (19 世紀) にかけて創出された複数の「インカ」表象を軸に、アンデス社会の変容と先住民をはじめ、アンデスに生きた多様な人々の複雑な心性^{メンタリティ}の変化を重層的に描き、「帝国の交錯」の社会的・文化的意味を解き明かした作品である。具体的に言えば、前半では、二つの「帝国」—15 世紀前半にアンデス世界を統一した「インカ帝国」と、ほぼその 1 世紀後に「インカ帝国」を征服し、大西洋世界を支配するにいたった「スペイン帝国」—が誕生する過程とそれぞれの「帝国」の内実が明らかにされ、後半では、おもに「人とモノの移動」と「想像力 (思想) の交錯」に焦点が絞られ、およそ 300 年に亘るスペイン支配下のアンデス社会の動態が「インカ」表象との関係で描かれる。管見によれば、本書ほど、多層的なアンデス社会の動態とアンデスの人々の心性の変化を 400 年近くに及ぶ長期の時間的スパンで通観し、しかも、それをスペイン史と密接に関連づけ、正統派の歴史からひさしく抹殺されてきた「社会的弱者」に視点を据えて分析、解明した類書は世界でも数少ないといっても過言ではない。その意味で、本書はきわめて意欲的であると同時に、貴重かつ興味深い作品である。以下にその内容を簡単にみていくことにしたい。

構成と内容

本書の構成は以下のとおりである。

- (第 1 章) インカ王国の生成
- (第 2 章) 古代帝国の成熟と崩壊
- (第 3 章) 中世スペインに共生する文化
- (第 4 章) 排除の思想 異端審問と帝国
- (第 5 章) 交錯する植民地社会
- (第 6 章) 世界帝国を生きた人々
- (第 7 章) 帝国の内なる敵 ユダヤ人とインディオ
- (第 8 章) 女たちのアンデス史
- (第 9 章) インカへの欲望
- (第 10 章) インカとスペインの訣別

第1章では、インカ社会が先インカ期から存在した汎アンデス的な社会経済システムを利用しながら「帝国」へと発展していく過程が「互酬関係」の一方的支配と「インカ的神聖王権化」を軸に解明され、とくにインカの国家イデオロギーとなる「太陽神信仰」の重要性が強調される。ここで注目しなければならないのは、著者が、先スペイン期のアンデスが無文字社会であったため、今日知られている同時期に関するアンデス情報には数多くの問題（「クロニカに内在するバイアス」など）が潜んでいることを、「通説」のインカ単一王朝説や王朝発祥の地をめぐる自己の体験をもとに指摘し、とくにインカ史研究につきまとう困難さと慎重な史料批判の重要性を意識しながら筆を進めている点である。さらに、著者はスペイン側の論理で創出されたインカ単一王朝説の「占有」をめぐる先住民たちの心性を論じ、本書を貫く独自のアンデス史観を垣間見せる。

第2章では、著者は「通説」やクロニカ情報に加えて、巡察の記録など、一次史料に依拠しながら、インカ国家が非対称的な互酬関係にもとづいて実施した巧妙な帝国統治（「インカの平和」）の実態を描く。ついで、著者は、聖都クスコが発する遠心力（征服活動＝拡大）と求心力（地方統治＝統合）が領土拡張にともなって次第に均衡を失い、その結果、ワスカル（Huácar）とアタワルパ（Atahualpa）という異母兄弟間で王位継承をめぐる血腥い軋轢が発生し、最終的に、スペイン人の侵略・征服が可能になったと論じ、それらの原因をインカの国家体制内部に潜在した政治的・社会的要因—不安定な王位継承システムや王家の形成とその特権的地位、王家の私領成立とミティマエス（強制的に移住させられた非インカ系先住民）の増大—に関連づける。

第3章と第4章では、著者は舞台をアンデスからイベリア半島へ移し、15世紀末に「新世界」へ乗り出したスペイン人征服者たちの心性や行動様式を読み解くため、キリスト教、イスラーム教とユダヤ教という、異なる三つの宗教と文化が「共生」する特異な時代を経験した中世、とくに14世紀末から近世にかけてのスペイン社会の動態を明らかにする。第3章では、8世紀初頭を嚆矢とするイスラーム教徒からの国土再征服運動の過程で、スペインのキリスト教社会が異なる二つの宗教とその文化と緊張関係を保ちながら「共生」→「対立」→「排除」へと、思想的に移行していく複雑で非直線的な変化の様子が描き出される。つづいて、著者は征服者の心性の中核をなす聖戦思想や、とくにポグロム（ユダヤ人虐殺）となって表出する反ユダヤ主義の生成・変化とその発展（キリスト教社会における改宗ユダヤ人に対する不信感や敵意の増幅と「血の純潔」思想の定着・拡大）の政治的・社会的背景を具体的な例を挙げて論じる。

第4章は、「フダイサンテ」（隠れユダヤ教徒）をキーワードにして、「共生」を持続させる流れが認められる一方で、15世紀末のカトリック両王期にスペインという「諸王国の連合国家」が成立する過程で新設された「異端審問」が政治的機能を担った結果、「排除」のイデオロギーが次第にスペイン社会の主流になっていく状況を興味深い具体例（グァダルーペの異端審問）をあげて明らかにする。最後に、著者は、1492年3月の「ユダヤ人追放令」で顕現する「排除」のイデオロギーがそれに激しく抗うイデオロギー（メシア待望運動）を生み出し、両者が激しくせめぎあう歴史的環境下、「インカ帝国」がスペイン人の前に姿を現し、二つの「帝国」の交錯がはじまると説く。

第5章では、まず著者は「新世界」へ渡ったコンベルソの行動を例示しながら、「インカ帝国」の征服には、長期に及ぶ異文化との「共生」を通じて鍛え上げられたスペイン・

キリスト教社会の「排除」のイデオロギーとコンベルソたちに共有された、反ユダヤ主義からの「解放」を求める強い願望とのコンフリクトが発する大きなエネルギーが注がれていくと説き、イベリア半島の歴史的経験が「新世界」へ放射されていく様を描く。ついで、後半では、ピサロ（Pizarro, Francisco）麾下のスペイン軍の侵略を受けたころのインカ帝国の政治状況、すなわちワスカルとアタワルパの対立や非インカ系民族集団のクスコ支配からの離脱の動きなどから説き起こし、スペイン軍のクスコ占領後に勃発したマンコ・インカ（Manco Inca）を領袖とする、いわゆる「インカの反乱」へ筆を進める。ここで、著者は従来のインカ征服史論ではあまり重視されなかったインカの存在に着目する。マンコの「反乱」に加担しなかったため、スペイン支配に「迎合的なインカ」として「負」のイメージで語られてきた、マンコの異母兄弟にあたるパウリュ（Paullu）である。著者はパウリュをはじめとする「親スペイン系インカ貴族」の存在と彼らのその後の行動に注目し、そこに異文化との「共生」を求める先住民の心性を読み取る。そして、著者によれば、それは、16世紀後半に勃発したペルーのエンコミエンダの世襲化をめぐる運動の中で先住民首長たちが示したスペイン国王との直接交渉にも通じる心性であった。換言すれば、著者は、アンデスを舞台に、「排除」と「共生」というイデオロギーの対峙がときに主体と客体を変えて、ときにさまざまなグラデーションを示しながら、重層的に表出したと主張する。その対立を覆い隠すような形で植民地社会にあらたに適用されたのが、著者の言葉を借りれば、「血の純潔」のイデオロギーに通底する「スペイン人の政体」と「インディオの政体」という新しい統治理念である。最後に、著者はトゥパク・アマル（Túpac Amaru）の処刑（1572年）で終息する「インカの反乱」の顛末にふれて、当時、副王トレド（Toledo, Francisco de）がスペイン国王によるペルー支配の正当性を訴えるために、また、反スペイン系インカを歴史的に抹殺することを目的として編纂させた「公式なインカ王朝史」（「歴史化されたインカ」）を「血統」にもとづいて受け入れた親スペイン系インカの中から、「排除」のイデオロギーにもとづいて創出された「インカ史」に異議申し立てが行われた事実を取り上げ、歴史操作に抗う先住民の姿に注目する。

第6章は、16世紀、「日の没することのない帝国」と称されるほど、広大な領域を支配したハブスブルグ朝スペインの盟主カルロス一世（Carlos I）およびフェリペ二世（Felipe II）の治世（ポルトガル王国を併合し、同君連合の成立）におけるアンデスの人々と「帝国」の関係をグローバルヒストリーのコンテクストで読み解こうとした意欲的な章である。著者はまず、特権授与を求めてスペインへ渡航した先住民の例を紹介したあと、王室の渡航禁止令にもかかわらず、文書主義ともいえるべき帝国の官僚的形式主義の間隙をぬって、コンベルソのみならず、さまざまな国や身分の人々が密航者として、それぞれの夢をかなえるために大西洋を横断して帝国内を移動したことや、大西洋を媒介にして地球規模での人の移動が始まった事実を明らかにする。ついで、著者は話題を「モノの移動」に移し、慢性的な財政逼迫に喘ぐスペイン帝国の重要な収入源になったポトシの銀を取り上げ、史料を引用して、グローバルな経済世界、すなわち「近代世界システム」成立の重要な一翼を担った大西洋貿易の陰で、ミタ制（輪番制の強制労働）のもと過酷な鉱山労働を強いられ、先スペイン期にはその使用がかなり限定されていたコカとチチャ酒に救いを求めるしかなかった先住民たちの悲惨な労働実態を描く。そして、最後に、著者は、銀が大西洋のみならずアジアへ通じる道を開いた経緯とその実態を明らかにし、そうして、「銀

の道」を介して、スペイン（ヨーロッパ）—アンデス—アジア（日本も含む）を円環的に結ぶ地球規模の「人の往還・モノの交流・想像力の交錯」が可能になったと論じる。

第7章では、著者は布教活動と植民地社会の関係に焦点を移し、16世紀末から17世紀前半にかけて、アンデスのスペイン人社会に放射されたイベリア半島の「排除」と「共生」のイデオロギーが布教方法をめぐって、征服後間もない時期の「共存」から「対立」へ変化し、さらに両者の対立が次第に先鋭化し、ついには「排除」のイデオロギーが支配的になっていく過程を、第五代副王トレドの強制集住政策、異端審問の設置、「異端」とされたドミニコ会士クルス（Cruz, Francisco de la）の処刑や偶像崇拜根絶運動を介して明らかにする。著者は千年王国主義と結びついた「インディオ・ユダヤ人同祖論」をキーワードに、その質的な変化を17世紀初頭に先住民を対象として大規模に実施された偶像崇拜根絶運動に読み取る。ついで、著者は同じコンテクストで、「カトリック王国」が同君連合としてイベリア半島に存在した時代（17世紀前半）、「新世界」、とくにリマを中心にアジアにいたる商業ネットワークを構築した強力なポルトガル系ユダヤ人商人たち（コンベルソ）が辿った歴史的経験と彼らの心性を取り上げ、その代表的な人物ペレス（Pérez, Manuel Bautista）が異端として焚殺刑に処される過程を詳細に描くことによって、宗教的純粋性が「排除」の理論として政治的機能を果たしたことを明らかにする。

第8章では、著者は、宗教的純粋性を理由に、リマの商業界を支配したユダヤ人男性たちが社会的に抹殺されたあと、男性中心の社会原理が支配的な植民地社会で、女性たちが人種や階級差をもものともせず逞しく生きるさまに着目し、当時のジェンダー概念を軸に、アンデス社会の女性、とくに先住民女性たちの動態を考察する。この章では、従来あまり顧みられることのなかった、インカ期ならびにスペイン支配期のアンデス社会における先住民女性の役割に焦点が合わされ、その歴史的な意味が論じられる。著者は、征服後間もない時期に、スペイン人男性との関係を余儀なくされたインカ皇女たちの存在に、インカ期のアクリャに通じる「女性を介した政治的関係」の再現を読み取り、彼女たちが自らの身体を犠牲にして「混血」という新しい「果実」をもたらすことで「インカとスペインを結びとめた」事実、「接続された歴史」の一例を見てとる。そうして、著者は、インカ皇女をはじめ先住民女性がスペイン人との「共生」のための「蝶番」として利用された事実を根拠に、インカ支配とスペイン支配を介して、先住民社会においても、男性中心の社会原理がジェンダー概念として定着していったことを明らかにし、同時に、スペイン人女性の絶対数が少なかった植民地時代初期のスペイン人社会において、「蝶番」となった先住民女性を母として生を受けた混血の娘たちが「スペイン人女性」として重要な役割を担った事実「帝国の交錯」の社会的・文化的意味を探る。

つづいて、著者は同じコンテクストで、ヨーロッパ社会におけるジェンダー概念に触れて、女性嫌悪の思想を取り上げ、それと表裏をなす、女性固有の霊的能力に対する「畏怖」の感情が一方では「聖女」を、他方では「魔女」を生み出す思想へ発展したと述べ、植民地社会でも女性がその固有の力（魔術）を生存戦略の武器として利用していた興味深い事実（魔女の存在）を紹介する。さらに、著者は17世紀後半のリマにおいて、偶像崇拜根絶運動の中で逮捕された先住民の「魔女」ファナ・デ・マヨ（Mayo, Juana de）の審問記録から、植民地社会で魔術が「脱人種性」を特徴としていたことと、その魔術にアンデスの伝統とヨーロッパ的観念が接合されていたことに注目する。最後に、先住民、非先

住民を問わず、魔女たちがコカの葉を媒介として「インカの力」の「占有」を求めた事実を重視し、そうして女性たちの間で生成された「インカ」表象が、16世紀後半に創出された「公式なインカ王朝史」とは無縁なもの、換言すれば、「脱/非歴史化されるインカ」表象（「インディオ的インカ」）として、以後のアンデス社会を流れる一水脈となっていくと主張する。

第9章では、著者は、アンデス社会において「インカ」表象をめぐって三つの流れが生成したことに、「帝国の交錯」の歴史的意味を探ろうとする。著者は、16世紀後半において、まずインカ貴族（24選挙人会）がスペイン側の論理で創出された「公式なインカ王朝史」を「血統」にもとづいて占有することでスペイン人との「共生」を目指したのを「第一の流れ」とし、ついで、「インカ」表象の占有をめざす非インカ系先住民の動きを「第二の流れ」（「再歴史化されるインカ」）と規定し、彼らの行動とその歴史的意味を論じる。さらに、グアマン・ポマ（Guamán Poma, Felipe）をはじめ、アンデス先住民たちに、イペリア半島のイデオロギー（「純潔」）が深く浸透していったことを明らかにしたうえで、未刊史料の「バタンクール家文書」を援用して、オロペサ侯爵領の継承権に絡んで生じた「インカ」表象の占有をめぐる熾烈な争いが1780年に勃発した反乱の首謀者で、「トゥパク・アマル二世」を名乗った「混血」のコンドルカンキ（Condorcanqui, José Gabriel）へと受け継がれていく過程を描き、「反乱」が従来のように、二項対立的な運動としては捉えきれないことを示唆する。そうして、著者は植民地時代後半、アンデス社会で、「インカ」表象をめぐる激しい二つの水脈（イデオロギー）の対立と、それとは次元を異にする第3の水脈、つまり、著者が第8章で取り上げた、「インカの力」を求める民衆の心性とが複雑に絡みあいながら収斂していく過程を追ひ、その意味を読み解く。

第10章では、まず著者は、18世紀初頭、スペイン継承戦争後に登場したブルボン朝スペインがおもに財政立て直しを目的に植民地で実施したさまざまな経済政策、とりわけ税制改革（増税）に対して、先住民のみならず、混血やクリオーリョなど、アンデスの民衆が示した抵抗運動の中で、「インカ」表象をめぐる三つの流れが次第に収斂して噴出したのがコンドルカンキを領袖とする、いわゆる「トゥパク・アマル二世の反乱」であると主張する。ついで、著者は、反乱鎮圧後にスペイン王室が採った、「インカ」の力を抹殺する政策により、「インカ」表象をめぐる三つの流れが寸断されて消え去り、アンデスにおける先住民と白人の「共生」の可能性が見果てぬ夢に化したと断じる。つまり、著者は、アンデス社会において、先スペイン期の「神格化されたインカ」が16世紀半ばの「歴史化されたインカ」を嚆矢として、植民地時代を通じて「再歴史化されたインカ」と「脱/非歴史化されたインカ」という、三つの異なる流れを創出し、それらは18世紀末にいったん一つに収斂したものの、19世紀初頭には、「主体なきインカの歴史化」という形で完成したと結論づけるのである。

おわりに

以上、ごく簡単に本書の内容を章ごとに追ってみた。本書は、著者がフロレス・ガリンドの研究成果を踏まえ、近年フランスの歴史家グリュジンスキ（Gruzinski, Serge）が「カトリック王国」を分析規模に設定し、二項対立的な思考とは対立するようなメスティーンソ的思考をキー概念に、とくに従来の国民国家史を超えたマクロな歴史を「接続された歴

史」という切り口で提示したように（「カトリック王国—接続された歴史と世界—」竹下和亮訳 『思想』第937号所収 [岩波書店、2002年]、71-116頁）、「スペイン帝国」を分析規模として、メスティーソ的思考で、インカ支配期からスペイン支配下の植民地時代を経て独立期にいたるアンデスの社会と思想のマクロな歴史を描いた作品である。つまり、著者はアンデスの人々とその社会の変遷を「接続された歴史」の視点から鋭く解き明かしたのである。それは、例えば、従来のアンデス史観に通底する「征服者（スペイン人）対 被征服者（先住民）」、あるいは「支配者（白人）対 被支配者（先住民や混血などの非白人）」といった、二項対立的な視点からはとうてい描き出すことができないアンデス社会の動態が「インカ」表象をめぐる三つの流れを軸に、スペインのみならず、当時の「世界」の歴史的脈絡に位置づけられて解明されていることから窺える。

とは言え、本書に問題がまったくないわけではない。例えば、先スペイン期から17世紀前半のアンデス社会の動態と、イベリア半島の同君連合が崩壊したハプスブルグ朝支配期の後半から18世紀後半のブルボン改革期にかけてのアンデス社会の動態に関する記述を比較すると、明らかに前者に比重が置かれ、その結果、後者に関しては、例えば、リマやクスコなど、都市部の「特殊な」状況がアンデス社会全体へ敷衍されるなど、やや牽強附会的な見解が散見される。しかし、それは、世界の学界において、アンデス史研究が主にクロニカの分析に大きく依存して、先住民文化や征服史の解明に重点を置いた時期から、膨大な量にのぼる未刊の土着史料・地方行政文書・訴訟文書・教会文書などを利用し、さまざまな遺跡、建造物、絵画、工芸品などをも分析対象として、多様な民族集団の住むアンデスの地方史、とくに17世紀半ばから18世紀後半にいたる植民地時代史の解明へ、大きく方向を転じてまだ日が浅いことを考慮すれば、許容される範囲の瑕疵と言えるだろう。その意味で、本書は著者の今後のさらなる研鑽と発展を大いに期待させる作品である。最後に、著者が現地体験をちりばめながら、「過去との対話」の意味や重要性をそれとなく読者に語りかける、その巧みな歴史叙述は特筆に値する。

木畑洋一著『イギリス帝国と帝国主義—— 比較と関係の視座』

(有志舎、2008 年)

古 矢 旬

かつて神話学者ジョーゼフ・キャンベルは、さまざまな地域社会のさまざまな時代の神話に共通に現れてくるひとつのイメージについて語っている。「ワシとヘビとの戦い」のイメージである。「ヘビは土地に縛りつけられているが、ワシは精神的な飛翔である。こういう葛藤は私たちみんなが経験するのではないのでしょうか。そしてその二つが合体したとき、すばらしいドラゴンが生まれます。翼を持ったヘビです」。¹⁾

すべての人間が経験するとされるこの葛藤に、おそらくもっとも職業的に立ち向かうことを要求されているのは、歴史家であるといってよいであろう。彼（もしくは彼女）は一方で、複雑に入り組んだ過去の大小さまざまな事件や事象や問題の姿形を、残された史料の森の中に迷い込み、地を這うようにして探ることによって、個別に再現してゆかなければならない。と同時に歴史家は、その個別性の迷路から意識的に身を遠ざけ距離を置くことによって、個々の事象相互の関係を鳥瞰的、客観的に見通し、時代の全体的構図を明らかにすることを求められている。

本書は、200 頁あまりのコンパクトな体裁ではありながら、この二重の課題をいくつかの重要な世界史的テーマに即して「ドラゴン」のように追究し続けてきた歴史家の足跡を示し、その方法論と独創的視点の展開を簡潔にまとめ、明らかにするとともに、現時点での史学的到達点の集成を試みた、きわめて重要な著作である。

本書の各章は、元はそれぞれ異なった機会に異なったプロジェクトのために書かれた論文であるが、本書のためにあらためて重複を削ぎ、加筆されたこともあり、イギリス帝国主義の成熟から衰退をめぐる著者の一貫した問題関心に沿って、周到かつ緊密に綯い合わされた統合的な一書をなす印象が強い。

その全体は、3 部 8 章の構成をとっている。第 I 部「帝国主義への視座」は、「9.11 事件」以後急速に台頭を見たいわゆる「アメリカ帝国論」の批判的検討を通して、著者独自の「世界史のなかの帝国・帝国主義」理解を提示する第 1 章と、著者の帝国理解においてもっとも独創的といってよい「帝国意識論」を概観した第 2 章とからなる。このいわば方法論的な 2 章における著者の主張の眼目は、「アメリカ帝国論」の多くに共通に見られる非歴史性という弊を克服するためには、現代世界を現代のみに視点を据えてみるのではなく、歴史的に見なければならないという点にある。すなわち現下の世界状況を全体的に理解するためには、冷戦後、とくに 21 世紀に入ってから顕著となったアメリカの軍事的・経済的・文化的な一極化という事実を挙げるだけでは決定的に不十分であると著者は主張する。著者によれば、そこで必要なことは、少なくとも世界史を 19 世紀中葉にまで遡

¹⁾ ジョーゼフ・キャンベル、ビル・モイヤーズ（飛田茂雄訳）『神話の力』（早川書房、1992 年）、85 頁。

り、イギリス帝国の完成、19世紀末から第一次世界大戦に至るヨーロッパ帝国主義の高潮期、ついで2つの世界大戦による帝国主義諸国の動揺と帝国の解体期、そしてこの帝国の衰退過程と並行する脱植民地化に及ぶ長期一連の構造的な歴史変動の帰結として「現代」をとらえ直すことである。

こうした問題設定を受けて、続く第Ⅱ部「帝国主義の諸相」では、まず第3章において、ヴィクトリア女王の即位50周年と60周年を賀する二つの式典（ゴールデン・ジュビリーとダイヤモンド・ジュビリー）によって象徴される絶頂期のイギリス帝国の概貌が、植民地支配を裏打ちする「帝国意識」の昂揚、国民社会へのジンギイズムの浸透といった側面に力点を置いて描かれる。

しかし、続く4、5章が明らかにするように、ダイヤモンド・ジュビリーの頃までには、イギリスのみならず、フランス、ドイツ、ロシアをはじめとするヨーロッパ大陸諸国も植民地の争奪戦に加わり、植民地化の波はアフリカと東アジアを洗い、世界史は明らかに「帝国主義世界体制」と呼びうる段階へと足を踏み入れていた。そして東アジアにおいてそのような地殻変動を促進した一因が、他ならぬ日本帝国の台頭であった。

第4章は、日清戦争と義和団事件と日露戦争を弾みとして日本が、イギリス主導下の帝国主義世界体制に新興帝国として参入してゆく過程を概観し、その過程で生じてきたヨーロッパ諸列強の対日批判と東アジア地域の対日警戒の高まりとに言及する。続く第5章では、この新しい「非西欧」「非白人」帝国の歴史的、地域的特色がイギリス帝国との比較を通して考察され、同盟で結ばれたこの二つの島国の帝国支配の構造と帝国意識が、世紀転換期から両大戦間期にいかなる変容を遂げてゆくかが描き出されてゆく。その際、著者の論述は、帝国側の植民地政策と植民地側の対応と抵抗という二つの観点の間を自在に往復しながら、また時に他の帝国主義国とその植民地との関係にも比較史的に目を配りながら、進められてゆく。こうして、帝国本国（中心）と植民地（周縁）との間の垂直的な支配被支配関係に着目して、日英をはじめとするいくつかの帝国主義列強の事例を比較検討することによって、著者は「帝国主義世界体制」の全体的構図を明らかにしてゆく。

第Ⅲ部では、「脱植民地化と帝国の残映」というタイトルが物語るように、著者の視点は、この世界体制の動揺から黄昏へと移行してゆき、ついには独立後の旧植民地諸国が生み出す新しい国際的秩序の可能性へと至る。第6章において著者は、この移行を促した最大の歴史的事件として、二つの世界大戦をとりあげ、それぞれが「帝国主義世界体制」に与えた打撃を、あらためて帝国と植民地の両側の状況に触れつつ明らかにしてゆく。

そして最後の2章では「脱植民地化」という世界史的な地殻変動の二つの帰結が語られ、近未来の世界への糸口が示される。第7章では、この変動が、イギリス帝国を連邦の国際組織たるコモンウェルスへと変えていった経緯が明らかにされ、ついでこの「帝国の残像」を背景とする「連邦」が、今後イギリスの国際的影響力の源泉となりうる可能性が検討されている。

最終第8章では、帝国の政治的支配がほとんど終了したにもかかわらず、なお「脱植民地化」が未完であるという現状が指摘されている。第一に植民地の独立という「政治的脱植民地化」は、必ずしも旧植民地の経済的従属や文化的・精神的な被支配という現実を払拭したわけではないからである。また第二に、帝国の実体が消滅した後も、かつての帝国の支配者と被支配者の両方に「帝国意識」の残滓が依然として色濃く認められるからであ

る。世界中の多くの旧植民地地域において、「脱植民地化」がまだ完了していないばかりか、かつての宗主国の国際意識には、なお帝国主義時代の文明観・人種観・歴史観が執拗に残り続けている。

著者によれば、このことはイギリスをはじめとするヨーロッパの旧宗主国についてだけいえるわけではない。とりわけアメリカと日本では、問題の所在自体が意識されていないだけに、その根はより深く、克服しがたいともいえる。アメリカの場合、自国の起源が通常「(イギリス)帝国からの独立＝脱植民地化」に求められるため、20世紀の「帝国主義世界体制」に一帝国主義国家として自らも加わった過去への無自覚、無批判を招きがちである。また日本の場合、自らの帝国の解体と「脱植民地化」の全プロセスを敗戦後の戦勝国の権力行使に委ねることとなった結果、通常の「脱植民地化」過程で旧宗主国が経験する植民地民衆の抗議運動や民族独立運動との対決にともなう国民的痛苦をおおかたのところ経験せずに済みますこととなった。このいわば他からの強制による受動的な「脱帝国化」は、過去の植民地支配が現地の人民にもたらした犠牲をめぐる日本と日本人の罪責感の欠落をもたらし、現在に至るまで、日本が東アジアにおいて国際的信頼を勝ち得ていない根本的理由となっていると著者は指摘する。

以上の概要からも知られるように、本書は「イギリス帝国」という未曾有の広大な地域に支配を及ぼした政治体の形成・発展・衰退・解体の過程を歴史的に辿り、それぞれの段階でこの帝国が人類史の全体に及ぼしたインパクトを順をおって明らかにし、最後には世界がかつてそのような「帝国」をもったという事実が、現代になお残している影響のいかんを問おうとするものである。したがって直接間接に本書の論述がカヴァーする時代は、19世紀から21世紀に及び、空間はイギリス帝国が最盛期に獲得した「世界性」を反映して文字通り地球大に及ぶ。このような巨大な主題をきわめて限られたスペースの中で扱いながら、本書は平凡な概説にも退屈な通史にも堕することがない。その一つの理由が、達意平明でありながら生彩に富む著者の文体にあることは疑いない。しかし、本書の歴史書としての魅力は、それ以上に歴史のダイナミズムを的確にとらえるためのいくつかの方法論的な工夫によって生み出されているように思われる。

その意味で、本書の第一の特長は、イギリス帝国史の全体像を理解するための鍵となる語句、概念が、一貫してぶれのない定義を与えられた上で、叙述の流れの中に適切に配されている点にある。人は優れた歴史書を読むとき、適切な場面で用いられた適切なキーワードやキーフレーズによって、あたかも自らの歴史理解を妨げていたデッドロックが一瞬にして開かれ、未知の歴史的世界が広いパースペクティヴをもって鮮やかに立ち現れてくるかのような感を抱くものである。本書には、そのような意味で文脈示唆的あるいは文脈創造的な鍵概念が随所にちりばめられている。

そうした鍵概念のうちもっとも重要なものが、第2章全体をその解明に当てている「帝国意識」であることは間違いない。それは、「自らが、世界政治の中で力を持ち、地球上の他民族に対して強力な支配権をふるい影響力を及ぼしている国、すなわち帝国の『中心』国に属しているという意識である」(38頁)と、名著『支配の代償』²⁾からの引用によ

²⁾ 木畑洋一『支配の代償―英帝国の崩壊と「帝国意識」』(東京大学出版会、1987年)。

って簡潔に定義されている。その上で、その具体的な内容として「民族・人種差別意識」「大国主義的ナショナリズム」「文明論的優越主義」(とそこに発する「文明化の使命」感)などの要素が抽出され提示される。こうした諸要素からなる「帝国意識」は、いったん形成されるや帝国の統治システムや構造の盛衰とは、ある程度独立に消長する。そして、さまざまな宣伝やメディアの装置をとおして、帝国主義本国のエリート層から大衆へと広がってゆくばかりか、被支配地域の現地エリート層や、はてはその民衆にまで浸透し、植民地の独立にとって大きな障害をなすこともある。そればかりでない。この「帝国意識」は、イギリス以外のどの帝国主義国-植民地関係にも付きまとう現象であり、したがってこれに注目することによって、「帝国主義世界体制」の広がりや強度と持続性を測り、比較することも可能となる。

同様な文脈発見的なキーワードとしては、「帝国の総力戦」が挙げられる。当初ヨーロッパに勃発した戦争が、海を越えて広がり「世界大戦」に発展したこと自体が、帝国主義体制の性格の反映であったという指摘に加え、著者はこの二度にわたる世界大戦では、いずれの場合も、被支配地域の資源も人間も支配地域のそれらと同様に動員されたという意味で「帝国の総力戦」であったという。著者によれば、このキーワードは戦後の「脱植民地化」という歴史の転換点を理解する上でも重要である。「帝国主義列強が支配領域のさらなる拡大をねらって争う状況自体が、その支配力を突き崩していく力、すなわち被支配の位置からの脱却をめざす民族運動、独立運動の力をはぐくんでいった」(本書163頁)からである。そしてこのキーワードは、「帝国の階層構造」というもう一つのキーワードと併置されたとき、たとえば第二次世界大戦の連合国側からの「反ファシズム戦争」という規定が一面的であり、連合国の植民地支配の実態をいかにも隠蔽するかのよう働いてきたという事実にも光をあてることとなる。

これら以外にも、(委任統治体制の帝国主義的性格を言い当てる)「隠された併合」、(脱植民地化以後もイギリスの国際行動を縛る)「帝国の残像」、(国王の国民統合機能の象徴化としての)「ロイヤル・ツアー」など、一語をもって広い歴史的背景を鮮明に思い起こさせるキーワードやキーフレーズが本書に生彩を加え、同時にテーマと叙述の一貫性を支えている。

さて、本書を貫く第二の方法論的特長は、視座の採り方の多様性、柔軟性にある。そこにはむしろ「帝国」という政治体の重層的構成、多元的編成が反映している面もあるだろうが、「帝国意識」についてすでに見たように、著者の比較の視座は、イギリス本国とインド、アイルランドという「半」植民地的存在、イギリス植民地体制とフランスのそれ、日英比較、脱植民地化における東アジアとアフリカとインドの比較、イギリス帝国と英連邦とコモンウェルスと、論旨の展開にしたがって自在に移動していく。こうして世界性と地域性との両側から「帝国主義世界体制」の実相が具体的に明らかにされてゆくのである。

第三に、冒頭で述べたような二つの視点の間に巧みな均衡が計られている点である。読者は、第Ⅱ、Ⅲ部にちりばめられた幾多の事件や人物をめぐる生き生きとしたエピソードの数々を読み進めるうちに、いつの間にか世紀単位の大変動の渦中に引き込まれてゆくのである。このようなダイナミックで統合的な著述を可能にするためには、一方において広範な史料の博搜と歴史の細部をおろそかにしない史料の実証の積み重ねが必要なことはいうまでもないが、他方でそれと並行して、個別の細部の相互連関の探求を通して時

代の全体的構造をとらえるための理論化作業を繰り返すことも不可欠であろう。その意味で、本書は『支配の代償』以来 20 年以上にわたり著者が積み重ねてきた実証と理論化の結晶であるといつてよい。

以上見てきたように、本書は内容の面からも方法の面からも、ただにイギリス史の専門家だけではなく、広く世界史、現代史の研究者に裨益するところきわめて大きい好著である。アメリカ現代史研究に従事する評者にとっても、とりわけ 19 世紀後半以降の半世紀間のアメリカの対外関係を、イギリスを中心とする「帝国主義世界体制」のうちに位置づけて見直そうとする本書の試みはきわめて刺激的であり、近年注目を浴びる「アメリカ史の国際化」「世界史の中のアメリカ史」といった学問的動向にさらに弾みをつける成果であるといつてよい。

とはいえ、本来が論文集であるという本書の性格からも、また少ない紙幅に地球史的なテーマを盛ったという限界からも、とくにイギリス史を専門とはしない他地域の歴史研究者からは、著者に問いたい点も少なくないものと推量される。そこで最後に評者も、本書に対して、いくつかの問題提起を行うことで責めをふさぐこととしたい。

アメリカ現代史に従事するものとして、まず問いたいことは、「現代世界」をどう見るかという点に関わる。最終の第 8 章のタイトル「未完の脱植民地化」がいみじくも暗示するように、著者は、現代世界をイギリス帝国の延長線上にとらえ、それが「帝国主義時代」の終焉（＝「脱植民地化」）の最終段階にあると理解している。他方で著者は第 1 章において、現在の自身が「経済グローバリズムを推進する多国籍資本のもとで、強国の権力行使が頻繁にみられるという現状認識」（28 頁）に立っていることを認めている。しかし本書は、この二筋の現代世界理解を交錯させるところには踏み込んでいない。ここに残された問題は、1970 年代以降つまり「帝国主義世界体制」崩壊以後に現れたグローバリズムが、「脱植民地化」という前代からの未決の課題といかに関連しているのかという点にある。未完の脱植民地化と現下のグローバル化との歴史的連関をかつてのイギリス帝国支配下の諸地域の現状に照らして理解することは、現代史学にとってもっとも重要な課題であるように思われる。

第二に、現代（とりわけ 21 世紀に入ってから）のアメリカの世界支配を「帝国」ではなく、むしろ「ヘゲモン」と規定するべきであるという著者の立場（29 頁）は、「帝国」「帝国主義」を 19 世紀中葉から第二次世界大戦までの時代性の刻印を帯びた歴史用語として用いるという著者の厳密な学問的立場から一応は首肯できる。しかし、アメリカ史の文脈で考えたとき、本書にいう（いわば認識象徴としての）「帝国主義」とはまったく異なった意味で、（組織象徴として）アメリカを「帝国」と呼びならわす政治的伝統がアメリカにあったこともまた事実であろう。たとえばジェファソンのいう「自由の帝国」は、本書にいう「帝国主義」とは（あったとしても）きわめて希薄な関係しかないものの、アメリカ人独自の「帝国意識」として無視しえないのではないだろうか。「9.11 事件」以後、雨後の筍のように現出した「アメリカ帝国論」の多くは、レーニンではなくジェファソンの伝統との関連で「帝国」に言及したものではないだろうか。冷戦以後のアメリカの世界支配について、著者はいう。「それ〔現在の世界〕は、帝国主義という概念でも帝国という概念でも説明できない新しい様相を提示している世界である」（29 頁）と。しかし、はた

してその新しさの中に、著者のいう帝国主義の一世紀前に言及された「アメリカ＝自由の帝国」の思想的伝統の反映はないであろうか。ことは、言葉の厳密さ以上に、思想の内実にかかっているように思われる。

第三に、これも現代の世界像に関わる問題であるが、著者の論点は「帝国主義世界体制」崩壊以後の「脱植民地化」、国家独立というフェーズに集中するあまり、帝国意識からの脱却の過程で、とりわけ植民地の内側に生ずる民族意識の多面的な実相が（少なくとも本書の限りでは）閑却されているかの印象がある。著者のいう「精神の脱植民地化」は、一元的な国民意識を生み出すよりは、しばしば多元的な民族意識や民族的伝統の「(再)創造」を伴ったのであり、それゆえ「脱植民地化」の過程は、少なからぬケースで新独立国内の民族間対立や内戦をすら伴う結果となったのではないだろうか。

むろんこれらは、おおかたのところ本書の扱う問題領域を外れるものであり、望蜀の感を免れない疑問や問題提起に過ぎない。むしろそれらは、本書が与えてくれる豊かな歴史の見取り図にしたがって、今後世界史の各分野で追究されてゆくべき問題であろう。

油井大三郎著『好戦の共和国 アメリカ—— 戦争の記憶をたどる』

(岩波書店、2008 年)

橋 川 健 竜

本書は、冷戦起源史、日本占領期史、アジア系アメリカ人研究、戦争観の比較など、数多くの分野で先駆的な研究を発表してアメリカ史研究・現代史研究を牽引してきた著者が、9・11 テロ後のアメリカが見せた軍事行動への突進に衝撃を受け、一般読者も視野に入れて執筆した、「アメリカの国民文化と「好戦性」の関係」(v頁)を歴史的に俯瞰する書物である。「好戦性」という問題を論じるには、戦争にいたる経緯や個々の戦闘の経過にとどまらず、軍隊組織と社会の関係、集合的記憶の形成、政治文化の変化など、数多くのことがらに触れる必要があるが、著者は独自のやりかたでそれらを整理し、有機的な議論を組み立てて、アメリカ史の全時代を新書の紙幅で論じている。以下ではその議論枠組みを照らすことを目標に、本書の内容を紹介し、検討したい。

導入部「はじめに」で著者は民主主義を「意見の対立や紛争を「平和的」に処理しようとする政治思想」(v頁)ととらえ、これと戦争によって解決を図る姿勢とを対比させる。本来は対立するはずの両者が並び立つ特殊な環境(あえて本書のタイトルに「帝国」でなく「共和国」をおく理由である)を考えるため、著者はアメリカ社会を「好戦」勢力、「反戦」勢力、そして防衛戦争を肯定するが最後の手段ととらえて慎重な姿勢を見せる「状況的非戦派」、の3つに分類する。これにより、多数派である「状況的非戦派」を武力行使容認に傾かせてきた「状況」の検討、という課題が設定される。

第1章は植民地時代の対先住民戦争・植民地戦争、独立戦争を扱い、第2章は日本では特に研究の薄い第二次米英戦争とアメリカ・メキシコ戦争を取り上げて、多くの新しい論点を提示している。植民地では常備軍ではなく民兵制度が導入されて定着し、軍事は住民が有事の際に限って対応するものとされた。ただし相手が先住民の場合、戦いは残虐な「無限定戦争」になっていき(9-12頁)、この時代の戦争には「二重基準」(12頁)が存在した。独立戦争中、ジョージ・ワシントンは訓練・火力に勝る正規軍を相手に苦戦する。だがこの戦争は、しだいに北米で「「国民戦争」的性格をその意識面で帯び」た(33頁)のに加えて、外交交渉を有利に運ぶ手段として戦闘を散発的に行う「限定戦争」の伝統にイギリス軍が従った、フランス・スペインなどが参戦して国際戦争となった、などの特殊性が幸いして、「辛勝」(32頁)で終わった。他方19世紀前半には、常備軍組織が形をなし、軍編成が民兵中心から志願兵・職業軍人中心へと変化し始めて、兵士個人の戦争の受け止めが組織の支障とならない体制がアメリカ・メキシコ戦争までに作られる。ユリシーズ・グラントのこの戦争にたいする批判的発言(66頁)は、その証拠になっている。また独立後の戦争は対先住民「無限定戦争」を含め、そこで戦果をあげた軍人が政治家として台頭する踏み台になり、好戦的風潮が政治に強く入り込み始める。戦時に愛国心が高まると戦争反対勢力が厳しい非難を浴びて沈黙させられる、という現在まで続くパターン

も、この時代に起源がある(52頁)。独立戦争後には大陸軍が急速に動員解除され、ワシントンは後に大統領退任演説で国際情勢への関与を戒めるなど、初期アメリカの共和主義には「啓蒙思想的な「戦争自制」観」があった(51頁)が、第二次米英戦争後、そこから外れていく変化が目につき始めるのである。

南北戦争・米西戦争を扱う第3章と第一次・第二次世界大戦を取り上げる第4章は、今日まで続くアメリカ社会の好戦性が定着していく過程の分析といえる。南北戦争は予想に反して長期化し、妥協の余地のないイデオロギー戦争色を強めた。南北双方で大きな人的・物的資源が動員され、進歩した兵器が旧式の戦法の下で威力を発揮し、不適切な衛生・救命体制もあって多数の死者を出し(本書末尾の表3に、戦争ごとの動員数と戦死者数が挙げられている)、「アメリカ史上初の「総力戦」となった」(83頁)。その衝撃は、いったん南北戦争を肯定してしまった平和運動が再出発して思想を深める契機になったが、国民一般レベルではすぐには消化されなかった。リンカンのゲティスバーグ演説は戦争目的を後から付け加えたとされるに止まる。またよく言われる「悲劇」という言葉も、「おわりに」で言及される(244頁)が、第3章ではタイトルにあるものの本文では強調されない。むしろ著者は、「武器によって連邦制が守られたという実感」(86頁)に加えて戦後に焦点が兵士の苦闘の経験のほうに移り、それが愛国心と関連づけられたことを強調する。兵士のパレードや、星条旗で戦死者の棺をくるむ演出、従軍経験に基づく大規模な圧力団体の形成、軍人恩給の潤沢な支給などを通じて「傷」が「癒」され(96頁)、南北戦争は肯定的な記憶として定着していったのである。また、続く米西戦争への両セクションからの参加が、全国的な愛国心の高揚と相まって南北間の「和解」を推進したという指摘(114頁)は、戦争と戦争の関係が強まっていくことを示唆する。そして「すべての戦争をなくすための戦争」というウッドロー・ウィルソンの第一次世界大戦への参戦の理由づけは、南北戦争の記憶を身近に感じ、平和的紛争解決に関心を寄せた南部人らしい議論でもあったが、これを受けて少なからぬ平和運動団体が参戦支持に転じる(119, 127-28頁)。南北戦争後にはまだ反常備軍・「戦争自制」の姿勢が残っていて動員解除が急速に進んだが、その後アメリカはフィリピンを例外に非公式帝国路線を歩んで「海洋帝国化」し、リアリスティックな世界秩序・戦略観が形を成して海軍を中心に「軍事大国化」していく(115, 116頁)。第一次・第二次世界大戦のいずれもアメリカは他国に比して犠牲者数が少なかったが、第一次世界大戦後には単独介入派と孤立主義派がアメリカの国際連盟加盟を阻み、ウィルソンの国際協調路線を否定した。その後1945年までには、平時における強大な軍事力の保持と、武力行使を常に視野に入れた国際主義が確立し、第二次世界大戦の経験がそれを支えた。

第5章は冷戦下の朝鮮戦争とベトナム戦争を、第6章は冷戦後の湾岸戦争と9.11テロ後の戦争を扱い、好戦的体制のダイナミクスと一つの戦争が次の戦争に及ぼす影響を論じて、叙述は堅牢である。「パルハーバー症候群」「ミュンヘン症候群」などが政治指導者に「強迫観念」(163-64, 173頁)としてののしかかり、脱植民地化過程を反共主義の眼鏡で強引に解釈せしめたが、他方朝鮮戦争末期までに、限定戦争以上を望まない世論も確立した。トルーマンは朝鮮戦争をより全面的な戦争に拡大させないように努力したとされ、中国義勇軍の反攻の記憶は、のちにベトナム戦争の拡大を抑える一因となったとされる。逆にジョン・ケネディについては、著者はその好戦的姿勢に光をあてて、「ケネディ神話」に

水をさしている。ベトナム戦争の泥沼化と敗戦は新たに反戦「世論」を高めさせ、長期の介入に対する警戒感を社会に定着させたため（「ベトナム症候群」（201-3頁）、政治指導者は「ベトナムの悪夢」という新たな強迫観念を抱え込む。湾岸戦争時のブッシュ（父）政権はこれを気にするが、軍事技術の進歩に頼った短期戦の計画を立案、さらに多国籍軍の形式を整えることで戦争に持ち込み、後に虚偽と判明する情報を流布させ、日々の戦況について厳しい報道管制を敷くなど、マスメディア操作にも念をいれた（210-13頁）。この戦争は短期間で終結するが、皮肉にもその限定戦争ぶりを批判するネオコン勢力が現れる。左翼的知識人の中にも対テロ戦争に同調する者が現れるといった9.11テロ後の愛国心の高揚を利用して、ブッシュ（子）政権はアフガニスタン戦争、さらに目標を大幅に拡張してイラク戦争にすすむ。世界からの強い批判にもかかわらず、「ブッシュ・ドクトリン」で先制攻撃を正当化し、国連安保理の了解を得ぬまま強行したこの戦争は、泥沼化してしまう。2008年大統領選挙について、著者は主要候補者2名（刊行当時）の戦争に関する見解を紹介し、イラク戦争に反対したバラク・オバマもアフガニスタン戦争を肯定していて、むしろ介入を強める可能性があることを示唆し、アメリカ社会の好戦性の根深さを強調している。

「おわりに」はアメリカの戦争の歴史を植民地時代、独立から19世紀末まで、米西戦争から第二次世界大戦まで、冷戦期、冷戦終結から現代まで、と5つに区分した上で、好戦性の理由を領土・市場拡大と軍事が結びついてきた歴史、リアリズムの潮流、最後の手段として戦争を許容する傾向、理想主義レトリックによる反戦論の逆転と戦争の正当化、の4点にまとめ、マスメディアが愛国心に流されて批判機能を失いがちなことを補足する。そして冒頭の対比に立ち返り、アメリカで実践されている民主主義は「国民民主制」（248頁）で「主権」に強くこだわり、国境の制約にとらわれていること、他方で他国は国際機関に「主権」を部分的に譲渡していること、を指摘する。こうした傾向にアメリカが合流していけるかどうか注視すべき、とのメッセージをもって、本書は閉じられる。

本書の好戦性分析は、政権ごとの世界戦略構想と実践の国際政治学的・短期的な比較ではなく、政府や人々を軍事力行使に押しやる有形無形の影響力、特に以前の戦争の記憶のそれという、より中長期的で感覚にかかわる側面を扱っている。議論は実際の軍事力行使に関係する発言と行動に絞られていて、「戦争」という言葉がしばしばレトリックとして用いられること——たとえば、ジョンソン政権の対貧困政策は本書でも通例に従って「貧困との闘い」と訳されているが（188頁）、原語では war on poverty である——から一般化を図るといった飛躍は、著者の慎むところである。「好戦」と「状況的非戦」のせめぎあいや、「好戦」側に踏み出す際の葛藤をとらえるため、南北戦争従軍中に見た「積み重なった死体」を米西戦争前に思い出すウィリアム・マッキンレー（101頁）や、第一次世界大戦への宣戦提案に対する反応を見て「若者への死のメッセージ…を賞賛するとは何とおかしなことか」と秘書に語るウィルソン（127-28頁）など、印象的な引用が挿入されている。著者の関心が「状況」の解明にあることを明らかにし、読者の理解を助けるだろう。前の戦争の経験が次の戦争に及ぼす影響も、第二次世界大戦期の国際秩序構想への超党派の取り組み、ベトナム戦争の戦線拡大を抑える方針、湾岸戦争を短期戦にする努力、など一定の効果を持ったことが指摘される。それに比べ、いわば「学習」の様子がなく、

むしろ過去の経験に挑戦したかのようなイラク戦争の特異性は際立って見える。「反戦」勢力については、全体的に記述は羅列的で、分析は控えめである。本書での言及から考えると、南北戦争以後、平和運動は次第に一国の政治文化を超えて、国際組織による紛争調停メカニズムなど、国際的な制度設計へと向かう。とすれば、戦争反対勢力と好戦性を並列して、同等にアメリカ政治文化の内的発展に関連づけるのは難しいのだろう。その点、「兵士の手紙」の公刊、「志願兵の帰還を求める運動」への貢献など、米比戦争期の反帝国主義者連盟の活動の紹介（108-10 頁）は精彩を放つ。その主張は一枚岩とはいえないにしても、米比戦争の性格——人種差別的戦闘と公式植民地帝国化——と自国理解——独立を果たした共和国——との間に矛盾を見出したこの団体の感覚が、国内の政治文化に根ざすからであろう。

非戦感覚が好戦性に抗しきれないことが検討課題であるため、集合的な非戦感覚を表現する言葉は、本書の鍵を握る。特徴的なことに人間でなく感覚そのものが主語となり、いかなる集団がそれを抱くのかは明らかにされない。まず「気分」は、「楽観論は吹き飛び、厭戦気分が高まった」（81 頁）と、戦時中の戦況に対する感覚に用いられる。戦争終結後になると、「平時に大規模な常備軍を維持することを警戒する心情が復活した」（90 頁）という表現も見られる。だが「心情」は、ウィルソンの「親南部的な心情」（118 頁）という表現から伺えるとおおり、理性的判断とは異質で、むしろ「状況」に影響されうるなど、その不安定性に特徴がある。第二次世界大戦は「[愛国的心情]の原点」（162 頁）となり、「心情」のあり方を決定的に固定してしまう。多くの政治指導者がそこに各種の「強迫観念」を感じるようになる（だが著者は、他地域では第二次世界大戦後、「戦争に対する懐疑的な心情が各地で発生した」（162 頁）とも述べ、この「心情」は西ヨーロッパでは西欧統合に結実したとする）。70 年代からは「ベトナム戦争の記憶をめぐる戦いが戦後に継続されている」（204 頁）ので、集合的に心情を語ることは難しく、この言葉は出てこない。第5章では戦争を厭う感覚が「限定戦争方針を支持する声」（177 頁）、「派兵を誤りとする世論」（194 頁）などと表現されるが、この「声」はもはや非戦以下になっているし、「世論」はマスメディアを通じて具現化するという含みがある。湾岸戦争時、メディア対策の前に、「世論」は軍事力行使に対する有効な批判には発達しなかった。この戦争を短期の限定戦争にしたのはむしろ、指導者の側の「ベトナムの悪夢」という強迫観念である。9・11 テロに伴う「愛国心の高揚」（221 頁）を経て、オバマが語るのもあくまで「選択的な非戦論」（239 頁）である今日、アメリカの非戦感覚について、著者はきわめて懐疑的である。

なお、本書は「意識」という言葉も使っている。「[アメリカ人]としての抵抗意識」、「[国民戦争]的性格をその意識面で帯び」（共に 33 頁）、「[反常備軍]意識」（34, 39 頁）、「民兵の場合は市民意識や地方意識が戦争遂行を制約する側面があった」（68 頁）など、植民地期から独立戦争期に関する議論で頻出し、非戦感覚の表現にも多く用いられる。逆に、この時期については「心情」は語られない。「意識」と「心情」が交錯するのは南北戦争後の時期で、前の段落でも引用した「平時に大規模な常備軍を維持することを警戒する心情が復活した」（90 頁）という表現がみられる。評者は本書における「意識」について、「心情」よりも冷静な思考に定着し、確固としている印象を抱くが、もし反常備軍「意識」から「心情」への入れ替えが非戦感覚の相対的な後退を意味するのなら、「復活

した」という言い方は適当だろうか。ちなみに南北戦争後、「意識」は「実際に銃によって個人の生命や財産を守ろうとする意識を強めた」(86 頁)、「南北それぞれに強い敵対意識」(88 頁)など、好戦性を弱めるよりは強める側面について使われ、好戦性の定着を感じさせる。そして 20 世紀に関する記述に「意識」は登場しない。このように、人々の集合的思考がはっきり形を成し、啓蒙思想にもとづく非戦性が強かった時代として、著者は 18 世紀を高く評価している。だが近年では国王への忠誠心も含めて、「心情」的側面から植民地社会と政治を語る研究も出ており、¹⁾ 本書の描く 18 世紀の思考世界は少し気にかかる。

本書はこのように、時とともに情動性が強まっていく印象を与えるが、ジェンダーと戦争の関係を示唆する記述も、情動性を感じさせる。米西戦争期の積極的開戦派セオドア・ローズヴェルトの男らしさへのこだわりは「強迫観念」と紹介され(102 頁)、「南部連合の大統領デーヴィスにペチコートをはかせ、女性のイメージでからかう政治漫画」(89 頁)への言及や、地面に縛り付けられたまま「弱虫!」などとのしられる夢を見たと言語するリンドン・ジョンソンの回顧(195 頁)も、ジェンダーにかかわる。著者が挙げるその他の好戦性亢進要因とジェンダーはどうかかわり、いつどの程度重要だったのだろうか。男性性の不足ないし欠如を言いつのことは、好戦勢力の側が非戦感覚を攻撃し、情動的にくじく手段とも考えうる。この面を強調しすぎると議論が平板になる危険があるが、ニュアンスにかんする見解を聞きたいところである。

なお紙幅の問題もあって、好戦性を支える諸要素の多くは、アメリカ社会に定着した後は論及されなくなる。銃の流布のあり方が南北戦争後に変化し、「武装した民主制」(86 頁)の色彩を強めたと指摘されるが、銃の問題は 20 世紀を扱う章では出てこない。またベトナム戦争についてしばしば言われる、アメリカ兵の人種差別意識と軍略の暴虐性の関係も取り上げられない。無限定戦法の問題は、米比戦争で触れられた後、第二次世界大戦中の無差別爆撃や原爆投下に移り、敵集団の人種・民族的アイデンティティから焦点が外れていく。本書の課題は好戦性であって暴力一般ではないことを考えれば、論点が現れては消える感じがするのもやむを得ないだろうか。この点を含め、19 世紀末から今日までのアメリカ社会の多民族化・多文化化と好戦性・非戦性の関係は、基本的には愛国心の高揚に取り込まれるという理解だろうか、取り上げられない。第二次世界大戦期と 1950 年代に平和運動団体が、国内の人種差別問題に活動の焦点を移したこと(153, 180 頁)が触れられるにとどまっている。

加えて、細部にわたるが気になる点もある。英蘭関係の文脈で 17 世紀後半にイギリスが制海権を持ったと主張することは可能だろうが、英仏関係の場合、人口や陸軍力ではフランスのほうが上であり、それをイギリス側は強く意識していた。17 世紀後半に「フランスは、イギリスの覇権に挑戦を始め」(13 頁)と言えるだろうか。また仏領カナダの地名は、英語読みが通例になっていない場合はフランス語読みで表記してもよいかもしれな

¹⁾ Brendan McConville, *The King's Three Faces: The Rise and Fall of Royal America, 1688–1776* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006); Nicole Eustace, *Passion Is the Gale: Emotion, Power, and the Coming of the American Revolution* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008).

い。19世紀については、「連邦への復帰」(82頁)や「アンドリュー・ジョンソン大統領は、連邦支持派ではあったが」(95頁)、などにおける「連邦」は the Union のことであろうが、「リンカン連邦制を守るために応戦を決断し」(72頁)や「連邦制が守られたからといって、南北の差を超えた共通意識が形成されたわけでもなかった」(90頁)における「連邦制」は、the Unionとfederalismの両方を指すようにも見える。また南北の兵士間の和解の象徴の一つとして、1917年にゲティスバーグにようやく作られたリー將軍騎馬像(97頁)は、図像を紹介するとよかっただろう。逆に、69頁に写真がある同じ戦場の「ペン部隊記念碑」は連邦軍側か、本文が「北部の側から南軍関係の記念碑建設が助長され始めた」(97頁)と示唆するとおり南軍側なのか、説明が必要である。

評者の能力の問題で本書の前半にコメントがやや偏ったが、考察して最後に残るのは、やはり著者の力量への感嘆である。喫緊性ある大きな主題——帝国アメリカの重要側面の形成史——を設定して、関係する事実や論点を、日本のアメリカ研究界では研究が極めて手薄な軍事にかかわるそれを含めて、渉猟し、組み合わせたこと、そしてアメリカ史の全時代を新書一冊で、一つの有機的な流れとして扱いきったことは、改めて強調しておきたい。本書は一般読者に「心情」的楽観論を戒めさせ、歴史の重層的な蓄積が現在の状況を作っていることと、長期的な構えで今後の世界やアメリカを考えるべきであることを、実感させるだろう。そしてアメリカ史研究者には、本書はまた別の重みを携えて迫ってくる。緻密な本国の研究に日々触れる日本のアメリカ史研究者は、自分の研究でも細部の彫琢に気を取られがちで、自分の主題の持つ意味を考える作業が後回しになりうる。だが本書は、本来は順番が逆であることを、否応なく思い出させるのである。

2008 年度（平成 20 年度）活動報告

I. セミナー

テーマ	講師（所属機関）	司会	期日	共催者
The Rise and Fall of American Secularism	Denis Lacorne (L' Institut d'études politiques de Paris)	古矢 旬	2008.5.10	アメリカ政治研究会主催 / 基盤研究(A)「現代アメリカ・ナショナリズムの複合的編制をめぐる学際的研究」、基盤研究(A)「公共文化の胎動」、CPAS 共催
The Politics of Race Relations for Asian Americans	Linda Trinh Vo (University of California, Irvine)	矢口祐人	2008.6.4	東京大学教養学部国際ジャーナリズム寄付講座主催 / CPAS 共催
Farewell to Little Tokyo: Wartime Nisei Journalists and the Ambiguities of Assimilation	Greg Robinson (Université du Québec à Montréal)	矢口祐人	2008.6.18	東京大学教養学部国際ジャーナリズム寄付講座主催 / CPAS 共催
Remembering 9/11: Vernaculars of Trauma	Monisha Das Gupta (University of Hawai'i at Manoa)	矢口祐人	2008.6.25	東京大学教養学部国際ジャーナリズム寄付講座主催 / CPAS 共催
Mondialisation de la faillite: Faillite de la mondialisation (破綻のグローバリゼーション グローバリゼーションの破綻)	Susan George (Transnational Institute)	増田一夫	2008.7.1	基盤研究(A)「デニズンシップ」、東京大学総合文化研究科地域文化研究専攻、人間の安全保障プログラム、地域文化研究学科フランス分科、CPAS 共催
The Migration Revolution in British North America	Alan Taylor (University of California, Davis)	遠藤泰生	2008.9.12	基盤研究(A)「公共文化の胎動」、初期アメリカ学会、CPAS
Squaring the Circle: Colonial and Native Spaces	Alan Taylor (University of California, Davis)	橋川健竜	2008.9.18	基盤研究(A)「公共文化の胎動」、CPAS
From Piety to Politics: The Social Evolution of Modern Pentecostalism	Roger Robins (Marymount College/ 東京大学フルブライト招聘教授)	矢口祐人	2008.12.3	アメリカ学会

Print Culture and Public Opinion in Early America: Rethinking the Connections	David D. Hall (Harvard University)	橋川健竜	2009.1.13	アメリカ学会、基盤研究(A)「公共文化の胎動」/CPAS共催
Perry Arrives in Japan: Cultural Diplomacy in Old Manuscripts and New Media	Susan Smulyan (Brown University)	能登路雅子	2009.1.27	基盤研究(A)「アメリカの世界戦略と文化外交に関する学際的研究」、CPAS主催/アメリカ学会共催
From Lincoln to Obama: The First and Second Reconstructions in American History	Eric Foner (Columbia University)	古矢 旬	2009.3.16	CPAS主催/基盤研究(A)「現代アメリカ・ナショナリズムの複合的編制をめぐる学際的研究」、アメリカ史学会、アメリカ学会共催
Changes in Trans-Pacific Dynamics: Colonial Legacies and Current Issues	Keith Camacho (UCLA) Tritia Toyota (UCLA)	能登路雅子	2009.3.17	基盤研究(A)「アメリカの世界戦略と文化外交に関する学際的研究」、CPAS主催

II. シンポジウム等

- ・アメリカ太平洋地域研究センター公開シンポジウム「アメリカ太平洋とイギリス帝国：The British Empire, Australia and the Americas」

日時：2008年9月13日 13：30-17：00

場所：東京大学駒場キャンパス18号館ホール

プログラム：

挨拶 木村秀雄（東京大学大学院総合文化研究科副研究科長）

ブルース・ミラー（オーストラリア大使館政務担当公使）

司会 木畑洋一（東京大学アメリカ太平洋地域研究センター教授）

報告 フィリップ・ベル（ニューサウスウェールズ大学名誉教授）

「アメリカの影響から逃れて—ポストモダン・オーストラリアン・カルチャー（ズ）」

“Out from Down Under: Post-modern Australian Culture(s)”

アラン・テイラー（カリフォルニア大学デヴィス校教授）

「トマス・ジェファソンの太平洋：合衆国の建国と帝国の科学」

“Thomas Jefferson’s Pacific: The Science of Distant Empire, 1768–1811”

福島輝彦（桜美林大学法学・政治学系教授・学系長）

「地域は血より濃し？—オーストラリアの対外関係におけるイギリス帝国」

“Region is Thicker than Blood?: The British Empire in Australia’s Foreign Relations”

デイヴィッド・カーター

（クイーンズランド大学／東京大学アメリカ太平洋地域研究センター客員教授）

「大英帝国の減退—現代オーストラリア文化における英国性」

“The Empire Dies Back: Britishness in Contemporary Australian Culture”

コメント 古矢 旬（東京大学アメリカ太平洋地域研究センター長）

橋川健竜（東京大学アメリカ太平洋地域研究センター准教授）

主催：東京大学大学院総合文化研究科附属アメリカ太平洋地域研究センター

共催：東京大学大学院総合文化研究科地域文化研究専攻、東京大学大学院国際社会科学専攻、日本学術振興会科学研究費補助金

基盤研究（A）「現代アメリカ・ナショナリズムの複合的編制をめぐる学際的研究」

基盤研究（A）「アメリカの世界戦略と文化外交に関する学際的研究」

基盤研究（A）「公共文化の胎動」

助成：豪日交流基金、財団法人アメリカ研究振興会

・ オーストラリアレクチャーシリーズ

1) 「アメリカ太平洋とイギリス帝国：The British Empire, Australia and the Americas」

2) フィリップ・ベル教授講演会

日時：2008年9月17日（水）11：00-12：30

場所：東京大学本郷キャンパス福武ホール1階会議室

講演：フィリップ・ベル（ニューサウスウェールズ大学名誉教授）

「テレビジョンの（複数の）終焉—制度と文化はテレビの未来にどう関わるか—

（“The End(s) of Television: Institutional and Cultural Factors in “Television’s” Many Futures”）」

コメント：デイヴィッド・カーター

（クイーンズランド大学／東京大学アメリカ太平洋地域研究センター客員教授）

共催：東京大学大学院情報学環、東京大学大学院総合文化研究科附属アメリカ太平洋地域研究センター

助成：豪日交流基金

3) 公開シンポジウム “The End of Television in Australia”

日時：2008年9月18日（木）14：00-17：00

場所：追手門学院大学5号館3階5301教室

報告：香取淳子（長崎県立大学シーボルト校教授）

「オーストラリアのテレビ事情」

フィリップ・ベル（ニューサウスウェールズ大学名誉教授）

“The End of Television in Australia: Institutional and Cultural Factors in
“Television’s” Many Futures”

コメント：デイヴィッド・カーター

（クイーンズランド大学／東京大学アメリカ太平洋地域研究センター客員教授）

主催：追手門学院大学オーストラリア研究所

共催：東京大学大学院総合文化研究科附属アメリカ太平洋地域研究センター

助成：豪日交流基金

・シンポジウム「アメリカの自由—過去と現在—: American Freedom: Past and Present」

日時: 2009年3月20日(金) 13:30-17:00

場所: 東京大学駒場キャンパス 18号館ホール

プログラム:

挨拶 木村秀雄(東京大学大学院総合文化研究科副研究科長)

司会 遠藤泰生(東京大学アメリカ太平洋地域研究センター教授)

報告 肥後本芳男(同志社大学言語文化教育研究センター教授)

“The Free and the Unfree in the Slaveholding Republic”

横山 良(神戸大学大学院国際文化学研究科教授)

“Populist Movement and the Color Line”

古矢 旬(東京大学アメリカ太平洋地域研究センター長)

“On American Freedom”

コメント 遠藤泰生

ケネス・ルオフ(Kenneth Ruoff, ポートランド州立大学歴史学部准教授)

総括コメント

エリック・フォーナー(Eric Foner, コロンビア大学歴史学部教授)

主催: 東京大学大学院総合文化研究科附属アメリカ太平洋地域研究センター

共催: 日本学術振興会科学研究費補助金

基盤研究(A)「現代アメリカ・ナショナリズムの複合的編制をめぐる学際的研究」

基盤研究(A)「公共文化の胎動」

東京大学大学院総合文化研究科地域文化研究専攻

助成: アメリカ研究振興会

後援: 岩波書店

〔共催シンポジウム〕

「Divided Memories: History Textbooks and the War in Asia: 東アジアにおける戦争の記憶と歴史教科書」

日時: 2008年10月2日(木) 14:30-18:30

場所: 東京大学駒場キャンパス 18号館ホール

プログラム:

Part 1. Comparative Analysis of High School History Textbooks in China, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and the United States

Gi-Wook Shin (Chair, The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, Stanford University)

“An Overview of Our Project”

Peter Duus (Stanford University)

“The Comparative Analysis of Historical Narratives Presented in the Textbooks of China, Japan and the U.S.”

Jae-Jung Chung (The University of Seoul)

“The Comparative Analysis of Textbooks in South Korea and Japan”

Weike Li (Editor, Peoples Education Press, Beijing)

“On Chinese Textbooks”

Haruo Tohmatsu (Tamagawa University)

“The Comparative Analysis of Japanese Textbooks with Other Textbooks”

Part 2. Textbooks as an International Relations Issue

Daniel Sneider (The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, Stanford University)

“The History of Textbooks as an International Issue and the Different Approaches to Solving It”

Hiroshi Mitani (The University of Tokyo)

“The Personal Experiences with Sino-Japanese and Korean-Japanese Historical Dialogue”

Shinichi Kitaoka (The University of Tokyo, Former ambassador to UN)

“The Experience of Official Joint Committee between Japan and China”

Part 3. General Discussions

Tatsuhiko Tsukiashi (The University of Tokyo, Korean history)

Shin Kawashima (The University of Tokyo, Chinese history)

主催：スタンフォード大学アジア太平洋研究センター

(The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, Stanford University)

共催：東京大学大学院総合文化研究科附属アメリカ太平洋地域研究センター、
東京大学大学院総合文化研究科地域文化研究専攻

III. 研究プロジェクト

- ・日本学術振興会科学研究費補助金・基盤研究（A）「アメリカの世界戦略と文化外交に関する学際的研究」（代表：能登路雅子）
- ・基盤研究（A）「現代アメリカ・ナショナリズムの複合的編制をめぐる学際的研究」（代表：古矢 旬）
- ・基盤研究（A）「公共文化の胎動：建国後の合衆国における植民地社会諸規範の継承と断絶に関する研究」（代表：遠藤泰生）
- ・日本学術振興会人文・社会科学振興プロジェクト「『アメリカ研究』の再編」（代表：古矢 旬）
- ・21世紀COEプログラム「共生のための国際哲学交流センター」への協力

IV. 出版活動

- ・『CPAS Newsletter』Vol. 9, No. 1（2008年9月）、No. 2（2009年3月）
- ・『アメリカ太平洋研究』第9巻（2009年3月）

V. センター所属教員の 2008 年 1 月から 12 月までの研究活動

古矢 旬

〔分担執筆〕

- ・「アメリカの対外介入——歴史的概観」、黒木英充編『「対テロ戦争」の時代の平和構築』東信堂、2008 年 8 月、165-85 頁。

〔その他の執筆〕

- ・「2008 年選挙の歴史的位相」、『外交フォーラム』、No. 237 (2008 年 4 月)、14-19 頁。
- ・対談 (松本礼二)「アメリカ民主主義の原像とは——トクヴィル『アメリカのデモクラシー』新訳をめぐって」『論座』2008 年 9 月号、102-15 頁。
- ・「オバマ次期政権の前途」『読売新聞』、2008 年 11 月 19 日。
- ・インタビュー「米大統領選の行方——多様性のアメリカは復活するか」『世界』2008 年 11 月号、62-72 頁。

〔口頭発表〕

- ・コメント 東京大学大学院総合文化研究科附属アメリカ太平洋地域研究センター公開シンポジウム『アメリカ太平洋とイギリス帝国：The British Empire, Australia and the Americas』、東京大学、2008 年 9 月 13 日。
- ・報告「シヴィック・ナショナリズムと宗教——アメリカ・キリスト教の場合」東京大学大学院総合文化研究科地域文化研究専攻シンポジウム、2008 年 11 月 1 日。

木畑洋一

〔著書〕

- ・『イギリス帝国と帝国主義——比較と関係の視座』有志舎、2008 年 4 月、9+249 頁。

〔編著〕

- ・『日韓 歴史家の誕生』（車河淳と共編）東京大学出版会、2008 年 11 月。
（執筆部分「はじめに 日韓歴史家会議と「歴史家の誕生」」、1-9 頁；「あとがき」211-13 頁）

〔分担執筆〕

- ・「イギリスとバルカン——20 世紀の歴史から」柴宜弘編『バルカン史と歴史教育 「地域史」とアイデンティティの再構築』明石書店、2008 年 3 月、90-99 頁。
- ・「グローバル・ヒストリーと帝国・帝国主義」水島司編『グローバル・ヒストリーの挑戦』山川出版社、2008 年 8 月、91-99 頁。

〔その他の執筆〕

- ・高等学校教科書『新版世界史A』（三好章らと共著）実教出版、2008 年 1 月。
- ・書評「君塚直隆『パクス・ブリタニカのイギリス外交』（有斐閣、2006 年）」『国際政治』151 号、2008 年 3 月、180-83 頁。
- ・書評「紀平英作・油井大三郎編『グローバリゼーションと帝国』（ミネルヴァ書房、2006 年）」『西洋史学』228 号、2008 年 3 月、91-93 頁。
- ・書評「David Day, *Conquest: A New History of the Modern World* (Sydney: HarperCollins, 2005)」『アメリカ太平洋研究』8 号、2008 年 3 月、191-94 頁。

- ・書評「石田憲編『膨張する帝国 拡散する帝国』（東京大学出版会、2007年）」『歴史学研究』840号、2008年5月、55-57頁。
- ・書評「山脇直司『グローバル公共哲学』（東京大学出版会、2008年）」『教養学部報』第513号（2008年7月2日）、3頁。

〔口頭発表〕

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橋川健竜

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（言語情報科学専攻）

（超域文化科学専攻）

（超域文化科学専攻）

（地域文化研究専攻）

（地域文化研究専攻）

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『アメリカ太平洋研究』編集委員会

編集後記

本号も、これまでの号と同様、アメリカ太平洋地域研究センターが秋に開いた公開シンポジウムの記録を、特集として冒頭に置いた構成となっている。公開シンポジウム開催に際しては、アメリカ研究振興会からいつもながらの手厚いご支援をいただいた。また「特集にあたって」でも記したことであるが、2008年度に本センターは、豪日交流基金を通してオーストラリア政府から寄付金をいただいたため、このシンポジウムにオーストラリアからフィリップ・ベル教授をお招きすることができた。本号がそれによって充実した特集を組むことができるようになった点につき、アメリカ研究振興会、豪日交流基金、オーストラリア政府に改めて謝意を表したい。

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また、本号の編集実務全般は、センターの研究機関研究員である宮本文さんが見事にこなして下さった。記して感謝したい。

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